ORDER : A. Hari Haranadha Sarma, J. This Writ Petition is filed invoking Article 226 of the Constitution of India with a prayer to issue Writ, Order or direction more particularly in the nature of Writ of Mandamus by declaring the action of the respondents in not implementing the order passed by the erstwhile Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal [for short referred as 'APAT' or 'Tribunal'] in O.A.No.8678 of 2011, dated 08.11.2011 counting the daily wage service from the date of completion of five years in calculating the qualifying service for fixation of pensionary benefits as illegal, arbitrary and violative of principles of natural justice and consequently direct the respondents to implement the orders of APAT dated 08.11.2011 passed in O.A.No.8678 of 2011. 2. The writ petitioners herein are the applicants before the erstwhile APAT. Factual matrix and sequence of events : 3. [i]. Extending the benefit of G.O.Ms.No.212, Finance (PC.III) Department dated 22.04.1994, the services of applicants were regularized with effect from 24.12.2010. The contention of the applicants is that they rendered service on a daily wage basis and their services are to be regularized either with effect from 25.11.1993 or from the date of completion of five years of service, they put in as daily wage basis and such calculation of qualifying the service shall be taken into account for fixing the pension etc. benefits. The applicants also prayed for holding G.O.Rt.No.1472 MA&UD dated 24.12.2010 as illegal, arbitrary in not granting the seniority on daily wage service with all attendant benefits. [ii] When the matter came up for hearing, the erstwhile APAT taken note of OA.No.8095 of 2008 and the orders therein, and allowed the OA.No.8678 of 2011 of the petitioners on 08.11.201, in tune with the orders passed in OA.No.8095 of 2008, observing that the applicants are entitled for regularization of services in terms of G.O.Ms.No.212, and they are entitled for notional fixation of pay, while directing the orders passed in O.A.No.8095 of 2008 dated 19.01.2011 shall be annexed to the orders in O.A.No.8678 of 2011 dated 08.11.2011, which suggests that the orders in O.A.No.8095 of 2008 are part and the basis for the orders now sought to be implemented. Contention of the Writ Petitioners: 4. [i] They are entitled for the benefit of G.O.Ms.No.212, dated 22.4.1994. Contention of the Writ Petitioners: 4. [i] They are entitled for the benefit of G.O.Ms.No.212, dated 22.4.1994. [ii] Their services were regularized vide G.O.Rt.No.1472 MA&UD, dated 24.12.2010 prospectively from the date of issuing of orders, without granting seniority from the date of completion of five years. [iii] O.A.No.8678 of 2011 filed was allowed, and they received orders in the third week of November. They are continuously approaching the respondents. [iv] They got issued a legal notice dated 01.04.2016. [v] The orders in O.A.No.8678 of 2011 became final. Therefore, they shall be implemented. Contention of the Respondents:- 5. [i] G.O.Rt.No.1472, MA&UD dated 24.12.2010 was issued in terms of G.O.Ms.No.212, dated 22.04.1994, with prospective effect and the Minimum Time Scale was given to the petitioners in the year 2009. G.O.Rt.No.1471, dated 24.12.2010 was issued and regularization proceedings were issued vide RC.No.4066 of 2010, dated 07.01.2011, regularizing the service of the applicants against the clear vacancies of Public Health Workers with prospective effect. [ii] OA.No.8678 of 2011 filed by the applicants was allowed on 08.11.2011 in terms of the orders of OA.No.8095 of 2008 dated 19.01.2011, directing the regularization of applicants' services and for notional fixation of pay. [iii] The applicants did not take any steps for enforcement of the orders of the APAT in OA.No.8678 of 2011, dated 08.11.2011 for nearly seven years. There is inordinate delay. Enforcement shall be sought within one year and the Writ Petition ought to be dismissed on the ground of latches as it is more than three (03) years after the orders passed in the said O.A. [iv] The orders in OA.8678 OF 2011, dated 08.11.2011 are passed by the Tribunal in terms of the orders in OA.No.8095 of 2008, dated 19.01.2011, whereas, the orders in O.A.No.8095 of 2008, dated 19.01.2011, when questioned were stayed on 23.09.2011 in W.P.No.26665 of 2011, prior to the orders passed in OA.No.8678 of 2011. Subsequently, W.P.No.26665 of 2011 was allowed, whereby the orders in O.A.No.8095 of 2008 which are the basis to pass orders in O.A.No.8678 of 2011 does not subsist. Hence, the orders in O.A.No.8678 of 2011 dated 08.11.2011 now sought to be implemented cannot be enforced. Hence, the present Writ Petition is liable to be dismissed. 6. Heard both sides extensively. Arguments for the writ petitioners: 7. [i] The orders in O.A.No.8678 of 2011 became final as they are not questioned. Hence, the orders in O.A.No.8678 of 2011 dated 08.11.2011 now sought to be implemented cannot be enforced. Hence, the present Writ Petition is liable to be dismissed. 6. Heard both sides extensively. Arguments for the writ petitioners: 7. [i] The orders in O.A.No.8678 of 2011 became final as they are not questioned. [ii] The APAT for enforcing the orders is not in existence. Therefore, for the relief of implementation, the present Writ Petition is came to be filed. [iii] There is continuous cause of action, in view of the liability on the respondents, to implement the orders. [iv] The petitioners got issued legal notice in the year 2016 demanding compliance of the orders, which suggest that they are pursuing the relief and hence, delay and latches cannot be attributed to them. Arguments for the Respondents: 8. [i] The basis for the orders dated 08.11.2011 passed in O.A.No.8678 of 2011 viz. the orders in O.A.No.8095 of 2008, were challenged in W.P.No.26665 of 2011 and the Hon’ble erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh allowed the said Writ Petition and same has attained the finality. Therefore, the petitioners cannot enforce the orders. [ii] Learned counsel for the respondents, by relying on some authorities, submitted that in view of delay and latches on the part of petitioners the present Writ Petition is liable to be dismissed. Analysis and Findings: Precedents: 9. [i]. In Mohammed Yakub Ali Vs. State of Telangana and Ors., 2016 3 ALD 251 : 2015 LAW Suit(Hyd) 507 vide para 13 and 14 of the judgment, the Hon’ble Division Bench of the Common High Court of Andhra Pradesh referred to exercise of discretion in entertaining the Writ Petition, where the orders in O.A. of the Tribunal were belatedly questioned by way of Writ Petition. It is observed by the Division Bench that though no period of limitation is prescribed in Writ Petition under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution, but the same shall be liable to be instituted within a reasonable time and proximate period of one year. At any rate, a period of three years is a reasonable period for anyone to ventilate one’s grievance, legal rights, which can be found the spirit behind the Limitation Act. [ii] In Y. Yadaiah vs. APSRTC, Rep. At any rate, a period of three years is a reasonable period for anyone to ventilate one’s grievance, legal rights, which can be found the spirit behind the Limitation Act. [ii] In Y. Yadaiah vs. APSRTC, Rep. by its Regional Manager, 2017 LawSuit(Hyd) 126: 2017(3) ALT 590 : 2017(3) ALD 657 vide Para 7, its observed that although no period of limitation is prescribed, one cannot knock the doors of the Court, whenever he feels convenient for him, and where the petitioner was a deep slumber for twenty years, the Court declines to exercise the discretion. [iii] In B.R.Chandraiah Vs. the Industrial Tribunal Cum-Labour Court, Ananthapur, Ananthapur District, rep. by Its Presiding Officer and Anr. , [2017 LawSuit(Hyd)484: 2018(1) ALD 401 ] , it is observed at para 4 that 10 years delay was found as abnormal. [iv] In Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board and Ors. vs. T.T. Murali Babu , [ 2014 4 SCC 108 ] vide para 16, it is observed in a case of four years of delay that the writ petition ought to have been thrown out. Paras 16 and 17 of the judgments read as follows: “16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the court would be under legal obligation to scrutinise whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant — a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, “procrastination is the greatest thief of time” and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis. 17. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant — a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, “procrastination is the greatest thief of time” and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis. 17. In the case at hand, though there has been four years' delay in approaching the court, yet the writ court chose not to address the same. It is the duty of the court to scrutinise whether such enormous delay is to be ignored without any justification. That apart, in the present case, such belated approach gains more significance as the respondent employee being absolutely careless to his duty and nurturing a lackadaisical attitude to the responsibility had remained unauthorisedly absent on the pretext of some kind of ill health. We repeat at the cost of repetition that remaining innocuously oblivious to such delay does not foster the cause of justice. On the contrary, it brings in injustice, for it is likely to affect others. Such delay may have impact on others' ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag others into litigation which in acceptable realm of probability, may have been treated to have attained finality. A court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons — who compete with “Kumbhakarna” or for that matter “Rip Van Winkle”. In our considered opinion, such delay does not deserve any indulgence and on the said ground alone the writ court should have thrown the petition overboard at the very threshold.” [v] In P.V. Narayana and Ors. etc., vs. APSRTC and Ors. Etc.,  2013 SCC OnLine AP 729 : 2013 Lawsuit (AP)2010 : 2013 (3) ALT 711 711 while referring to the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court, it is observed that relevant considerations to be taken into account in determining the delay and latches, which are summarized in para 51, which reads as follows: “ 51. etc., vs. APSRTC and Ors. Etc.,  2013 SCC OnLine AP 729 : 2013 Lawsuit (AP)2010 : 2013 (3) ALT 711 711 while referring to the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court, it is observed that relevant considerations to be taken into account in determining the delay and latches, which are summarized in para 51, which reads as follows: “ 51. On the basis of the decisions of the Supreme Court referred to above, the relevant considerations that may be taken into account in determining the issue of delay and laches may be summarized thus: (1) Though no period of limitation is prescribed for the writ Courts to exercise their powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or to file a writ petition, a person aggrieved should approach the Court without loss of time. In appropriate cases, where there is delay and the same has properly been explained with cogent reasons, Court may condone the delay as an exception to meet the ends of justice. But, it would be a sound and wise exercise of discretion for the Courts to refuse to exercise their extraordinary powers under Article 226 in the case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously for relief and who stand by and allow things to happen and then approach the Court to put forward stale claims and try to unsettle settled matters. (2) Courts have evolved rules of self-imposed restraints or fetters where the High Court may hot enquire into belated or stale claim and deny relief to a party if he is found guilty of laches. One who is tardy, not vigilant and does not seek intervention of the Court within a reasonable time from the date of accrual of cause of action or alleged violation of the constitutional, legal or other right, is not entitled to relief under Article 226. (3) No hard and fast rule can be laid down for universal application and every case shall have to be decided on its own facts. (4) There is no inviolable rule of law that whenever there is a delay, the Court must necessarily refuse to entertain the petition; it is a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion, and each case must be dealt with on its own facts. (4) There is no inviolable rule of law that whenever there is a delay, the Court must necessarily refuse to entertain the petition; it is a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion, and each case must be dealt with on its own facts. (5) There is no lower limit or upper limit and it will all depend on what the breach of the fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and how the delay arose. (6) The principle on which the Court refuses relief on the ground of laches or delay is that the rights accrued to others by the delay in filing the petition should not be disturbed, unless there is a reasonable explanation for the delay, because Court should not harm innocent parties if their rights had emerged by the delay on the part of the petitioners. (7) Where there is remiss or negligence on the part of a party approaching the Court for relief after an inordinate and unexplained delay, in such cases, it would not be proper to enforce the fundamental right As a general rule if there has been unreasonable delay the Court ought not ordinarily to lend its aid to a party in exercise of the extraordinary power of mandamus. (8) There is no waiver of fundamental right But while exercising discretionary jurisdiction Court can take into account delay and laches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ Court. (9) Though the High Court in exercise of the power under Article 226 in its discretion grant relief in cases where the fundamental rights are violated, but, in such cases also, High Court, to meet the ends of justice, shall refuse to exercise its high prerogative jurisdiction in favour of a party who has been guilty of laches and where there are other relevant circumstances which indicate that it would be inappropriate to exercise the discretionary jurisdiction. (10) The maximum period fixed by the Legislature as the time within which the relief by a suit in a civil Court must be brought may ordinarily taken to be a reasonable standard by which delay in seeking remedy under Article 226 can be measured. (10) The maximum period fixed by the Legislature as the time within which the relief by a suit in a civil Court must be brought may ordinarily taken to be a reasonable standard by which delay in seeking remedy under Article 226 can be measured. (11) If a person entitled to a relief chooses to remain silent for long, he thereby gives rise to a reasonable belief in the mind of others that he is not interested in claiming that relief. Courts have applied the rule of delay with greater rigor in service matters. (12) The benefit of a judgment cannot be extended to a case automatically. The Court is entitled to take into consideration the fact as to whether the petitioner had chosen to sit over the matter and wake up after the decision of the Court If it is found that the petitioner approached the Court with unreasonable delay, the same may disentitle him to obtain a discretionary relief. Long Delay disentitles a party to the discretionary relief under Articles 32 and 226 and persons who had slept over their rights for long and elected to wake up when they had the impetus from the judgment of similarly placed persons. (13) Where during the intervening period rights of third parties have crystallized, it would be inequitable to disturb those rights at the instance of a person who has approached the Court after long lapse of time and where there is no cogent explanation for the delay. (14) Where the appellate authority acting within its jurisdiction condoned the delay after being satisfied with the facts stated in relation thereto, the High Court in exercise of its powers under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution should not ordinarily interfere with the order.” [vi] The Hon’ble Apex Court in Mahendra Singh Bisht vs. Union Of India And Others , [ 2012 (1) SCC 273 ] vide para 26 observed as follows: 26. It is also of some relevance to note that disobedience of court orders by positive or active contribution or non-obedience by a passive and dormant conduct leads to the same result. Disobedience of orders of the court strikes at the very root of the rule of law on which the judicial system rests. The rule of law is the foundation of a democratic society. Judiciary is the guardian of the rule of law. Disobedience of orders of the court strikes at the very root of the rule of law on which the judicial system rests. The rule of law is the foundation of a democratic society. Judiciary is the guardian of the rule of law. If the judiciary is to perform its duties and functions effectively and remain true to the spirit with which they are sacredly entrusted, the dignity and authority of the courts have to be respected and protected at all costs (refer T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad case [T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad (102) v. Ashok Khot, (2006) 5 SCC 1 ] , SCC p. 6, para 5). The proceedings before the highest court of the land in a public interest litigation, attain even more significance. These are the cases which come up for hearing before the court on a grievance raised by the public at large or public-spirited persons. The State itself places matters before the Court for determination which would fall, statutorily or otherwise, in the domain of the executive authority. MERITS: 10. [i] The orders in O.A.No.8678 of 2011 are not on merits and they are simply with reference to orders in O.A.No.8095 of 2008, which is the subject matter of W.P.No.26665 of 2011. The orders in W.P.No.26665 of 2011, dated 23.09.2011 are in respect of O.A.No.8095 of 2008 allowing of the Writ Petition, setting aside orders in O.A.No.8095 of 2008, whereby the basis for Orders in O.A.No.8678 of 2011 is not there. [ii] The Tribunal has not gone into the merits in O.A.No.8678 of 2011, but on the ground of covered matter viz., Orders in O.A.No.8095 of 2008, passed the orders in O.A.No.8678 of 2011 now sought to be implemented. [iii] It is not the case of the respondents that subsequent to allowing of Writ Petition i.e., W.P.No.26665 of 2011 and on setting aside the orders in O.A.No.8095 of 2008, they have moved any Writ Petition challenging the orders passed in the said O.A. No.8678 of 2011 now sought to be implemented. But, now the respondents are seriously raising the objection for implementation of the orders passed in the application filed by the petitioners in O.A.8678 of 2011. [iv] The petitioners herein who are successful in O.A.No.8678 of 2011 cannot have any chance to seek setting aside the order in W.P.No.26665 of 2011 wherein Orders passed in O.A.No.8095 of 2008 are set aside. [iv] The petitioners herein who are successful in O.A.No.8678 of 2011 cannot have any chance to seek setting aside the order in W.P.No.26665 of 2011 wherein Orders passed in O.A.No.8095 of 2008 are set aside. The chance, if any to question the orders now sought to be implemented is with the respondents but not for the petitioners. [v] One way there are latches on the part of the petitioners in approaching this Court with abnormal delay of around seven years. On the other side, there is a failure equally on the part of the respondents in not questioning the orders passed in O.A.No.8678 of 2011 by way of Writ Petition, initially or at least after allowing of W.P.No.26665 of 2011 for not implementing the orders. [vi] The respondents are under the impression that since the orders in O.A.No.8095 of 2008 are not there, the orders in O.A.No.8678 of 2011 will automatically disappear and become nonest. [vii] The petitioners did not put in any serious efforts for implementation by approaching the Tribunal during its existence. [viii] The spine and basis for orders in O.A.No.8678 of 2011 vide the orders in O.A.No.8095 of 2008 are set-aside in W.P.No.26665 of 2011. [ix] Comparative merits in both the cases viz., in O.A.No.8095 of 2008 and O.A.No.8678 of 2011, discussion and conclusions thereof are not known. [x] The argument is that the benefit of G.O.Ms.No.212 is to be extended not with effect from the regularization but with effect from putting in qualifying service of five years or a particular cut-off date has been approved by several Courts, whether applicable to the petitioners is a question of fact. There is no such discussion in the impugned orders. [xi] The present Writ Petition cannot be dismissed as prayed for the respondents, merely on the ground of latches. At the same time, cannot be allowed straight away, in view of the setting aside of orders passed in O.A.No.8095 of 2008 in Writ Petition No.26665 of 2011, which is the basis for the orders passed in O.A.No.8678 of 2011. [xi] The present Writ Petition cannot be dismissed as prayed for the respondents, merely on the ground of latches. At the same time, cannot be allowed straight away, in view of the setting aside of orders passed in O.A.No.8095 of 2008 in Writ Petition No.26665 of 2011, which is the basis for the orders passed in O.A.No.8678 of 2011. [xii] The right of the petitioners / employees in terms of the G.O. and upholding of rights by Courts in respect of other employees on one hand and the legal objection of the respondents as to considerable delay and as to absence of the basis for the orders in O.A. required to be viewed and weighed balancing the interest of both sides. [xiii] It is not the case that the O.A. was filed belatedly. 11. In the light of the legal and factual context particularly the contribution and failure of both sides, we deem it proper to permit the petitioners to make a representation afresh to the respondents, seeking extension of benefit of G.O.Ms.No.212 dated 22.04.1994, in it’s true spirit as has been interpreted by the Courts including the Hon’ble Supreme Court, as to extension of benefit on par with other employees, standing in similar position with that of the petitioners herein. 12. The petitioners are permitted to make a detailed representation with legal and factual basis within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. Upon such representation, the respondent authorities shall consider and pass appropriate orders strictly in accordance with law, within a period of three (03) months thereafter. 13. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs. As a sequel, Interlocutory Applications pending, if any, shall stand closed.