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2025 DIGILAW 851 (KAR)

Muddegowdara Veerabhadrappa v. G. M. Virupakshappa S/o Shri Maheshwarappa

2025-07-08

ANU SIVARAMAN, K.MANMADHA RAO

body2025
JUDGMENT : ANU SIVARAMAN, J. 1. The Commercial Appeal as well as the Miscellaneous First Appeal arise out of the Order dated 05.01.2021 passed in A.S.No.4/2018, by the Principal District and Sessions Judge at Davanagere (hereinafter referred to as the 'trial Court'). 2. Heard Shri. Arun B.M, learned counsel appearing for the appellants in COMAP No.68/2021 and respondents No.2 and 3 in MFA No.1654/2021. Shri. Unnikrishnan M, learned counsel appearing for respondents No.1 and 2 in COMAP No.68/2021 and appellants No.1 and 2 in MFA No.1654/2021 and Shri. Shivashankar S.K, learned counsel appearing for respondents No.3(a) and (b) in COMAP No.68/2021 and appellants No.3(a) and (b) in MFA No.1654/2021. 3. For the purpose of convenience, the parties are referred to in this judgment as per their ranking before the Arbitral Tribunal unless otherwise specified. 4. It is submitted that the parties were partners of the firm by name M/s. Guru Marulasiddeshwara Swamy Associates constituted on 22.05.2007. The firm had purchased property having an extent of 4 acres and 20 guntas of land in Sy.No.87/2 and bearing Chalti No.116/1, 2 and 3 of Davangere Mahanagara Palike (DMP) situated in Shekarappa Nagar, Davangere in CTS.No.2620 under a Sale Deed dated 15.04.2008 (hereinafter referred to as the 'schedule property'). The sale consideration to the extent of Rs.1 Crore was met through a loan borrowed from the Davangere Harihara Urban Co-operative Bank ('Bank' for short). 5. It is further submitted that the claimants dissolved the firm by issuing a Legal Notice dated 07.10.2015 to the respondents. In view of the fact that the firm had not undertaken any other business and since the schedule property purchased by availing loan from the Bank was the only asset of the firm, the claimants had given two options to the respondents for settling the dues. The two options are as follows:- "a) First Option: i) Sell the aforesaid property of the firm and appropriate the proceeds equally on or before November 2015. ii) repay the loan to M/s.The Davangere Harihara Urban Co-operative Bank Ltd. Davangere, in its entirety. iii) either party shall not have any claim against each other i.e., my clients will not claim reimbursement of monies paid to M/s.The Davangere Harihara Urban Co-operative Bank Ltd., Davangere. you will not claim reimbursement of monies paid to Shri. Dayananda and Shri. Panchanna. you will also return all the blank cheques. iii) either party shall not have any claim against each other i.e., my clients will not claim reimbursement of monies paid to M/s.The Davangere Harihara Urban Co-operative Bank Ltd., Davangere. you will not claim reimbursement of monies paid to Shri. Dayananda and Shri. Panchanna. you will also return all the blank cheques. b) Second Option: i) Divide the aforesaid property of the firm into two equal shares and allot to both the parties as per the portions demarcated herein (sketch annexed hereto). ii) repay the loan to M/s.The Davangere Harihara Urban Co-operative Bank Ltd., Davangere, in its entirety. iii) either party shall not have any claim against each other i.e., my clients will not claim reimbursement of monies paid to M/s.The Davangere Harihara Urban Co-operative Bank Ltd., Davangere. you will also not claim reimbursement of monies paid to Shri Dayananda and Shri. Panchanna. you will also return all the blank cheques." The respondents rejected the aforesaid options through a Reply Notice dated 18.03.2016, subsequent to which the claimants, by invoking the Arbitration Clause approached the Court seeking appointment of an Arbitrator. On appointment of a sole arbitrator, the claimants filed their Claim Petition in AC No. 132/2017. 6. Before the learned Arbitrator, it was asserted by the respondents that the claim was misconceived, as the actual consideration paid for purchase of the schedule property was Rs.1,71,00,000/- not Rs.1 Crore as claimed by the claimants, asserting that payments made to the co- owners, who were partners of the selling firm, had not been accounted for by the claimants. The respondents further contended that additional amounts had been borrowed from private individuals including Sri Dayananda and Sri Panchanna, on behalf of the firm to pay the co-owners, and that this excess amount was to be equally borne by both parties. 7. On consideration of the parties' contentions and the material on record, a detailed Award dated 14.09.2018 was passed by the Sole Arbitrator, wherein it was found that the registered Sale Deed recorded the consideration paid as Rs.1 Crore, and no evidence was produced to establish that Rs.71,00,000/- had been borrowed from private persons as alleged by the respondents. It was therefore held that the schedule property had been purchased for Rs.1 Crore and both parties were required to repay their respective share of the liability to the Bank. It was therefore held that the schedule property had been purchased for Rs.1 Crore and both parties were required to repay their respective share of the liability to the Bank. The Arbitrator directed that the schedule property be divided by metes and bounds as delineated in the rough sketch accompanying Ex.P3-Legal Notice and demarcated by the letters A-A1, B-B1 & E-C, C1-F, and required the parties to clear the loan amount with proportionate interest, obtain a 'No Due Certificate' from the Bank, and register the Partition Deed by seeking execution. It was further directed that, in the event of default by either party in paying their balance sum, the other party would be entitled to clear the entire balance and execute the award. Thereafter, it is submitted that the claimants were compelled to clear the entire outstanding amount of Rs.50,56,000/- to the Bank on 24.04.2019, which included the respondents' share of approximately Rs.50 Lakhs, and execution was sought by the claimants in Execution Petition No.91/2019, which remains pending consideration. 8. The respondents challenged the Award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 ('Arbitration Act' for short) in A.S.No.4/2018. In the said Suit, the respondents (plaintiffs) filed I.As.No.III and IV under Order XLI Rule 27 of CPC read with Sections 19 and 27 of the Arbitration Act for production of additional evidence and vital documents such as correspondence letters, Bank statements, etc., as the original documents could not be produced before the Arbitral Tribunal. The trial Court rejected I.As.No.III and IV and answered the issues framed under I.As.No.III and IV in the negative, and partly allowed the suit by modifying Para No.3 of the Arbitral Award and directed the claimants and the respondents to equally repay the balance outstanding amount to the Bank as on the date of the Claim Petition. The respondents in the claim petition have approached this Court challenging the judgment and decree dated 05.01.2021 in A.S.No.4/2018. The learned Counsel for the appellants contends that the award was improper and the same should have been set aside by the trial Court. The claimants before the Tribunal, who were the respondents in A.S.No.4/2018 have filed the appeal contending that the modification made to the arbitral award was totally unwarranted and that the award, which did not suffer from any patent illegality should have been upheld. 9. The claimants before the Tribunal, who were the respondents in A.S.No.4/2018 have filed the appeal contending that the modification made to the arbitral award was totally unwarranted and that the award, which did not suffer from any patent illegality should have been upheld. 9. The learned Counsel appearing for the claimants contends that the respondents did not raise any sustainable contention in their appeal regarding the Arbitral Award. It is further contended that the power to modify the award is available only in the extremely limited circumstances. Therefore, there was no scope for the trial Court to interfere in the Award and that the impugned Order is contrary to the provisions of Section 34 (2) of the Arbitration Act 10. Further, it is contended that the Court failed to consider that the respondents had not substantiated their case by producing balance sheets, etc., or established that the Arbitral Award was contrary to Section 48 of the Partnership Act, 1932 . Therefore, there was no scope of re- appreciation of evidence and modifying a portion of the Arbitral Award. 11. It is also contended that the Court failed to consider that the claimants had made it clear in their Legal Notice that the proposals were without prejudice to their Rights and the proposals were rejected outright by the respondents in their Reply Notice. Therefore, the observations made by the trial Court were without application of mind, perverse and requires to be set aside. 12. It is further contended that the finding of the trial Court that the Arbitral Award requires modification due to suppression of facts is ill-founded, insofar as it has not stated as to what facts are suppressed. 13. The learned counsel appearing for the claimants has placed reliance on the following decisions: (i) S.V. Chandra Pandian and Others v. S.V. Sivalinga Nadar and Others, (1993) 1 SCC 589 (ii) N. Khadervali Saheb (Dead) by LRs. and Another v. N. Gudu Sahib (Dead) and Others, (2003) 3 SCC 229 (iii) Subhash Chandra Sen (Dead) through Legal Representatives and Others v. Nabin Sain (Dead) through Legal Representatives, (2018) 6 SCC 443 (iv) Gayatri Balasamy v. ISG Novasoft Technologies Limited, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 986 (v) Navodaya Mass Entertainment v. J.M. Combines, (2015) 5 SCC 698 14. and Another v. N. Gudu Sahib (Dead) and Others, (2003) 3 SCC 229 (iii) Subhash Chandra Sen (Dead) through Legal Representatives and Others v. Nabin Sain (Dead) through Legal Representatives, (2018) 6 SCC 443 (iv) Gayatri Balasamy v. ISG Novasoft Technologies Limited, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 986 (v) Navodaya Mass Entertainment v. J.M. Combines, (2015) 5 SCC 698 14. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents contended that I.As.No.III and IV, were filed under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC read with Sections 19 and 27 of the Arbitration Act to adduce additional evidence on the vital documents. The Trial Court rejected I.As.No.III and IV on the ground that the CPC provisions are not applicable to the Arbitration and Conciliation Proceedings. 15. It is further contended that the learned Arbitrator did not consider the important documents and evidence of the parties, whereas the trial Court considered these aspects and modified the award in respect of repayment of remaining loan amount to the Bank. Given such observations, the trial Court failed to provide entitlement of the share of each party in view of the admitted repayment of Rs.30,00,000/- by the claimants. Thus, it is contended that the equal distribution of share by the learned Arbitrator and the trial Court is arbitrary and against the records. Therefore, the learned counsel for the respondents prays that the judgment and decree dated 05.01.2021 in A.S.No.4/2018 passed by trial Court and the Arbitral Award dated 14.09.2018 passed by the learned Arbitrator should be set aside in the interest of justice and equity. 16. We have considered the contentions advanced. The issue with regard to the amounts paid by the respective parties to the vendors of the property was the specific point on which arbitration was conducted. We notice that the specific contention before the Arbitral Tribunal was that the only activity conducted by the firm was purchase of the property which was the subject matter of the loan transaction. The Arbitral Tribunal had considered the pleadings of the parties as well as the materials on record. The specific contention with regard to the claim of the parties was considered by the Tribunal on the basis of the evidence and the materials on record. Issues were specifically raised as to the amount of consideration and the respective share of the parties. The issues framed by the Arbitral Tribunal as follows:- "1. The specific contention with regard to the claim of the parties was considered by the Tribunal on the basis of the evidence and the materials on record. Issues were specifically raised as to the amount of consideration and the respective share of the parties. The issues framed by the Arbitral Tribunal as follows:- "1. Whether the claimants prove that the entire sale consideration amount of Rs.1 Crore of the schedule property was met through a loan amount of Rs.1 Crore obtained from Davanagere Harihara Urban Cooperative Bank Limited, Davanagere on 12.04.2008 as averred in para 7 of the claim petition? 2. Whether the respondents prove that the schedule property was purchased for Rs.1,71,00,000/- as averred in para 4 of the Objection Statement? 3. Whether the respondents further prove that claimants have paid only Rs.5,00,500/- instead of Rs.35,00,500/- being the 50% of Rs.71 Lakhs and that shortfall of Rs.30 lakhs was adjusted at the request of the claimants by 1st respondent by borrowing loan from Dayananda and Panchanna as averred in para 6 of the objection statement? 4. Whether the respondents prove that they are entitled for extra 30,000 sq.ft. in the schedule property towards their share since the claimants did not repay the loan amount of Rs.30 lakhs with interest obtained from Dayananda and Panchanna and for not repaying Rs.12,50,000/- alleged to have been utilised by 1 st claimant out of loan amount of Rs.1 Crore as pleaded in para 7 of the objection statement? 5. Whether the claimants prove that the firm had paid Rs.49,48,807/- towards principal amount and Rs.94,86,067/- towards interest to Davanagere Harihara Urban Cooperative Bank Limited, Davanagere as on 24.10.2017 as pleaded in para 7 of the claim petition? 6. Whether the claimants prove that they are entitled to 18% interest on Rs.4,18,28,400/ being the market value of their share of 50% from 25.07.2015 as claimed in para 14(d) of the petition?" 17. It was after considering the entire contentions of the parties and the documents produced on either side that the Arbitral Tribunal came to the conclusion that the respondents had not produced any material to show that the first respondent (Shri. G.M. Virupakshappa) had borrowed a sum of Rs.71,00,000/- from private persons for the purpose of paying the vendors for purchase of the property by the firm. The fact that the firm had borrowed Rs.1 Crore from the Bank was admitted by the opposite party in the arbitral proceedings. There was no evidence on record to link the payments made by the respondents to the firm. No material was on record to show the payments were made on behalf of the firm. 18. It was in the above circumstances that the Arbitral Tribunal had come to the conclusion that the property was purchased for a sum of Rs.1 Crore since the respondents could not discharge the burden of proving that there was any further amount paid as consideration. The Tribunal had therefore accepted the contention of the claimants. It was found that the loan had been availed specifically for purchasing the property and that even if there were other payments made to the co-owners of the property before execution of the Sale Deed, they would stand included in the sale consideration shown in the Sale Deed. It was further found that there was no material produced to support the contention that personal loans had been availed and further amounts had been paid towards the sale consideration of the property in question. The award considers the claims of the parties in extenso at paragraph No.19. Each document relied on by the claimants as well as the opposite party have been specifically taken note of and adverted to by the Arbitral Tribunal. 19. In the above circumstances and in view of the limited scope of interference in an Arbitral Award under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, we are of the opinion that the Court was justified in not setting aside the Arbitral Award. 20. It is pertinent to note that the dispute which was referred to arbitration was with regard to the dissolution of the firm and the settlement of accounts between the partners. The firm was admittedly one which could be dissolved at will and the claimants had invoked the right of dissolution and had issued notice dated 07.10.2015 exercising such right as per Ex.P3-Legal Notice. A rough sketch demarcating two equal portions of the property was also annexed to the notice. After considering all the materials on record, the Arbitral Tribunal directed the apportionment of the property between the parties as provided in the sketch. It is contended that the sketch provided by the claimants should not have been accepted as such. A rough sketch demarcating two equal portions of the property was also annexed to the notice. After considering all the materials on record, the Arbitral Tribunal directed the apportionment of the property between the parties as provided in the sketch. It is contended that the sketch provided by the claimants should not have been accepted as such. Though the learned counsel appearing for the appellants (respondents before the Tribunal) attempted to argue that such demarcation or division by metes and bounds should not have been undertaken by the arbitrator, we are of the opinion that since admittedly the firm stood dissolved by will, the arbitrator was well within his powers in ordering a division of the property, which is the sole asset of the firm by metes and bounds. We are supported in this view by the judgments of the Apex Court in the case of Subhash Chandra Sen (Dead) through Legal Representatives and Others v. Nabin Sain (Dead) through Legal Representatives, (2018) 6 SCC 443. 21. Further, the contention that the claimants should have been permitted to produce material before the trial Court in support of their contentions before the arbitrator also cannot be accepted since there is nothing on record to show that the appellants were prevented by any justifiable reason from producing the material before the Arbitral Tribunal. 22. In paragraph No.23 of the award, the Arbitral Tribunal has clearly found that a sum of Rs.49,48,807/- was paid by the claimants towards the principal and Rs.94,86,067/- was paid towards the interest towards their share of the liability of the amount borrowed from the Bank. The Arbitral Tribunal found that the said statement was neither controverted by the respondents' counsel nor denied in the evidence of RW.1. Exs.P8 and P9 were also produced to prove the correctness of the said contention. It is in the said circumstances that the Arbitral Tribunal had accepted the claim and held that the claimants have to remit the shortfall in their share of liability of Rs.50,00,000/- with proportionate interest after adjusting the payment made as per Exs.P8 and P9. The opposite parties were required to repay their share of the debt along with the proportionate interest and get the property discharged by obtaining 'No Due Certificate' from the Bank. 23. The opposite parties were required to repay their share of the debt along with the proportionate interest and get the property discharged by obtaining 'No Due Certificate' from the Bank. 23. Though the appellants (in MFA No.1654/2021) had set up a case that they had paid the amounts to the owners of the property directly and that the amount taken as loan from the Bank was to have been repaid by the claimants, they could not produce any evidence before the Arbitral Tribunal in support of such contentions. We notice that even the material produced by the appellants (in MFA No.1654/2021) before the Arbitral Tribunal to contend that there were payments made to the co-owners of the property cannot be accepted in view of the fact that some of such payments are seemed to have been made admittedly by the claimants and not by the opposite party exclusively. Further, there is no material to show that the payments were made on behalf of the firm. In the said circumstances, the Arbitral Tribunal came to the conclusion that there was no sufficient material on record to show that there was any further sale consideration or agreement with regard to payment of the entire loan taken from the Bank by the claimants. However, in the application under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, the Court accepted the contention of the appellants that the amounts paid to the owners was part of the sale consideration for the property and that there were agreements inter se between the claimants and the respondents with regard to payment of the compensation. The Court has re-appreciated the entire evidence on record acting as an appellate Court rather than as a Court under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act which has the limited powers to consider whether the arbitration award is liable to be interfered with in terms of the said Section. Having re- appreciated the evidence, the Court comes to a different conclusion and attempted a modification of the award. The Court also relied on the statement in the notice issued by the claimants to the respondents to come to the conclusion that the contentions raised by the respondents before the arbitral Tribunal were sustainable. 24. Having re- appreciated the evidence, the Court comes to a different conclusion and attempted a modification of the award. The Court also relied on the statement in the notice issued by the claimants to the respondents to come to the conclusion that the contentions raised by the respondents before the arbitral Tribunal were sustainable. 24. The Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in the case of Gayatri Balasamy v. ISG Novasoft Technologies Limited, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 986 , has specifically considered the extent of the power of the appropriate Court under the Arbitration Act to modify the award. It was found that notwithstanding Section 33, a Court reviewing an award under Section 34 possesses the authority to rectify computational, clerical or typographical errors or other manifest errors provided such modifications do not necessitate a merits based evaluation. The power of modification was traced to the inherent powers of the Court. However, it was further held that such power is not to be confused with appellate jurisdiction of a higher Court or the power to review the judgment of the trial Court. If the modification is debatable or a doubt arises regarding its appropriateness, that is, if the error is not apparent on the face of the record, the Court will be left unable to proceed. 25. From the materials on record, it appears that at- least some of the payments allegedly made to Shri. Dayananda and Shri. Panchanna were also made by the claimants before the Arbitral Tribunal. Since Section 34 Court has upheld the finding of the Arbitral Tribunal that the recitals with regard to consideration as provided in the registered Sale Deed have to prevail over the other material produced to show payments made before such deeds were registered, we are of the opinion that it was not open to the Court to then hold that there were further payments made. In any event, there was no material available before the Section 34 Court to attempt a modification of the award, which is possible only in specific circumstances as has been held by the Apex Court. 26. In the above view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the said exercise undertaken by the Section 34 Court was totally unjustified. 27. In the result:- (i) Commercial Appeal No.68/2021 filed by the claimants is allowed. (ii) MFA No.1654/2021 filed by the respondents is dismissed. 26. In the above view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the said exercise undertaken by the Section 34 Court was totally unjustified. 27. In the result:- (i) Commercial Appeal No.68/2021 filed by the claimants is allowed. (ii) MFA No.1654/2021 filed by the respondents is dismissed. (iii) The arbitral award shall stand upheld and can be executed in accordance with law, without undue delay. The parties shall bear their own costs.