ORDER : ASHOK KUMAR JAIN, J. S.B. Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 1444/2014 1. Instant civil miscellaneous appeal is preferred by appellant- claimants dis-satisfied from award date 26.11.2012 in MAC claim No. 57/2012 (1259/2009) (197/2012) passed by learned Additional District Judge No. 14, Jaipur Metro, Jaipur. 2. Office has pointed out a delay of 693 days and to substantiate the reasons of delay an application under Section 5 of Limitation Act is filed. 3. Learned counsel for appellant-claimants submits that after procuring the copy of the award, claimants have contacted the counsel for the appellant, but they were not aware about period of limitation, therefore, the delay was bona fide. 4. Aforesaid contentions were opposed by counsel for the insurance Company. 5. Considered submission of learned counsel for appellant and learned counsel for respondent-insurance company on condonation of delay. 6. Section 5 of the Limitation Act prescribes that any appeal or revision or an application may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the petitioner satisfies the Court on sufficient cause for not preferring an appeal or revision or making an application within prescribed period. 7. In case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag Vs. Katiji AIR 1987 SC 1353 , Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down the following principles to allow application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act:- 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "Every days delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hours delay. every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. 8. In case of Balwant Singh (dead) Vs. Jagdish Singh and Ors. 2010 (8) SCC 685 , Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering Section 5 of Limitation Act has referred the judgment in the case of Union of India Vs. Ram Charan, AIR 1964 SC 215 and observed that the explained delay should be clearly understood in contradistinction to inordinate unexplained delay. Delay is just one of the ingredients which has to be considered by the Court. In addition to this, the Court must also take into account the conduct of the parties, bona fide reasons for condonation of delay and whether such delay could easily be avoided by the applicant acting with normal care and caution. The statutory provisions mandate that applications for condonation of delay and applications belatedly filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation, should be rejected unless sufficient cause is shown for condonation of delay. The larger benches as well as equi- benches of Hon’ble Supreme Court have consistently followed these principles and have either allowed or declined to condone the delay in filing such applications. Thus, it is the requirement of law that these applications cannot be allowed as a matter of right and even in a routine manner. An applicant must essentially satisfy the above stated ingredients; then alone the Court would be inclined to condone the delay. 9. In the case of Brijesh Kumar & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors., (2014) 13 SCC 291 , while referring the judgment of Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & Ors., (2013) 12 SCC 649 , Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down that sufficient cause is a condition precedent for exercise of discretion by the Court for condonation of delay. The Supreme Court further observed that the Court cannot condone the delay, if it is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, and a delay cannot be condoned on sympathetic grounds. 10. The Supreme Court further observed that the Court cannot condone the delay, if it is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, and a delay cannot be condoned on sympathetic grounds. 10. Very recently condonation of delay under Section 5 of Limitation Act was considered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of P. Subba Reddy (died) by LRs. And Ors. Vs. Special Deputy Collector (LA), 2024 INSC 286 wherein also it was held that unless sufficient cause is shown the application under Section 5 of Limitation Act cannot be allowed. The underlying provisions after harmonious construction of provision of law were formulated in following manner:- (i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself; (ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time; (iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally; (iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act; (v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence; (vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal; (vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and (viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamount to disregarding the statutory provision. 11. 11. A perusal of application clearly indicate that claimants have not assigned any reason for condonation of delay. Moreover, the delay is more than 693 days and same is extraordinary delay. The appellants are required to show sufficient reasons, but they have failed to justify the grounds for condonation of delay, therefore, the application for condonation of delay is liable to be dismissed. 12. Consequently, the application under Section 5 of Limitation Act is hereby dismissed along with civil misc. appeal. 13. Misc. application(s), if any, stands disposed of. 14. No order as to costs. S.B. Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 668/2013 1. Dissatisfied from award dated 26.11.2012, the insurance company has filed instant appeal on the basis of excessive determination of award or compensation in favor of claimants. 2. Learned counsel for insurance company submits that learned Tribunal has committed serious error while not considering the issue of negligence and also while determining the compensation of death of Manohar Lal. He further submits that the accident was a result of crossing of road by Manohar Lal and it was his own negligence, which resulted into accident. He referred the age bracket and determination of income by the Tribunal and submits that the Tribunal has determined the income on wrong assumption. 3. Aforesaid contentions were opposed by learned counsel for claimants and he submits that the claimants have also filed an appeal for an enhancement as the Tribunal has failed to determine compensation on loss of earning capacity, future prospect and loss of consortium. He further submits that the Tribunal has determined the compensation on lower side and after considering the judgment in case of National Insurance Company Limited Vs. Pranay Sethi (2017) 16 SCC 680 , the impugned award is lower than just compensation. 4. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material placed on record. 5. After filing claim petition by claimants (legal heirs of deceased Manoharlal) the claimants have led evidence, both documentary and oral. AW-2 Mohan Lal was examined as an eye witness. A perusal of material on record, particularly evidence of AW2 clearly indicate that the involvement of vehicle insured with the insurance company was never doubted by anyone. The insurance company has not submitted any evidence to contradict claim of claimant for involvement of vehicle. The issue of negligence was considered by learned Tribunal on basis of evidence both oral and documentary. 6. The insurance company has not submitted any evidence to contradict claim of claimant for involvement of vehicle. The issue of negligence was considered by learned Tribunal on basis of evidence both oral and documentary. 6. Herein, a perusal of evidence as discussed by learned Tribunal clearly indicate that due to rash and negligent driving of driver of vehicle insured with the appellant-insurance company resulted into accident. The Tribunal has not found any negligence on the part of deceased and we agree with findings recorded by the Tribunal, therefore, the contention of the counsel for insurance company cannot be accepted that the accident was a result of negligence or contributory negligence of deceased Manohar Lal. The claimants have claimed that this appellant was working in fabric printing firm and was earning as Rs.12,000/- to 15,000/- per month. There is no contrary evidence to rebut the evidence of claimants on this issue. 7. Learned Tribunal after considering the evidence and documents has found that the age of deceased was 44 years and he was in age group was 40-45 years. Learned Tribunal after considering the job of deceased has determined RS.200/- per day as income of deceased and further added 30% as future prospects. 8. Having considered the judgment in case of Sarla Verma & Ors vs Delhi Transport Corp.& Anr AIR 2009 (6) SCC 121 , National Insurance Company Limited Vs. Pranay Sethi (2017) 16 SCC 680 , R. Valli Vs. Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation Ltd. (2022) 5 SCC 107 and Magma General Insurance Company Ltd. Vs, Nanu Ram @ Chuhru Ram and Ors. (2018) 18 SCC 130 the compensation determined by learned Tribunal on death of Manohar appears to be reasonable and just, therefore the objections about determination of compensation by the Tribunal is not tenable. 9. In view of discussions made hereinabove, the appeal sans merits and liable to be dismissed. 10. As a result, Civil Misc. appeal Nos. 1444/2014 and 668/2013 are hereby dismissed along with pending application(s), if any.