JUDGMENT : [Manish Chodhury, J] The present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is preferred on behalf of a detenu, Smti. Chinneilhing Haokip @ Neopi [hereinafter referred to as ‘the detenu’, for short] by the detenu’s elder sister, Smti. Lhingneikim Haokip as the next friend to challenge a Detention Order bearing no. CON/PITNDPS/15/2024/69 dated 30.05.2024 passed by the Special Secretary to the Government of Nagaland, Home Department [the respondent no.2] as the Detaining Authority in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section [1] of Section 3 of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 [‘the PIT NDPS Act’, for short] and all other consequential orders passed thereafter. By the Detention Order dated 30.05.2024, the detenu was detained and kept in the District Jail, Dimapur for an initial period of 3 [three] months. 2. It appears relevant to delineate the previous events which purportedly led to the passing of the Order of Detention dated 30.05.2024, at first. 3. A First Information Report [FIR] [Suo Moto] was lodged before the Officer In-Charge, Narcotic Police Station, Police Headquarters [PHQ], Nagaland, Kohima on 06.04.2024 by one Pangerlemba Sangtam, an Assistant Sub-Inspector [ASI] attached to Narcotic Police Station, PHQ, Kohima stating inter-alia that on 05.04.2024, he and a team of police personnel were detailed for MVCP duty and accordingly, routine checkings of vehicles were being carried out by the team at a place in between Khuzama and Vizwema, near Agri-Link Road. During such routine checkings, at around 20-00 hours on 05.04.2024, one vehicle bearing registration no. AS-03/T-4234 [Mahindra TUV – red colour] [‘the subject-vehicle’, for short] which was coming from Manipur side, was made to stop for checking. On checking, the subject-vehicle was found to have the following three occupants including the driver, :- [i] Nehkoi Guite [driver] [53 yrs/M], S/o - Zonsei Guite, Add - Zomi Villa, North AOC, Porompat, Imphal East, P/add - Kangpokpi, P.O./P.S. - Kangpokpi, Dist. - Kangpokpi, Manipur. [ii] Hoinu @ Vahboi, [50 yrs/F], W/o - Nehkoi Guite, Add - Zomi Villa, North AOC, Porompat, Imphal East, P/add - Kangpokpi, P.O./P.S. - Kangpokpi, Dist. - Kangpokpi, Manipur. [iii] Chenneilhing [43 yrs/F], W/o - Angam, Add - Patjong, P.O./P.S. - Kangpokpi, Dist. - Kangpokpi, Manipur. - Kangpokpi, Manipur. [ii] Hoinu @ Vahboi, [50 yrs/F], W/o - Nehkoi Guite, Add - Zomi Villa, North AOC, Porompat, Imphal East, P/add - Kangpokpi, P.O./P.S. - Kangpokpi, Dist. - Kangpokpi, Manipur. [iii] Chenneilhing [43 yrs/F], W/o - Angam, Add - Patjong, P.O./P.S. - Kangpokpi, Dist. - Kangpokpi, Manipur. The informant had further mentioned that on inspection of the subject-vehicle, items, suspected to be narcotic drugs, were detected and information was immediately given to the superior officers. The Gazetted Police Officer, the Officer In-Charge, Khuzama Police Station and independent witnesses were called to the place to conduct search and seizure. The subject-vehicle was, thereafter, checked in presence of the witnesses and the suspected accused persons/occupants were also informed of their rights to be searched in presence of a Magistrate or a Gazetted Officer, after which body searches were carried out in presence of the Gazetted Officer. 3.1. The informant further stated that during search, narcotic drugs, suspected to be Heroin, packed in 20 [twenty] soap boxes, were found concealed inside the gear level cover of the subject-vehicle and accordingly, those were seized. In addition, the subject-vehicle with its ignition key and connected vehicular documents, a cash amount of Rs. 1,43,000/- and other items were seized from the possession of the accused persons by preparing a Seizure Memo, in presence of the independent witnesses, the Gazetted Police Officer, etc. The suspected narcotic drugs [Heroin] were weighed separately, with and without the soap box covers. On weighment, the total weight was found to be 239 gms [approx.], without the soap box covers. The informant further mentioned that the seizure process was carried out under videography. The seized contraband items were then serially marked, packed and sealed, with attestations of the independent witnesses, the Gazetted Police Officer and the accused persons. With the FIR, the informant produced the accused persons along with the seized suspected contraband items, the subject-vehicle etc. at the Narcotic Police Station, PHQ, Kohima at 06-50 hours on 06.04.2024 and requested to register a case under the provisions of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 [‘the NDPS Act’, for short] for further investigation. 3.2. On receipt of the FIR, a crime case, Narcotic Police Station, PHQ Case no. at the Narcotic Police Station, PHQ, Kohima at 06-50 hours on 06.04.2024 and requested to register a case under the provisions of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 [‘the NDPS Act’, for short] for further investigation. 3.2. On receipt of the FIR, a crime case, Narcotic Police Station, PHQ Case no. 05 of 2024 was registered by the Officer In-Charge, Narcotic Police Station, PHQ on 06.04.2024 for the offences under Section 22 [b] and Section 60 of the NDPS Act and entrusted the investigation of the case to one Bongkhao Konyak, UBSI attached to the said Police Station. The accused persons including Chenneilhing @ Neopi, were arrested and thereafter, produced before the Court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kohima. On being so produced, they were initially remanded to police custody. Subsequently, the accused persons were remanded to judicial custody. 3.3. On 10.04.2024, the I.O. of the case, Narcotic Police Station Case no. 05 of 2024 produced the accused person, Hoinu @ Vahboi before the Court of learned Principal District & Sessions Judge, Kohima [‘the Special Judge, NDPS, Kohima’, for short] in connection with Special Case no. 16 of 2024, which has arisen out of Narcotic Police Station, PHQ Case no. 05 of 2024. On the same date, the other two accused persons :- Nekhot Guite and Chenneilheng were also produced. The I.O. submitted an application before the learned Special Judge, NDPS, Kohima with a prayer to discharge the arrested accused person, Hoinu @ Vahboi on the premise that during the course of investigation, no evidence/involvement could be established against Hoinu @ Vahboi. The learned Special Judge, NDPS, Kohima perused the concerned case diary and as per the prayer of the I.O., discharged the arrested accused person, Hoinu @ Vahboi from the liability of the case by an Order dated 10.04.2024. 3.4. During a subsequent period, a bail application, registered and numbered as I.A. no. 130/2024, on behalf of the arrested accused person, Smti. Chenneilheng Haokip @ Neopi was preferred before the learned Special Judge, NDPS, Kohima. The said bail application, I.A. no. 130/2024 came to be considered by the learned Special Judge, NDPS, Kohima on 24.05.2024. The learned Special Judge, NDPS, Kohima after hearing the learned counsel for the accused person, Smti. 130/2024, on behalf of the arrested accused person, Smti. Chenneilheng Haokip @ Neopi was preferred before the learned Special Judge, NDPS, Kohima. The said bail application, I.A. no. 130/2024 came to be considered by the learned Special Judge, NDPS, Kohima on 24.05.2024. The learned Special Judge, NDPS, Kohima after hearing the learned counsel for the accused person, Smti. Chenneilheng Haokip @ Neopi and the learned Public Prosecutor and after perusal of the materials in the case diary, rejected the prayer for bail by its Order dated 24.05.2024. The learned Special Judge, NDPS, Kohima had observed, in the Order dated 24.05.2024, that the case was still at the stage of investigation and it was of the view that sufficient time ought to be granted to the investigating agency to complete the investigation. 3.5. A proposal for the detention of the proposed detenu, Smti. Chenneilheng Haokip @ Neopi who had already been arraigned as an accused in Narcotic Police Station, PHQ Case no. 05 of 2024 and was arrested along with the two accused persons :- [i] Nekhoi Guite; and [ii] Smti. Hoinu @ Vahboi; was submitted by the I.O. of the case under the provisions of the PIT NDPS Act. In the proposal, it was mentioned that on 05.04.2024, the proposed detenu was arrested along with the other two accused persons :- [i] Nekhoi Guite; and [ii] Smti. Hoinu @ Vahboi; and 20 [twenty] soap boxes containing 239 gms [approx.] of suspected Heroin were recovered from inside the subject-vehicle wherein they were occupants. The soap boxes were found concealed inside the gear level cover of the subject-vehicle. 3.6. In the proposal, in was further mentioned that the proposed detenu was in judicial custody and lodged then in the District Jail, Kohima. The I.O. further mentioned that the proposal was based on credible information and it was ascertained that the seized soap boxes containing suspected contraband [Heroin] belonged to the proposed detenu and the same were to be delivered to a Dimapur based trafficker. In the proposal, the I.O. had further mentioned that there was evidence that the proposed detenu procured drugs a multiple number of times from a Myanmar based trafficker. It was mentioned that from analysis of the Call Detail Records [CDR], the proposed detenu was found to be in constant contact with one Adaliu Chawang. In the proposal, the I.O. had further mentioned that there was evidence that the proposed detenu procured drugs a multiple number of times from a Myanmar based trafficker. It was mentioned that from analysis of the Call Detail Records [CDR], the proposed detenu was found to be in constant contact with one Adaliu Chawang. In the proposal, it was further mentioned that the proposed detenu was actively involved in illicit trafficking in a very organized manner and if the proposed detenu was not kept in preventive detention, she was likely to continue in the act of illicit trafficking. The I.O. further mentioned that the preventive detention of the proposed detenu was necessary to disrupt the existing network of illicit trafficking. 3.7. The proposal for detention on the proposed detenu under Section 3 [1] of the PIT NDPS Act along with the relied upon documents was submitted by the I.O. through the jurisdictional Superintendent of Police before the Chairman, Screening Board, PIT NDPS Act, Kohima, Nagaland for detention of the proposed detenu, an accused in connection with Narcotic Police Station, PHQ Case no. 05 of 2024 registered under Section 22 [b] r/w Section 60, NDPS Act. 3.8. The Screening Board, PIT NDPS Act, which has been constituted under the PIT NDPS Act, held one of its sittings on 17.05.2024 to look into the proposal submitted in connection with the proposed detenu, Smti. Chenneilheng Haokip @ Neopi and to make recommendation. Another proposal for detention of another proposed detenu, Adaliu Chawang, daughter of Phuba Chawang, Village - Samziuram, Post Office & Police Station – Jalukie, District - Peren, Nagaland was also placed before the Screening Board in the said sitting for consideration. The Screening Board after perusal of the proposals and the documents submitted therewith by the I.O. of Narcotic Police Station, PHQ Case no. 05 of 2024 recommending detention, formed an opinion that sufficient materials were available for placing the proposed detenu, an accused in connection with Narcotic Police Station, PHQ Case no. 05 of 2024, under preventive detention. The Screening Board accordingly, recommended to forward the proposal to the Special Secretary to the Government of Nagaland, Home Department with the recommendation to place the proposed detenu under the preventive detention, as provided under Section 3 [1] of the PIT NDPS Act. 3.9. The proposal for detention of the proposed detenu, Smti. 05 of 2024, under preventive detention. The Screening Board accordingly, recommended to forward the proposal to the Special Secretary to the Government of Nagaland, Home Department with the recommendation to place the proposed detenu under the preventive detention, as provided under Section 3 [1] of the PIT NDPS Act. 3.9. The proposal for detention of the proposed detenu, Smti. Chenneilheng Haokip @ Neopi was forwarded to the Special Secretary to the Government of Nagaland, Home Department on 17.05.2024 by the Office of the Director General of Police, Nagaland, Kohima and under the hand of the Additional Director General of Police [Adm.] & Chairman, Screening Board, PIT NDPS Act, Nagaland vide an Office Letter no. PHQ/IGP/CID/NAR-D/81A/2022/175 dated 17.05.2024. 3.10. On the basis of the proposal received from the Additional Director of Police [Adm.] & Chairman, Screening Board, PIT NDPS Act, Nagaland, the respondent no. 2 reached a satisfaction on examination of the proposal and the supporting documents that there were sufficient grounds for detention of the proposed detenu, Smti. Chenneilheng Haokip @ Neopi and formed a view that it was necessary to detain her with a view to preventing her from engaging in illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. The respondent no. 2 had accordingly, passed the impugned Order of Detention dated 30.05.2024 in exercise of powers conferred by sub-section [1] of Section 3 of the PIT NDPS Act directing that the detenu be detained and kept in the District Jail, Dimapur for an initial period of three months. 3.11. It is noticed that on the date of passing the impugned Order of Detention under Section 3 [1] of the PIT NDPS Act, that is, on 30.05.2024, the respondent no. 2 also made the grounds of detention ready for communicating them to the detenu. The Detaining Authority, that is, the respondent no. 2 appeared to have taken steps for execution of the Detention Order through the Deputy Secretary to the Government of Nagaland, Political Branch, Home Department. The detenu was thereafter, communicated with the Detention Order dated 30.05.2024 along with the grounds of detention and the supporting documents on 03.06.2024 and the same fact is demonstrated from an Office Letter bearing no. 2 appeared to have taken steps for execution of the Detention Order through the Deputy Secretary to the Government of Nagaland, Political Branch, Home Department. The detenu was thereafter, communicated with the Detention Order dated 30.05.2024 along with the grounds of detention and the supporting documents on 03.06.2024 and the same fact is demonstrated from an Office Letter bearing no. PHQ/IGP/CID/NAR-D/81A/2022/96 dated 03.06.2024 of the Deputy Superintendent of Police [Crime] & In-Charge, NCORD Secretariat, PHQ, Nagaland, Kohima addressed to the Deputy Secretary to the Government of Nagaland, Political Branch, Home Department and an Acknowledgement Certificate signed by the detenu on 03.06.2024 wherein signatures were subscribed by two witnesses and the Executing Officer. 4. It appears relevant to delineate some of the events subsequent to the passing of the Detention Order dated 30.05-2024. 5. Subsequent to passing of the Detention Order on 30.05.2024, a bail application was filed under Section 439 r/w Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 before the learned Special Judge, NDPS, Kohima on behalf of the two accused persons :- [i] Nehkoi Guite; and [ii] Smti. Chenneilheng Haokip @ Neopi [the detenu] for releasing them on default bail. The said application was registered and numbered as I.A. [Crl.] no. 167 of 2024. The said bail application came up for consideration before the learned Special Judge, NDPS, Kohima on 05.06.2024. The learned Special Judge, NDPS, Kohima heard the learned counsel for the accused persons and the learned Public Prosecutor for the State of Nagaland. The learned Special Judge took note of the fact that the accused persons were arrested on 05.04.2024 and till 05.06.2024, they were in custody for more than 60 [sixty] days and no charge-sheet had been filed during the mandatory period of 60 [sixty] days. The learned Special Judge was of the view that the accused persons were, therefore, entitled for default bail. Accordingly, the learned Special Judge allowed the bail application of the two accused persons, thereby, allowing them to be released on default bail by its Order dated 05.06.2024, subject to the terms and conditions mentioned therein. 5.1. The detenu being aggrieved by the impugned Detention Order dated 30.05.2024, stated to have submitted Representations, dated 11.06.2024, before :- [i] the Joint Secretary, Department of Revenue, Ministry of Finance, Government of India; [ii] the State Government; [iii] the Advisory Board; [iv] the District Jail Authority, Dimapur; for revocation of the Detention Order. 5.1. The detenu being aggrieved by the impugned Detention Order dated 30.05.2024, stated to have submitted Representations, dated 11.06.2024, before :- [i] the Joint Secretary, Department of Revenue, Ministry of Finance, Government of India; [ii] the State Government; [iii] the Advisory Board; [iv] the District Jail Authority, Dimapur; for revocation of the Detention Order. 5.2. It is stated that on 14.06.2024, the learned Special Judge, NDPS, Kohima was informed through the learned Public Prosecutor about execution of the Detention Order against the detenu, who is an accused in Special Case no. 16 of 2024, arising out of Narcotic Police Station, PHQ Case no. 05 of 2024. 5.3. The Detaining Authority, that is, the respondent no. 2 stated to have received the Representation dated 11.06.2024 of the detenu from the Senior Superintendent of Jail, District Jail, Dimapur vide Office Letter no. DJD-166/2024-25/146-57 dated 11.06.2024. By an Order dated 27.06.2024, the Detaining Authority rejected the prayer for revocation of the Detention Order dated 30.05.2024. 5.4. The matter of detention was also considered by the Advisory Board, constituted under the PIT NDPS Act. In its Opinion rendered on 08.08.2024, the Advisory Board recorded that the State Government had placed the matter before the Advisory Board vide its Communication dated 05.06.2024. The Advisory Board heard the detenu in person. After hearing the detenu in person and after considering the materials placed before it, the Advisory Board in its Opinion, recorded a view that there was sufficient cause for detention of the detenu, who had been detained vide the Detention Order dated 30.05.2024 passed by the Detaining Authority [the respondent no. 2] in connection with Narcotic Police Station, PHQ Case no. 05 of 2024, registered under Section 22 [b] r/w Section 60 of the NDPS Act. 5.5. The Representation submitted before the Central Government seeking revocation of the Detention Order dated 30.05.2024 came to be rejected vide a Memorandum dated 27.08.2024 of the Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, PIT NDPS Division, Department of Revenue, Ministry of Finance, Government of India. 5.6. After the Advisory Board rendered its Opinion on 08.08.2024 in the afore-stated manner, the original Detention Order dated 30.05.2024 passed in respect of the detenu came to be confirmed vide a Confirmation Order dated 30.08.2024 by the Chief Secretary to the Government of Nagaland in exercise of powers conferred by Clause [f] of Section 9 of the PIT NDPS Act. After the Advisory Board rendered its Opinion on 08.08.2024 in the afore-stated manner, the original Detention Order dated 30.05.2024 passed in respect of the detenu came to be confirmed vide a Confirmation Order dated 30.08.2024 by the Chief Secretary to the Government of Nagaland in exercise of powers conferred by Clause [f] of Section 9 of the PIT NDPS Act. By the Confirmation Order dated 30.08.2024, the period of Detention of the detenu was extended for another period of three months w.e.f. 03.09.2024 till 02.12.2024 with the observation that within the said period, the matter of detention of the detenu would be reviewed as required under the provisions of the PIT NDPS Act. 5.7. By an Order dated 02.12.2024 passed by the Chief Secretary to the Government of Nagaland, the period of Detention of the detenu was extended for a further period of three months w.e.f. 02.12.2024 till 02.03.2025 in exercise of powers conferred by Clause [f] of Section 9 of the PIT NDPS Act with the observation that within the said period, the matter of detention of the detenu would be reviewed as required under the provisions of the PIT NDPS Act. 6. We have heard Mr. V. Sirie, learned counsel for the petitioner & the detenu; Mr. K. Angami, learned Public Prosecutor for the State of Nagaland; and Mr. Yangerwati, learned Central Government Counsel representing Mr. Z.N. Ngullie, learned Central Government Counsel for the respondent/Union of India. 7. Mr. Sirie, learned counsel appearing for the detenu/petitioner has submitted that it has not yet been established on the basis of chemical examination report that the seized items, weighing 239 grams [approx.], are heroin. He has further contended that even if the seizure of contraband is accepted to be heroin, then also the quantity was lesser than commercial quantity of 250 grams, as prescribed by the NDPS Act. Moreover, the same were not found in the physical possession of the detenu but were found inside the gear level cover of the subject-vehicle in a concealed form. The subject-vehicle was driven by the accused person named Nehkhoi Guite, which goes to indicate that the subject-vehicle was predominantly under the control and dominion of Nehkhoi Guite. Moreover, the same were not found in the physical possession of the detenu but were found inside the gear level cover of the subject-vehicle in a concealed form. The subject-vehicle was driven by the accused person named Nehkhoi Guite, which goes to indicate that the subject-vehicle was predominantly under the control and dominion of Nehkhoi Guite. After discharging another arrested accused person, Hoinu @ Vahbol, wife of Nehkhoi Guite, who was also an occupant of the subject-vehicle at the relevant time, the Detaining Authority had chosen not to pass any order of detention in respect of Nehkhoi Guite while choosing to detain the present detenu preventively when the detenu had no criminal antecedent of being involved in any case previously under the NDPS Act. The learned counsel has, thus, raised a question on the subjective satisfaction reached by the Detaining Authority in the case in hand. He has further contended that the materials which appeared to have been considered by the Detaining Authority had no rational probative value. The Order of Detention based on the statements recorded in custody of the detenu and the other arrested accused person, Nehkhoi Guite, who has not been preventively detained, clearly appears to be a misuse of the drastic power of preventive detention, which otherwise is anathema to the right of personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. He has contended that the Detaining Authority could not have made an alleged confessional statement of the accused, that is, the detenu the basis for its reaching satisfaction in view of Article 20 [3] of the Constitution of India. The only other material being a statement of a co-accused which was an exculpatory statement for him, could not have been relied on by the Detaining Authority to pass the Detention Order in the case in hand. The learned counsel has further contended that the Detaining Authority had passed the Order of Detention only on the basis that the detenu was not an inhabitant of the State of Nagaland but an inhabitant of the State of Manipur and such an action is ex-facie mala fide and arbitrary. Mr. The learned counsel has further contended that the Detaining Authority had passed the Order of Detention only on the basis that the detenu was not an inhabitant of the State of Nagaland but an inhabitant of the State of Manipur and such an action is ex-facie mala fide and arbitrary. Mr. Sirie has further submitted that the constitutional postulate contained in Clause [5] Article 22 of the Constitution of India and the prescription set forth in sub-section [3] of Section 3 of the PIT NDPS Act have been violated in the instant case as the detenu was not communicated with the Order of Detention and the grounds of detention in a language understood by her. He has submitted that the language was English in the Order of Detention, the grounds of detention and the other supporting documents; and as the detenu had studied up to Class – VII standard only, and cannot read, write or could understand the English language; the detenu ought to have been served with such copies either in Manipuri or in Kuki dialect only, as she understands only the said two languages. He has, thus, contended that there has been clear violation of Clause [5] of Article 22 of the Constitution as well as Section 3 [3] of the PIT NDPS Act in the case in hand and, therefore, the preventive detention of the detenu is not sustainable in law. 8. Mr. Angami, learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the State respondents has supported the Order of Detention dated 31.05.2024 and all other subsequent actions. He has contended that the detenu who was an inhabitant of Manipur, was found in possession of suspected contraband substance, suspected to be Heroin. He has further contended that the Detaining Authority on reaching a satisfaction, on the basis of the materials placed before it, had preventively detained the detenu with a view to prevent her from engaging in illicit traffic in future. He has further submitted that all procedural safeguards were followed in detaining the detenu. He has further submitted that the Detaining Authority had reached a finding, at the time of passing the Detention Order, that the detenu as an accused in Narcotic Police Station, PHQ Case no. He has further submitted that all procedural safeguards were followed in detaining the detenu. He has further submitted that the Detaining Authority had reached a finding, at the time of passing the Detention Order, that the detenu as an accused in Narcotic Police Station, PHQ Case no. 05 of 2024, was likely to be released on bail shortly thereafter and had passed the Order of Detention as the detenu appeared to be involved in intra-State and inter-State network of smugglers and traffickers of illicit drugs. In response to the contention advanced on behalf of the detenu regarding violation of Article 22 [5] of the Constitution and Section 3 [3] of the PIT NDPS Act, Mr. Angami, learned Public Prosecutor has contended that the detenu had duly received a copy of the Detention Order dated 30.05.2024 along with its enclosures and had also acknowledged their receipt by subscribing her signature in an Acknowledgement Certificate dated 03.06.2024 and by certifying that the contents were explained to her in the language [Nagamese/Manipuri], the languages she purportedly understands, with translator, in presence of the witnesses, who had also subscribed their signatures in the Acknowledgment Certificate along with the Executing Officer on 03.06.2024. Mr. Angami has contended that in such situation, it is not open for the detenu to contend that there was violation of the provisions contained in Article 22 [5] of the Constitution and Section 3 [3] of the PIT NDPS Act. 9. When the writ petition was moved on 14.08.2024, notices were issued to the respondents. On 16.10.2024, the learned Central Government Counsel for the respondent no. 4 was asked to file affidavit before the next date to be fixed after 2 [two] weeks. The writ petition was thereafter, listed on 06.11.2024, 13.11.2024, 27.11.2024 and 04.12.2024 respectively. On 04.12.2024, the learned Central Government Counsel had submitted that he was yet to file the counter affidavit on behalf of the respondent no. 4, Union of India and he would make endeavour to file the affidavit within the said week. As sought for by him, the writ petition was ordered to be listed on 10.12.2024. No affidavit was filed on behalf of the respondent no. 4, Union of India on 10.12.2024. 4, Union of India and he would make endeavour to file the affidavit within the said week. As sought for by him, the writ petition was ordered to be listed on 10.12.2024. No affidavit was filed on behalf of the respondent no. 4, Union of India on 10.12.2024. When the writ petition was listed again on 12.12.2024, it was pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the detenu submitted a Representation before the Central Government on 11.06.2024 seeking revocation of the Detention Order passed against her and it was after 75 [seventy-five] days of making the Representation, the Central Government by its Memorandum dated 27.08.2024 rejected the Representation. As any Representation submitted before a competent authority including the Central Government, against a Detention Order is required to be disposed of at the earliest and no affidavit was filed on behalf of the respondent Union of India, as on 12.12.2024, explaining the period of delay regarding disposal of the Representation dated 11.06.2024, the learned Central Government Counsel was asked to obtain written instruction on the next date of listing, 20.12.2024 as the writ petition was substantially heard on all other points on 12.12.2024. When the writ petition was listed on 20.12.2024, none had appeared to represent the respondent no. 4, Union of India nor any written instructions on the afore-mentioned point had been placed before the Court. It was in such fact situation, the writ petition was closed for Order. 10. We have given due consideration to the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the materials brought on record by the parties to their pleadings. We have also considered the decisions cited at the Bar. 11. The Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 [‘the PIT NDPS Act, for short] is an Act which provides for detention in certain cases for the purpose of preventing illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances and for matters connected therewith. The PIT NDPS Act has been brought for the reason that illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances poses a serious threat to the health and welfare of the people and the activities of persons engaged in such illicit traffic have a deleterious effect on the national economy. The PIT NDPS Act has been brought for the reason that illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances poses a serious threat to the health and welfare of the people and the activities of persons engaged in such illicit traffic have a deleterious effect on the national economy. By sub-section [1] of Section 3 of the PIT NDPS Act, power has been vested in the Central Government or a State Government or any officer of the Central Government, not below the rank of a Joint Secretary to that Government, specially empowered for the purposes of Section 3 by that Government, or any officer of a State Government, not below the rank of a Secretary to that Government, specially empowered for the purposes of Section 3 by that Government, to make an Order, if satisfied, with respect to any person [including a foreigner] directing that the person be detained, with a view to preventing him from engaging in illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, if it is necessary so to do. The definition of ‘illicit traffic’ has been provided in Section 2 [e] of the PIT NDPS Act. As per Section 2 [e], ‘illicit traffic’ inter-alia means engaging in the production, manufacture, possession, sale, purchase, transportation, warehousing, concealment, use or consumption, import inter-State, export inter-State, import into India, export from India or transshipment, of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances. 12. The detenu was arrested on 05.04.2024 on the ground of finding suspected contraband in the subject-vehicle wherein the detenu was one of the three occupants, which consisted of two females, and on the basis of the FIR lodged thereafter, registered as Narcotic Police Station, PHQ Case no. 05 of 2024 under Section 22 [b] and Section 60 of the NDPS Act. It is stated that after arrest and production, the detenu as the accused in the said case was initially remanded to police custody for seven days and later on, was remanded to judicial custody from 12.04.2024 to 05.06.2024. 13. The Order of Detention was passed by the Detaining Authority on 30.05.2024. In order to appreciate the submissions of the parties on the point of legality and validity of the Order of Detention passed on 30.05.2024, it appears appropriate to refer to the said Order of Detention itself. 13. The Order of Detention was passed by the Detaining Authority on 30.05.2024. In order to appreciate the submissions of the parties on the point of legality and validity of the Order of Detention passed on 30.05.2024, it appears appropriate to refer to the said Order of Detention itself. For ready reference, the contents of the Order of Detention dated 30.05.2024 are extracted hereinbelow :- ORDER Dated Kohima, the 30th May, 2024. NO. CON/PIT NDPS/15/2024/69 :: Whereas, the Addl. DGP [Adm], Nagaland has sent a proposal for detention of Mrs. Chinneilhing Haokip @ Neopi [43 years]; D/o – Thangboi Haokip; V/o – Patjang; PO/PS – Kangpokpi; Dist. – Kangpokpi; State – Manipur; P/add – Relief Camp, Kangpokpi, under PIT NDPS Act, 1988 along with records under Section 3 [1] of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988. And whereas, on perusal of records as submitted by the Addl DGP [Adm], Nagaland, it appears that Mrs. Chinneilhing Haokip @ Neopi [43 years]; D/o – Thangboi Haokip; V/o – Patjang; PO/PS – Kangpokpi; Dist. – Kangpokpi; State – Manipur; P/add – Relief Camp, Kangpokpi, was involved in the following case :- i. Narcotic PS Case no. 005/24 U/S 22[b]/60 NDPS Act. And whereas, the Addl. DGP [Adm], Nagaland has proposed to prevent Mrs. Chinneilhing Haokip @ Neopi [43 years]; D/o – Thangboi Haokip; V/o – Patjang; PO/PS – Kangpokpi; Dist. – Kangpokpi; State – Manipur; P/add – Relief Camp, Kangpokpi, under PITNDPS Act, 1988 from continuing her harmful and prejudicial activity by engaging in illicit traffic in narcotics drugs and psychotropic substances which poses a serious threat to people’s health and welfare and the activities of her engaged in such illegal traffic have a deleterious effect on the national economy. And whereas, I, xxxxx, Special Secretary [Home], Nagaland, specially empowered under Section 3 [1] of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 [as amended], am satisfied on careful examination of the proposal of the Addl. DGP [Adm], Nagaland and other supporting documents, found sufficient grounds for detention of Mrs. Chinneilhing Haokip @ Neopi [43 years]; D/o – Thangboi Haokip; V/o – Patjang; PO/PS – Kangpokpi; Dist. – Kangpokpi; State – Manipur; P/add – Relief Camp, Kangpokpi, and being satisfied that with a view of preventing her from engaging in illicit traffic in NDPS, it is necessary to detain her. Chinneilhing Haokip @ Neopi [43 years]; D/o – Thangboi Haokip; V/o – Patjang; PO/PS – Kangpokpi; Dist. – Kangpokpi; State – Manipur; P/add – Relief Camp, Kangpokpi, and being satisfied that with a view of preventing her from engaging in illicit traffic in NDPS, it is necessary to detain her. Now, therefore, the undersigned, in exercise of powers conferred by sub-section [1] of Section 3 of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 do hereby issue this order directing Mrs. Chinneilhing Haokip @ Nepoi [43 years]; D/o – Thangboi Haokip; V/o – Patjang; PO/PS – Kangpokpi; Dist. – Kangpokpi; State – Manipur; P/add – Relief Camp, Kangpokpi be detained and kept in District Jail, Dimapur for an initial period of three months. NO. CON/PIT NDPS/15/2024/69 :: Whereas, the Addl. DGP [Adm], Nagaland has sent a proposal for detention of Mrs. Chinneilhing Haokip @ Neopi [43 years]; D/o – Thangboi Haokip; V/o – Patjang; PO/PS – Kangpokpi; Dist. – Kangpokpi; State – Manipur; P/add – Relief Camp, Kangpokpi, under PIT NDPS Act, 1988 along with records under Section 3 [1] of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988. And whereas, on perusal of records as submitted by the Addl DGP [Adm], Nagaland, it appears that Mrs. Chinneilhing Haokip @ Neopi [43 years]; D/o – Thangboi Haokip; V/o – Patjang; PO/PS – Kangpokpi; Dist. – Kangpokpi; State – Manipur; P/add – Relief Camp, Kangpokpi, was involved in the following case :- i. Narcotic PS Case no. 005/24 U/S 22[b]/60 NDPS Act. And whereas, the Addl. DGP [Adm], Nagaland has proposed to prevent Mrs. Chinneilhing Haokip @ Neopi [43 years]; D/o – Thangboi Haokip; V/o – Patjang; PO/PS – Kangpokpi; Dist. – Kangpokpi; State – Manipur; P/add – Relief Camp, Kangpokpi, under PITNDPS Act, 1988 from continuing her harmful and prejudicial activity by engaging in illicit traffic in narcotics drugs and psychotropic substances which poses a serious threat to people’s health and welfare and the activities of her engaged in such illegal traffic have a deleterious effect on the national economy. And whereas, I, xxxxx, Special Secretary [Home], Nagaland, specially empowered under Section 3 [1] of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 [as amended], am satisfied on careful examination of the proposal of the Addl. And whereas, I, xxxxx, Special Secretary [Home], Nagaland, specially empowered under Section 3 [1] of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 [as amended], am satisfied on careful examination of the proposal of the Addl. DGP [Adm], Nagaland and other supporting documents, found sufficient grounds for detention of Mrs. Chinneilhing Haokip @ Neopi [43 years]; D/o – Thangboi Haokip; V/o – Patjang; PO/PS – Kangpokpi; Dist. – Kangpokpi; State – Manipur; P/add – Relief Camp, Kangpokpi, and being satisfied that with a view of preventing her from engaging in illicit traffic in NDPS, it is necessary to detain her. Now, therefore, the undersigned, in exercise of powers conferred by sub-section [1] of Section 3 of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 do hereby issue this order directing Mrs. Chinneilhing Haokip @ Nepoi [43 years]; D/o – Thangboi Haokip; V/o – Patjang; PO/PS – Kangpokpi; Dist. – Kangpokpi; State – Manipur; P/add – Relief Camp, Kangpokpi be detained and kept in District Jail, Dimapur for an initial period of three months. Sd/- Special Secretary to the Govt. of Nagaland. 14. The respondent no. 2 while passing the impugned Detention Order on 30.05.2024 as the Detaining Authority, stated to have prepared the grounds of detention for communicating them to the detenu on 30.05.2024. The grounds of detention prepared by the Detaining Authority were as under :- Subject :- Communication of Grounds of Detention under Section 3 [1] of the PITNDPS Act, 1980. Whereas, the undersigned has made Detention Order against you under the provision of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 on the following grounds :- 1. In the instant case, 20 [twenty] nos. of Soap cases of Suspected Heroin [Sunflower] weighing 239 gms were seized from your possession and you, Mrs. Chinneilhing Haokip @ Nepoi have admitted to dealing in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Possession, sales, purchase, transportation and concealment of such illegal substances in various parts of North East State of India, confirming to acts under Section 2 [e] of PITNDPS Act, 1988. 2. That, you purchases illegal drugs from Manipur and smuggle it to Nagaland for the purpose of selling them in Nagaland, indicating the inter-state network of illicit drug trafficking. 3. 2. That, you purchases illegal drugs from Manipur and smuggle it to Nagaland for the purpose of selling them in Nagaland, indicating the inter-state network of illicit drug trafficking. 3. That, the case is still at the initial stage of investigation and there is probability of you having linkage spreading across different parts of North-East States of India where large number of people are involved, both on the demand/supply side which needs to be further investigated in order to unearth the conspiracy and networking. 4. That there has been a huge public outcry concerning traffic of illicit drugs in the State which is causing problems of abuse and addiction of all age groups. You are directly/indirectly involved in Intra and inter-State network of smuggling and trafficking of illicit drugs whereby luring youngsters to addiction resulting in them becoming peddlers/carriers for easy earnings to cover the cost of their consumption addiction. 5. That, you are presently under Judicial Custody and likely to get bail if not preventively detained. On the basis of materials placed before me, I am satisfied that you are likely to indulge in similar prejudicial activity unless you are prevented from doing so by an appropriate order of preventive detention. 6. That, if bailed there is great chance of you continuing to indulge in illicit trafficking of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances and, may not co-operate with the investigation agencies or hamper investigation. In light of the above facts and circumstances, I have no hesitation in arriving at the conclusion that you, Mrs. Chinneilhing Haokip @ Nepoi, through your above acts engaged yourself in prejudicial activities involving illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs, therefore, a fit case for detention under the PITNDPS, Act, 1988. Enclosures : Police Report and all supporting documents to the case. Sd/- Special Secretary to the Govt. of Nagaland 15. It is a proposition that if there is an imminent possibility of a person, in custody in connection with a crime case, being set at liberty and his detention in connection with the crime case coming to an end, and if it appears to the appropriate authorities that the person’s detention is otherwise necessary and justified, the appropriate authorities are not precluded from passing an appropriate order detaining the person concerned. In exercise of the power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the Court, while reviewing a detention order, does not substitute its judgment for the decision of the executive. But, at the same time, the Court has a duty to enquire as to whether the decision of the executive has been made upon matters laid down by the statute as relevant for reaching such a decision. Such enquiry is essential as the precious fundamental right of personal liberty of a person/citizen, guaranteed to him under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, is involved and a person including a citizen, cannot be deprived of his personal liberty, except for reasons laid down by the law and for a purpose sanctioned by law. In Khudiram Das vs. State of West Bengal, [1975] 2 SCC 81, a Constitution Bench has considered the point of judicial reviewability of the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority as well as the area within which the validity of the subjective satisfaction can be subjected to judicial scrutiny. It has been observed therein that the grounds on which the satisfaction is based must be such as a rational human being can consider connected with the fact in respect of which the satisfaction is to be reached. The grounds must be relevant to the subject-matter of the inquiry and must not be extraneous to the scope and purpose of the statute. If the authority has taken into account, it may even be with the best of intention, as a relevant factor something which it could not properly take into account in deciding whether or not to exercise the power or the manner or extent to which it should be exercised, the exercise of the power would be bad. 16. The case of detention in Sama Aruna vs. State of Telengana and another, [2018] 12 SCC 150, was one under the Telengana Prevention of Dangerous Activities Bootleggers Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986 [‘the Telengana Act’, for short]. The order of detention dated 23.11.2016 was challenged on the premise that the grounds of detention were stale as they were based on six crime cases reported during the period from 21.11.2013 to 05.09.2016 and the incidents said to have occurred during the period from 2002 – 2003 to 21.11.2014. The order of detention dated 23.11.2016 was challenged on the premise that the grounds of detention were stale as they were based on six crime cases reported during the period from 21.11.2013 to 05.09.2016 and the incidents said to have occurred during the period from 2002 – 2003 to 21.11.2014. In such backdrop, the Hon’ble Supreme Court while reviewing the order of detention, has observed in the following manner :- 16. Obviously, therefore, the power to detain, under the 1986 Act can be exercised only for preventing a person from engaging in, or pursuing or taking some action which adversely affects or is likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order; or for preventing him from making preparations for engaging in such activities. There is little doubt that the conduct or activities of the detenu in the past must be taken into account for coming to the conclusion that he is going to engage in or make preparations for engaging in such activities, for many such persons follow a pattern of criminal activities. But the question is how far back? There is no doubt that only activities so far back can be considered as furnish a cause for preventive detention in the present. That is, only those activities so far back in the past which lead to the conclusion that he is likely to engage in or prepare to engage in such activities in the immediate future can be taken into account. In Golam Hussain vs. State of W.B. [Golam Hussain v. State of W.B., [1974] 4 SCC 530] this Court observed as follows : [SCC p. 535, para 5] 5. No authority, acting rationally, can be satisfied, subjectively or otherwise, of future mischief merely because long ago the detenu had done something evil. To rule otherwise is to sanction a simulacrum of a statutory requirement. But no mechanical test by counting the months of the interval is sound. It all depends on the nature of the acts relied on, grave and determined or less serious and corrigible, on the length of the gap, short or long, on the reason for the delay in taking preventive action, like information of participation being available only in the course of an investigation. We have to investigate whether the causal connection has been broken in the circumstances of each case. We have to investigate whether the causal connection has been broken in the circumstances of each case. Suffice it to say that in any case, incidents which are said to have taken place nine to fourteen years earlier, cannot form the basis for being satisfied in the present that the detenu is going to engage in, or make preparation for engaging in such activities. 17. We are, therefore, satisfied that the aforesaid detention order was passed on grounds which are stale and which could not have been considered as relevant for arriving at the subjective satisfaction that the detenu must be detained. The detention order must be based on a reasonable prognosis of the future behaviour of a person based on his past conduct in light of the surrounding circumstances. The live and proximate link that must exist between the past conduct of a person and the imperative need to detain him must be taken to have been snapped in this case. A detention order which is founded on stale incidents, must be regarded as an order of punishment for a crime, passed without a trial, though purporting to be an order of preventive detention. The essential concept of preventive detention is that the detention of a person is not to punish him for something he has done but to prevent him from doing it. See G. Reddeiah vs. State of A.P. [G. Reddeiah vs. State of A.P., (2012) 2 SCC 389 ] and P.U. Iqbal v. Union of India [P.U. Iqbal v. Union of India, (1992) 1 SCC 434 ]. * * * * * * * * * 22. We are of the view, that the detention order in this case is vitiated by taking into account incidents so far back in the past as would have no bearing on the immediate need to detain him without a trial. The satisfaction of the authority is not in respect of the thing in regard to which it is required to be satisfied. Incidents which are stale, cease to have relevance to the subject-matter of the enquiry and must be treated as extraneous to the scope and purpose of the statute. 23. In this case, we find the authority has come to a conclusion so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever reach. A detaining authority must be taken to know both, the purpose and the procedure of law. 23. In this case, we find the authority has come to a conclusion so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever reach. A detaining authority must be taken to know both, the purpose and the procedure of law. It is no answer to say that the authority was satisfied. In T.A. Abdul Rahman v. State of Kerala [T.A. Abdul Rahman vs. State of Kerala, (1989) 4 SCC 741 ] , this Court observed, where the authority takes into account stale incidents which have gone-by to seed it would be safe to infer that the satisfaction of the authority is not a genuine one. 17. In Huidrom Knungjao Singh vs. State of Manipur and others, reported in [2012] 7 SCC 181, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has surveyed a number of precedents while examining an order of detention dated 30.06.2011 passed under Section 3 [2] of the National Security Act, 1980. It has been held that the question of personal liberty of a person is sacrosanct and the State Authority cannot be permitted to take it away without following the procedure prescribed by law, otherwise it would be violative of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 21 and Article 22 of the Constitution of India. It has also been observed that the law of preventive detention is based and could be described as a ‘jurisdiction of suspicion’. Personal liberty of an individual is the most precious and prized right guaranteed under the Constitution in Part III. The State has been granted the power to curb such rights under criminal laws as also under the laws of preventive detention, which, therefore, are required to be exercised with due caution as well as upon a proper appreciation of the facts as to whether such acts are in any way prejudicial to the interest and security of the State and its citizens, or seek to disturb public law and order, warranting the issuance of such an order. While holding that there is no prohibition in law to pass the detention order of a person who is already in custody in respect of criminal case, it has been observed that if the detention order is challenged the detaining authority has to satisfy the Court the following facts :- [1] The authority was fully aware of the fact that the detenu was actually in custody; [2] There was reliable material before the said authority on the basis of which it could have reasons to believe that there was real possibility of his release on bail and further on being released he would probably indulge in activities which are prejudicial to public order; [3] In view of the above, the authority felt it necessary to prevent him from including in such activities and therefore, detention order was necessary. 18. The following observations made in the case of Khaja Bilal Ahmed vs. State of Telengana and others, reported in [2020] 13 SCC 632, are also of relevance and import :- 23. In the present case, the order of detention states that the fourteen cases were referred to demonstrate the ‘antecedent criminal history and conduct of the appellant’. The order of detention records that a ‘rowdy sheet’ is being maintained at PS Rain Bazar of Hyderabad City and the appellant ‘could not mend his criminal way of life’ and continued to indulge in similar offences after being released on bail. In the counter-affidavit filed before the High Court, the detaining authority recorded that these cases were ‘referred by way of his criminal background … [and] are not relied upon’. The detaining authority stated that the cases which were registered against the appellant between 2009 and 2016 ‘are not at all considered for passing the detention order’ and were ‘referred by way of his criminal background only’. This averment is plainly contradictory. The order of detention does, as a matter of fact, refer to the criminal cases which were instituted between 2007 and 2016. In order to overcome the objection that these cases are stale and do not provide a live link with the order of detention, it was contended that they were not relied on but were referred to only to indicate the antecedent background of the detenu. In order to overcome the objection that these cases are stale and do not provide a live link with the order of detention, it was contended that they were not relied on but were referred to only to indicate the antecedent background of the detenu. If the pending cases were not considered for passing the order of detention, it defies logic as to why they were referred to in the first place in the order of detention. The purpose of the Telangana Offenders Act, 1986 is to prevent any person from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. For this purpose, Section 3 prescribes that the detaining authority must be satisfied that the person to be detained is likely to indulge in illegal activities in the future and act in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The satisfaction to be arrived at by the detaining authority must not be based on irrelevant or invalid grounds. It must be arrived at on the basis of relevant material; material which is not stale and has a live link with the satisfaction of the detaining authority. The order of detention may refer to the previous criminal antecedents only if they have a direct nexus or link with the immediate need to detain an individual. If the previous criminal activities of the appellant could indicate his tendency or inclination to act in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, then it may have a bearing on the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. However, in the absence of a clear indication of a causal connection, a mere reference to the pending criminal cases cannot account for the requirements of Section 3. It is not open to the detaining authority to simply refer to stale incidents and hold them as the basis of an order of detention. Such stale material will have no bearing on the probability of the detenu engaging in prejudicial activities in the future. 19. In Ameena Begum vs. The State of Telengana and others, [2023] 9 SCC 587, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has also made a survey of previous authorities outlining the contours of judicial reviewability of an order of preventive detention. After making an analysis of the precedents, the Hon’ble Court has proceeded to observe as under :- 27. 19. In Ameena Begum vs. The State of Telengana and others, [2023] 9 SCC 587, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has also made a survey of previous authorities outlining the contours of judicial reviewability of an order of preventive detention. After making an analysis of the precedents, the Hon’ble Court has proceeded to observe as under :- 27. Be that as it may, culling out the principles of law flowing from all the relevant decisions in the field, our understanding of the law for deciding the legality of an order of preventive detention is that even without appropriate pleadings to assail such an order, if circumstances appear therefrom raising a doubt of the detaining authority misconceiving his own powers, the Court ought not to shut its eyes; even not venturing to make any attempt to investigate the sufficiency of the materials, an enquiry can be made by the Court into the authority's notions of his power. Without being remotely concerned about the sufficiency or otherwise of the materials on which detention has been ordered, the Court would be justified to draw a conclusion, on proof from the order itself, that the detaining authority failed to realise the extent of his own powers. This is quite apart from questioning the action for want of sufficient materials that were before the detaining authority. The authority for the detention is the order of detention itself, which the detenu or the Court can read. Such a reading of the order would disclose the manner in which the activity of the detenu was viewed by the detaining authority to be prejudicial to maintenance of public order and what exactly he intended should not be permitted to happen. Any order of a detaining authority evincing that the same runs beyond his powers, as are actually conferred, would not amount to a valid order made under the governing preventive detention law and be vulnerable on a challenge being laid. 28. In the circumstances of a given case, a constitutional court when called upon to test the legality of orders of preventive detention would be entitled to examine whether: 28.1. 28. In the circumstances of a given case, a constitutional court when called upon to test the legality of orders of preventive detention would be entitled to examine whether: 28.1. The order is based on the requisite satisfaction, albeit subjective, of the detaining authority, for, the absence of such satisfaction as to the existence of a matter of fact or law, upon which validity of the exercise of the power is predicated, would be the sine qua non for the exercise of the power not being satisfied; 28.2. In reaching such requisite satisfaction, the detaining authority has applied its mind to all relevant circumstances and the same is not based on material extraneous to the scope and purpose of the statute; 28.3. Power has been exercised for achieving the purpose for which it has been conferred, or exercised for an improper purpose, not authorised by the statute, and is therefore ultra vires; 28.4. The detaining authority has acted independently or under the dictation of another body; 28.5. The detaining authority, by reason of self-created rules of policy or in any other manner not authorised by the governing statute, has disabled itself from applying its mind to the facts of each individual case; 28.6. The satisfaction of the detaining authority rests on materials which are of rationally probative value, and the detaining authority has given due regard to the matters as per the statutory mandate; 28.7. The satisfaction has been arrived at bearing in mind existence of a live and proximate link between the past conduct of a person and the imperative need to detain him or is based on material which is stale; 28.8. The ground[s] for reaching the requisite satisfaction is/are such which an individual, with some degree of rationality and prudence, would consider as connected with the fact and relevant to the subject-matter of the inquiry in respect whereof the satisfaction is to be reached; 28.9. The grounds on which the order of preventive detention rests are not vague but are precise, pertinent and relevant which, with sufficient clarity, inform the detenu the satisfaction for the detention, giving him the opportunity to make a suitable representation; and 28.10. The timelines, as provided under the law, have been strictly adhered to. 29. The grounds on which the order of preventive detention rests are not vague but are precise, pertinent and relevant which, with sufficient clarity, inform the detenu the satisfaction for the detention, giving him the opportunity to make a suitable representation; and 28.10. The timelines, as provided under the law, have been strictly adhered to. 29. Should the Court find the exercise of power to be bad and/or to be vitiated applying any of the tests noted above, rendering the detention order vulnerable, detention which undoubtedly visits the person detained with drastic consequences would call for being interdicted for righting the wrong. 20. In Nenavath Bujji etc. vs. the State of Telengana and others, [2024] 3 SCR 1181 : 2024 INSC 239 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under :- 43. We summarize our conclusions as under : - [i] The Detaining Authority should take into consideration only relevant and vital material to arrive at the requisite subjective satisfaction, [ii] It is an unwritten law, constitutional and administrative, that wherever a decision-making function is entrusted to the subjective satisfaction of the statutory functionary, there is an implicit duty to apply his mind to the pertinent and proximate matters and eschew those which are irrelevant & remote, [iii] There can be no dispute about the settled proposition that the detention order requires subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority which, ordinarily, cannot be questioned by the court for insufficiency of material. Nonetheless, if the detaining authority does not consider relevant circumstances or considers wholly unnecessary, immaterial and irrelevant circumstances, then such subjective satisfaction would be vitiated, [iv] In quashing the order of detention, the Court does not sit in judgment over the correctness of the subjective satisfaction. The anxiety of the Court should be to ascertain as to whether the decision-making process for reaching the subjective satisfaction is based on objective facts or influenced by any caprice, malice or irrelevant considerations or non-application of mind, [v] While making a detention order, the authority should arrive at a proper satisfaction which should be reflected clearly, and in categorical terms, in the order of detention, [vi] The satisfaction cannot be inferred by mere statement in the order that ‘it was necessary to prevent the detenu from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order’. Rather the detaining authority will have to justify the detention order from the material that existed before him and the process of considering the said material should be reflected in the order of detention while expressing its satisfaction, [vii] Inability on the part of the state’s police machinery to tackle the law and order situation should not be an excuse to invoke the jurisdiction of preventive detention, [viii] Justification for such an order should exist in the ground(s) furnished to the detenu to reinforce the order of detention. It cannot be explained by reason[s]/ground[s] not furnished to the detenu. The decision of the authority must be the natural culmination of the application of mind to the relevant and material facts available on the record, and [ix] To arrive at a proper satisfaction warranting an order of preventive detention, the detaining authority must, first examine the material adduced against the prospective detenu to satisfy itself whether his conduct or antecedent(s) reflect that he has been acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and, second, if the aforesaid satisfaction is arrived at, it must further consider whether it is likely that the said person would act in a manner prejudicial to the public order in near future unless he is prevented from doing so by passing an order of detention . For passing a detention order based on subjective satisfaction, the answer of the aforesaid aspects and points must be against the prospective detenu. The absence of application of mind to the pertinent and proximate material and vital matters would show lack of statutory satisfaction on the part of the detaining authority. 21. A look at the Detention Order dated 30.05.2024 demonstrates that the Detaining Authority on perusal of records submitted by the Additional Director General of Police [Adm] found that the detenu was involved in Narcotic Police Station Case no. 05 of 2024 registered under Section 22[b] and Section 60 of the NDPS Act. 21. A look at the Detention Order dated 30.05.2024 demonstrates that the Detaining Authority on perusal of records submitted by the Additional Director General of Police [Adm] found that the detenu was involved in Narcotic Police Station Case no. 05 of 2024 registered under Section 22[b] and Section 60 of the NDPS Act. It may be mentioned that Section 22 of the NDPS Act has prescribed for punishment for contravention in relation to psychotropic substance by providing inter-alia that whoever, in contravention of any provision of the NDPS Act or any rule or order made or condition of licence granted thereunder, manufactures, possesses, sells, purchases, transports, imports inter-States, exports inter-States or uses any psychotropic substance shall be punishable with the further provision in Clause [b] to the effect that where the contravention involves quantity lesser than commercial quantity but greater than small quantity, the offender is punishable with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years and with fine which may extend to one lakh rupees. Section 60 of the NDPS Act is a provision for confiscation. The Detaining Authority found that the Additional Director General of Police [Adm.] had proposed to prevent the detenu from continuing her harmful and prejudicial activity by engaging in illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. The Detaining Authority had thereafter, mentioned that it had got satisfied on careful examination of the proposal of the Additional Director General of Police [Adm.] and other supporting documents and found sufficient grounds for detention of the detenu with a view of preventing her from engaging in illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. The Detention Order demonstrates that the Detaining Authority had based its purported subjective satisfaction on the proposal submitted by the Additional Director General of Police [Adm]. 22. The Additional Director General of Police [Adm.] in his proposal dated 17.05.2024, other than the incident wherein the detenu and two other occupants of the subject-vehicle came to be apprehended, had mentioned that in the course of investigation, the accused person, that is, the proposed detenu was thoroughly interrogated and her statement under Section 161, CrPC was recorded. 22. The Additional Director General of Police [Adm.] in his proposal dated 17.05.2024, other than the incident wherein the detenu and two other occupants of the subject-vehicle came to be apprehended, had mentioned that in the course of investigation, the accused person, that is, the proposed detenu was thoroughly interrogated and her statement under Section 161, CrPC was recorded. It was stated that the accused in her statement under Section 161, CrPC voluntarily admitted and accepted that the seized contraband, suspected to be Heroin and weighing 239 grams, belonged to her and had further revealed that the contraband items were procured from one Hatnu through Titing @ Hoikhoting and were to be delivered to a trafficker named Adaliu and it was in the process of such transportation, the contraband items were seized by Police on 05.04.2024. The proposal further mentioned that the accused, that is, the proposed detenu had also stated that she purchased Heroin from the same persons many times earlier at a particular price/per soap case and used to sell them at a higher price than the purchase price. The accused, that is, the proposed detenu was found to have stated that she received a sum of rupees two lakh in cash through such transactions. The Additional Director General of Police [Adm] had also stated that the other arrested accused person, Nehkhoi Guite in his statement under Section 161, CrPC stated that the seized contraband items belonged to the other arrested accused person, that is, the proposed detenu and he was paid an amount of rupees fifteen thousand for concealing and transporting those from Kangpokpi to Dimapur. The other materials which the Additional Director General of Police [Adm] stated to have collected during the course of investigation were the Call Detail Records of the accused person, that is, the detenu which revealed about her constant contact with Adaliu Chawang during the month of March, 2024 and some bank deposit slips, screen shots of G-Pay, etc., from her mobile phone. It was on the basis of the above materials, the Additional Director General of Police [Adm] submitted the proposal with the observation that the accused person, that is, the proposed detenu was a part of an inter-State network of smugglers and traffickers of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances and her preventive detention was necessary for preventing her from indulging repeatedly in trafficking of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. 23. 23. From the above material indicated in the proposal of the Additional Director General of Police [Adm] and the Order of Detention passed by the Detaining Authority, it emerges that the said two authorities had taken into account the involvement of the detenu in the crime case, Narcotic Police Station, PHQ Case no. 05 of 2024, wherein the detenu was found to be one of the three occupants of the subject-vehicle and suspected contraband items, suspected to be heroin and weighing 239 grams [quantity lesser than commercial quantity but greater than small quantity], were found concealed inside the gear level cover of the subject-vehicle wherein another accused, named, Nehkhoi Guite was the driver and the third occupant, Hoinu @ Vahbol was his wife. After they were apprehended on 05.04.2024, the Investigating Officer [I.O.] had, on 10.04.2024, deemed it appropriate to make a prayer for discharge the arrested accused person, Hoinu @ Vahbdol from the liability of the case on the ground of no evidence. The I.O. of the case in his proposal for preventive detention specifically recorded that the proposed detenu was not earlier involved in such activities in response to the query whether the proposed detenu was involved in any other case or had committed any offence previously. Neither the Additional Director General of Police [Adm] & Chairman, Screening Board, PITNDPS Act nor the Detaining Authority had referred to any other crime case the detenu was found involved or arrested. In other words, there was no criminal antecedent of the detenu, at the time of passing the Order of Detention, to the effect that the detenu was either arrested earlier in any crime case involving narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances or the detenu was suspected to be involved in any previous crime case involving narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. The arrest of the detenu in connection with Narcotic Police Station, PHQ Case no. 05 of 2024 was the lone incident of her alleged involvement in suspected contraband and there was no previous record of her arrest in connection with any offence, much less an offence under the NDPS Act. 24. The phrase, ‘study the past if you would divine the future’ is a quote by Confucius conveying the idea that a study of the past helps one to understand the future. 24. The phrase, ‘study the past if you would divine the future’ is a quote by Confucius conveying the idea that a study of the past helps one to understand the future. As per Machiavelli, ‘whoever wishes to foresee the future must consult the past; for human events ever resembled those of preceding times. This arises from the fact that they are produced by men whoever have been, and ever shall be, animated by the same passions, and thus, they necessarily have the same results’. This quote suggests that the past can help you foresee the future. The proposition that the conduct or activities of the detenu in the past can be taken into account for coming to the conclusion that he is going to engage in or make preparations for engaging in such activities, for many such persons follow a pattern of criminal activities, is a rational proposition in a matter of preventive detention for reaching the subjective satisfaction. It is found to be a settled proposition that the detention order must be based on a reasonable prognosis of the future behavior of a person based on his past conduct in light of the surrounding circumstances. Live and proximate link must exist between the past conduct of a person to give rise to the pressing need to detain him with a view of preventing him from indulging in criminal activities with which he was found to be involved in the past. In the case of the detenu in hand, with no criminal antecedents of involvement in any crime case earlier under any penal law, not to speak of any crime relating to contraband substance or under the NDPS Act, it is difficult to comprehend about the manner in which the Detaining Authority had reached a subjective satisfaction that unless the detenu is detained, she is likely to engage illicit traffic of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substance in future. There were no previous criminal activities of the detenue to indicate about her tendency or inclination to indulge in activities of illicit traffic in future for taking into account by the Detaining Authority for reaching of any subjective satisfaction. There were no previous criminal activities of the detenue to indicate about her tendency or inclination to indulge in activities of illicit traffic in future for taking into account by the Detaining Authority for reaching of any subjective satisfaction. The prescription in Section 3 of the PIT NDPS Act for detention of a person is reaching of satisfaction, albeit subjective satisfaction, of the detaining authority with a view to preventing him from engaging in illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances and the necessity for such detention. It is pertinent to mention that the Special Court empowered to grant or refuse to bail to an accused involved with an offence under the NDPS Act and to hold a trial for such offences takes into account all the relevant factors while granting or refusing bail. The Special Court while allowing the two accused persons, Smti. Chinneilhing Haokip @ Neopi and Nehkhoi Guite in connection with Narcotic Police Station, PHQ Case no. 05 of 2024 on 05.06.2024, on execution of a bail bond of Rs. 50,000/-, had inter-alia observed that the accused persons shall have to appear before the I.O. and the Court, as and when summoned, and they shall not commit similar offence within which they are accused of. It was inbuilt in the order granting bail that if the accused person, Smti. Chinneilhing Haokip @ Neopi would be found involved in any offence under the NDPS Act, it would be sufficient for the investing authority to seek cancellation of the bail and to seek the accused person into custody again. In the Detention Order dated 30.05.2024, the Detaining Authority simply recorded that it had derived satisfaction on careful examination of the proposal and other supporting documents and ‘found sufficient grounds for detention’ with no reflection as regards the process of considering the materials placed before it and the justification for exercising the drastic power of preventive detention. 25. The I.O. and the Additional Director General of Police [Adm.] & Chairman, Screening Board, PIT NDPS Act are found to have based their respective proposal substantially on the basis of the statement of the detenu recorded under Section 161, CrPC as an accused in Narcotic Police Station, PHQ Case no. 05 of 2024. 25. The I.O. and the Additional Director General of Police [Adm.] & Chairman, Screening Board, PIT NDPS Act are found to have based their respective proposal substantially on the basis of the statement of the detenu recorded under Section 161, CrPC as an accused in Narcotic Police Station, PHQ Case no. 05 of 2024. An exculpatory statement is one which is made by a person claiming that he is innocent of the charge and in the case in hand, one of the arrested co-accused, Nekhoi Guite had made an exculpatory statement clearing himself of the accusation of wrongdoing in concealment and in carrying of the alleged contraband inside the gear level cover of the subject-vehicle, where he was the driver, thereby, shifting the entire blame of wrongdoing to another arrested co-occupant in the form of the detenu. In the Indian Evidence Act, an exculpatory statement of a co-accused is not to be taken into consideration, in absence of independent corroboration. 26. Article 20 [3] of the Constitution has provided that no person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. It is a fundamental right embedded in Part - III of the Constitution. It is a right which has been incorporated in the Constitution to serve as a shield against potential abuse of power by the authorities. Article 20 [3] is based on the maxim, ‘nemon tenetur seipsum accusare’ which means that ‘no person is obliged to accused himself’. It is a proposition that a confessional statement is not admissible in evidence but on disclosure of any information, discovery can be made and such can be used as an evidence against such a person and the same would not be violative of Article 20 [3] by virtue of Section 27 of the Evidence Act, 1872 and proviso to Section 23 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023. Article 20[3] is a safeguard against self-incrimination. 27. A Constitution Bench in Raja Narayanlal Bansilal vs. Maneck Phiroz Mistry and another, AIR 1961 SC 29 , has considered the scope and effect of Article 20 [3] of the Constitution. Article 20[3] is a safeguard against self-incrimination. 27. A Constitution Bench in Raja Narayanlal Bansilal vs. Maneck Phiroz Mistry and another, AIR 1961 SC 29 , has considered the scope and effect of Article 20 [3] of the Constitution. It has been held that one of the essential conditions for invoking the constitutional guarantee enshrined in Article 20 [3] is that a formal accusation relating to the commission of an offence, which would normally lead to his prosecution, must have been levelled against the person who is being compelled to give evidence against himself. In other words, for invoking the constitutional right against testimonial compulsion guaranteed under Article 20 [3], it must appear that a formal accusation has been made against the person pleading the guarantee and that it relates to the commission of an offence which in the normal course may result in prosecution. The nature of the accusation and its probable sequel or consequence are regarded as important. It has been held to be well settled in a subsequent Constitution Bench decision in Ramanlal Bhogilal Shah and another vs. D. K. Guha and others, [1973] 1 SCC 696, that with the lodging of a first information report a person is accused of an offence comes within the meaning of Article 20 [3]. It has been observed that for coming with the sweep of Article 20 [3], the statement should be a statement which makes the case against the accused person at least probable, considered by itself. At the same time, it has also been observed that the only protection that Article 20 [3] gives to a person accused of an offence is that he cannot be compelled to be a witness against himself, but the protection does not mean that he need not give information regarding matters which do not tend to incriminate him. A three-Judge Bench in the case of Nandini Satpathy vs. P. L. Dani and another, reported in (1978) 2 SCC 424 , has held that the area covered by Article 20 [3] of the Constitution and Section 161 [2] of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [presently, Section 180 [2] of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023] is substantially the same so far as police investigations are concerned. It has been said that Section 161 [2], CrPC is a parliamentary gloss on the constitutional clause. It has been said that Section 161 [2], CrPC is a parliamentary gloss on the constitutional clause. Section 161, CRPC enabled the police to examine the accused during investigation but the prohibitive sweep of Article 20 [3] of the Constitution goes to the stage of police investigation also, not commencing in court only. Section 180 [2] of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 would be of the same effect. The ban on self-accusation, while one investigation or trial is underway, goes beyond that case and protects the accused in regard to other offences pending or imminent, which may deter him from voluntary disclosure of criminatory matter. It has been observed to the effect that an answer acquires confessional status only if, in terms or substantially, all the facts which constitute the offence are admitted by the offender. Article 20 [3] strikes at confessions and self-incriminations. It has been expounded that 'to be witness against oneself' is not confined to particular offence regarding which the questioning is made but extends to other offences about which the accused has reasonable apprehension of implication from his answer. The conclusion is stated to be flown from 'tendency to be exposed to a criminal charge', appearing in Section 161 [2] of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [presently, Section 180 [2] of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023]. 'A criminal charge' covers any criminal charge then under investigation or trial or imminently threatens the accused. 28. The materials which was made the basis of preventive detention by the Detaining Authority was the confessional statement of the detenu as an accused and not materials which were collected on the basis of the alleged inculpatory statement of the detenu, made as an accused in Narcotic Police Station, PHQ Case no. 05 of 2024 after formal accusations were made in an FIR dated 06.04.2024. Therefore, the protective sweep of Article 20 [3] of the Constitution gets operational in the case. 29. 05 of 2024 after formal accusations were made in an FIR dated 06.04.2024. Therefore, the protective sweep of Article 20 [3] of the Constitution gets operational in the case. 29. All the above have got enough force to make the foundation of subjective satisfaction, claimed to have been reached by the Detaining Authority, shaky and vulnerable in preventively detaining the detenu from the perspective that if the detenu is not preventively detained, the detenu is likely to indulge in illicit traffic in future, more particularly, in the absence of any previous history or antecedent of the detenu’s involvement in any case of crime, much less a crime relating to illicit traffic. Non-existence of any live and proximate link has made the Order of Detention more shaky and vulnerable. Resting the discussion on this aspect here, it appears appropriate to dilate on the other relevant issue agitated by the parties. 30. With regard to the contention advanced as regards violation of Clause [5] of Article 22 of the Constitution of India and sub-section [3] of Section 3 of the PIT NDPS Act, it can be noticed that sub-section [3] of the Section 3 of the PIT NDPS Act has provided that for the purposes of Clause [5] of Article 22 of the Constitution, the communication is to be made to the person detained in pursuance to a detention order of the grounds on which the order has been made as soon as after the detention, but ordinarily not later than five days, and in exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in writing, not later than fifteen days, from the date of detention. From the language of the provision contained in sub-section [3] of Section 3, it is evident that the prescription relates to the communication of the grounds of detention. The prescription contained in sub-section [3] of Section 3 is to be read together with the provision of making a detention order under sub-section [1] of Section 3. By Clause [5] of Article 22 of the Constitution, the fundamental right is guaranteed to a person, who is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, to be communicated with the grounds on which the detention order has been made, by the authority making the order, to afford the detained person an earliest opportunity of making a representation against the detention order. 31. 31. Article 22 [5] of the Constitution of India read with Section 3[3], PIT NDPS Act casts a dual obligation on the authority making the order of preventive detention :- firstly, to communicate to the person detained as soon as possible after the detention, the grounds on which the detention order has been made; and it should not ordinarily be not later than five days, and only in exceptional circumstances, that too, for reasons to be recorded in writing, such communication can be made within a period not later than fifteen days from the date of detention; and secondly, to afford the person detained the earliest opportunity of making an effective representation against the order of detention. 32. In the proposal for detention of the detenu, submitted by the I.O. of Narcotic Police Station, PHQ Case no. 05 of 2024, it was recorded that the languages and scripts known to the detenu are Kuki/Manipuri. In the writ petition, it has been averred that the detenu had studied up to Class - VII standard only and she cannot read and write and does not understand the English language. It has been asserted that the detenu understands only Kuki dialect and Manipuri language only. But the Order of Detention, the grounds of detention, and other supporting materials, supplied to the detenu, were all in English language. In reply to such statements and averments made in the writ petition, the State respondents, in their affidavit-in-opposition, have asserted that the detenu had not only received the copy of the Detention Order along with its enclosures, but also duly acknowledged their receipt on 03.06.2024 by signing the Acknowledgment Certificate, with an endorsement that the contents of the Detention Order and the enclosed documents were explained to her in the language she understands, that is, Nagamese/Manipuri with translator. The Acknowledgement Certificate dated 03.06.2024 goes to indicate that the detenu acknowledged the receipt of one set of the Detention Order dated 30.05.2024 and its enclosures certifying that their contents had been explained to her in the language she understands, that is, Nagamese/Manipuri with translator, in presence of the witnesses, mentioned therein. The Advisory Board, in its Report dated 08.08.2024, has mentioned that detenu was heard in person in Manipuri through the assistance of a translator/interpreter who was well versed with both English and Manipuri. The Advisory Board, in its Report dated 08.08.2024, has mentioned that detenu was heard in person in Manipuri through the assistance of a translator/interpreter who was well versed with both English and Manipuri. The Advisory Board, in its Report dated 08.08.2024, also reproduced the statement of the detenu recorded by it. Before the Advisory Board, the detenu stated that she studied in Manipuri till Class - VII in a local school of her area in Manipur and she did not know either Nagamese or English or Hindi. The detenu, however, admitted that the detention papers were served on her on 03.06.2024 but she could not read the contents of the documents as she does not know how to read English. 33. From the above facts and circumstances, it is evident that, firstly, the copies of the Detention Order dated 30.05.2024, the grounds of detention, stated to have prepared on 30.05.2024, and the other supporting documents were all served upon the detenu on 03.06.2024; secondly, the language used in the Detention Order, the grounds of detention and the supporting documents was English; thirdly, at the time of serving those documents which were in English, the Executing Officer used the assistance of a translator/interpreter and the translator/interpreter explained the contents of those documents to the detenu in Nagamese/Manipuri language; fourthly, the detenu studied in Manipuri language up to Class - VII standard in a local school in Manipur; and fifthly, from the statement made by the detenu before the Advisory Board, it is evident that she does not know either Nagamese or English or Hindi and she does not know how to read English. 34. In such backdrop, the issue which has arisen for consideration is whether, due to supply of the requisite documents in English language and explanation of their contents in Manipuri, the detenu had been deprived of the opportunity of making an effective representation against the Detention Order dated 30.05.2024 resulting in violation of the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 22[5] of the Constitution of India read with Section 3[3] of the PITNDPS Act. In our considered view, the answer is in the affirmative. It has emerged that the detenu is not conversant with the English language and she cannot read and write in the English language. In our considered view, the answer is in the affirmative. It has emerged that the detenu is not conversant with the English language and she cannot read and write in the English language. Such illiterateness of the detenu with the English language can also be easily gauged from the fact that the detenu had studied in Manipuri language in a local school of her area in Manipur. To the detenu, who is not conversant with the English language, communication of the Detention Order dated 30.05.2024, the grounds of detention and the other supporting documents in English, upon her, with their oral translation by a translator, at the time of serving those documents, does not fulfill the requirements of law and such non-communication has made the act of preventive detention of the detenu further vulnerable to the extent of making the act unsustainable in law. Our such view is justified by a nos. of precedents of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India and of this Court on the issue, which are adverted to hereinafter. 35. In Harikisan vs. State of Maharashtra and others, reported in AIR 1962 SC 911 , a Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court examined the matter of preventive detention wherein a writ of habeas corpus was sought for. The appellant-detenu was preventively detained by an Order dated 10.04.1961 passed by the District Magistrate under Section 3[1][a][ii] of the Preventive Detention Act [Act IV of 1950]. The detention order and the grounds of detention were served on the appellant-detenu on the same date. It was urged on behalf of the appellant-detenu that the detention order and the grounds of detention being in English, he was unable to understand them and when asked for a Hindi version, the said request was denied on the ground that the documents were served in the official language, English. The writ petition seeking the writ of habeas corpus was dismissed by the High Court by recording that the appellant-detenu studied up to 7th Hindi standard equivalent to 3rd English standard. The High Court discarded the contention by holding that the service upon the appellant-detenu of the detention order and the grounds of detention in English was enough communication to enable him to make his representation. 35.1. In the above backdrop, the Hon’ble Supreme Court had proceeded to observe as under :- 7. The High Court discarded the contention by holding that the service upon the appellant-detenu of the detention order and the grounds of detention in English was enough communication to enable him to make his representation. 35.1. In the above backdrop, the Hon’ble Supreme Court had proceeded to observe as under :- 7. …… The learned Attorney-General has tried to answer this contention in several ways. He has first contended that when the Constitution speaks of communicating the grounds of detention to the detenue, it means communication in the official language, which continues to be English; secondly, the communication need not be in writing and the translation and explanation in Hindi offered by the Inspector of Police, while serving the Order of Detention and the grounds would be enough compliance with the requirements of the law and the Constitution; and thirdly, that it was not necessary in the circumstances of the case to supply the grounds in Hindi. In our opinion, this was not sufficient compliance in this case with the requirements of the Constitution, as laid down in clause [5] of Article 22. To a person, who is not conversant with the English language, service of the Order and the grounds of detention in English, with their oral translation or explanation by the police officer serving them does not fulfil the requirements of the law. As has been explained by this Court in the case of State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya [1951 SCC 43 : (1951) SCR 167], clause [5] of Article 22 requires that the grounds of his detention should be made available to the detenue as soon as may be, and that the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the Order should also be afforded to him. In order that the detenue should have that opportunity, it is not sufficient that he has been physically delivered the means of knowledge with which to make his representation. In order that the detenue should be in a position effectively to make his representation against the Order, he should have knowledge of the grounds of detention, which are in the nature of the charge against him setting out the kinds of prejudicial acts which the authorities attribute to him. Communication, in this context, must, therefore, mean imparting to the detenue sufficient knowledge of all the grounds on which the Order of Detention is based. Communication, in this context, must, therefore, mean imparting to the detenue sufficient knowledge of all the grounds on which the Order of Detention is based. …………… Naturally, therefore, any oral translation or explanation given by the police officer serving those on the detenue would not amount to communicating the grounds. Communication, in this context, must mean bringing home to the detenue effective knowledge of the facts and circumstances on which the Order of Detention is based. 8. We do not agree with the High Court in its conclusion that in every case communication of the grounds of detention in English, so long as it continues to be the official language of the State, is enough compliance with the requirements of the Constitution. If the detained person is conversant with the English language, he will naturally be in a position to understand the gravamen of the charge against him and the facts and circumstances on which the order of detention is based. But to a person who is not so conversant with the English language, in order to satisfy the requirements of the Constitution, the detenue must be given the grounds in a language which he can understand, and in a script which he can read, if he is a literate person. 9. The Constitution has guaranteed freedom of movement throughout the territory of India and has laid down detailed rules as to arrest and detention. It has also, by way of limitations upon the freedom of personal liberty, recognised the right of the State to legislate for preventive detention, subject to certain safeguards in favour of the detained person, as laid down in clauses [4] and [5] of Article 22. One of those safeguards is that the detained person has the right to be communicated the grounds on which the order of detention has been made against him, in order that he may be able to make his representation against the order of detention. In our opinion, in the circumstances of this case, it has not been shown that the appellant had the opportunity, which the law contemplates in his favour, of making an effective representation against his detention. On this ground alone we declare his detention illegal, and set aside the Order of the High Court and the Order of Detention passed against him. 36. On this ground alone we declare his detention illegal, and set aside the Order of the High Court and the Order of Detention passed against him. 36. In Hadibandhu Das vs. District Magistrate, Cuttack and another, reported in AIR 1969 SC 43 , the order under challenge was an order dated 15.12.1967 passed under Section 3 [1][a][ii] of the Preventive Detention Act [Act IV of 1950]. The validity of the order of detention was inter-alia challenged on the ground that the detention order and the grounds in support thereof served upon the appellant were written in the English language which the appellant did not understand. On 18.01.1968, the detaining authority, that is, the concerned District Magistrate supplied to the appellant an Oriya translation of the order and the grounds. On 28.01.1968, the State of Orissa revoked the earlier order of detention and issued a fresh order of detention by supplying a translated copy of the order in Oriya to the appellant. The appellant submitted a supplementary petition and the High Court rejected the petition filed by the appellant. The Constitution Bench while examining the issue, found that the second order dated 28.10.1968 was not passed on any fresh facts, thereby, making the order invalid on that count itself. The Constitution Bench had further found that the District Magistrate served a translation in Oriya of the detention order and the grounds upon the appellant on 18.01.1968, which was after expiry of five days as prescribed in Section 7 of the Act IV of 1950. The Constitution Bench in Hadibandhu Das [supra] then referred to the earlier Constitution Bench decision in Harikisan [supra] to point out that any oral translation or explanation of the detention order and the grounds thereof to the detenu in a language understood by him/her would not amount to communication and such oral explanation or translation on the detenu, without supplying him the translation scripts in the language which the detenu understood, would amount to denial of the right of being communicated the grounds and of affording the opportunity of making an effective representation against the order. 37. The decision in Mrs. Tsering Dolkar vs. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi and others, reported in [1987] 2 SCC 6, had followed the earlier two Constitution Bench decisions. The detenu in Mrs. 37. The decision in Mrs. Tsering Dolkar vs. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi and others, reported in [1987] 2 SCC 6, had followed the earlier two Constitution Bench decisions. The detenu in Mrs. Tsering Dolkar [supra] was of Ladakhi origin and he was detained under the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 [‘the COFEPOSA Act’] by an order dated 21.07.1986. The detenu was also arrested in the concerned crime case and was, later on, enlarged on bail. It was urged that the detenu was denied a fair and adequate opportunity of representing against his detention as the grounds of detention and copies of the supporting documents were not in English language and copies thereof had been furnished in Tibetan language whereas the detenu knew only Ladakhi. It has been held as a settled law that the detaining authority is required to provide the materials to the detenu in a language which he understands in order that an effective representation against his detention can be made. It has been observed that there can be no two opinions that the requirement of law within the provisions of Article 22[5] of the Constitution is that the detenu has to be informed about the grounds of detention in a language which he understands. It has been held that the law is laid down clearly that in the matter of preventive detention, the test is not one of prejudice but one of strict compliance with the provisions of the statute and when there is a failure to comply with those requirements, it becomes difficult to sustain the order. In Mrs. Tsering Dolkar, it was observed that due to such defects and shortcomings the order of detention would not survive and the order of detention was quashed, setting the detenu at liberty. 38. The decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Mrs. Hina Khan vs. Superintendent, Gauhati District Jail, Gauhati and others, [1989] 2 GLR 253, was rendered in connection with a detention order passed under the PITNDPS Act. The grounds of detention were served on the detenu in Assamese whereas the documents relied on to support the grounds were served in English. The supporting documents, served upon the detenu, were not translated into Assamese. Following the decisions in Harikisan [supra] and Mrs. The grounds of detention were served on the detenu in Assamese whereas the documents relied on to support the grounds were served in English. The supporting documents, served upon the detenu, were not translated into Assamese. Following the decisions in Harikisan [supra] and Mrs. Tsering Dolkar [supra] and examining the two statutes, the Preventive Detention Act [Act IV of 1950] and the PITNDPS Act, the Division Bench found that the PITNDPS Act had not made any amendment touching on the said aspect regarding communication and the ground urged by the detenu touched upon Article 22 [5] of the Constitution of India. On consideration of the authorities and inter-alia on the ground urged regarding non-supply of the supporting documents in Assamese language, the order of detention was found unsustainable and set aside. 39. From the above discussion, it can be clearly summed up that an obligation has been clearly cast on the Detaining Authority making the Order of Detention, to furnish copies of all the supporting documents, as relied on by the Detaining Authority, along with the Order of Detention and the grounds of detention to a person, preventively detained, in a language he understands within the mandatory time-period set forth in Section 3 [3] of the PIT NDPS Act. Such compliance would only discharge the responsibility cast on the Detaining Authority for enabling the detenu to make an effective representation against the order of detention for compliance of constitutional postulate contained in Article 22 [5] of the Constitution. The Detaining Authority cannot discharge such responsibility by merely furnishing the copies of the Detention Order, the grounds of detention and the other supporting documents in a language other than a language understood by the detenu and such an act will fall short of Constitutional mandate of Article 22 [5] and Section 3 [3] of the PIT NDPS Act. Reverting back to the facts of the case, we have already found out that the Detention Order dated 30.05.2024, the grounds of detention and the supporting documents were furnished to the detenu in English and their contents were only explained in Nagamese/Manipuri to the detenu by a translator. Reverting back to the facts of the case, we have already found out that the Detention Order dated 30.05.2024, the grounds of detention and the supporting documents were furnished to the detenu in English and their contents were only explained in Nagamese/Manipuri to the detenu by a translator. Non supply of translated copies of the Detention Order dated 30.05.2024, the grounds of detention and the other supporting documents in a language understood by the detenu, a lady studying up to Class - VII standard, has clearly resulted in infraction of the fundamental right of the detenu guaranteed under Article 22 [5] of the Constitution of India, along with the right under Section 3 [3] of the PIT NDPS Act. 40. In view of the above discussion and the vulnerability of the Detention Order dated 30.05.2024 on the afore-stated grounds, the Detention Order dated 30.05.2024 does not stand for survival for any further period. It is accordingly quashed and set aside. Consequently, all other consequential orders passed on the basis of the Detention Order dated 30.05.2024 are also set aside. It is ordered that the detenu, Smti. Chinneilhing Haokip @ Neopi is to be released forthwith if she is not required to be detained in connection with any other case. The writ petition stands accordingly, allowed.