JUDGMENT : (Rakesh Kainthla, J.) The petitioners have filed the present petition for quashing of F.I.R. No. 26 of 2020, dated 26.02.2020, registered at Police Station Kihar, Tehsil Salooni, District Chamba, H.P., for the commission of offences punishable under Section 420 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and consequential proceedings arising out of the F.I.R. 2. Briefly stated, the brief facts giving rise to the present petition are that informant/respondent No. 4 made a complaint to the police, asserting that he was executing the work of construction of the Bhandal Panoga Bridge over the river Siul. He entered into an agreement with the present petitioners for the fabrication, launching, erection and transportation of steel up to the site for Rs.64,00,000. He transferred Rs.15 lakhs to the petitioners. The petitioners assured the informant that they would complete the work within 135 days. However, the petitioners did not pick up the phone after receiving the money. The department imposed a penalty of Rs.14,00,000 and withheld the money due to the informant. The informant made a complaint to the police station, Kihar on 23.01.2020. The petitioners visited the police station in Kihar and admitted their fault. They agreed to bring the fabricated steel worth Rs.20 lakhs within 20 days. They also agreed to compensate the informant for his financial loss. The petitioners did not honour their promise and did not pick up the phone. They caused a loss of Rs.50,00,000 to the informant. The Police registered the F.I.R. and conducted the investigation. 3. Being aggrieved by the registration of the F.I.R., The petitioners have filed the present petition for quashing the F.I.R. and consequential proceedings arising out of it. It was asserted that F.I.R. and criminal proceedings arising out of it amount to an abuse of the process of the law. The petitioners repeatedly requested the informant to complete the civil work, but he failed to do so. The petitioners visited the site repeatedly and shifted the machinery with Rs.50 lakhs to Salooni. They could not execute the work because the site was not ready as per the agreed terms and conditions. The parties entered into an agreement on 23 rd January 2020, and the informant agreed to complete the civil work. The dispute between the parties is purely civil. It is related to the specific performance of the agreement executed between the parties. The parties entered into an agreement on 23 rd January 2020, and the informant agreed to complete the civil work. The dispute between the parties is purely civil. It is related to the specific performance of the agreement executed between the parties. There was no dishonest intention on the part of the petitioners. They could not execute the work because the informant failed to complete the civil work. The petitioners had filed CrMMO number 1257/2022, which was dismissed for non- prosecution on 28 th December 2023. The dismissal of the earlier petition does not have any effect on the present petition. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the F.I.R. and consequential proceedings arising out of the same be quashed. 4. The petition is opposed by respondents Nos. 1 to 3 by filing a reply making a preliminary submission regarding the lack of maintainability. The contents of the petition were denied on merits; however, it was admitted that an F.I.R. was registered against the petitioners. It was asserted that the petitioners failed to fulfil their part of the contract and cheated the informant. The police conducted an investigation and found sufficient reasons to file the chargesheet against the petitioner. The matter was listed before the Court on 6 th July 2024 for the service of the petitioners. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 5. A rejoinder denying the contents of the reply and affirming those of the petition was filed. 6. I have heard M/s R.L. Chaudhary and H.R. Sidhu, learned counsel for the petitioners, and Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for respondent Nos. 1 to 3/State. 7. Mr R.L. Chaudhary, learned counsel for the petitioners, submitted that the dispute between the parties is civil and relates to the specific performance of the agreement. The informant failed to perform his part of the agreement. The petitioners could not execute the steelwork without the civil work. There is no material on record to show that the intention of the petitioners was dishonest from the beginning. The continuation of the proceedings amounts to an abuse of the process of law. The dismissal of the earlier petition will not affect the present petition. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the F.I.R. and consequential proceedings arising out of the same be quashed. The continuation of the proceedings amounts to an abuse of the process of law. The dismissal of the earlier petition will not affect the present petition. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the F.I.R. and consequential proceedings arising out of the same be quashed. He relied upon Naresh Kumar vs State of Karnataka 2024 INSC 196 , Sarabjit Kaur vs State of Punjab Cr. A. no. 581 of 2023 decided on 01.03.2023, Deepak Gaba vs State of U.P. 2023 (3) SCC 423 and Vinod Kumar vs Union of India Writ Petition (Civil) no. 255 of 2021 decided on 29.06.2021 in support of his submission. 8. Mr Lokender Kutlheria, learned Additional Advocate General for respondent nos. 1 to 3/State, submitted that the petitioners had taken money from the informant and failed to execute the work undertaken to be executed by them. They had a dishonest intention right from the beginning, which is evident from the fact that they did not pick up the phone after getting the money from the informant. The challan has been filed before the Competent Court, and this court should not exercise its inherent jurisdiction. The petitioners had filed a similar petition earlier, which was dismissed, and the present petition is not maintainable without a change in circumstances. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 9. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 10. The law relating to quashing of FIR was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: - “7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarized some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words: “102. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarized some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added) 8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case. In clause (1) it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed. As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed. Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed.” 11. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed: “8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice. 9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations : ( i ) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; ( ii ) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; ( iii no prima facie offence is made out; ( iv ) the dispute is civil in nature; ( v. ) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and ( vi ) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably ( State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 12. The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 13. Mr. R L Chaudhary, learned counsel for the petitioners, heavily relied upon the photocopy of the agreement to submit that the present case involves a breach of the agreement, and there is no cheating. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in MCD v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi, (1983) 1 SCC 1: 1983 SCC (Cri) 115 that the proceedings can be quashed on the face of the complaint and the papers accompanying the same, no offence is constituted. It is not permissible to add or subtract anything. It was observed: “10. It is, therefore, manifestly clear that proceedings against an accused in the initial stages can be quashed only if, on the face of the complaint or the papers accompanying the same, no offence is constituted. It is not permissible to add or subtract anything. It was observed: “10. It is, therefore, manifestly clear that proceedings against an accused in the initial stages can be quashed only if, on the face of the complaint or the papers accompanying the same, no offence is constituted. In other words, the test is that taking the allegations and the complaint as they are, without adding or subtracting anything, if no offence is made out, then the High Court will be justified in quashing the proceedings in exercise of its powers under Section 482 of the present Code.” 14. Madras High Court also held in Ganga Bai v. Shriram, 1990 SCC OnLine MP 213: ILR 1992 MP 964: 1991 Cri LJ 2018 , that the fresh evidence is not permissible or desirable in the proceedings under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. It was observed: “Proceedings under Section 482, Cr.P.C. cannot be allowed to be converted into a full-dressed trial. Shri Maheshwari filed a photostat copy of an order dated 28.7.1983, passed in Criminal Case No. 1005 of 1977, to which the present petitioner was not a party. Fresh evidence at this stage is neither permissible nor desirable. The respondent, by filing this document, is virtually introducing additional evidence, which is not the object of Section 482, Cr.P.C.” 15. Andhra Pradesh High Court also took a similar view in Bharat Metal Box Company Limited, Hyderabad and Others vs. G. K. Strips Private Limited and another, 2004 STPL 43 AP , and held: “9. This Court can only look into the complaint and the documents filed along with it, and the sworn statements of the witnesses, if any recorded. While judging the correctness of the proceedings, it cannot look into the documents, which were not filed before the lower Court. Section 482 Cr.PC debars the Court to look into fresh documents, in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa and another, 2002 (1) Supreme 192 . The relevant portion of the said judgment reads as follows: "The complaint has to be read as a whole. Section 482 Cr.PC debars the Court to look into fresh documents, in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa and another, 2002 (1) Supreme 192 . The relevant portion of the said judgment reads as follows: "The complaint has to be read as a whole. If it appears that on consideration of the allegations, in the light of the statement made on oath of the complainant that the ingredients of the offence or offences are disclosed and there is no material to show that the complaint is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious, in that event there would be no justification for interference by the High Court. When information is lodged at the Police Station and an offence is registered, then the mala fides of the informant would be of secondary importance. It is the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in Court which decides the fate of the accused person. The allegations of mala fides against the informant are of no consequence and cannot by itself be the basis for quashing the proceedings". 16. A similar view was taken in Mahendra K.C. v. State of Karnataka, (2022) 2 SCC 129 : (2022) 1 SCC (Cri) 401, wherein it was observed at page 142: “16. … the test to be applied is whether the allegations in the complaint, as they stand, without adding or detracting from the complaint, prima facie establish the ingredients of the offence alleged. At this stage, the High Court cannot test the veracity of the allegations, nor, for that matter, can it proceed in the manner that a judge conducting a trial would, based on the evidence collected during the course of the trial.” 17. This position was reiterated in Supriya Jain v. State of Haryana, (2023) 7 SCC 711 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 765, wherein it was held: 13. All these documents which the petitioner seeks to rely on, if genuine, could be helpful for her defence at the trial, but the same are not material at the stage of deciding whether quashing as prayed for by her before the High Court was warranted or not. We, therefore, see no reason to place any reliance on these three documents. 18. We, therefore, see no reason to place any reliance on these three documents. 18. A similar view was taken in Iveco Magirus Brandschutztechnik GMBH v. Nirmal Kishore Bhartiya, (2024) 2 SCC 86: (2024) 1 SCC (Cri) 512: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1258, wherein it was observed: “63. Adverting to the aspect of the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Courts under Section 482CrPC, in a case where the offence of defamation is claimed by the accused to have not been committed based on any of the Exceptions and a prayer for quashing is made, the law seems to be well settled that the High Courts can go no further and enlarge the scope of inquiry if the accused seeks to rely on materials which were not there before the Magistrate. This is based on the simple proposition that what the Magistrate could not do, the High Courts may not do. We may not be understood to undermine the High Courts' powers saved by Section 482CrPC; such powers are always available to be exercised ex debito justitiae , i.e. to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone the High Courts exist. However, the tests laid down for quashing an FIR or criminal proceedings arising from a police report by the High Courts in the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482CrPC not being substantially different from the tests laid down for quashing a process issued under Section 204 read with Section 200, the High Courts on recording due satisfaction are empowered to interfere if on a reading of the complaint, the substance of statements on oath of the complainant and the witness, if any, and documentary evidence as produced, no offence is made out and that proceedings, if allowed to continue, would amount to an abuse of the legal process. This, too, would be impermissible if the justice of a given case does not overwhelmingly so demand.” (Emphasis supplied) 19. Therefore, it is not permissible to look into the material filed by the petitioners with the petition, and the Court has to rely upon the material brought before the learned Trial Court. The authenticity of the agreement filed with the petition has not been established, and it is impermissible to rely upon it to quash the FIR. 20. In any case, this agreement was executed subsequently and will not affect the initial transaction. 21. The authenticity of the agreement filed with the petition has not been established, and it is impermissible to rely upon it to quash the FIR. 20. In any case, this agreement was executed subsequently and will not affect the initial transaction. 21. The ingredients of cheating were explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in S.W. Palanitkar v. State of Bihar (2002) 1 SCC 241 as under: “10. The ingredients of an offence of cheating are: (i there should be fraudulent or dishonest inducement of a person by deceiving him, (ii)(a) the person so deceived should be induced to deliver any property to any person or to consent that any person shall retain any property; or (b) the person so deceived should be intentionally induced to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived; and (iii) in cases covered by (ii)(b), the act of omission should be one which causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to the person induced in body, mind, reputation or property. 11. One of us (D.P. Mohapatra, J.), speaking for the Bench, in HridayaRanjan Prasad Verma v. State of Bihar [(2000) 4 SCC 168: 2000 SCC (Cri) 786 ] on facts of that case, has expressed thus: (SCC p. 177, para 15) “15. In determining the question, it has to be kept in mind that the distinction between mere breach of contract and the offence of cheating is a fine one. It depends upon the intention of the accused at the time of inducement, which may be judged by his subsequent conduct, but this subsequent conduct is not the sole test. Mere breach of contract cannot give rise to criminal prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown right at the beginning of the transaction, that is, the time when the offence is said to have been committed. Therefore, it is the intention which is the gist of the offence. To hold a person guilty of cheating, it is necessary to show that he had a fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making the promise. From his mere failure to keep up a promise subsequently, such a culpable intention right at the beginning, that is, when he made the promise, cannot be presumed.” (emphasis supplied) 12. To hold a person guilty of cheating, it is necessary to show that he had a fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making the promise. From his mere failure to keep up a promise subsequently, such a culpable intention right at the beginning, that is, when he made the promise, cannot be presumed.” (emphasis supplied) 12. Finding that the ingredients of the offence of cheating and its allied offences had not been made out, this Court interfered with the order of the High Court and quashed the criminal proceedings. 13. In G.V. Rao v. L.H.V. Prasad [ (2000) 3 SCC 693 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 733], this Court in para 7 has stated thus: (SCC pp. 696-97) “7. As mentioned above, Section 415 has two parts. While in the first part, the person must ‘dishonestly’ or ‘fraudulently’ induce the complainant to deliver any property; in the second part, the person should intentionally induce the complainant to do or omit to do a thing. That is to say, in the first part, inducement must be dishonest or fraudulent. In the second part, the inducement should be intentional. As observed by this Court in Jaswantrai Manilal Akhaney v. State of Bombay [ AIR 1956 SC 575 : 1956 Cri LJ 1116], a guilty intention is an essential ingredient of the offence of cheating. In order, therefore, to secure the conviction of a person for the offence of cheating, ‘mens rea’ on the part of that person must be established. It was also observed in Mahadeo Prasad v. State of W.B. [ AIR 1954 SC 724 : 1954 Cri LJ 1806] that in order to constitute the offence of cheating, the intention to deceive should be in existence at the time when the inducement was offered.”(emphasis supplied) 14. In Trisuns Chemical Industry v. Rajesh Agarwal [(1999) 8 SCC 686: 2000 SCC (Cri) 47] dealing with the effect of existence of arbitration clause in the agreement on criminal prosecution on the ground that civil proceedings are also maintainable, this Court has held that quashing of FIR or a complaint exercising power under Section 482 CrPC should be limited to a very extreme exception; merely because an act has a civil profile is not enough to stop action on the criminal side. It is further held that a provision made in the agreement for referring the disputes to arbitration is not an effective substitute for a criminal prosecution when the disputed act constitutes a criminal offence. 22. A similar view was taken in G.V. Rao v. L.H.V. Prasad (2000) 3 SCC 693 as under: “4. Cheating” is defined in Section 415 of the Penal Code, 1860, which provides as under: “415. Cheating.—Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to ‘cheat’. Explanation.—A dishonest concealment of facts is a deception within the meaning of this section.” 5. The High Court quashed the proceedings principally on the ground that Chapter XVII of the Penal Code, 1860 deals with the offences against properties and, therefore, Section 415 must also necessarily relate to the property which, in the instant case, is not involved and, consequently, the FIR was liable to be quashed. The broad proposition on which the High Court proceeded is not correct. While the first part of the definition relates to property, the second part does not necessarily relate to property. The second part is reproduced below: “415. … intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to ‘cheat’.” 6. This part speaks of intentional deception, which must be intended not only to induce the person deceived to do or omit to do something but also to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property. The intentional deception presupposes the existence of a dominant motive of the person making the inducement. This part speaks of intentional deception, which must be intended not only to induce the person deceived to do or omit to do something but also to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property. The intentional deception presupposes the existence of a dominant motive of the person making the inducement. Such inducement should have led the person deceived or induced to do or omit to do anything which he would not have done or omitted to do if he were not deceived. The further requirement is that such an act or omission should have caused damage or harm to the body, mind, reputation or property. 7. As mentioned above, Section 415 has two parts. While in the first part, the person must “dishonestly” or “fraudulently” induce the complainant to deliver any property; in the second part, the person should intentionally induce the complainant to do or omit to do a thing. That is to say, in the first part, inducement must be dishonest or fraudulent. In the second part, the inducement should be intentional. As observed by this Court in Jaswantrai Manilal Akhaney v. State of Bombay [ AIR 1956 SC 575 : 1956 Cri LJ 1116: 1956 SCR 483 ], a guilty intention is an essential ingredient of the offence of cheating. In order, therefore, to secure the conviction of a person for the offence of cheating, “mens rea” on the part of that person must be established. It was also observed in Mahadeo Prasad v. State of W.B. [ AIR 1954 SC 724 : 1954 Cri LJ 1806] that in order to constitute the offence of cheating, the intention to deceive should be in existence at the time when the inducement was offered. 8. Thus, so far as the second part of Section 415 is concerned, “property”, at no stage, is involved. Here, it is the doing of an act or omission to do an act by the complainant as a result of intentional inducement by the accused, which is material. Such inducement should result in the doing of an act or omission to do an act as a result of which the person concerned should have suffered or was likely to suffer damage or harm in body, mind, reputation or property. Such inducement should result in the doing of an act or omission to do an act as a result of which the person concerned should have suffered or was likely to suffer damage or harm in body, mind, reputation or property. In an old decision of the Allahabad High Court in Empress v. Sheoram [(1882) 2 AWN 237] , it was held by Mahmood, J.: “That to palm off a young woman as belonging to a caste different to the one to which she really belongs, with the object of obtaining money, amounts to the offence of cheating by personation as defined in Section 416 of the Penal Code, 1860, which must be read in the light of the preceding Section 415.” 23. This position was reiterated in Deepak Gaba v. State of U.P. , (2023) 3 SCC 423 : (2023) 1 SCC (Cri) 714: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 3 wherein it was observed at page 433: 18. In order to apply Section 420 IPC, namely, cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property, the ingredients of Section 415 IPC have to be satisfied. To constitute an offence of cheating under Section 415 IPC, a person should be induced, either fraudulently or dishonestly, to deliver any property to any person, or consent that any person shall retain any property. The second class of acts set forth in the section is the intentional inducement of doing or omitting to do anything which the person deceived would not do or omit to do, if she were not so deceived. Thus, the sine qua non of Section 415 IPC is “fraudulence”, “dishonesty”, or “intentional inducement”, and the absence of these elements would debase the offence of cheating. [ Iridium India Telecom Ltd. v. Motorola Inc., (2011) 1 SCC 74 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1201 19. Explaining the contours, this Court in Mohd. Ibrahim v. State of Bihar [Mohd. Ibrahim v. State of Bihar, (2009) 8 SCC 751 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 929 . This Court, in this case, has cautioned that the ratio should not be misunderstood, to record the clarification, which in the present case, in our opinion, is not of any avail and help to the Respondent 2 complainant. We respectfully concur with the clarification as well as the ratio explaining Sections 415, 464, etc. This Court, in this case, has cautioned that the ratio should not be misunderstood, to record the clarification, which in the present case, in our opinion, is not of any avail and help to the Respondent 2 complainant. We respectfully concur with the clarification as well as the ratio explaining Sections 415, 464, etc. IPC.], observed that for the offence of cheating, there should not only be cheating, but as a consequence of such cheating, the accused should also have dishonestly adduced the person deceived to deliver any property to a person; or to make, alter, or destroy, wholly or in part, a valuable security, or anything signed or sealed and which is capable of being converted into a valuable security. 24. It was held in Naresh Kumar v. State of Karnataka, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 268, that mere breach of contract does not give rise to criminal liability unless there is a fraudulent intention from the beginning. It was observed: 8. Essentially, the present dispute between the parties relates to a breach of contract. A mere breach of contract, by one of the parties, would not attract prosecution for criminal offence in every case, as held by this Court in Sarabjit Kaur v. State of Punjab, (2023) 5 SCC 360 Similarly, dealing with the distinction between the offence of cheating and a mere breach of contractual obligations, this Court, in Vesa Holdings (P) Ltd. v. State of Kerala, (2015) 8 SCC 293 , has held that every breach of contract would not give rise to the offence of cheating, and it is required to be shown that the accused had fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making the promise. 25. The informant specifically stated in the FIR that the petitioners did not honour their promise and did not pick up their phones after getting the money. These averments prima facie show that the petitioners had a dishonest intention right from the beginning, and that is why they failed to pick up the phone after getting the money from the informant. They made a representation to the informant that they would execute the steelwork and obtained Rs.15,00,000 from him. They failed to honour their promise. Hence, the ingredients of Section 420 of the IPC are prima facie satisfied. 26. They made a representation to the informant that they would execute the steelwork and obtained Rs.15,00,000 from him. They failed to honour their promise. Hence, the ingredients of Section 420 of the IPC are prima facie satisfied. 26. It was submitted that allegations in the F.I.R. are false, and the informant had failed to execute the civil work. This submission will not help the petitioner. It was laid down in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643, that the Court exercising inherent jurisdiction to quash the FIR cannot go into the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations. It was observed : - “13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if taken at their face value, must disclose the commission of an offence and make out a case against the accused. At the cost of repetition, in the present case, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, even if taken at their face value, do not disclose the commission of an offence or make out a case against the accused. We are of the considered view that the present case would fall under Category-3 of the categories enumerated by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra) 14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706 : 2018 INSC 1060 “ 14. First, we would like to deal with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that once the charge sheet is filed, the petition for quashing of the FIR is untenable. First, we would like to deal with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that once the charge sheet is filed, the petition for quashing of the FIR is untenable. We do not see any merit in this submission, keeping in mind the position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23] In Joseph Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court while deciding the question of whether the High Court could entertain the Section 482 petition for quashing of FIR when the charge-sheet was filed by the police during the pendency of the Section 482 petition, observed: (SCC p. 63, para 16) “16. Thus, the general conspectus of the various sections under which the appellant is being charged and is to be prosecuted would show that the same is not made out even prima facie from the complainant's FIR. Even if the charge sheet had been filed, the learned Single Judge [ Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365 ] could have still examined whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant were prima facie made out from the complainant's FIR, charge-sheet, documents, etc. or not.” 27. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dharambeer Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2025) 1 SCC 392 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1894 that the Court, while exercising jurisdiction under section 482 of CrPC, cannot conduct a mini-trial. It was observed at page 397: “17. This Court, in a series of judgments, has held that while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the High Court is not supposed to hold a mini-trial. A profitable reference can be made to the judgment in CBI v. Aryan Singh [CBI v. Aryan Singh, (2023) 18 SCC 399 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 379 ]. The relevant paragraph from the judgment is extracted hereunder: (SCC paras 6-7) 6. … As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings, while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court is not required to conduct the mini-trial. … 7. The relevant paragraph from the judgment is extracted hereunder: (SCC paras 6-7) 6. … As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings, while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court is not required to conduct the mini-trial. … 7. … At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court has very limited jurisdiction and is required to consider ‘whether any sufficient material is available to proceed further against the accused for which the accused is required to be tried or not’.” 28. Hence, it is not permissible for the Court to go into the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR. 29. It is undisputed that the petitioner had filed a petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. previously, which was dismissed. It was submitted that the mere dismissal of the earlier petition will not affect the present petition. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Supdt. and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs v. Mohan Singh , (1975) 3 SCC 706 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 156: 1974 SCC OnLine SC 306 , that the High Court can entertain a subsequent petition in case of a change in circumstances. It was observed at page 708: 2. The main question debated before us was whether the High Court had jurisdiction to make the order dated April 7, 1970, quashing the proceeding against Respondents 1, 2 and 3 when, on an earlier application made by the first respondent, the High Court had by its order dated December 12, 1968, refused to quash the proceeding. Mr Chatterjee, on behalf of the State, strenuously contended that the High Court was not competent to entertain the subsequent application of Respondents 1 and 2 and make the order dated April 7, 1970, quashing the proceeding because that was tantamount to a review of its earlier order by the High Court, which was outside the jurisdiction of the High Court to do. He relied on two decisions of the Punjab and Orissa High Courts in support of his contention, namely, Hoshiar Singh v. State [AIR 1958 Punj 312: 60 Punj LR 438: 1958 Cri LJ 1093] and Namdeo Sindhi v. State [ AIR 1958 Ori 20 : 1958 Cri LJ 67: ILR 57 Cut 355] . He relied on two decisions of the Punjab and Orissa High Courts in support of his contention, namely, Hoshiar Singh v. State [AIR 1958 Punj 312: 60 Punj LR 438: 1958 Cri LJ 1093] and Namdeo Sindhi v. State [ AIR 1958 Ori 20 : 1958 Cri LJ 67: ILR 57 Cut 355] . But we fail to see how these decisions can be of any help to him in his contention. They deal with a situation where an attempt was made to persuade the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction to reopen an earlier order passed by it in appeal or revision, finally disposing of a criminal proceeding, and it was held that the High Court had no jurisdiction to revise its earlier order, because the power of revision could be exercised only against an order of a subordinate court. Mr Chatterjee also relied on a decision of this Court in U.J.S. Chopra v. State of Bombay [ AIR 1955 SC 633 : (1955) 2 SCR 94: 1955 Cri LJ 1410] where N.H. Bhagwati, J., speaking on behalf of himself and Imam, J., observed that once a judgment has been pronounced by the High Court either in the exercise of its appellate or its revisional jurisdiction, no review or revision can be entertained against that judgment and there is no provision in the Criminal Procedure Code which would enable the High Court to review the same or to exercise revisional jurisdiction over the same. These observations were sought to be explained by Mr Mukherjee on behalf of the first respondent by saying that they should not be read as laying down any general proposition excluding the applicability of Section 561-A in respect of an order made by the High Court in exercise of its appellate or revisional jurisdiction even if the conditions attracting the applicability of that section were satisfied in respect of such order, because that was not the question before the Court in that case and the Court was not concerned to inquire whether the High Court can in exercise of its inherent power under Section 5 61 A review an earlier order made by it in exercise of its appellate or revisional jurisdiction. The question as to the scope and ambit of the inherent power of the High Court under Section 561-A vis-a-vis an earlier order made by it was, therefore, not concluded by this decision, and the matter was resolved so far as this Court is concerned. Mr Mukherjee cited in support of this contention three decisions, namely, Raj Narain v. State [ AIR 1959 All 315 : 1959 Cri LJ 543: 1959 All LJ 56], Lal Singh v. State [AIR 1970 Punj 32: 1970 Cri LJ 267: ILR (1970) 1 Punj 177] and Ramvallabh Jha v. State of Bihar [AIR 1962 Pat 417: (1962) 2 Cri LJ 625: 1962 BLJR 553] . It is, however, not necessary for us to examine the true effect of these observations as they have no application because the present case is not one where the High Court was invited to revise or review an earlier order made by it in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, finally disposing of a criminal proceeding. Here, the situation is wholly different. The earlier application, which was rejected by the High Court, was an application under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash the proceeding, and the High Court rejected it on the ground that the evidence was yet to be led and it was not desirable to interfere with the proceeding at that stage. But, thereafter, the criminal case dragged on for a period of about one and a half years without any progress at all, and it was in these circumstances that Respondents 1 and 2 were constrained to make a fresh application to the High Court under Section 561-A to quash the proceeding. It is difficult to see how, in these circumstances, it could ever be contended that what the High Court was being asked to do by making the subsequent application was to review or revise the order made by it on the earlier application. Section 561-A preserves the inherent power of the High Court to make such orders as it deems fit to prevent abuse of the process of the Court or to secure the ends of justice, and the High Court must, therefore, exercise its inherent powers having regard to the situation prevailing at the particular point of time when its inherent jurisdiction is sought to be invoked. The High Court was, in the circumstances, entitled to entertain the subsequent application of Respondents 1 and 2 and consider whether, on the facts and circumstances then, obtaining the continuance of the proceeding against the respondents constituted an abuse of the process of the Court or its quashing was necessary to secure the ends of justice. The facts and circumstances obtained at the time of the subsequent application of Respondents 1 and 2 were clearly different from what they were at the time of the earlier application of the first respondent because, despite the rejection of the earlier application of the first respondent, the prosecution had failed to make any progress in the criminal case even though it was filed as far back as 1965 and the criminal case rested where it was for a period of over one and half years. It was for this reason that, despite the earlier order dated December 12, 1968, the High Court proceeded to consider the subsequent application of Respondents 1 and 2 for the purpose of deciding whether it should exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 561-A. This the High Court was perfectly entitled to do, and we do not see any jurisdictional infirmity in the order of the High Court. Even on the merits, we find that the order of the High Court was justified as no prima facie case appears to have been made out against Respondents 1 and 2.” (Emphasis supplied) 30. It was held in R. Annapurna v. Ramadugu Anantha Krishna Sastry, (2002) 10 SCC 401: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1135: 2000 SCC OnLine SC 1143 that where no development had taken place after the rejection of the earlier petition, the second petition is not maintainable. It was observed: “6. There can be no two opinions that the order dated 28-1-1995 has become final. Learned counsel for the respondents made an endeavour to show that it is open to the same parties to move the High Court once again on causes which developed subsequent to 28-1-1995. We are not considering that contention in the present case, for the second petition for quashing was not made on the strength of anything which developed subsequent to 28- 1-1995 but only on the facts which subsisted before that date. We are not considering that contention in the present case, for the second petition for quashing was not made on the strength of anything which developed subsequent to 28- 1-1995 but only on the facts which subsisted before that date. If that be so, the High Court had no power to upset the order dated 28-1-1995 with the help of any subsequent order, though in this case, the High Court did so without being informed of the prior order.” 31. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bhisham Lal Verma v. State of U.P., 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1399 that a person approaching the High Court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. should take all the pleas, and it is impermissible to file the petitions in piecemeal. It was observed: “10. In S. Madan Kumar v. K. Arjunan 2006 SCC OnLine Mad 94 , the Madras High Court observed that a person who invokes Section 482 Cr. P.C. should honestly come before the Court raising all the pleas available to him at that point of time, and he is not supposed to approach the Court with instalment pleas. It was further observed that there may be a change of circumstances during the course of criminal proceedings which would give scope for the person aggrieved to invoke the inherent jurisdiction of the Court, but when he is posted with all the facts and circumstances of a case, he cannot withhold part of it for the purpose of filing yet another petition seeking the same relief. 11. We are in complete agreement with these observations of the Madras High Court. Though it is clear that there can be no blanket rule that a second petition under Section 482 Cr. P.C. would not lie in any situation and it would depend upon the facts and circumstances of the individual case, it is not open to a person aggrieved to raise one plea after the other, by invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 Cr. P.C., though all such pleas were very much available even at the first instance. Permitting the filing of successive petitions under Section 482 Cr. P.C., ignoring this principle, would enable an ingenious accused to effectively stall the proceedings against him to suit his own interest and convenience, by filing one petition after another under Section 482 Cr. P.C., though all such pleas were very much available even at the first instance. Permitting the filing of successive petitions under Section 482 Cr. P.C., ignoring this principle, would enable an ingenious accused to effectively stall the proceedings against him to suit his own interest and convenience, by filing one petition after another under Section 482 Cr. P.C., irrespective of when the cause thereof arose. Such abuse of process cannot be permitted. 32. A similar view was taken in Naushad Ahmad Ansari vs. State of Uttarakhand SLP (Crl) No. 9111 of 2022 decided on 12.12.2024 wherein it was observed: “8. It is a matter of record that a previous petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. stood dismissed, and an appeal against such dismissal to this Court was also dismissed. The law on this point is well-settled. The dismissal of a previous petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. does not bar a subsequent petition, under the said Section, from being entertained, if the facts so justify. (see Vinod Kumar v. Union of India, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 559 and Supdt. and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs v. Mohan Singh, (1975) 3 SCC 706 ) The record is silent as to which facts persuaded the High Court to exercise its jurisdiction for a second time when one such petition already stood dismissed and such order, confirmed by this Court. It has been treated like an application coming up at the first instance. Such an approach is not justified.” 33. Similar is the judgment in Muskan Enterprises v. State of Punjab, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4107, wherein it was observed: “18. Recently, this Court in Bhisham Lal Verma v. State of U.P. 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1399 has again held that there is no blanket rule against the filing of successive petitions under section 482, Cr. P.C. before the high court. It was also held that if such a petition is filed, it must be seen whether there was any change in facts or circumstances necessitating the filing of such a petition.” 34. A similar view was taken in Vinod Kumar v. Union of India, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 559, wherein it was observed: “4. P.C. before the high court. It was also held that if such a petition is filed, it must be seen whether there was any change in facts or circumstances necessitating the filing of such a petition.” 34. A similar view was taken in Vinod Kumar v. Union of India, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 559, wherein it was observed: “4. The law on point as held by this Court in “ Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Mohan Singh” reported in (1975) 3 SCC 706 is clear that dismissal of an earlier 482 petition does not bar the filing of a subsequent petition under Section 482, in case the facts so justify.” 35. In the present case, the petition does not mention any change in the circumstances, and the present petition is not maintainable. 36. A charge sheet has been filed before the Court. The learned Trial Court is seized of the matter. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Iqbal v. State of U.P. , (2023) 8 SCC 734: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 949 that when the charge sheet has been filed, the learned Trial Court should be left to appreciate the same. It was observed: “At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the investigation has been completed and the charge sheet is ready to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the FIR do not inspire any confidence, particularly in the absence of any specific date, time, etc. of the alleged offences, we are of the view that the appellants should prefer a discharge application before the trial court under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). We say so because even according to the State, the investigation is over and the charge sheet is ready to be filed before the competent court. In such circumstances, the trial court should be allowed to look into the materials which the investigating officer might have collected forming part of the charge sheet. If any such discharge application is filed, the trial court shall look into the materials and take a call whether any discharge case is made out or not.” 37. The FIR discloses the commission of cognizable offences; hence, it cannot be quashed at this stage. 38. No other point was urged. 39. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and the same stands dismissed. The FIR discloses the commission of cognizable offences; hence, it cannot be quashed at this stage. 38. No other point was urged. 39. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and the same stands dismissed. 40. The observations made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case.