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2025 DIGILAW 833 (SC)

Lucky Kumar (Since Deceased) Represented Through Legal Heirs v. Majinder Singh

2025-03-25

PANKAJ MITHAL, S.V.N.BHATTI

body2025
ORDER : 1. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. Under challenge in this petition are the judgment and order dated 18.05.2022 passed by the High Court and that passed by the Rent Controller, Amritsar dated 04.02.2019 in a civil suit for eviction of the petitioners/tenants. 3. The facts in brief are that the petitioners are Non Resident Indians who were living in Germany. They are the co-owners of the property forming part of Khasra No.926 min, situated at area Abadi kataria, Court Road, Near Rialto Cinema, Amritsar. The said property includes the shop in dispute i.e. Shop No.12 which forms part of the demised premises. The said property was purchased by the petitioners under different sale deeds for the reason that the different portions of the said property were owned by different persons. 4. The petitioners invoked the provisions of Section 13-B of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 [Hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'.] to get the aforementioned shop vacated from the petitioners/tenants. The rent controller by the order dated 04.02.2019 had allowed the aforesaid petition and the revision against the same has been dismissed by the High Court confirming the order of eviction. 5. The submission of learned counsel for the petitioners is that the need of the respondent-landlord for the shop in dispute is not a bona fide one and that he has applied for vacation of different properties and as such, has exhausted his right to seek eviction of the petitioners from the shop in dispute in terms of Section 13-B of the Act. 6. It is an admitted fact that the respondent-landlord does not possess any other property other than the property in question that is part of Khasra No. 926 min, which may contain several shops wherein different tenants exist. He has only applied for the vacation of the various shops from the tenancy of different tenants forming part of the same building for the bona fide need of establishing himself in a hotel/restaurant business for which the entire property as a whole is genuinely required by him. 7. The submission of learned counsel for the petitioners is that the respondent-landlord has purchased more than thirty properties by separate sale deeds and that once he has applied for vacation of one of the properties, he cannot maintain any further petition under Section 13-B of the Act. 7. The submission of learned counsel for the petitioners is that the respondent-landlord has purchased more than thirty properties by separate sale deeds and that once he has applied for vacation of one of the properties, he cannot maintain any further petition under Section 13-B of the Act. This aspect was well considered by the High Court and it was opined that if various portions of the same property/building are purchased by the respondent-landlord by different sale deeds for the reason that they were owned by different persons and if he applies for vacation of the same, it will constitute seeking eviction of the various tenants from the same property/building and would not constitute making an application in respect of a different property. 8. In the case of Swami Nath Vs. Nirmal Singh: (2010) 9 SCC 452 , a similar argument in connection with the aforesaid Act itself came to be considered and the Court held that if the interpretation advanced by the tenant is accepted, it will be lead to absurdity. This Court placing reliance upon an earlier decision observed as under: 13. Reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in Baldev Singh Bajwa v. Monish Saini where the same question had come up for consideration and it was observed that on a plain reading of the provisions of Section 13-B, it would be obvious that once in a life-time possession is given to an NRI to get one building vacated in a summary manner. It was also submitted that the ownership of the Respondent/landlord in respect of only one building had not been disputed by the Petitioners and the only contention that was raised on their behalf was that each separate tenancy in a building would amount to a separate unit and after exhausting the right of summary possession once, it was no longer available to the NRI landlord to exercise such an option for the second time to a particular building, which contention had been negated by the Courts below. 14. We have carefully considered the submissions made on behalf of the respective parties and we are unable to agree with the submissions made on behalf of the Petitioners. 14. We have carefully considered the submissions made on behalf of the respective parties and we are unable to agree with the submissions made on behalf of the Petitioners. The interpretation sought to be given to the proviso to Section 13-B(1) of the 1949 Act would lead to an absurd situation which was not contemplated by the legislature while introducing the provisions of Section 13-B by way of amendment in 2001. The very object of the amendment would be frustrated if the narrow and constricted meaning being canvassed on behalf of the petitioners is to be accepted.' 9. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances and the case law on the subject, we are not inclined to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners and hold that the respondent-landlord has applied for the vacation of one residential building alone may be against the different tenants in the same building and as such, is not de-barred from maintaining this application under Section 13-B of the Act and that his need in respect of the said shop is genuine and bona fide. 10. The present petition stands dismissed in the above terms. 11. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.