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2025 DIGILAW 858 (AP)

Katravath Bapya Naik v. State of Andhra Pradesh

2025-07-11

Y.LAKSHMANA RAO

body2025
ORDER : 1. The Criminal Revision Case has been filed under Sections 397 and 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [the Cr.P.C.] challenging the judgment dated 20.11.2008 passed in Criminal Appeal No.134 of 2008 on the file of the learned X Additional District and Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Guntur at Narasaraopet [the Appellate Court ] confirming the judgment dated 22.04.2008 passed in C.C.No.236 of 2005 on the file of the learned I Additional Junior Civil Judge, Gurazala [the Trial Court] whereby and whereunder the Petitioner/Accused No.2 was found guilty of the offence punishable under Section 7A read with Section 8(e) of the Andhra Pradesh Prohibition Act, 1995 [the A.P.P. Act] and was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one year and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/-. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER: 2. Sri Sravan Kumar Mannava, learned Counsel for the Petitioner, while reiterating the grounds of revision, argued that even though necessary ingredients of offence under Section 7A read with Section 8(e) of ‘the A.P.P. Act’ are not made out, the Petitioner was convicted; evidence of the witnesses of the prosecution is inconsistent and not corroborating; the case was foisted implicating the Petitioner for statistical purposes; the seized contraband is a planted one; independent witnesses were not deliberately examined and urged to allow the Criminal Revision Case. 3. It is further argued that, in this case a disturbing feature is there that the officer who participated in the ride conducted investigation, he had got vested interest in the matter and falsely implicated the Accused No.2 in this case. Hence, it is urged to set aside the judgment of the learned Appellate Court as the person who registered the FIR and conducted the investigation and filed charge sheet is one and the same. 4. Alternatively, it is submitted that the revisionist at the time of the alleged offence was aged about 25 years; nearly 19 years have passed by; he had suffered a lot of mental agony; now he is aged about 44 years; he has been suffering from severe aliments due to post Covid-19 complications and requested to consider the case of the revisionist sympathetically and requested to impose sentence which he had already undergone, while volunteering that the sentence of payment of additional fine of Rs.10,000/- may be put as a measure of penance and urged to dispose of the revision. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE STATE: 5. On the other hand, Ms. P. Akila Naidu, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor submits that the prosecution examined P.Ws.1 to 3 who had spoken in clear terms that the Petitioner was indulged in the commission of an offence punishable under Section 7A read with Section 8(e) of ‘the A.P.P. Act’. There was no need or necessity for the investigating officer to falsely implicate the Petitioner in this case. The Petitioner was found red handed with the contraband. Therefore, a case was booked and after thorough investigation charge sheet was laid. The witnesses of the prosecution have thoroughly supported the case of the prosecution. Hence, it is urged to dismiss the revision case, as re-appreciation of the evidence is not permissible at this revisional stage. 6. Thoughtful consideration is bestowed on the arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for both sides. I have perused the entire record. POINT FOR CONSIDERATION: 7. Now the points for consideration are: i. Whether the order in Crl.A.No.134 of 2008 dated 20.11.2008, passed by the Appellate Court, is correct, legal, and proper with respect to its finding, sentence, or judgment, and there are any material irregularities? ii. And to what relief? ANALYSIS: 8. Indeed, this Court has no jurisdiction to re-appreciate the evidence of the witnesses of the prosecution on any score let alone the interestedness or corroboration of the witnesses. Be that as it may, P.W.3/Inspector of Prohibition and Excise, Piduguralla had conducted the raid, he detected the Petitioner, who was indulged in possession of the contraband, which is punishable under Section 7A read with Section 8(e) of ‘the A.P.P. Act’, he himself registered the crime in Ex.P2/FIR, he himself conducted the investigation and laid charge sheet in the Court for the offence under Section 7A read with Section 8(e) of ‘the A.P.P. Act’. 9. In this regard, it is profitable to refer the judgment, relied on by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Megha Singh v. State of Haryana, (1996) 11 SCC 709 wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court at para No.4 mentioned as under: “4. After considering the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears to us that there is discrepancy in the depositions of PWs 2 and3 and in the absence of any independent corroboration such discrepancy does not inspire confidence about the reliability of the prosecution case. After considering the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears to us that there is discrepancy in the depositions of PWs 2 and3 and in the absence of any independent corroboration such discrepancy does not inspire confidence about the reliability of the prosecution case. We have also noted another disturbing feature in this case. PW 3, Siri Chand, Head Constable arrested the accused and on search being conducted by him a pistol and the cartridges were recovered from the accused. It was on his complaint a formal first information report was lodged and the case was initiated. He being complainant should not have proceeded with the investigation of the case. But it appears to us that he was not only the complainant in the case but he carried on with the investigation and examined witnesses under Section 161 CrPC. Such practice, to say the least, should not be resorted to so that there may not be any occasion to suspect fair and impartial investigation.” 10. Similarly, in another judgment relied on by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Mohan Lal v. State of Punjab, AIR 2018 SC 3853 at para No.15 held as under: “15. The discussion in the present case may not be understood as confined to the requirements of a fair investigation under the NDPS Act only carrying a reverse burden of proof. Baldev Singh ( AIR 1999 SC 2378 ) (supra) related to a prosecution under Section 165A of the IPC. Nonetheless, it observed that if the informant were to be made the investigating officer, it was bound to reflect on the credibility of the prosecution case. Megha Singh ( AIR 1995 SC 2339 ) (supra) concerned a prosecution under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1985. It was held that the Head Constable being the complainant himself could not have proceeded with the investigation and it was a practice, to say the least, which should not be resorted to so that there may not be any occasion to suspect fair and impartial investigation. Rajangam (supra) was a prosecution under the NDPS Act, an objection was taken that PW6 who apprehended the accused could not have investigated the case. Upholding the objection, relying on Megha Singh (supra) the accused was acquitted. Rajangam (supra) was a prosecution under the NDPS Act, an objection was taken that PW6 who apprehended the accused could not have investigated the case. Upholding the objection, relying on Megha Singh (supra) the accused was acquitted. The view taken by the Madras High Court in Balasundaran v. State, 1999 (113) ELT 785 (Mad.), was also noticed as follows : "16. Learned Counsel for the appellants also stated that P.W. 5 being the Inspector of Police who was present at the time of search and he was the investigating officer and as such it is fatal to the case of the prosecution. P.W. 5, according to the prosecution, was present with PWs 3 and 4 at the time of search. In fact, P.W. 5 alone took up investigation in the case and he had examined the witnesses. No doubt the successor to P.W. 5 alone had filed the chargesheet. But there is no material to show that he had examined any other witness. It therefore follows that P.W. 5 was the person who really investigated the case. P.W. 5 was the person who had searched the appellants in question and he being the investigation officer, certainly it is not proper and correct. The investigation ought to have been done by any other investigating agency. On this score also, the investigation is bound to suffer and as such the entire proceedings will be vitiated.” 11. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Bhagwan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (1976) 1 SCC 15 another judgment relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner, at para No.5 it is held as under: “5. Now, ordinarily this Court does not interfere with concurrent findings of fact reached by the trial court and the High Court on an appreciation of the evidence. But this is one of those rare and exceptional cases where we find that several important circumstances have not been taken into account by the trial court and the High Court and that has resulted in serious miscarriage of justice calling for interference from this Court. We may first refer to a rather disturbing feature of this case. It is indeed such an unusual feature that it is quite surprising that it should have escaped the notice of the trial court and the High Court. We may first refer to a rather disturbing feature of this case. It is indeed such an unusual feature that it is quite surprising that it should have escaped the notice of the trial court and the High Court. Head Constable Ram Singh was the person to whom the offer of bribe was alleged to have been made by the appellant and he was the informant or complainant who lodged the first information report for taking action against the appellant. It is difficult to understand how in these circumstances Head Constable Ram Singh could undertake investigation of the case. How could the complainant himself be the investigator? Infact, Head Constable Ram Singh, being an officer below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police, was not authorised to investigate the case but we do not attach any importance to that fact, as that may not affect the validity of the conviction. The infirmity which we are pointing out is not an infirmity arising from investigation by an officer not authorised to do so, but an infirmity arising from investigation by a Head Constable who was himself the person to whom the bribe was alleged to have been offered and who lodged the first information report as informant or complainant. This is an infirmity which is bound to reflect on the credibility of the prosecution case.” 12. The Hon’ble Apex Court in State v. Rajangam, (2010) 15 SCC 369 another decision relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner, at para Nos.9 and 10 it is held as under: “9. The learned counsel appearing for the accused submitted that the controversy involved in this case is no longer res integra. In Megha Singh v. State of Haryana, (1996) 11 SCC 709 : 1997 SCC (Cri) 267, this Court has taken a categorical view that the officer who arrested the accused should not have proceeded with the investigation of the case. The relevant paragraph reads as under: (SCC p. 711, para 4) “4. … We have also noted another disturbing feature in this case. PW 3, Siri Chand, Head Constable arrested the accused and on search being conducted by him a pistol and the cartridges were recovered from the accused. It was on his complaint a formal first information report was lodged and the case was initiated. He being complainant should not have proceeded with the investigation of the case. PW 3, Siri Chand, Head Constable arrested the accused and on search being conducted by him a pistol and the cartridges were recovered from the accused. It was on his complaint a formal first information report was lodged and the case was initiated. He being complainant should not have proceeded with the investigation of the case. But it appears to us that he was not only the complainant in the case but he carried on with the investigation and examined witnesses under Section 161 CrPC. Such practice, to say the least, should not be resorted to so that there may not be any occasion to suspect fair and impartial investigation.” 10. The ratio of Megha case [ (1996) 11 SCC 709 : 1997 SCC (Cri) 267] has been followed by other cases. In another case in Balasundaran v. State [ (1999) 113 ELT 785 (Mad)] , in para 16, the Madras High Court took the same view. The relevant portion reads as under: (ELTp.790, para 16) “16. Learned counsel for the appellants also stated that PW 5 being the Inspector of Police who was present at the time of search and he was the investigating officer and as such it is fatal to the case of the prosecution. PW 5, according to the prosecution, was present with PWs 3 and 4 at the time of search. In fact, PW 5 alone took up investigation in the case and he had examined the witnesses. No doubt the successor to PW 5 alone had filed the charge-sheet. But there is no material to show that he had examined any other witness. It therefore follows that PW 5 was the person who really investigated the case. PW 5 was the person who had searched the appellants in question and he being the investigation officer, certainly it is not proper and correct. The investigation ought to have been done by any other investigating agency. On this score also, the investigation is bound to suffer and as such the entire proceedings will be vitiated.” 13. PW 5 was the person who had searched the appellants in question and he being the investigation officer, certainly it is not proper and correct. The investigation ought to have been done by any other investigating agency. On this score also, the investigation is bound to suffer and as such the entire proceedings will be vitiated.” 13. It is contended by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Megha Singh , Mohan Lal Bhagwan Singh and Rajangam , in a case where the officer who conducted the raid, lodged a report, later conducted the investigation and filed charge sheet, the investigation is vitiated for violation of the principles of natural justice. It is contended further that the informant is P.W.3 in this case; P.W.3 conducted the raid; P.W.3 also conducted the investigation; P.W.3 also filed the charge sheet; it doubts and reflects the credibility of the prosecution case; P.W.3 having participated in the raid could not have proceeded further in lodging and registering the FIR and conducted further investigation and filed charge sheet. By relying on the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Megha Singh , Mohan Lal , Bhagwan Singh , Rajangam cases, it is argued that the investigation is tainted by credibility, and it is fatal to the case of the prosecution. In view of the above, it is submitted that the judgment of the learned Trial Court and Appellate Court are not unsustainable and hence, they are liable to be set aside. 14. However, the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor brought to the notice of this Court the Constitutional Bench judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Mukesh Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2020) 10 SCC 120 wherein a Five Judge Bench was convened to determine the validity of the view taken by the Hon’ble Apex court in Mohan Lal v. State of Punjab supra, wherein the Apex Court observed that if in the case, the investigation is conducted by the police officer who himself is the complainant, the trial is vitiated and the Accused is entitled to acquittal. 15. 15. The decision of Mohan Lal , however, came up for consideration before the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Varinder Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh, MANU/SC/0173/2019 wherein the Apex Court held that the decision of the case of Mohan Lal shall be applicable prospectively, meaning thereby, all pending criminal prosecutions, trials and appeals prior to the law laid down in Mohan Lal shall continue to be governed by individual facts of the case. 16. The contentious issue involved in Mukesh Singh supra was, “Whether in the case where the investigation is conducted by the informant/police officer who himself is the complainant, the trial is vitiated and in such a situation, the Accused is entitled to acquittal?” 17. The Hon’ble Supreme Court stated that the observations of the Supreme Court in the cases of Bhagwan Singh , Megha Singh and Rajangam supra and the acquittal of the Accused by the Supreme Court on the ground that as the informant and the investigator was the same, it had vitiated the trial and the Accused was entitled to acquittal are to be treated to be confined to their own facts. It cannot be said that in the aforesaid decisions, the Supreme Court laid down any general proposition of law that in every case where the informant is the investigator there is a bias caused to the Accused and the entire prosecution case is to be disbelieved, and the Accused is entitled to acquittal. 18. In Mukesh Singh supra the Hon’ble Apex Court at para No.10 clearly observed that in a case where the informant himself is the investigator, by that itself cannot be said that the investigation was vitiated on the ground of bias or the like factor. The question of bias or prejudice would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Therefore, the Accused is not entitled to acquittal on the sole ground that informant is the investigator. The matter must be decided on a case-to-case basis. A contrary decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Mohan Lal supra and any other decision taking a contrary view that the informant cannot be the investigator and in such a case the Accused is entitled to acquittal are not good law and they are specifically overruled. 19. The matter must be decided on a case-to-case basis. A contrary decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Mohan Lal supra and any other decision taking a contrary view that the informant cannot be the investigator and in such a case the Accused is entitled to acquittal are not good law and they are specifically overruled. 19. The learned Assistant Public Prosecutor relied on a decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Girja Prasad v. State of M.P., (2007) 7 SCC 625 wherein at paragraph No.25 it is held as under: “25. In our judgment, the above proposition does not lay down correct law on the point. It is well settled that credibility of witness has to be tested on the touchstone of truthfulness and trustworthiness. It is quite possible that in a given case, a court of law may not base conviction solely on the evidence of the complainant or a police official but it is not the law that police witnesses should not be relied upon and their evidence cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars by other independent evidence. The presumption that every person acts honestly applies as much in favour of a police official as any other person. No infirmity attaches to the testimony of police officials merely because they belong to police force. There is no rule of law which lays down that no conviction can be recorded on the testimony of police officials even if such evidence is otherwise reliable and trustworthy. The rule of prudence may require more careful scrutiny of their evidence. But, if the court is convinced that what was stated by a witness has a ring of truth, conviction can be based on such evidence.” 20. While deciding a Criminal Revision Case filed against acquittal of accused, it is apposite to refer the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar , (2002) 6 SCC 650 wherein at Paragraph No.13 it is held as under: “13. ... In the absence of any legal infirmity either in the procedure or in the conduct of the trial, there was no justification for the High Court to interfere in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. It has repeatedly been held that the High Court should not re-appreciate the evidence to reach a finding different from the trial Court. ... In the absence of any legal infirmity either in the procedure or in the conduct of the trial, there was no justification for the High Court to interfere in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. It has repeatedly been held that the High Court should not re-appreciate the evidence to reach a finding different from the trial Court. In the absence of manifest illegality resulting in grave miscarriage of justice, exercise of revisional jurisdiction in such cases is not warranted.” 21. In State of Karnataka v. Appa Babu Ingale, AIR 1993 SC 1126 at Paragraph No.2 it is held as under: “…Ordinarily it is not open for the High Court to interfere with the concurrent findings of the courts below specially by re-appreciating the evidence in its revisional jurisdiction….” 22. In Jagannath Chowdhary v. Ramayan Singh, AIR 2002 SC 2229 at Paragraph Nos.10 to 13 it is held as under: “10. While it is true and now well-settled in a long catena of cases that exercise of power under Section 401 cannot but be ascribed to be discretionary - this discretion, however, as is popularly informed has to be a judicious exercise of discretion and not an arbitrary one. Judicial discretion cannot but be a discretion which stands "informed by tradition, methodised by analogy and disciplined by system" - resultantly only in the event of a glaring defect in the procedural aspect or there being a manifest error on a point of law and thus a flagrant miscarriage of justice, exercise of revisional jurisdiction under this statute ought not to be called for. It is not to be lightly exercised but only in exceptional situations where the justice delivery system requires interference for correction of a manifest illegality or prevention of a gross miscarriage of justice. In Nosibolla: Logendranath Jha and Chinnaswamy Reddy (supra) as also in Thakur Das (Thakur Das (Dead) by LRs v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr., 1978 (1) SCC 27 ) this Court with utmost clarity and in no uncertain terms recorded the same. It is not an appellate forum wherein scrutiny of evidence is possible; neither the revisional jurisdiction is open for being exercised simply by reason of the factum of another view being otherwise possible. It is not an appellate forum wherein scrutiny of evidence is possible; neither the revisional jurisdiction is open for being exercised simply by reason of the factum of another view being otherwise possible. It is restrictive in its application though in the event of there being a failure of justice there can said to be no limitation as regards the applicability of the revisional power. 11. The High Court possesses a general power of superintendence over the actions of courts subordinate to it. On its administrative side, the power is known as the power of superintendence. On the judicial side, it is known as the duty of revision. The High Court can at any stage even on its own motion, if it so desires, and certainly when illegalities or irregularities resulting in injustice are brought to its notice call for the records and examine them. This right of the High Court is as much a part of the administration of justice as its duty to hear appeals and revisions and interlocutory applications -so also its right to exercise its powers of administrative superintendence. Though however, the jurisdictional sweep of the process of the High Court, however, under the provisions of Section 401 is very much circumscribed, as noticed hereinbefore. 12. Having regard to the aforesaid, we do feel it expedient to record that in the contextual facts presently under consideration before this Court, the High Court cannot but be said to have exceeded its revisional jurisdiction in setting aside the order of acquittal. 13. In any event, writing of a fresh judgment as directed by the Court is rather a significant departure in the normal disposal of revisional applications. Opportunities have been given for further argument but would that by itself tilt the scale - this aspect of the matter has already been noticed earlier, as such we need not dilate thereon excepting recording that an extremely significant departure from the normal form of Court orders stands challenged in this Court.” 23. Keeping in view of all the principles laid down in the judgments referred supra, I shall proceed to decide this Revision Case without there being any iota of re-appreciation of evidence by sitting like a second appellate court. Keeping in view of all the principles laid down in the judgments referred supra, I shall proceed to decide this Revision Case without there being any iota of re-appreciation of evidence by sitting like a second appellate court. This Court, while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 397 read with Section 401 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ cannot invoke it’s revisional power as a Second Appellate Court and re-appreciation of evidence is not possible in the revision case as laid down in the decisions in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh , Jagannath Chowdhary and Appa Babu Ingale . However, this Court is not denuded of its powers to examine whether judgments impugned are correct, legal and proper with respect to their findings, sentence or even judgment and there are any material irregularities. If there are manifest illegalities and interest of public justice requires interference for the correction of those manifest illegalities or to prevent a great miscarriage of justice, this Court is empowered to evaluate the evidence and analyze it and come to a just conclusion. 24. Coming to the facts of the instant case, the learned Trial Court examined P.Ws.1 to 3, marked Ex.P1 to P5 and M.Os.1 & 2. P.Ws.1 to 3 in one voice supported the case of the prosecution that the accused/Petitioner were in possession of I.D Arrack in two cans illegally. The learned Trial Court found the Petitioner/Accused No.2 guilty under Section 7A read with 8 (e) of ‘the A.P.P. Act’ and sentenced him to undergo one-year simple imprisonment and fine of Rs.10,000/-. The learned Appellate Court also confirmed the same. 25. Hence, the contention of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that the informant and the Investigating Officer are one and the same, and the investigation is vitiated by bias and perfunctory, cannot be appreciated, in view of the judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Mukesh Singh and Girja Prasad. 26. In the result, the Criminal Revision Case is required to be disposed of, confirming the conviction as originally imposed by the learned Trial Court in C.C.No.236 of 2005, and subsequently upheld by the learned Appellate Court in Criminal Appeal No.134 of 2008. 27. The Petitioner was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a term of one year and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/-. 27. The Petitioner was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a term of one year and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/-. Indeed, Section 7 A read with section 8 (e) of ‘the APP Act.,’ mandates that the offenders have to be punished with an imprisonment not less than one year, but it may extend up to five years, along with a fine, which is not less than Rs.10,000/-, but it may extend up to Rs.1,00,000/-. 28. Be that as it may, in regard to imposition of sentence on the petitioners, in Santhosh Kumar v. Municipal Corporation, 2000 (9) SCC 151 the Hon’ble Apex Court while referring judgment in N. Sumumaran Nair v. Food Inspector Mavehkara, AIR 1995 SCW 1983 had commuted the sentence under Clause (d) of Section 433 of ‘the Cr.P.C.’ and imposed Rs.10,000/- as fine in commutation of the sentence of 6 months imprisonment. 29. Yet, a learned Single Judge of this Court in Guthula Ramakrishna v. State of A.P. 2022 SCC Online AP 156 while dismissing the criminal revision case held that the minimum sentence provided by law cannot be reduced further by quoting the judgments of the Apex Court in State of MP v. Vikram Das , 18 (2019) 4 SCC 125 and Meera v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2022 SCC Online SC 31 wherein it is held that merely because long time has passed in concluding the trial and/or deciding the appeal by the High Court, is no ground not to impose the punishment and/or to impose the sentence already undergone. 30. However, another learned single judge of this Court in Kesuboyina Kanakayya v. A.P., Crl. R.C. No. 2145 of 2009 dated 29.01.2024 instead of awarding sentence of imprisonment of one year, the accused therein was directed to pay fine of Rs.5,000/-. 31. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Santhosh supra commuted the sentence of imprisonment of fine and sentenced the petitioner therein to undergo the imprisonment which he had already undergone, even though there was statutory prescription of imposition of minimum sentence of imprisonment. 32. Of course, in a different context relating to Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Braham Dass v. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1988 SCC 1789 in para-Nos. 5 & 6 held as under: “5. 32. Of course, in a different context relating to Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Braham Dass v. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1988 SCC 1789 in para-Nos. 5 & 6 held as under: “5. Coming to the question of sentence, we find that the appellant had been acquitted by the trial court and the High Court while reversing the judgment of acquittal made by the appellate Judge has not make clear reference to clause (f). The occurrence took place about more than 8 years back. Records show that the appellant has already suffered a part of the imprisonment. We do not find any useful purpose would be served in sending the appellant to jail at this point of time for undergoing the remaining period of the sentence, though ordinarily in an anti-social offence punishable under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act the Court should take strict view of such matter. 6. While dismissing the appeal, we would, however, limit the sentence of imprisonment to the period already undergone and sustain. the fine alongwith the default sentence.” 33. Further, the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Des Raj v. State of Haryana, 1996 Cri. L.J. 2720 in para-Nos.8 & 9 held as under: “8. The respective arguments have been considered carefully. It is not disputed that the sample in question was taken on 29-8-1987 and the prosecution was launched against him on 9-10-1987. After a long and protracted trial, the petitioner was convicted and sentenced by order dated November 7, 1992 which has been confirmed by the appellate Court by order dated November 17, 1995. In other words, the petitioner has been undergoing the turmoil of a criminal prosecution for the last about-eight years. 9. Now, it is well settled that the right to speedy and expeditious trial is one of the most valuable and cherished rights guaranteed under the Constitution. Fundamental rights are not a teasing illusion to be mocked at. These are meant to be enforced and made a reality. Fair, just and reasonable procedure implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution creates a right in the accused to be tried speedily. Right to speedy trial is the right of the accused. The fact that a speedy trial is also in public interest or that it serves the social interest also, does not make it any-the-less the right of the accused. Right to speedy trial is the right of the accused. The fact that a speedy trial is also in public interest or that it serves the social interest also, does not make it any-the-less the right of the accused. Right to speedy trial flowing from Article 21 encompasses all the stages, namely the stage of investigation, inquiry trial, appeal, revision and retrial. This is how the Courts shall understand this right and have gone to the extent of quashing the prosecution after such inordinate delay in concluding the trial of an accused keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case. Keeping a person in suspended animation for 8 years or more without any case at all cannot be with the spirit of the procedure established by law. It is correct that although minimum sentence to be imposed upon a convict is prescribed by the statute yet keeping in view the provisions of Article 21 of the Constitution of India and the interpretation thereof qua the right of an accused to a speedy trial, judicial compassion can play a role and a convict can be compensated for the mental agony which he undergoes on account of protracted trial due to the fault of the prosecution by this Court in the exercise of its extra-ordinary jurisdiction.” 34. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Haripapda Das v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1999 SCC 1482 in para No.6 held as under: “6. This appeal is directed against the conviction of the appellant under Prevention of Food Adulteration Act for selling adulterated mustard oil. Although in the samples drawn by the Food Inspector, no impurity or objects injurious to health could be detected but it was found that the saponification value exceeded marginally than the prescribed limit and the B.R. reading also exceeded marginally than the prescribed limit. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and also considering that the appellant was released on bail by this Court long back and because of the protracted litigation up to this Court he has also suffered a lot of mental agony and also financial hardship and also considering the fact that he had already undergone imprisonment for more than three weeks, we feel that in the facts of the case the ends of justice will be met if the sentence of imprisonment is reduced to the period already undergone. We, however, direct that besides the fine imposed by the Courts below, the appellant will have to pay a fine Rs. 5,000/- within four weeks from today, in default he will have to undergo imprisonment for three months. The appeals are disposed of accordingly. The bail bonds stand discharged.” 35. The learned counsel for the revisionist has also relied on the judgment of the High Court of Rajasthan at Jodhapur in Swaroopa Ram v. State of Rajasthan, Crl. R.P. No. 115 of 2007 dated 05.02.2025 wherein at page No.9 it is held as under: “9. This Court finds that the petitioner was a milk vendor and there is no reason available with it to disbelieve the report of the Public Analyst, wherein the sample of milk drawn from the petitioner was found to be Adulterated. However, in the opinion of this Court, since the incident relates to the year 1997 and the petitioner has suffered the agony and trauma of protracted trial for about 27 years coupled with the fact that the petitioner has spent some period in custody, it will be just and proper if the sentence awarded to him by the learned trial Court for the offence under section 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 is reduced to the period already undergone by him.” 36. In fact, the right to speedy trial is a fundamental right as per the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hussainara Khatoon (IV) v. Home Secretary State of Bihar, AIR 1979 SC 1360 . This right includes speedy disposal of appeals. In addition to the appeals, the right to a speedy trial also includes criminal revisions as per the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Rajdeo Sharma v. State of Bihar , 2000 (1) BLJR 37 . The Petitioner was in incarceration for a considerable length of time. There are no similar adverse antecedents reported against the petitioners as fairly conceded by the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor. CONCLUSION: 37. The Petitioner was in incarceration for a considerable length of time. There are no similar adverse antecedents reported against the petitioners as fairly conceded by the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor. CONCLUSION: 37. In the facts and circumstances of the instant case, for the above reasons, this criminal revision case is disposed of confirming the conviction for the offence under Section 7A read with section 8 (e) of 'the APP Act' and sentencing the petitioners to suffer imprisonment to which the petitioner had already undergone, while imposing an additional amount of Rs.10,000/- towards fine on the petitioner excluding the fine amount already paid by petitioner pursuant to the judgment of the learned Appellate and Trial Courts. 38. The petitioner shall pay the additional fine amount of Rs.10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand Only) within two months from the date of receipt of this order, failing which, the petitioner shall suffer remaining one-year simple imprisonment as ordered by the learned courts below. 39. The learned Trial Court shall take necessary follow-up steps. 40. There shall be no order as to costs. As a sequel, interlocutory applications, if any pending, shall stand closed.