Judgment : VENUTHURUMALLI GOPALA KRISHNA RAO, J. This second appeal is filed aggrieved against the judgment and decree dated 17-12-2011 in A.S.No.203 of 2010 on the file of the I Additional District Judge, Ongole, Prakasam District, confirming the judgment and decree dated 28-4-2010 in O.S.No.39 of 2006 on the file of the Senior Civil Judge, Darsi. 2. The appellant herein is the minor defendant, represented by her next friend guardian and later she was declared as major by discharging the guardian vide Court order dated 27-6-2017 in S.A.M.P.No.2009/2016 and the respondent is the plaintiff in O.S.No.39 of 2006 on the file of the Senior Civil Judge, Darsi. 3. The plaintiff initiated action in O.S.No.39 of 2006 on the file of the Senior Civil Judge, Darsi, for preliminary decree for partition and separate possession of plaint schedule properties by metes and bounds into two equal shares and to allot one such share to her. 4. The learned Senior Civil Judge, Darsi, decreed the suit with costs, passing a preliminary decree for partition of the suit properties into two equal shares and one such share shall be given to the plaintiff. Felt aggrieved of the same, the unsuccessful defendant in the above said suit filed the aforesaid appeal suit before the first appellate Court. The learned I Additional District Judge, Ongole, dismissed the first appeal by confirming the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. Aggrieved thereby, the unsuccessful defendant/appellant approached this Court by way of second appeal. 5. For the sake of convenience, both parties in the second appeal will be referred to as they are arrayed in the original suit. 6. The case of the plaintiff, in brief, as set out in the plaint averments in O.S.No.39 of 2006, is as follows : (a) It is pleaded that all the plaint schedule properties were absolute properties of one late Polu China Musalaiah, who was the father of plaintiff and her brother Polu Nasara Reddy @ Nasaraiah. On the death of the said Polu China Musalaiah about 25 years ago, the plaint schedule properties devolved upon the plaintiff and her brother Nasara Reddy @ Nasaraiah in equal shares and they became co-owners and ever since they were enjoying the plaint schedule properties as co-owners. On the death of the said Polu China Musalaiah about 25 years ago, the plaint schedule properties devolved upon the plaintiff and her brother Nasara Reddy @ Nasaraiah in equal shares and they became co-owners and ever since they were enjoying the plaint schedule properties as co-owners. (b) It is further pleaded that on the death of the plaintiff’s brother Nasara Reddy @ Nasaraiah, his share in the plaint schedule properties devolved upon the minor defendant, who is his sole at law as his wife predeceased him. So, the plaintiff and the minor defendant are co-owners of the plaint schedule properties ever since the death of Polu Nasara Reddy @ Nasaraiah, which occurred in the first week of August, 2006. The plaintiff and minor defendant are in joint possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule properties and the minor defendant is being represented by her guardian maternal uncle Neelam Kondaiah. In view of strange attitude of the guardian of minor defendant, the plaintiff was feeling inconvenience to continue co-ownership in the plaint schedule properties with the defendant. So, the plaintiff got issued a legal notice demanding partition on 31-8-2006. The guardian of minor defendant refused to cooperate for amicable partition of the plaint schedule properties out of court and he gave a reply notice on behalf of the minor defendant with false allegations on 03-10-2006 and that the plaintiff was constrained to file the suit for partition of the plaint schedule properties. 7. The defendant filed written statement denying the contents of plaint averments and further contended as follows: (a) It is denied that the age of plaintiff mentioned as 40 years in the plaint and in fact, the plaintiff is aged more than 50 years and except the relationship between the parties, rest of the averments made by the plaintiff in her plaint are denied. According to the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, if at all the plaintiff is entitled to any share, she will be entitled to a share in the properties of her father i.e., the plaintiff would be entitled only to a 1/4 th share in all the joint family properties i.e. a ½ share in the undivided ½ share held by her father in the joint family properties. It is denied that on the death of her father Polu China Musalaiah, the plaintiff and her brother Nasara Reddy became entitled to an each ½ share in all the joint family properties and that they have been in joint possession and enjoyment of the same till today as co-sharers and co-owners. The plaintiff was never in possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule properties and the defendant Polu Nasaramma, being minor, represented by her guardian to the plaint schedule properties as a co-sharer along with her brother Nasara Reddy after the death of her father. Nasara Reddy was in exclusive possession and enjoyment of all the family properties that devolved on him after the death of his father and ever since the death of his father in his own riht to the exclusion of the plaintiff for over a statutory period to the knowledge of one and all including the plaintiff and he had even perfected his title in the same i.e. in the alleged share of the plaintiff by adverse possession as well. The plaintiff never claimed any share in the family properties after the death of her father even though she was aware that Nasara Reddy, her brother was in exclusive possession of all the family properties after the death of her father even though including her alleged share, which amount to ouster and now the claim made by the plaintiff for partition is specifically barred by limitation and as such, the present suit is not maintainable as the same is specifically barred by limitation. (b) It is further contended that in fact, Nasara Reddy, this defendant’s father, was in possession and enjoyment of all the family properties to the exclusion of plaintiff and this defendant has succeeded to his entire estate i.e. all the family properties held by him were devolved on August, 2006. (c) It is further contended that some of the properties mentioned in the plaint schedule are grazing lands that are being jointly enjoyed by this defendant along with other co-owners and the present suit for partition without impleading them is not maintainable and this suit is bad for non-joinder of proper and necessary parties. There is no cause of action or right of suit for the plaintiff to file the suit. Hence, it is prayed to dismiss the suit with costs. 8. There is no cause of action or right of suit for the plaintiff to file the suit. Hence, it is prayed to dismiss the suit with costs. 8. On the basis of above pleadings, the learned Senior Civil Judge, Darsi, framed the following issues for trial: (1) Whether the suit for partition is barred by limitation ? (2) Whether the plaintiff is entitled only 1/4 th share in the joint family property i.e. ½ share in the undivided ½ share of the plaint schedule ? (3) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for preliminary decree for partition and separate possession of ½ share in the suit schedule property ? and (4) To what relief ? 9. During the course of trial in the trial Court, on behalf of the plaintiff, P.Ws.1 and 2 were examined and Exs.A-1 to A-3 were marked. On behalf of the defendant, D.Ws.1 to 3 were examined and Exs.B-1 to B-16 were marked. 10. The learned Senior Civil Judge, Darsi, after conclusion of trial, on hearing the arguments of both sides and on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, decreed the suit with costs. Felt aggrieved thereby, the unsuccessful defendant filed the appeal suit in A.S.No.203 of 2010 before the learned I Additional District Judge, Ongole, wherein, the following issues (points) came up for consideration: (1) Whether the suit for partition is barred by limitation ? (2) Whether the plaintiff is entitled only 1/4 th share in the joint family property i.e. ½ share in the undivided ½ share of the plaint schedule ? (3) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for preliminary decree for partition and separate possession of ½ share in the suit schedule property ? 11. The learned I Additional District Judge, Ongole, i.e., the first appellate Judge, after hearing the arguments, answered the issues (points), as above, against the defendant/appellant and in favour of the plaintiff/ respondent and dismissed the appeal suit filed by the defendant. Felt aggrieved of the same, the unsuccessful defendant in O.S.No.39 of 2006 filed the present second appeal before this Court. 12. After the institution of second appeal by the defendant in the suit, this Court ordered notice to the respondent before admission and the said notice was served on the respondent/plaintiff. Felt aggrieved of the same, the unsuccessful defendant in O.S.No.39 of 2006 filed the present second appeal before this Court. 12. After the institution of second appeal by the defendant in the suit, this Court ordered notice to the respondent before admission and the said notice was served on the respondent/plaintiff. Heard Sri P. Rajasekhar, learned counsel, representing Sri Kuntamukkala Sai Sree Sanjay, learned counsel for the appellant/defendant and Sri O. Manoher Reddy, learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the respondent/plaintiff. 13. It has to be kept in mind that the right of appeal is neither a natural nor an inherent right attached to the litigation. It is regulated in accordance with law. A second appeal preferred under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure could be admitted only when the appellant satisfies the Court that substantial question of law between the parties arise in the case. A proper test for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial would be or whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and if so, whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by the superior Courts or is not free from difficulty or cause for discussion of alternative views. In the case of Boodireddy Chandraiah v. Arigela Laxmi , [1 (2007) 8 SCC 155 ] , the Apex Court held that it is not within the domain of the High Court to investigate the grounds on which the findings were arrived at by the last Court of fact namely, the first appellate Court. In a case where from a given set of circumstances two inferences of facts are possible, one drawn by the lower appellate Court will not be interfered by the High Court in a second appeal. Adopting any other approach is not permissible. Where, the facts required for a point of law have not been pleaded, a litigant should not be allowed to raise that question as a substantial question of law in second appeal. Mere appreciation of facts, documentary evidence and contents of documents cannot be held to be raising a substantial question of law. 14. Where, the facts required for a point of law have not been pleaded, a litigant should not be allowed to raise that question as a substantial question of law in second appeal. Mere appreciation of facts, documentary evidence and contents of documents cannot be held to be raising a substantial question of law. 14. The defendant having chosen to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 100 of Civil Procedure Code, it is for her to meet the above principles and satisfy the Court whether there exists any substantial question of law. 15. This second appeal is filed against the concurrent findings arrived by both the Courts below, therefore the grounds urged in the second appeal are to be scrutinized to find out whether the appellant has shown any substantial question of law. The contention of appellant is that the judgment and decree of the trial Court as well as the first appellate Court are contrary to law and that the second appeal may be allowed by setting aside the judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below i.e. the trial Court and the first appellate Court. 16. It is the specific case of the respondent/plaintiff that all the plaint schedule properties were absolute properties of late Polu China Musalaiah i.e. the father of plaintiff and Polu Nasara Reddy @ Nasaraiah. The said Nasara Reddy is own brother of the plaintiff and the said Polu China Musalaiah was having two children, plaintiff and Polu Nasara Reddy and on the death of Polu China Musalaiah about 25 years ago prior to filing of the suit, the plaint schedule properties devolved upon the plaintiff and her brother Nasara Reddy in equal shares and they became co-owners and ever since they were enjoying the plaint schedule properties as co-owners and Nasara Reddy died and the share of Nasara Reddy was devolved upon the minor defendant, who is the sole legal heir of Nasara Reddy. The relationship in between both the parties is not in dispute. It was contended by the learned counsel for defendant that after the death of Polu China Musalaiah in the year 1975, the defendant’s father Nasara Reddy was in exclusive possession of the plaint schedule properties within the knowledge of one and all including the plaintiff. 17. The relationship in between both the parties is not in dispute. It was contended by the learned counsel for defendant that after the death of Polu China Musalaiah in the year 1975, the defendant’s father Nasara Reddy was in exclusive possession of the plaint schedule properties within the knowledge of one and all including the plaintiff. 17. The learned counsel for appellant/defendant would contend that the plaintiff herein filed the suit for partition of the plaint schedule properties into two equal shares and to allot one such share to her and deliver the same to her without filing any document to show that the plaint schedule lands are joint family properties and liable for partition. The respondent/plaintiff specifically pleaded in the plaint itself that the plaint schedule properties are the absolute properties of her father and after the death of her father, the plaint schedule properties devolved upon his two children i.e., the plaintiff and Nasara Reddy in equal shares and after the death of Nasara Reddy, the half share of Nasara Reddy came into the possession of the defendant. The defendant specifically pleaded in the written statement itself that according to the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, if at all the plaintiff is entitled to any share, she will be entitled to a share in the properties of her father and that the plaintiff would be entitled only to 1/4 th share in the joint family properties i.e. half share in the undivided half share held by her father in the joint family properties. The defendant admitted that the plaint schedule properties are joint family properties. 18. The defendant admitted in the written statement and in reply notice Ex.A-3 that the plaint schedule properties are joint family properties. The admission made in the written statement is a judicial admission. As seen from Ex.A-3 copy of reply notice, in fact jointness of the plaint schedule properties was admitted by the defendant in Ex.A-3 reply notice said to have been issued by the defendant through her counsel. But, it was pleaded in Ex.A-3 reply notice by the defendant that the plaintiff had taken an amount of Rs.60,000/- in the presence of elders at about 35 years prior to Ex.A-3 reply notice and relinquished her share in the joint family properties. But, it was pleaded in Ex.A-3 reply notice by the defendant that the plaintiff had taken an amount of Rs.60,000/- in the presence of elders at about 35 years prior to Ex.A-3 reply notice and relinquished her share in the joint family properties. Therefore, the burden is upon the appellant/defendant to prove that the plaintiff had taken an amount of Rs.60,000/- in the presence of elders and relinquished her share in the joint family properties. No such evidence was produced by the appellant to prove the same. Admission is a best piece of evidence against the maker and it can be inferred from the conduct of the party. Admission implied by conduct is strong evidence against the maker, but she is at liberty to prove that such admission was mistaken or untrue, but the defendant failed to prove the same. 19. The learned counsel for appellant would contend that the defendant relied on Exs.B-4 to B-16 true copies of No.3 Adangals of faslies from 1400 to 1406 i.e. from the year 1990 to 1996 and the learned counsel for appellant would contend that the appellant is in possession and enjoyment over the suit schedule properties. The defendant filed adangals for faslies from 1400 to 1406 i.e. from the year 1990 to 1996 whereas the suit for partition was instituted in the year 2006. But, mere entries in Revenue records about the possession of one co-sharer do not confer any right and exclusive possession of the defendant. Possession of property by one co-sharer shall be deemed that he is in possession of property of all co-sharers. 20. The learned counsel for appellant would contend that there is no pleading of ouster in the written statement itself, the father of appellant/ defendant is in continuous possession and enjoyment over the plaint schedule properties since the date of death of Polu China Musalaiah and after the death of the defendant’s father, the defendant is in possession and enjoyment over the same. As seen from the pleading in the written statement, the defendant pleaded that the plaintiff never claimed any share in the joint family properties after the death of her father even though she was aware that Nasaraiah, who was her brother, was in exclusive possession and enjoyment of all the joint family properties after the death of her father even though including her share which amounts to ouster. The defendant also specifically pleaded in the written statement itself that after the death of her grandfather, her father Nasaraiah was in exclusive possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule properties that devolved upon him and after the death of her father, she is in exclusive possession for over a statutory period to the knowledge of one and all including the plaintiff and she had perfected her title in the alleged share of the plaintiff by adverse possession. 21. The law is well settled that if a co-sharer is in possession of the property, his possession cannot be deemed to be adverse for other co-sharers unless there has been an ouster of other co-sharers. Possession of a property belonging to several co-sharers by one co-sharer shall be deemed that he possesses the property on behalf of the other co-sharers unless there has been a clear ouster by denying the title of other co-sharers. The mutation in the Revenue records in the name of one co-sharer would not amount to ouster unless there is a clear declaration that the title of other co-sharers is denied. 22. In the case of Mohd. Mohammad Ali v. Jagadish Kalita , [(2004) 1 SCC 271] , the Apex Court held as follows: “ … … … in appropriate cases, the Court may have to construe the entire pleadings so as to come to the conclusion as to whether the proper plea of adverse possession has been raised in the written statement or not which can also be gathered from the cumulative effect of the averments made therein. Long and continuous possession by itself would not constitute adverse possession. Even non-participation in the rent and profits of the land to a co-sharer does not amount to ouster so as to give title by prescription. A co-sharer becomes a constructive trustee of other co-sharer and the right of the plaintiff or his predecessors in interest would thus be deemed to be protected by the trustees. Possession of a property belonging to several co-sharers by one co-sharer shall be deemed to be possession on behalf of the other co-sharers unless there has been a clear ouster by denying the title of other co-sharers. Possession of a property belonging to several co-sharers by one co-sharer shall be deemed to be possession on behalf of the other co-sharers unless there has been a clear ouster by denying the title of other co-sharers. Mutation in the revenue records in the name of one co-sharer would not amount to ouster unless there is a clear declaration that the title of the other co-sharers was denied and disputed.” The legal position in this regard is no more res integra. The same has been well settled by the Apex Court in a catena of judgments: “ Possession of a property belonging to several co-sharers by one co-sharer shall be deemed that he possesses the property on behalf of the other co-sharers unless there has been a clear ouster by denying the title of other co-sharers and mutation in the revenue records in the name of one co-sharer would also not amount to ouster unless there is a clear declaration that title of the other co-sharer/s is denied. Therefore, the law is very clear that if a co-sharer is in possession of the entire property, the possession cannot be deemed to be adverse for other co-sharers. Unless there has been an ouster of other co-sharers, the possession of the property belonging to several co-sharers by one co-sharer shall be deemed that he possesses the property on behalf of the other co-sharers unless there has been a clear ouster by denying the title of other co-owners. It is also relevant to say that mutation in revenue records in the name of one co-sharer would not amount to ouster unless there is a clear declaration that the title of other co-sharers is denied. For the reasons best known to the appellant, she failed to prove the alleged ouster as pleaded in the written statement. 23. The learned counsel for appellant would contend that without considering admissions of the plaintiff in cross-examination, the learned trial Judge decreed the suit. For the reasons best known to the appellant, she failed to prove the alleged ouster as pleaded in the written statement. 23. The learned counsel for appellant would contend that without considering admissions of the plaintiff in cross-examination, the learned trial Judge decreed the suit. He would also contend that the plaintiff admitted in her evidence in cross-examination that Nellam Nagi Reddy, Malapati Budda Reddy, Nellam China Kotireddy, Nellam Peda Kotireddy, Polu Peda Musalaiah and Polu China Musalaiah are living jointly as members of a composite family, but the learned trial Judge and the learned first appellate Judge without considering the above admission of the plaintiff in cross- examination, arrived at a conclusion that the plaint schedule properties are joint family properties. 24. The learned counsel for appellant placed reliance on G. Annapurnayya v. K. Appalanarsimhamurthy , [ 1995(1) A.P.L.J. 284 (HC)] . The composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in the aforesaid case held as follows: “16. Now if we test the facts and circumstances in this case with the legal position regarding composite family as stated above, they fail to bring in the proof to any extent. In the first place, no such custom of composite family is established, by independent and reliable evidence, to have existed among the agricultural families in Arjunagiri or among the members of the Brahmin community or among the members of the family of plaintiff’s father and the family of Somayajulu. The solitary instance of plaintiff’s father said to have gone in illatom affiliation to the family of Somayajulu as an incident of composite family let alone not established much less satisfied the requirement of proof of a custom to have the force of law.” In the case on hand, in the plaint itself the plaintiff specifically pleaded that all the plaint schedule properties were absolute properties of her father Polu China Musalaiah and she is having only one brother Polu Nasara Reddy and after the death of her father Polu China Musalaiah, the entire plaint schedule properties devolved upon the plaintiff and her brother Nasara Reddy @ Nasaraiah in equal shares and they became co-owners and they are enjoying the plaint schedule properties and subsequent to the death of her brother Nasaraiah, his share devolved upon the defendant herein, who is none other than his daughter. It is well settled that in the absence of pleading, no amount of evidence will be looked into. It is also relevant to say that stray admission made by a party in cross-examination cannot be taken into consideration and the entire evidence has to be looked into. Therefore, I am unable to accept the said contention of the learned counsel for appellant that both the Courts below have not taken into consideration of the aforesaid admission made by the plaintiff. 25. The learned counsel for appellant relied on Beharilal v. Jagannath, 1992 (0) MPLJ 79 and also relied on a judgment of the composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in the case of Tavidisetty Venkateswara Rao v. Tavidisetty Nageswara Rao , 2003 SCC Online AP 933. Admittedly, in the case on hand, the alleged ouster as pleaded by the defendant in the written statement is not at all proved by her. As stated supra, unless there is a clear proof of ouster of the plaintiff in the suit schedule properties, the plaintiff continues to have constructive possession even though the defendant is in possession of the same for some period. To establish ouster in cases involving claim of adverse possession, the defendant has to prove three elements viz., (1) hostile intention, (2) long and uninterrupted possession and (3) exercise of right of exclusive ownership openly and to the knowledge of the owner. In cases of adverse possession, the starting point of limitation does not commence from the date when the right of ownership arises to the plaintiff but it commences from the date when the defendant’s possession become adverse. In the case on hand, the alleged adverse possession as pleaded by the defendant in the written statement is not at all proved by her. As noticed supra, the possession of a co-owner in the joint family property belongs to the other co-owners is deemed to be the possession of all co-sharers. 26. The learned counsel for appellant placed reliance on Wuntakal Yalpi Chenabasavana Gowd v. Rao Bahadur Y. Mahabaleshwarappa , [(1954) 1 SCC 732] In the said case, the Apex Court held as follows: “11. Once it is held that the possession of a co-sharer has become adverse to the other co-sharer as a result of ouster, the mere assertion of his joint title by the dispossessed co-sharer would not interrupt the running of adverse possession. Once it is held that the possession of a co-sharer has become adverse to the other co-sharer as a result of ouster, the mere assertion of his joint title by the dispossessed co-sharer would not interrupt the running of adverse possession. He must actually and effectively break up the exclusive possession of his co-sharer by re-entry upon the property or by resuming possession in such matter as it was possible to do. It may also check the running of time if the co-sharer who is in exclusive possession acknowledges the title of his co-owner or discontinues his exclusive possession of the property. On the materials on the record, none of these things seems to have been proved in the present case. Resumption of physical possession or re-entry upon the property was absolutely out of the question, as the property was in the possession of a lessee. … … …” The facts in the aforesaid case are, the property was in possession of a lessee. As stated supra, the alleged ouster as pleaded by the appellant in the written statement was not at all proved by her. Therefore, the facts and circumstances in the case relied on by the learned counsel for appellant are different to the instant case. 27. The learned counsel for appellant placed another reliance on Chhotelal Babulal v. Premlal Girdharilal , [1976(0) Supreme (MP) 50] . In the case on hand, the plaintiff asserted in the plaint itself that the plaint schedule properties belong to her father, the same is not at all disputed by the defendant and her father is none other than the plaintiff’s brother. It is not at all the case of defendant that the plaintiff’s father died intestate. The contention of respondent/plaintiff is that her father died intestate prior to institution of the suit for partition itself and that the son and daughter of Polu China Musalaiah are having equal rights in the plaint schedule properties and they are in continuous possession over the plaint schedule properties. On 31-8-2006, the plaintiff issued a legal notice by demanding the defendant for partition of the plaint schedule properties. On 31-8-2006, the plaintiff issued a legal notice by demanding the defendant for partition of the plaint schedule properties. In the reply notice itself, the defendant pleaded jointness in the family properties but the contention of defendant is that after receiving an amount of Rs.60,000/- in the presence of elders, the plaintiff relinquished her right in the joint family properties, but the same is not at all proved by the defendant. 28. The learned counsel for appellant placed reliance on Hero Vinoth v. Seshammal , [ (2006) 5 SCC 545 ] , wherein the Apex Court held as follows: “24. The principles relating to Section 100 CPC relevant for this case may be summarized thus: (i) …………………………………. (ii) ... … … A question of law having a material bearing on the decision of the case (that is, a question, answer to which affects the rights of parties to the suit) will be a substantial question of law, if it is not covered by any specific provisions of law or settled legal principle emerging from binding precedents, and, involves a debatable legal issue. A substantial question of law will also arise in a contrary situation, where the legal position is clear, either on account of express provisions of law or binding precedents, but the court below has decided the matter, either ignoring or acting contrary to such legal principle. In the second type of cases, the substantial question of law arises not because the law is still debatable, but because the decision rendered on a material question, violates the settled position of law. (iii) The general rule is that High Court will not interfere with the concurrent findings of the courts below. But it is not an absolute rule. Some of the well- recognised exceptions are where (i) the courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. … … …” The learned counsel for appellant placed another reliance on Nazir Mohammed v. J. Kamala , [ (2020) 19 SCC 57 ] , wherein the Apex Court held as follows: “33. The principles relating to Section 100 CPC relevant for this case may be summarized thus: 33.1. …………………………. 33.2. …………………………. 33.3. …………………………. 33.4. … … …” The learned counsel for appellant placed another reliance on Nazir Mohammed v. J. Kamala , [ (2020) 19 SCC 57 ] , wherein the Apex Court held as follows: “33. The principles relating to Section 100 CPC relevant for this case may be summarized thus: 33.1. …………………………. 33.2. …………………………. 33.3. …………………………. 33.4. The general rule is, that the High Court will not interfere with the concurrent findings of the courts below. But it is not an absolute rule. Some of the well-recognised exceptions are where: (i) the courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. A decision based on no evidence, does not refer only to cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to case, where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding.” The present case on hand does not come within the ambit of aforesaid exceptions as held by the Apex Court. As stated supra, on appreciation of the entire evidence on record, the learned trial Judge rightly came to the conclusion that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of partition in the plaint schedule properties and on re-appreciation of the entire evidence on record, the learned first appellate Judge also arrived at a conclusion that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of partition of the plaint schedule properties. The findings given by both the Courts below are based on evidence on record. The present second appeal is not even admitted so far and it is at the stage of admission. This Court being second appellate Court should be satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law and not a mere question of law. In fact, the substantial questions of law raised by the appellant in the grounds of appeal are not even substantial questions of law. 29. Having regard to the reasons assigned, this Court is satisfied that the concurrent findings of fact recorded by both the Courts below on all the issues/points in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant do not brook interference and that both the Courts below are justified in decreeing the suit of the plaintiff. 29. Having regard to the reasons assigned, this Court is satisfied that the concurrent findings of fact recorded by both the Courts below on all the issues/points in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant do not brook interference and that both the Courts below are justified in decreeing the suit of the plaintiff. The findings of fact recorded by both the Courts below were based on proper appreciation of evidence and the material on record and there was neither illegality nor irregularity in those findings and therefore, the findings do not require to be upset. Further, the existence of a substantial question of law is a sine qua non for the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court as per Section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure. The questions raised, strictly speaking, are not even pure questions of law, let alone substantial questions of law. 30. In the result, the second appeal is dismissed at the stage of admission, confirming the judgments and decrees of both the Courts below. Pending applications, if any, shall stand closed. Each party do bear their own costs in the second appeal.