JUDGMENT : HEMANT M. PRACHCHHAK, J. 1. Present First Appeal is filed under Section 96 of the CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE , 1908 at the instance of the appellant – original plaintiff against the judgment and decree dated 29.09.2007 passed by the learned 7 th Additional Senior Civil Judge, Bhavnagar (herein after referred to as “the trial court”) in Special Civil Suit No. 120 of 2000, whereby, the learned Judge partly allowed the suit filed by the appellant and awarded compensation to the tune of Rs.2,00,000/- against the claim of Rs.20,00,000/-. 2. Brief facts leading to the present appeal are that, on 27.6.1998, when the appellant Lasiben was working in the farm, at that time, all of a sudden, the electric live wire fell on the one hand of Lasiben and so she was trying to remove said wire by another hand and as a result of that, she got injury and electric shock and she became unconscious. Therefore, she was admitted in hospital at Mahuva. That, thereafter, she was transferred to Civil Hospital at Ahmedabad as the injury was serious in nature. That, she had taken treatment as an indoor patient for a period of one month and because of the said injury and treatment taken by her in Civil Hospital, Ahmedabad the doctor had operated and both the hands of Lasiben were amputated from elbow of both the hands, and therefore, because of the negligence on the part of the employees of the respondent-company, she has to suffer a serious and permanent injury, and therefore, she filed a special civil suit for compensation before the 7 th Additional Senior Civil Judge at Bhavnagar. 2.1 That, as the appellant was only aged 12 years at the time of incident, therefore, her father Unadbhai through his advocate had issued legal notice to the respondents seeking compensation, which was replied by the respondent and had denied all the allegations and also denied their liability. That, thereafter the appellant had preferred the aforesaid suit before the trial court seeking compensation to the tune of Rs.12,00,000/- and thereafter, the appellant has enhanced he amount of compensation from Rs.12,00,000/- to Rs.20,00,000/-. That, after service of summons, the respondents had filed their written at Exh.-6 denying all the allegations made in the plaint and they had also denied their liability to pay compensation. That, after service of summons, the respondents had filed their written at Exh.-6 denying all the allegations made in the plaint and they had also denied their liability to pay compensation. 2.2 That, after considering the pleadings of both the sides, the trial court had framed the following issues vide Exh.-7 : (1) Whether plaintiff proves that the injuries were caused on account of negligence & willful default on the part of the employee of the defendant? (2) Whether the defendant proves that there was no negligence on the part of defendant? (3) Whether plaintiff proves that she is entitled to get compensation? (4) Whether the plaintiff proves that she is entitled to get interest? If yes, at what rate? (5) What compensation should be awarded to the plaintiff? (6) What order and decree? 2.3 That, the issues were replied by the trial court in para-7. To prove the case, appellant had produced oral evidence, whereby, the appellant herself had deposed at Exh.-42 and one Sonba w/o Gillabhai had deposed at Exh.-76 and also produced documentary evidence vide Exh.-22 to 24 and vide Exh.-46 to 68, whereas, the respondent had produced documentary evidence vide Exh.-86 to 95 and had examined Mr. Sunilbhai Ramalbhaya vide Exh.-85. After considering the oral as well as documentary evidence led by both the sides, the trial court has awarded compensation to the tune of Rs.2,00,000/- against the claim of Rs.20,00,000/- vide judgment and decree dated 29.09.2007. The break-up of the compensation awarded is as under : Sr.No. Head Amount 1 Loss of future income (1500x12x15x40) Rs. 1,08,000/- 2 Pain, shock and suffering Rs. 5,000/- 3 Special diet Rs. 3,000/- 4 Transportation charge Rs. 1,000/- 5 Medical expenses Rs. 10,000/- 6 Attendance charges Rs. 5,300/- Total Rs. 1,27,000/- 3. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment and award, the appellant has preferred the present appeal seeking enhancement of the compensation. 4. Heard learned advocate Mr. U.I. Vyas, appearing for the appellant – original plaintiff and learned advocate Ms. R.V. Acharya, appearing for the respondent – PGVCL. 5. Learned advocate Mr. Vyas has submitted that the impugned judgment and award passed by the trial court is contrary to law, facts and evidence on record. 4. Heard learned advocate Mr. U.I. Vyas, appearing for the appellant – original plaintiff and learned advocate Ms. R.V. Acharya, appearing for the respondent – PGVCL. 5. Learned advocate Mr. Vyas has submitted that the impugned judgment and award passed by the trial court is contrary to law, facts and evidence on record. He has submitted that though the trial court has considered the issues in favour of the appellant, however, while awarding the amount of compensation, the trial court has awarded a very meager amount of Rs.2,00,000/-, which is unjust, inadequate and improper. He has submitted that though the trial court has considered the negligence aspect against the respondent, which is not in dispute as the respondents have challenged the same, however, while passing the impugned judgment and award the trial court has committed a serious error of law and on facts. He has further submitted that the trial court has failed to consider the fact that the appellant was merely a 12 years old girl at the time of incident and both her hands were amputated below elbow due to electrocution, which is proved before the trial court by legal evidence and medical certificates produced at Exh.-24, 46 and 47, however, the trial court has failed to appreciate the said documents while passing the impugned judgment and award and awarded a very meager amount to the tune of Rs.2,00,000/- only towards compensation. He has further submitted that the trial court has also failed to consider that the appellant being a lady and because of amputation of both her hands, she completely lost the marriage prospect and also she had to suffer permanent disablement in nature and 100% financial disability body as a whole. He has submitted that even for attending natural calls, she had to take assistance of someone else and even she is unable to prepare food for herself i.e. she had to engage somebody to take care of her for the whole life, which aspects were not considered by the trial court while passing the impugned judgment and award. He has submitted that even for attending natural calls, she had to take assistance of someone else and even she is unable to prepare food for herself i.e. she had to engage somebody to take care of her for the whole life, which aspects were not considered by the trial court while passing the impugned judgment and award. He has further submitted that during the pendency of the suit, her parents passed away and thereafter, she was taken care by other family members and for whole life she has to live alone, therefore, considering all these facts and circumstances the trial court ought to have appreciated these aspects while passing the impugned judgment and award and ought to have awarded reasonable and just compensation in favour of the appellant. Over and above the grounds agitated in the memo of appeal, learned advocate Mr. Vyas has urged that the present appeal be allowed and the impugned judgment and award passed by the trial court be quashed and set aside / appropriately modified. 6. As against that, learned advocate Ms. Acharya, appearing for the respondent – PGVCL, has submitted that the trial court has held all the issues in favour of the appellant and the appellant has not challenged the findings recorded by the trial court. She has submitted that the trial court has not committed any error while passing the impugned judgment and award and awarded the compensation to the tune of Rs.2,00,000/- which is just and reasonable amount. She has submitted that there was no sufÏcient evidence produced before the trial court with regard to the negligence on the part of the respondent PGVCL and therefore, the trial court has rightly passed the impugned judgment and award. She has further submitted that the trial court after considering all the legal submissions and after considering the documentary as well as oral evidence led before it has rightly awarded compensation to the tune of Rs.2,00,000/- and no further enhancement is to be made in the present appeal. She has further submitted that the trial court after considering all the legal submissions and after considering the documentary as well as oral evidence led before it has rightly awarded compensation to the tune of Rs.2,00,000/- and no further enhancement is to be made in the present appeal. She has submitted that the appellant has failed to prove before the trial court as to what was the actual loss caused to her and therefore, in absence of any cogent and material evidence produced by the appellant, the trial court has not committed any error while passing the impugned judgment and award and awarded Rs.2,00,000/- towards compensation, which is just and adequate and no interference is required to be called for in the present appeal and the present appeal be dismissed. 7. I have heard the learned advocates appearing for the respective parties and perused the material placed on record. I have also gone through the impugned judgment and award passed by the trial court. It appears from the record that at the time of incident the appellant was aged 12 years and studying in local school in village Bila, Ta. Mahuva, Dist. Bhavnagar and due to the injuries sustained by her in electrocution she was unable to continue her studies as she had sustained 100% disability. She being a girl also lost marriage prospect and also she had to take help of others for her day-to-day activities and for that she had to incur extra amount towards such expenses. Unfortunately, during the pendency of the suit her parents passed away and now she is taken care by near relatives and she will have to remain alone for her whole life because nobody is going to marry with her due to amputation of both her hands below elbow. At that relevant point of time, she was only aged 12 years and therefore, notional income is require to be considered. It also appears from the record that the trial court has awarded very meager amount under the head of pain, shock and suffering as she had to undergo major surgery for amputation and thereafter spring rafting. At that relevant point of time, she was only aged 12 years and therefore, notional income is require to be considered. It also appears from the record that the trial court has awarded very meager amount under the head of pain, shock and suffering as she had to undergo major surgery for amputation and thereafter spring rafting. The trial court has committed a serious error while calculating the amount towards future loss of income to the tune of Rs.1,500/- and the same is required to be considered at Rs.3,000/- looking to the age of appellant i.e. 12 years at the time of incident and maximum multiplier is required to be considered i.e. multiplier of 18, which comes to Rs.3,000x12x18=Rs.6,48,000/-. The trial court has also committed an error while considering the amount under the head of pain, shock and suffering and medical expenses to the tune of Rs.5,000/- and Rs.10,000/- respectively, the same is required to be considered at Rs.1,00,000/-. The trial court has considered the amount of Rs.1,000/- and Rs.3000/- towards Transportation charges and special diet respectively, however, the same are required to be considered at Rs.15,000/-. The future medical expenses and other expenses are required to be considered at Rs.2,50,000/- and an amount of Rs.2,50,000/- is required to be considered towards additional assistance of the care taker for future. 7.1 Taking the disability first, it is required to be noted that negligence is not in dispute so also, the amputation. The disability has been assessed as per the guidelines for Evaluation of Permanent Physical Impairment in Amputees (hereinafter referred to as “the guidelines”), which read thus: Basic Guidelines : 1. In case of multiple amputees, if the total sum of percentage permanent physical impairment is above 100%, it should be taken as 100%. 2. Amputation at any level with uncorrectable inability to wear and use prosthesis, should be given 100% permanent physical impairment. 3. in case of amputation in more than one limb, percentage of each limb is counted and another 10% will be added, but when only toes or fingers are involved only another 5% will be added. 4. Any complication in form of stiffness, neuroma, Infection etc. has to be given a total of 10% additional weightage. 5. Dominant upper limb has been given 4% extra percentage. Upper Limb Amputations Percent Permanent Physical Impairment and loss of physical function of each limb 1. Fore-quarter amputation 100% 2. 4. Any complication in form of stiffness, neuroma, Infection etc. has to be given a total of 10% additional weightage. 5. Dominant upper limb has been given 4% extra percentage. Upper Limb Amputations Percent Permanent Physical Impairment and loss of physical function of each limb 1. Fore-quarter amputation 100% 2. Shoulder disarticulation 90% 3. Above Elbow up to upper 1/3 of arm 85% 4. Above Elbow up to lower 1/3 of arm 80% 5. Elbow disarticulation 75% 6. Below Elbow up to upper 1/3 of forearm 70% 7. Below Elbow up to lower 1/3 of forearm 65% 8. Wrist disarticulation 60% 9. Hand through carpal bones 55% 10. Thumb through C.M. or through 1st M.C. Joint 30% 11. Thumb disarticulation through metacarpophalangeal joint or through proximal phalanx 25% 12. Thumb disarticulation through inter-phalangeal joint or through distal phalanx 15% 7.2 On close scrutiny of the guidelines in paragraph 1 it provides that in case of multiple amputees, if the total sum of percentage of permanent physical impairment is above 100%, it should be taken as 100%. Paragraph 3 provides that in case of amputation in more than one limb, percentage of each limb is counted and another 10% is to be added. Item no.7 of the tabular form provides that if the amputation is below elbow upto lower 1/3 rd of forearm, the same is to be treated as 65%. In the present case, it is not in dispute and further fortified by the medical certificate produced at Exh.-46 and 47 and photographs produced on record which indicates that both the arms of the appellant have been amputated below the elbow. The appellant was aged 12 yeas school going girl and was helping her parents in agricultural activities and for performing the agricultural activities, arms are the vital organs and if both the arms have been amputated, it is difÏcult to comprehend as to how, and what work, now, the appellant would be able to perform. It is also pertinent to note herein that the appellant is a girl and because of amputation, she has lost the prospect of marriage for whole life and even she is unable to perform her day-to-day routine work. It is also pertinent to note herein that the appellant is a girl and because of amputation, she has lost the prospect of marriage for whole life and even she is unable to perform her day-to-day routine work. Even for preparing food for herself she needs assistance of others and unfortunately, during the pendency of the suit her parents also passed away and therefore, for whole life she has to live at the mercy of others. 7.3 At this juncture, it would be fruitful to refer to the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court rendered in case of M.P. Electricity Board vs. Shail Kumari and Others , reported in [2002] 2 SCC 162 , wherein it has been observed and held in paragraphs 7 to 14 as under : “7. It is an admitted fact that the responsibility to supply electric energy in the particular locality was statutorily conferred on the Board. If the energy so transmitted causes injury or death of a human being, who gets unknowingly trapped into it the primary liability to compensate the sufferer is that of the supplier of the electric energy. So long as the voltage of electricity transmitted through the wires is potentially of dangerous dimension the managers of its supply have the added duty to take all safety measures to prevent escape of such energy or to see that the wire snapped would not remain live on the road as users of such road would be under peril. It is no defence on the part of the management of the Board that somebody committed mischief by siphoning such energy to his private property and that the electrocution was from such diverted line. It is the look out of the managers of the supply system to prevent such pilferage by installing necessary devices. At any rate, if any live wire got snapped and fell on the public road the electric current thereon should automatically have been disrupted. Authorities manning such dangerous commodities have extra duty to chalk out measures to prevent such mishaps. 8. Even assuming that all such measures have been adopted, a person undertaking an activity involving hazardous or risky exposure to human life, is liable under law of torts to compensate for the injury suffered by any other person, irrespective of any negligence or carelessness on the part of the managers of such undertakings. 8. Even assuming that all such measures have been adopted, a person undertaking an activity involving hazardous or risky exposure to human life, is liable under law of torts to compensate for the injury suffered by any other person, irrespective of any negligence or carelessness on the part of the managers of such undertakings. The basis of such liability is the foreseeable risk inherent in the very nature of such activity. The liability cast on such person is known, in law, as "strict liability". It differs from the liability which arises on account of the negligence or fault in this way i.e. the concept of negligence comprehends that the foreseeable harm could be avoided by taking reasonable precautions. If the defendant did all that which could be done for avoiding the harm he cannot be held liable when the action is based on any negligence attributed. But such consideration is not relevant in cases of strict liability where the defendant is held liable irrespective of whether he could have avoided the particular harm by taking precautions. 9. The doctrine of strict liability has its origin in English Common Law when it was propounded in the celebrated case of Rylands v. Fletcher (1868 Law Reports (3) HL 330). Blackburn J., the author of the said rule had observed thus in the said decision: "The rule of law is that the person who, for his own purpose, brings on his lands and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it at his peril; and if he does so he is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape." 10. There are seven exceptions formulated by means of case law to the doctrine of strict liability. It is unnecessary to enumerate those exceptions barring one which is this. "Act of stranger i.e. if the escape was caused by the unforeseeable act of a stranger, the rule doe snot apply". (vide Page 535 Winfield on Tort, 15th Edn.) 11. The rule of strict liability has been approved and followed in many subsequent decision in England. A recent decision in recognition of the said doctrine is rendered by the House of Lords in Cambridge Water Co. Ltd. v. Eastern Counties Leather Plc. {1994(1) All England Law Reports (HL) 53}. (vide Page 535 Winfield on Tort, 15th Edn.) 11. The rule of strict liability has been approved and followed in many subsequent decision in England. A recent decision in recognition of the said doctrine is rendered by the House of Lords in Cambridge Water Co. Ltd. v. Eastern Counties Leather Plc. {1994(1) All England Law Reports (HL) 53}. The said principle gained approval in India, and decisions of the High Courts are a legion to that effect. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India and a Division Bench in Gujarat State Rod Transport Corporation v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai had followed with approval the principle in Rylands v. Fletcher. By referring to the above two decisions a two Judge Bench of this Court has reiterated the same principle in Kaushnuma Begum v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. { 2001 (2) SCC 9 }. 12. In M.C. Mehta v. Union of India this Court has gone even beyond the rule of strict liability by holding that "where an enterprise is engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous activity and harm is caused on any one on account of the accident in the operation of such activity, the enterprise is strictly and absolutely liable to compensate those who are affected by the accident; such liability is not subject to any of the exceptions to the principle of strict liability under the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher." 13. In the present case, the Board made an endeavour to rely on the exception to the rule of strict liability (Rylands v. Fletcher) being "an act of stranger". The said exception is not available to the Board as the act attributed to the third respondent should reasonably have been anticipated or at any rate its consequences should have been prevented by the appellant-Board. In Northwestern Utilities, Limited v. London Guarantee and Accident Company, Limited {1936 Appeal Cases 108}, the Privy Council repelled the contention of the defendant based on the aforesaid exception. In that case a hotel belonging to the plaintiffs was destroyed in a fire caused by the escape and ignition of natural gas. The gas had percolated into the hotel basement from a fractured welded joint in an intermediate pressure main situated below the street level and belonging to the defendants which was a public utility company. In that case a hotel belonging to the plaintiffs was destroyed in a fire caused by the escape and ignition of natural gas. The gas had percolated into the hotel basement from a fractured welded joint in an intermediate pressure main situated below the street level and belonging to the defendants which was a public utility company. The fracture was caused during the construction involving underground work by a third party. The Privy Council held that the risk involved in the operation undertaken by the defendant was so great that a high degree care was expected of him since the defendant ought to have appreciated the possibility of such a leakage. 14. The Privy Council has observed in Quebec Railway, Light Heat and Power Company Limited v. Vandry and Ors. {1920 Law Reports Appeal Cases 662} that the company supplying electricity is liable for the damage without proof that they had been negligent. Even the defence that the cables were disrupted on account of a violent wind and high tension current found it sway through the low tension cable into the premise of the respondents was held to be not a justifiable defence. Thus, merely because the illegal act could be attributed to a stranger is not enough to absolve the liability of the Board regarding the live wire lying on the road.” 7.4 It would also be appropriate to refer to the decision of this Court rendered in case of Sanjay Kalubhai Makwana vs. Paschim Gujarat Vij Company Ltd. in First Appeal No.3575 of 2013 decided on 09.12.2022, more particularly paragraphs 10, 13, 15, 16 and 17 wherein, this Court after considering catena of decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court as well as this Court, has enhanced the amount of compensation in favour of the victim appellant. It is also to be noted herein that this Court while dismissing the appeal preferred by the PGVCL being First Appeal No.470 of 2012, has observed and held that it is the preliminary duty of the PGVCL to maintain the electric line in a proper way to avoid such kind of incidents of electrocution as it found in the present case that due to negligence on the part of the Electric Board, the present appellant has lost both her hand below elbow and suffered permanent disablement in nature which ultimately resulted into loss of marriage prospect and now she has to live alone for whole life. After considering all these aspects and after considering the submissions canvassed by both the sides, I am of the opinion that the present appeal is required to be allowed and the impugned judgment and award passed by the trial court is required to be modified to the extent that the amount of compensation is required to be enhanced to Rs.8,00,000/- in addition to the amount awarded by the trial court i.e. Rs.2,00,000/-, in all total Rs.10,00,000/- is to be awarded. 8. In view of above, the judgment and decree dated 29.09.2007 passed by the learned 7 th Additional Senior Civil Judge, Bhavnagar in Special Civil Suit No. 120 of 2000 is hereby modified and it is declared that the appellant would be entitled for an additional compensation of Rs.8,00,000/- (Rs.10,00,000/- - Rs.2,00,000/- = Rs.8,00,000/-). The respondents are directed to deposit an additional compensation of Rs.8,00,000/- before the trial court concerned within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order, alongwith interest at the rate of 6% from the date of filing of the this appeal till realization. Once such amount is deposited, the same shall be disbursed in favour of the appellant, after proper verification and after following due procedure, through RTGS/NEFT. 9. The appeal stands allowed. No order as to costs. Record & Proceedings, if any received, be sent back to the concerned Court forthwith.