ORDER : T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO, J. 1. This Criminal Petition, under Sections 480 and 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, has been filed by the petitioner/sole accused, seeking bail, in Crime No.50/2025 of Mahila Urban Police Station, Eluru District. 2. A case has been registered against the Petitioner for the Offences under sections 69, 77, 88 of the B.N.S. 3. The prosecution's case, in brief, iS that the de-facto Complainant, Thota Lakshmi Tejaswini, was pursuing an MD in Anesthesia at ASRAM Medical College, EIuru, from 2022 to 2025. ln March 2023, she developed an intimate relationship with the accused, who was pursuing an MD in Radiology at the same college, They became acquainted and maintained a friendly relationship. The accused professed love and promised to marry her, and trusting him, she fell in love. On October 1, 2023, the complainant rented a flat at Neeraja Apartments, Eluru, to continue her studies. During that period, the accused frequently Visited her flat, reiterated his promise to marry her, and had sexual intercourse with her multiple times. During their physical intimacy, the accused recorded nude videos and photographs of the complainant on his phone. Consequently, the complainant became pregnant. The accused coerced her into having three abortions by threatening to reveal compromising photographs and videos. on 30.04.2025, the accused had sexual intercourse With the complainant in a hotel room at N. Square, Eluru I Town area. After completing his studies, the accused returned to his native place on May 4, 2025, and ceased all communication With the Complainant. Upon informing her father, she tried to contact him, but her calls went unanswered suspecting foul play, she inquired and discovered that the accused was scheduled to marry another woman on May 10, 2025. Realizing she had been deceived, She filed a Police complaint, resulting in the registration of the FIR. 4. Upon informing her father, she tried to contact him, but her calls went unanswered suspecting foul play, she inquired and discovered that the accused was scheduled to marry another woman on May 10, 2025. Realizing she had been deceived, She filed a Police complaint, resulting in the registration of the FIR. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the Police falsely implicated the petitioner without any iota of evidence; the petitioner was arrested on 08.05.2025, and has since been in judicial custody; the petitioner’s earlier bail application (Crl.M.P.No.267 of 2025) before the V Additional District & Sessions Judge-Gum-Special Court for Trial of offences against woman, West Godavari, Eluru, was dismissed mechanically on, 27.05.2025 without proper consideration; since, the investigating Officer has examined all the material witnesses and collected the necessary evidence, there is no risk of evidence tampering if the petitioner is granted bail. 5. On the other hand, the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor submits that, except for the receipt of the RFSL report, most of the investigation has been completed. 6. I have heard both Sides. Learned counsel on either side reiterated their submissions on par with the contentions presented in the petition and the report. 7. In Masroor V. State of U.P., (2009) 14 SCC 286 a Division Bench of the Hon]ble Supreme Court observed as follows: 13. ... Though at the stage of granting bail, an elaborate examination of evidence and detailed reasons touching the merit of the case, which may prejudice the accused, should be avoided, but there is a need to indicate in such order reasons for prima facie concluding why bail was being granted particularly where the accused is charged Of having committed a serious offence. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that even according to the prosecution’s case, the relationship between the petitioner and the defacto complainant was a long standing consensual physical relationship without any element of deception from its inception, as such, the same cannot be a ground for lodging the FIR for the offences mentioned above. 9. This Court views that not every instance of engaging in sexual relations with a woman under the promise of marriage constitutes rape. It cannot be universally stated that sexual intercourse under such a promise will always amount to rape. Each case must be examined individually, considering the specific facts and the surrounding circumstances of the situation. 10. 9. This Court views that not every instance of engaging in sexual relations with a woman under the promise of marriage constitutes rape. It cannot be universally stated that sexual intercourse under such a promise will always amount to rape. Each case must be examined individually, considering the specific facts and the surrounding circumstances of the situation. 10. A perusal of the record reveals that both the petitioner and the de facto complainant hold postgraduate medical degrees-the petitioner in Radiology and the complainant in Anesthesia. According to the complainant’s report, she developed an intimate relationship with the accused in March 2023, during their MD Anesthesia course at the same college. The petitioner gained intimacy by promising marriage and, on that pretext, engaged in sexual intercourse with her multiple times. Given their educational backgrounds, it can be inferred that both parties had full knowledge and understanding of their actions. The complainant lodged the report on 06.05,2025, indicating a substantial delay after the relationship began in 2023. Considering the significant delay in filing the complaint and the parties' educational qualifications, it is reasonable to conclude that they were likely aware of the consequences of their actions. 11. In Mahesh Damu. Khare V. The State of Maharashtra and Ors., MANU/SC/1252/2024 the Hon'ble Supreme Court, held that: 31. In our view if criminality is to be attached to such prolonged physical relationship at a very belated stage, it can lead to serious consequences. It will open the scope for imputing criminality to such long term relationships after turning sour, as such an allegation can be made even at a belated stage to drag a person in the juggernaut of stringent criminal process. There is always a danger of attributing criminal intent to an otherwise disturbed civil relationship of which the Court must also be mindful. 32. It is evident from the large number of cases decided by this Court dealing with similar matters as discussed above that there is a worrying trend that consensual relationships going on for prolonged period, upon turning sour, have been sought to be criminalised by invoking criminal jurisprudence. 12. In Maheshwar Tigga V. The State of Jharkhand, MANU/SC/O725/2020 the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: 20. 12. In Maheshwar Tigga V. The State of Jharkhand, MANU/SC/O725/2020 the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: 20. We have no hesitation in concluding that the consent of the prosecutrix was but a conscious and deliberated choice, as distinct from an involuntary action or denial and which opportunity was available to her, because of her deep-seated love for the Appellant leading her to willingly permit him liberties with her body, which according to normal human behaviour are permitted only to a person with whom one is deeply in love. 13. In Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar vs. The State of Maharashtra and ors., MANU/SC/1518/2018 the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: 20. Thus, there is a clear distinction between rape and consensual sex. The court, in such cases, must very carefully examine whether the complainant had actually wanted to marry the victim or had mala tide motives and had made a false promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the later falls within the ambit of cheating or deception. There is also a distinction between mere breach of a promise and not fulfilling a false promise. If the Accused has not made the promise with the sole intention to seduce the prosecutrix to indulge in sexual acts, such an act would not amount to rape. There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the Accused and not solely on account of the misconception created by Accused, or where an Accused, on account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her despite having every intention to do. Such cases must be treated differently. If the complainant had any mala fide intention and if he had clandestine motives, it is a clear case of rape. The acknowledged consensual physical relationship between the parties would not constitute an offence under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code. 14. The two paramount considerations, namely, the likelihood of the accused fleeing from justice and his tampering with prosecution evidence, relate to ensuring a fair case trial in the course of justice. Due and proper weight should be bestowed on these two factors apart from others. 15. In Pratap Singh V. State of Himachal Pradesh, MANU/HP/0646/2016, the High Court of Himachal Pradesh held that : 6. Due and proper weight should be bestowed on these two factors apart from others. 15. In Pratap Singh V. State of Himachal Pradesh, MANU/HP/0646/2016, the High Court of Himachal Pradesh held that : 6. Apart from that, did the petitioner ever promise to marry the prosecutrix at the first place is also a question that can only be determined during the course of trial, but these are not circumstances which can be said to be sufficient enough to curtail the liberty of the petitioner. Bail is the rule and jail the exception. 10. What would emerge from the conspectus of the aforesaid case law is that at the pro-conviction stage, there is a presumption of innocence. The object of keeping a person in custody is to ensure his availability to face the trial and to receive the sentence that may be passed. The detention is not supposed to be punitive or preventive. Seriousness of allegation or availability of material in support thereof are not the only considerations for declining bail. Another factor which has to be borne in mind is the delay in commencement and conclusion of trial, after all the accused cannot be kept in custody for indefinite period, that too at the pre-conviction stage, if the trial is not likely to be concluded within a reasonable time. 11. It is more than settled that the object of bill is to secure the attendance of the accused at the trial, and the proper test to be applied in the solution of the question whether bail should be granted or refused is whether it is probable that the party will appear to take his trial. Otherwise, bail is not to be withheld as a punishment. The Court has also to consider whether there is any possibility of the accused tampering with evidence or influencing witnesses etc. Once these tests are satisfied, bail should. be granted to an under trial which is also important as viewed from another angle, namely, an accused person who enjoys freedom is in a much better position to look after his case and to properly defend himself than if he was in custody. Thus, grant or non-grant of bail depends upon a variety of circumstances and the cumulative effect thereof enters into judicial verdict. Thus, grant or non-grant of bail depends upon a variety of circumstances and the cumulative effect thereof enters into judicial verdict. The Court stresses that any single circumstance cannot be treated as of universal validity or as necessarily justifying the grant or refusal of bail. 16. In Sanjay Chandra V. CBI, (2012)1 SCC 40 the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that : 21. In bail applications, generally, it has been laid down from the earliest times that the object of bail is to secure the appearance of the accused person at his trial by a reasonable amount of bail. The object of bail is neither punitive nor preventative. Deprivation of liberty must be considered a punishment unless it is required to ensure that an accused person will stand his trial when called upon. The courts owe more than verbal respect to the principle that punishment begins after conviction, and that every man is deemed to be innocent until duly tried and duly found guilty 22. From the earliest times, it was appreciated that detention in custody pending completion of the trial could be a cause of great hardship. From time to time, necessity demands that some unconvicted persons should be held in custody pending trial to secure their attendance at the trial but in such cases, "necessity" is the operative test. In this country, it would be quite contrary to the concept of personal liberty enshrined in the Constitution that any person should be punished in respect of any matter upon which he has not been convicted or that in any circumstances, he should be deprived of his liberty upon only the belief that he will tamper with the witnesses if left at liberty, save in the most extraordinary circumstances. 23. Apart from the question of prevention being the object of refusal of bail, one must not lose sight of the fact that imprisonment before conviction has a substantial punitive content. It would be improper for any court to refuse bail as a mark of disapproval of former conduct, whether the accused has been convicted for it or not, or to refuse bail to an unconvicted person for the purpose of giving him a taste of imprisonment as a lesson. 17. It would be improper for any court to refuse bail as a mark of disapproval of former conduct, whether the accused has been convicted for it or not, or to refuse bail to an unconvicted person for the purpose of giving him a taste of imprisonment as a lesson. 17. In State of Kerala vs. Raneef, MANU/SC/0001/2011, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that : In deciding bail applications an important factor which should certainly be taken into consideration by the Court is the delay in concluding the trial. Often this takes several years, and if the accused is denied bail but is ultimately acquitted, who will restore so many years of his life spent in custody? Is Article 21 of the Constitution, which is the most basic of all the fundamental rights in our Constitution, not violated in such a case? Of course this is not the only factor, but it is certainly one of the important factors in deciding whether to grant bail. 13. In the present case the Respondent has already spent 66 days in custody (as stated in paragraph 2 of his counter affidavit), and we see no reason why he should be denied bail. A doctor incarcerated for a long period may end up like Dr. Manette in Charles Dicken's novel 'A Tale of Two Cities', who forgot his profession and even his name in the Bastille. 18. At this stage, the allegations against the petitioner are subject to the trial's outcome. The trial is anticipated to take a considerable amount of time. Bail serves the purpose of allowing an accused to remain free until his guilt or innocence is determined. It is settled law that mere apprehension that the accused would tamper with the prosecution evidence or intimidate the witnesses cannot be a ground to refuse bail unless the prosecution shows that the accused tried for such tampering/intimidation. 19. The petitioner's continued preventive custody is based on an unsubstantiated suspicion that he might tamper with the evidence or influence witnesses. Given the penal provisions invoked vis-a-vis pre-trial custody, coupled with the prima facie analysis of the nature of allegations, and the other factors peculiar to this case, there would be no justifiability for further pre-trial incarceration at this stage, subject to the compliance with terms and conditions mentioned in this order. Given the penal provisions invoked vis-a-vis pre-trial custody, coupled with the prima facie analysis of the nature of allegations, and the other factors peculiar to this case, there would be no justifiability for further pre-trial incarceration at this stage, subject to the compliance with terms and conditions mentioned in this order. Given the same, the petitioner's release would not cause in any way hampering of investigation. 20. The material on record indicates that the petitioner has a permanent residence, with no reasonable concern of absconding and no prior criminal record. The trial's commencement remains uncertain as the investigation is still ongoing. There is no material to suggest that granting bail would obstruct justice. This Court finds no risk of the petitioner tampering with witnesses or hampering the investigation. The petitioner has been in judicial custody since 08.05.2025, by which time a significant portion of the investigation is likely complete. Given these circumstances, this Court concludes that releasing the petitioner on bail will not impede the investigation. However, due to the seriousness of the allegations, stringent conditions will be imposed to ensure the petitioner’s attendance throughout the investigation and trial. 21. For the reasons stated above, this court views that bail can be granted to the petitioner/accused with the following conditions.- (i) Petitioner/Accused shall be released on bail on executing a personal bond for Rs.50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand only) with two sureties for the like sum each to the satisfaction of the learned Principal Civil Judge (Junior Division)-Gum-Judicial First class Magistrate Court, Eluru. (ii) On such release, petitioner/accused shall appear before the investigating officer concerned once in a fortnight i.e., every lst Saturday between 10.00 AM and 05.00 PM, till filing of charge sheet. (iii) The petitioner/accused shall not, directly or indirectly, make any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him/her from disclosing such facts {o the Court or to any Investigating or Police Officer and shall cooperate with the investigating agency. 22. It is explicitly clarified that the observations made in this order are preliminary and pertain solely to the decision on the present application without indicating a stance on the case's merits. The Investigating Agency is free to investigate without being influenced by the observations in this order 23. Accordingly, the Criminal Petition is allowed. Miscellaneous applications, pending if any, shall stand closed.