JUDGMENT : JYOTI MULIMANI, J. 1. Sri.Sharath S.Gowda, counsel for the appellant, and Sri.Vijaykumara, counsel for caveator/ Respondent No. 1, have appeared in person. 2. This is an appeal from the Court of XLIV Addl. City Civil and Sessions Judge (CCH-45), Bengaluru City. 3. For convenience's sake, the parties are referred to as per their status and rankings before the Trial Court. 4. The plaint averments are these: The property originally belonged to Sri.Muttayya and his sons, namely Sri.Appayya, Sri.Hanumaiah and Sri.Narasimhaiah. It is said that they had executed a power of attorney in favor of one Sri.Raman. The attorney appears to have sold the property to the plaintiff under a registered sale deed dated 30.07.2012. She had given a public notice in the most prevailing newspaper, "The Hindu" dated 20.07.2012, and there were no claimants or objections from anybody. On 15.09.2013, all of a sudden, the defendants claimed that they were the grandchildren of Sri.Muttayya and the suit schedule property is their ancestral property. Alleging interference, the plaintiff filed a suit seeking the relief of an injunction. After the service of the summons, the defendants appeared through their counsel, and the first defendant filed a written statement and denied the plaint averments. He specifically denied the plaintiff's ownership and possession of the suit schedule property. Among other grounds, he prayed for dismissal of the suit. The second defendant filed a memo adopting the written statement filed by the first defendant. Based on the pleadings, the Trial Court framed issues, the parties led evidence and documents were exhibited. The Trial Court vide Judgment and Decree dated 09.10.2017 decreed the suit and defendants or any other persons claiming under them were restrained by an order of permanent injunction from interfering with the plaintiff's possession over the suit property. Hence, the defendant No.2 has filed the present appeal under Section 96 of CPC. Counsel appearing for the parties urged several contentions. Counsel Sri.Sharath S.Gowda, in presenting his argument, strenuously urged that the defendants had specifically denied the plaintiff's title over the suit schedule property. The plaintiff did not produce the alleged power of attorney. He argued by saying that the Apex Court in Anathula Sudhakar Vs. P. Buchi Reddy (Dead) by LRs. and Others, (2008) 4 SCC 594 has summarized the proposition of law. Counsel submits that the decree of the suit is unsustainable in law. The plaintiff did not produce the alleged power of attorney. He argued by saying that the Apex Court in Anathula Sudhakar Vs. P. Buchi Reddy (Dead) by LRs. and Others, (2008) 4 SCC 594 has summarized the proposition of law. Counsel submits that the decree of the suit is unsustainable in law. By way of reply to this contention, an attempt is made on behalf of the plaintiff to contend that the attorney, Sri.Raman has sold the property in question in plaintiff's favor. Counsel Sri.Vijaykumara., submits that the plaintiff has proved the prima facie ownership and possession over the suit property as of the date of filing of the suit. He argued by saying that the appellant has not made out any grounds to interfere with the Judgment and Decree of the Trial Court. Accordingly, he prayed for dismissal of the appeal. Lastly, counsel Sri.Vijaykumara., submits that an application is filed under Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC for the production of additional evidence. Counsel, therefore, submits that the same may be placed on record and an appropriate order may be passed. Counsel Sri.Sharath S.Gowda., submits that the application is liable to be dismissed on the following grounds: I. Respondent No.1 has not fulfilled the criteria as enumerated under Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC. II. In a suit for bare injunction, the issue which is required to be proved by the plaintiff is whether he or she is in lawful possession as of the date of filing of the suit. III. The documents that are furnished by respondent No.1 are all Xerox copies and post-suit documents. 5. Heard the arguments and perused the records with care. 6. The following points would arise for consideration: (1) Whether the Trial Court justified in decreeing the suit? (2) Whether respondent No.1 has made out a case to allow the application filed under Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC? 7. The facts are sufficiently said and do not require reiteration. The issue falls within a narrow compass and relates to the grant of an injunction and the production of additional evidence. The suit giving rise to this appeal was filed by the plaintiff seeking the relief of an injunction. As could be seen from the nature of the lis between the parties, the suit is one for a bare injunction based on possession as of the date of filing of the suit. The suit giving rise to this appeal was filed by the plaintiff seeking the relief of an injunction. As could be seen from the nature of the lis between the parties, the suit is one for a bare injunction based on possession as of the date of filing of the suit. The right to an injunction is based on a prima facie right. In the present case, the plaintiff claims prima facie ownership and possession over the suit schedule property as of the date of filing of the suit based on the sale deed, that is executed by one Sri.Raman, as an Attorney holder of Muttayya and his family members. The defendants specifically denied the plaintiff's title and her possession over the suit schedule property as of the date of filing of the suit. The Trial Court decreed the suit on the sole ground that the plaintiff has become the owner of the property by a registered sale deed dated 30.07.2012, and in an injunction suit, the title of the plaintiff need not be traced. The conclusion and the finding arrived at by the Trial Court are untenable in law because of the proposition of the law laid down by the Apex Court in P. BUCHI REDDY 's case. The plaintiff claims ownership based on a sale deed executed by Sri.Raman as an attorney holder. The plaintiff has not produced the power of attorney. It is significant to note that, Sri.Raman was examined as PW2, and he states that he has misplaced the power of attorney; hence, he could not furnish the same. This Court declines to accept the statement. Counsel Sri.Vijaykumara., submits that the plaintiff has taken back the original of Ex.P.1 by replacing the same with a Certified copy. A perusal of a certified copy of Ex.P.1 reflects that, Sri.Raman appears to have sold the property in favor of the plaintiff as an attorney of Muttayya and his family members. However, there is nothing on record to show that such a power of attorney existed at any point in time. The Apex Court in unequivocal terms, has held that where the plaintiff's title is not in dispute or not under a cloud, a suit for a bare injunction could be decided concerning the finding on possession. However, there is nothing on record to show that such a power of attorney existed at any point in time. The Apex Court in unequivocal terms, has held that where the plaintiff's title is not in dispute or not under a cloud, a suit for a bare injunction could be decided concerning the finding on possession. It has been held that if the matter involves complicated questions of fact and law relating to title, the Court will relegate the parties to the remedy by way of a comprehensive suit for declaration of title instead of deciding the issue in a suit for mere injunction. In the present case, a cloud is raised over the plaintiff's title. Moreover, it cannot be said that the dispute raised by the defendants about the title is a feeble and vague objection. The Trial Court has overlooked this aspect of the matter. 8. Next, let me consider the application filed under Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC. Smt.Indiramma - respondent No.1 has sworn to a declaration of fact by way of an affidavit and attempted to furnish certain documents viz., B-Katha, tax paid receipts, electricity bills, photographs, etc. I have perused the application and also true copies of the documents filed along with the application. Under Rule 27 of Order 41, production of additional evidence, whether oral or documentary is permitted only under three circumstances which are: (1) the Trial Court had refused to admit the evidence though it ought to have been admitted (2) the evidence was not available to the party, despite the exercise of due diligence; and (3) the Appellate Court required additional evidence to enable it to pronounce better judgment or for any other substantial cause of like nature. The true test is whether the Appellate Court can pronounce judgment on the materials before it without taking into consideration the additional evidence sought to be adduced. When the Appellate Court finds itself unable to pronounce judgment owing to a lacuna or defect in the evidence as it stands, it may admit additional evidence. In the present case, an attempt is made on behalf of respondent No.1 to furnish certain documents as additional evidence, contending that they are crucial documents, hence they may be accepted. Counsel Sri.Vijaykumara., submits that Defendant No.2 had requested the authority concerned not to issue B-katha in favor of the plaintiff. In the present case, an attempt is made on behalf of respondent No.1 to furnish certain documents as additional evidence, contending that they are crucial documents, hence they may be accepted. Counsel Sri.Vijaykumara., submits that Defendant No.2 had requested the authority concerned not to issue B-katha in favor of the plaintiff. Hence, she could not furnish the same before the Trial Court. This Court declines to accept the said contention. A perusal of the documents depicts that they are all post-suit documents and are all Xerox copies. I propose to say that the production and leading evidence in the Appellate Court, oral or documentary, is not a matter of right, or ipso facto. I would observe that the parties can produce evidence only when the conditions laid down in Rule 27 of Order 41 are satisfied. The reasons accorded for the production of additional evidence do not meet the requirements of Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code. Furthermore, the law is well settled that the power is discretionary and must be exercised on sound judicial principles. In my view, respondent No.1 has failed to satisfy the conditions laid down under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code. Hence, I decline to exercise the discretionary power, and accordingly, the application is rejected. For the reasons stated above, the Judgment and Decree of the Trial Court are liable to be set aside. 9. The Judgment and Decree dated 09.10.2017 passed by the XLIV Addl. City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru (CCH-45) in O.S.No.7350/2013 is set aside. The plaintiff's suit is dismissed. 10. Resultantly, the Regular First Appeal is allowed.