ORDER : 1. The petitioner is at the doors of this Court calling in question proceedings in C.C.No.315 of 2024 pending before the II Additional Civil Judge and JMFC, Hassan arising out of complaint filed under Section 200 of the Cr.P.C., for offences punishable under Sections 2 and 3 of the VAN (Sanrakshan Evan Samvardhan) Adhiniyam, 1980 and under Rule 15 of the Van (Sanrakshan Evam Samvardhan) Rules, 2023 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ and ‘the Rules’ for short). 2. Facts, in brief, germane are as follows:- It is the case of the prosecution that one T.D. Dasegowda, Son of late Dyavegowda submits an application under the Right to Information Act to the Public Information Officer and the Tahsildar seeking certain documents including copies of mutation, orders of higher authorities and other Court orders relating to recording the land as forest, of a particular property situated in Sy. No.22 measuring 61 acres and 32 guntas located in Tyavalli Village, Shanthigrama Hobli, Hassan Taluk. The Tahsildar issues an endorsement on 28-10-2020 conveying that the documents requested by the applicant with respect to entry of Forest in the record of rights of the aforesaid property was not available in the office records. The applicant, under the RTI Act, then takes recourse to filing an appeal before the petitioner under Sections 24 and 49 of the Right to Information Act and Section 136(2) of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 . 3. In the said appeal, it was the case of T.D. Dasegowda that an inadvertent entry of word ‘forest’ in the record of rights in relation to Sy.No.22 had crept in and sought restoration of the RTC entry as ‘Sarkari Gomala’. The said appeal was registered as R.A.No.296 of 2020-21. The petitioner, in the discharge of his duties as Assistant Commissioner, hears of the matter from 23-07-2021 to 17-12-2021, affords opportunity to both the Tahsildar and the applicant and on perusal of relevant documents observed that Forest Department has failed to provide any document demonstrating the classification of the land in question as a forest land, except presenting particular record of rights. On the said examination of documents and consideration of arguments presented, the petitioner passes an order on 5-01-2022 directing restoration of the entry in the record of rights as Sarkari Gomala. On the said examination of documents and consideration of arguments presented, the petitioner passes an order on 5-01-2022 directing restoration of the entry in the record of rights as Sarkari Gomala. The petitioner further observes that it was open to the Forest Department to pursue transfer of title in its name by making appropriate proposal before the Deputy Commissioner as restoration was only as Sarkari Gomala. 4. The Forest Department, claiming to be aggrieved by the order of the petitioner, passed under Section 136(2) of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act prefers a revision petition before the Deputy Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner on 26-09-2023 remands the matter back to the Assistant Commissioner for hearing afresh, on the reasons so rendered in the said order. The Deputy Commissioner further directed that the Assistant Commissioner should conclude the hearing of the matter within six months. 5. When things stood thus, the Forest Department registers a private complaint against the petitioner for violation of the provisions of the Act and the Rules. The allegation is that the petitioner while passing the order in R.A.No.296 of 2020-21 has favoured individual’s interest over public interest and has passed the order against the respondent/Forest Department. The concerned Court takes cognizance of the offence against the petitioner and registers C.C.No.315 of 2024. Registration of criminal case and issuance of summons has driven the petitioner to this Court in the subject petition. 6. Heard Sri Sandeep Patil, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Sri B.N. Jagadeesha, learned Additional State Public Prosecutor for the respondent. 7. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would vehemently contend that the petitioner passes the order on 05-01-2022 in R.A.No.296 of 2020-21. The Forest Department files the appeal. The Deputy Commissioner remits the matter back to the Assistant Commissioner for hearing afresh, at which point in time the petitioner was not the Assistant Commissioner. The allegation in the complaint is that the petitioner has passed the order on 05-01-2022 contrary to several judgments of the Supreme Court. The crime is registered, as observed hereinabove, by filing a private complaint on 27-01-2024. The learned counsel would contend that the punishment imposable for violation of Sections 2 and 3 of the Act r/w Rule 15 of the Rules is 6 months. If punishment that can be imposable is 6 months, the complaint could not have been registered after a delay of 2 years. The learned counsel would contend that the punishment imposable for violation of Sections 2 and 3 of the Act r/w Rule 15 of the Rules is 6 months. If punishment that can be imposable is 6 months, the complaint could not have been registered after a delay of 2 years. He would submit that it is hit by Section 468 of the Cr.P.C. 7.1. Apart from the aforesaid submissions, the learned counsel would submit that the petitioner has performed his duties as Assistant Commissioner under Section 136 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act. These are quasi-judicial functions against which an appeal/revision was available before the Deputy Commissioner. The Forest Department files a revision before the Deputy Commissioner. The Deputy Commissioner considers it and remits the matter back. He would submit that this cannot become a subject matter of crime, as performance of quasi-judicial function cannot become a crime, unless mens rea pervades the said action. He would further contend that the concerned Court could not have taken cognizance of the offence without sanction for prosecution being placed before it, as the petitioner is a public servant and has performed his duties as a public servant. On all these grounds, the learned counsel would seek quashment of the proceedings. 8. Per contra, the learned Additional State Public Prosecutor would put up vehement objections to the quashment of proceedings by taking this Court through the documents appended to the statement of objections to contend that once a forest it is always a forest. When the RTC was clearly indicating that it was a forest land, the petitioner ought not to have held as Sarkari Gomala, since RTC extracts produced before the petitioner when he decided the matter, the trees grown were Bamboo, Honne and Tapsi, which is indicative of the fact that it is a forest land. He would submit that the petitioner being a public servant could not have acted contrary to law and observed that the land is a Sarkari Gomala. The learned Additional State Public Prosecutor would submit that sanction to prosecute is accorded by the Competent Authority on 13-06-2024. Therefore, he would submit that the proceedings should be permitted to be continued. 9. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the respective learned counsel and have perused the material on record. 10. The learned Additional State Public Prosecutor would submit that sanction to prosecute is accorded by the Competent Authority on 13-06-2024. Therefore, he would submit that the proceedings should be permitted to be continued. 9. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the respective learned counsel and have perused the material on record. 10. The functioning of the petitioner, as Assistant Commissioner at the relevant point in time, is a matter of record. An appeal being preferred before him in R.A.No.296 of 2020-21 is again a matter of record. The petitioner holds proceedings for about 4 months, hears the parties, analyses the documents and holds that the only access route to the agricultural land in Sy.No.22 was being used in grazing cattle. Therefore, on those documents, the land was observed to be a Sarkari Gomala. The Forest Department gets touchy, contending that once a forest always a forest, prefers an appeal/revision before the Deputy Commissioner. The Deputy Commissioner allows the revision and remands the matter back to the Assistant Commissioner for hearing afresh, as the contention was appropriate opportunity was not afforded to the Forest Department to make its case. The relevant order of the Deputy Commissioner reads as follows: The Deputy Commissioner further directs the proceedings to be concluded within 6 months from the date of remand. What is discernible from the aforesaid proceedings is, that the petitioner in the capacity of Assistant Commissioner, under the provisions of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, has held and ordered in the proceedings as a quasi-judicial Authority. He has not restored the entry to any private party, but noticing the fact that the land was used for cattle grazing for ages passes the following order: "Even though the land was under the physical control of the Forest Department, in the absence of an order by the State Government under section 3 of the Forest Act and notification under section 4 of the Act, the legal position is that the land continues to be under the control of the Revenue Dept governed by the Karnataka Land Revenue Act" The order, cannot but be said to be in exercise of quasi-judicial function. The Deputy Commissioner has now set aside and remitted the matter back to the hands of the Assistant Commissioner, for consideration afresh. The said consideration is said to be pending even as on date. 11. The Deputy Commissioner has now set aside and remitted the matter back to the hands of the Assistant Commissioner, for consideration afresh. The said consideration is said to be pending even as on date. 11. What shocks is the action of the Forest Department. The Forest Department registers a private complaint before the jurisdictional Magistrate invoking Rule 15 of the Rules for offences punishable under Sections 3A and 3B of the Act. Sections 3A and 3B of the Act read as follows: “ 3-A. Penalty for contravention of the provisions of the Act .—Whoever contravenes or abets the contravention of any of the provisions of Section 2, shall be punishable with simple imprisonment for a period which may extend to fifteen days. 3-B. Offences by authorities and Government departments .— (1) Where any offence under this Act has been committed— (a) by any department of Government, the head of the department; or (b) by any authority, every person who, at the time the offence was committed, was directly in charge of, and was responsible to, the authority for the conduct of the business of the authority as well as the authority, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly: Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render the head of the department or any person referred to in clause (b), liable to any punishment if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where an offence punishable under the Act has been committed by a department of Government or any authority referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1) and it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to any neglect on the part of, any officer, other than the head of the department, or in the case of an authority, any person other than the persons referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1), such officer or persons shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.” Section 3A punishes a person who contravenes or abets any of the provisions of Section 2 with imprisonment which may extend upto 15 days . Section 3B deals with offence by Authorities and Government Departments. Any offence committed under the Act by any Authority, every person who at the time of offence committed was directly responsible for conduct of the said offence would become open for punishment for 15 days of imprisonment. 12. Admittedly, the date on which the petitioner has passed the order is 05-01-2022 . The said order forms the fulcrum of the entire complaint. The complaint is registered on 27-01-2024 , two years after the petitioner passing the order. The bar under Section 468 of the Cr.P.C., would kick in. Section 468 reads as follows:- “ 468. Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation .— (1) Except as otherwise provided elsewhere in this Code, no Court shall take cognizance of an offence of the category specified in sub-section (2), after the expiry of the period of limitation. (2) The period of limitation shall be— ( a ) six months, if the offence is punishable with fine only; ( b ) one year, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year; (c) three years, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years. (2) The period of limitation shall be— ( a ) six months, if the offence is punishable with fine only; ( b ) one year, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year; (c) three years, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years. (3) For the purposes of this section, the period of limitation, in relation to offences which may be tried together, shall be determined with reference to the offence which is punishable with the more severe punishment or, as the case may be, the most severe punishment.” (Emphasis supplied) Section 468 deals with power to take cognizance after the period of limitation. The period of limitation would be 6 months ,if the offence is punishable with fine only; would be one year, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year. It is settled principle of law, that it is not the date on which cognizance is taken by the Court that becomes important for computation of limitation, under Section 468 of the Cr.P.C, it is the date on which the complaint is registered. The offence in the case at hand, is punishable with imprisonment for 15 days and fine. The maximum period of limitation thus, would be six months. The complaint is registered after 2 years of passing the order. Therefore, the registration of complaint is on the face of it, beyond limitation. 13. A Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in the case of Sarah Mathew v. Institute of Cardio Vacular Diseases, (2014) 2 SCC 62 has elaborately delineated the concept of limitation under Section 468 of the Cr.P.C. as follows: “…. …. …. 47. So far as the “heading” of the chapter is concerned, it is well settled that “heading” or “title” prefixed to sections or group of sections have a limited role to play in the construction of statutes. They may be taken as very broad and general indicators or the nature of the subject-matter dealt with thereunder but they do not control the meaning of the sections if the meaning is otherwise ascertainable by reading the section in proper perspective along with other provisions. They may be taken as very broad and general indicators or the nature of the subject-matter dealt with thereunder but they do not control the meaning of the sections if the meaning is otherwise ascertainable by reading the section in proper perspective along with other provisions. In Frick India Ltd. v. Union of India, (1990) 1 SCC 400 : 1990 SCC (Tax) 185, this Court has observed as under : (SCC p. 405, para 8) “8. It is well settled that the headings prefixed to sections or entries cannot control the plain words of the provision; they cannot also be referred to for the purpose of construing the provision when the words used in the provision are clear and unambiguous; nor can they be used for cutting down the plain meaning of the words in the provision. Only, in the case of ambiguity or doubt the heading or sub-heading may be referred to as an aid in construing the provision but even in such a case it could not be used for cutting down the wide application of the clear words used in the provision.” 48. Therefore, the submission that heading of Chapter XXXVI is an indicator that the date of taking cognizance is material, must be rejected. 49. It is true that penal statutes must be strictly construed. There are, however, cases where this Court has having regard to the nature of the crimes involved, refused to adopt any narrow and pedantic, literal and lexical construction of penal statutes. (See Murlidhar Meghraj Loya v. State of Maharashtra, (1976) 3 SCC 684 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 493 and Kisan Trimbak Kothula v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 1 SCC 300 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 97) In this case, looking to the legislative intent, we have harmoniously construed the provisions of Chapter XXXVI so as to strike a balance between the right of the complainant and the right of the accused. Besides, we must bear in mind that Chapter XXXVI is part of the Criminal Procedure Code , which is a procedural law and it is well settled that procedural laws must be liberally construed to serve as handmaid of justice and not as its mistress. (See: Sardar Amarjit Singh Kalra v. Pramod Gupta, (2003) 3 SCC 272 , N. Balaji v. Virendra Singh, (2004) 8 SCC 312 and Kailash v. Nanhku, (2005) 4 SCC 480 ) Conclusion 50. (See: Sardar Amarjit Singh Kalra v. Pramod Gupta, (2003) 3 SCC 272 , N. Balaji v. Virendra Singh, (2004) 8 SCC 312 and Kailash v. Nanhku, (2005) 4 SCC 480 ) Conclusion 50. Having considered the questions which arise in this reference in the light of legislative intent, authoritative pronouncements of this Court and established legal principles, we are of the opinion that Krishna Pillai v. T.A. Rajendran , 1990 Supp SCC 121 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 646 will have to be restricted to its own facts and it is not the authority for deciding the question as to what is the relevant date for the purpose of computing the period of limitation under Section 468 CrPC, primarily because in that case, this Court was dealing with Section 9 of the Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929 which is a special Act. It specifically stated that no court shall take cognizance of any offence under the said Act after the expiry of one year from the date on which offence is alleged to have been committed. There is no reference either to Section 468 or Section 473 CrPC in that judgment. It does not refer to Sections 4 and 5 CrPC which carve out exceptions for the special Acts. This Court has not adverted to diverse aspects including the aspect that inaction on the part of the court in taking cognizance within limitation, though the complaint is filed within time may work great injustice on the complainant. Moreover, reliance placed on Antulay ‘1984’ case [A.R. Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak, (1984) 2 SCC 500 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 277], in our opinion, was not apt. In Antulay ‘1984’ case [A.R. Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak, (1984) 2 SCC 500 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 277] this Court was dealing inter alia with the contention that a private complaint is not maintainable in the Court of the Special Judge set up under Section 6 of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952 (“the 1952 Act”). It was urged that the object underlying the 1952 Act was to provide for a more speedy trial of offences of corruption by a public servant. It was argued that if it is assumed that a private complaint is maintainable then before taking cognizance, a Special Judge will have to examine the complainant and all the witnesses as per Section 200 CrPC. It was argued that if it is assumed that a private complaint is maintainable then before taking cognizance, a Special Judge will have to examine the complainant and all the witnesses as per Section 200 CrPC. He will have to postpone issue of process against the accused and either inquire into the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by a police officer and in cases under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 by police officers of designated rank for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding. It was submitted that this would thwart the object of the 1952 Act which is to provide for a speedy trial. This contention was rejected by this Court holding that it is not a condition precedent to the issue of process that the court of necessity must hold the inquiry as envisaged by Section 202 CrPC or direct investigation as therein contemplated. That is matter of discretion of the court. Thus, the questions which arise in this reference were not involved in Antulay ‘1984’ case [A.R. Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak, (1984) 2 SCC 500 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 277] : since there, this Court was not dealing with the question of bar of limitation reflected in Section 468 CrPC at all, in our opinion, the said judgment could not have been usefully referred to in [ Krishna Pillai v. T.A. Rajendran , 1990 Supp SCC 121 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 646] while construing provisions of Chapter XXXVI CrPC. For all these reasons, we are unable to endorse the view taken in [ Krishna Pillai v. T.A. Rajendran , 1990 Supp SCC 121 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 646]. 51. In view of the above, we hold that for the purpose of computing the period of limitation under Section 468 CrPC the relevant date is the date of filing of the complaint or the date of institution of prosecution and not the date on which the Magistrate takes cognizance. We further hold that [ Bharat Damodar Kale v. State of A.P. , (2003) 8 SCC 559 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 39] which is followed in [ Japani Sahoo v. Chandra Sekhar Mohanty , (2007) 7 SCC 394 : (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 388] lays down the correct law. We further hold that [ Bharat Damodar Kale v. State of A.P. , (2003) 8 SCC 559 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 39] which is followed in [ Japani Sahoo v. Chandra Sekhar Mohanty , (2007) 7 SCC 394 : (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 388] lays down the correct law. [ Krishna Pillai v. T.A. Rajendran , 1990 Supp SCC 121 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 646] will have to be restricted to its own facts and it is not the authority for deciding the question as to what is the relevant date for the purpose of computing the period of limitation under Section 468 CrPC. 52. The reference is answered accordingly. The Registry may list the matters before the appropriate courts for disposal.” (Emphasis supplied) In the light of the offence being punishable with 15 days and the law being unequivocal, the complaint lodged after two years is hopelessly barred by limitation. Therefore, the complaint ought not to have been entertained. 14. Over and above the aforesaid finding, what shocks the conscience of the Court is that the Forest Department registering a crime for the performance of the petitioner’s quasi-judicial functions. As an Assistant Commissioner, looking into the records, he has passed an order, not bartering away the forest land to private entity, but observing it as a Sarkari Gomala. Appeal is a remedy which is exercised by the Forest Department. After having filed an appeal and secured an order of remand to consider the issue afresh, it did not lie with the Forest Department to register a crime against the petitioner for having performed his quasi-judicial functions, unless it is found the exercise of such function is laced with criminality and foundationed on mens rea. In the light of the preceding analysis, if further proceedings are permitted to continue, it would result in miscarriage of justice and become an abuse of the process of the law. 15. For the aforesaid reasons, the following: ORDER : (i) Criminal Petition is allowed. (ii) Proceeding in C.C.No.315 of 2024 arising out P.C.R.No.105 of 2024 pending before the II Additional Civil Judge & JMFC, Hassan stands quashed.