JUDGMENT Crl.M.A. No.1 of 2024 has been filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, with prayer to condone the delay of 1580 days in filing the appeal. 2. Heard Sri. George Sebastian, the learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri.B.G. Harindranath, the learned senior counsel appearing for respondents 2 to 4, 7 to 9, 12, 13 and 15 to 17, instructed by the respective counsel who filed vakalath for them. Also heard Sri.A. Balagopal, the learned counsel appearing for respondents 10 and 11. Perused the averments in the petition and the counter affidavits filed by the respondents. 3. This appeal has been filed on 21.02.2024 challenging the decree and judgment dated 28.07.2017 in O.S. No.3/2014 on the files of the 1st Additional Sub Court, Kozhikode. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners/appellants, delay of 1580 days occurred in preferring the appeal and the reasons for the delay have been specifically averred in paragraph Nos.5 and 6 of the affidavit in support of the petition and the same are as under: 5. On coming to know about the foul play from the part of his counsel, he had issued a lawyer notice to his counsel and he had preferred a complaint against him before the bar Council of Kerala. A true copy of the registered lawyer notice dated 31.07.2021 issued on behalf of the 1 st defendant is produced herewith and marked as Annexure A. A true copy of the letter dated 25.07.2022 issued by the 1 st defendant to his lawyer is produced herewith and marked as Annexure B. A true copy of the complaint dated 25.11.2021 filed by the 1st defendant before the Bar Council of Kerala is produced herewith and marked as Annexure C. The 1 st defendant alone was conducting the case and he was looking after the case. He expired on 07.08.2022 after battling cancer for a long period. A true copy of the death certificate of the 1st defendant dated 29.08.2022 is produced herewith and marked as Annexure D. After the death of the 1 st defendant, the applicants herein had started to follow up the matter and the 1 st applicant herein is continuing with the proceedings before the Bar Council. The proceedings before the Bar Council is being pending as DC Case No. 25/2023. The proceedings before the Bar Council is being pending as DC Case No. 25/2023. A true copy of the notice dated 29.07.2023 issued from Bar Council of Kerala is produced herewith and marked as Annexure E. Even though various request were made by the applicants herein to return the files to the lawyer of the deceased 1 st defendant, he had not returned the documents and files. The 1st defendant, before his death, had told that he had never engaged the said lawyer to appear for him in RFA 59/2018. After the death of the 1 st defendant, the applicants filed a petition to implead themselves in RFA 59/2018 filed by the original plaintiffs. The said IA (IA 2/2023 in RFA 59/2018) was allowed on 31.10.2023. While the applicants were exploring the possibility of filing a cross objection the said appeal, had filed a memo seeking withdrawal of the appeal, immediately after the Impleading petition was allowed. The said appeal was dismissed on 21.11.2023. 6. After going through the records of the case and after holding discussions with lawyers, the applicants came to know that the 1 st defendant did not get an opportunity to contest the case on merits and the judgment and decree is detrimental to the interests of the applicants. Therefore the appeal is being filed along with the accompanying petition to condone the delay. Originally the 1 st defendant was conducting the case. He was unaware of the fact that his interests were not protected by his counsel earlier. On coming to know about the foul play from the part of the counsel, he immediately initiated legal proceedings against him. Subsequently, he expired also, after suffering from cancer for a long period. When the applicants came to know about all these things, they got themselves impleaded in the appeal which was pending. Immediately, the said appeal was withdrawn. In such a situation, the applicants have filed this appeal along with a petition to condone the delay. The applicants are entitled to deduct the period permitted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court from the extent of delay on account of Covid 19. 4. Immediately, the said appeal was withdrawn. In such a situation, the applicants have filed this appeal along with a petition to condone the delay. The applicants are entitled to deduct the period permitted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court from the extent of delay on account of Covid 19. 4. Apart from the affidavit which do form part of this petition, another affidavit also has been filed by the petitioner as on 04.03.2024, wherein in paragraph No.7, it is averred that the actual delay is 2380 days, out of which the period between 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022, comes to 715 days and also 90 days, the time provided to prefer the appeal to be excluded. 5. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners/appellants, since ‘sufficient cause’ shown as averred in the affidavit, for the reasons stated in the affidavit as extracted herein above, the delay is to be condoned, in the interest of justice, so as to dispose of the appeal on merits. 6. Strongly opposing condonation of long delay of 1580 days, the learned senior counsel appearing for respondents 2 to 4, 7 to 9, 12, 13 and 15 to 17 would submit that, the actual delay is 2380 days. It is submitted further that, in this matter, the decree and judgment was passed on 28.07.2017 and challenging the same, the plaintiffs filed R.F.A. No.59/2018, wherein the legal heirs of the deceased 1 st defendant were impleaded as additional R13 and R14, who are the petitioners/appellants herein. After appearance of R13 and R14, the appellants in the said appeal filed memo not pressing the appeal and accordingly, the appeal was dismissed as not pressed on 21.11.2023. It is submitted by the learned senior counsel that, when the appellants herein, who got impleaded as additional respondents 13 and 14 in R.F.A. No.59/2018, they had the option to file a petition to transpose themselves as appellants and to continue the earlier appeal itself. Instead of opting the said legal procedure, the appellants herein conceded dismissal of the appeal and the same was dismissed as not pressed on 21.11.2023. Thereafter, they applied for certified copy of the decree and judgment in O.S. No.3/2014 afresh on 03.02.2024 and on getting copies thereof, the present appeal has been filed on 21.02.2024. Instead of opting the said legal procedure, the appellants herein conceded dismissal of the appeal and the same was dismissed as not pressed on 21.11.2023. Thereafter, they applied for certified copy of the decree and judgment in O.S. No.3/2014 afresh on 03.02.2024 and on getting copies thereof, the present appeal has been filed on 21.02.2024. It is pointed out further that, after dismissal of R.F.A. No.59/2018 on 21.11.2023 also the appellants herein not even cared to apply for the certified copy of the judgment and decree and as contended in paragraph No.3 of the additional affidavit, the certified copies were applied only on 03.02.2024. On the above facts, it is submitted that there is no ‘sufficient cause’ established to condone the long delay of 1580 days. Therefore, this petition deserves dismissal for the said reasons. 7. The learned counsel appearing for respondents 10 and 11 also supported the arguments advanced by the learned senior counsel, Sri.B.G. Harindranath. Respective counsel appearing for the contesting respondents also read out the contentions raised by them in the counter affidavits filed by them. 8. The short question that arise for consideration is whether the appellants shown sufficient cause for not filing the appeal in time or there was reluctance on the part of the 1 st defendant or on the petitioners/appellants in appeal in time, being the legal heirs of the original 1 st defendant, who admittedly died on 07.08.2022? 9. The learned counsel for the petitioners/appellants pressed for allowing the petition on payment of cost also. The said prayer also is strongly opposed by the contesting respondents. 10. In this context, it is apposite to extract Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and the same is as follows: “5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases: Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions or Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.” 11. In fact, the legal position in the matter of condonation of delay is no more res-integra and condonation of delay can be considered subject to showing “sufficient cause”. In fact, the legal position in the matter of condonation of delay is no more res-integra and condonation of delay can be considered subject to showing “sufficient cause”. In a latest decision of the Apex Court reported in [2024 SCC OnLine SC 3612 : 2024 INSC 932 ] State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary , the Apex Court considered a Special Leave Petition filed by the State of Madhya Pradesh, challenging the verdict of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Second Appeal with a delay of 5 years 10 months and 16 days (1788 days) and while dismissing the delay petition, the Apex Court reiterated the legal position in paragraph Nos. 5 to 7 as under: 5. The legal position is that where a case has been presented in the Court beyond limitation, the petitioner has to explain the Court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the Court within limitation. In Majji Sannemma v. Reddy Sridevi 4 , it was held by this Court that even though limitation may harshly affect the rights of a party, it has to be applied with all its rigour when prescribed by statute. A reference was also made to the decision of this Court in Ajay Dabra v. Pyare Ram 5 wherein, it was held as follows: "13. This Court in the case of Basawaraj v. Special Land Acquisition Officer [ (2013) 14 SCC 81 ] while rejecting an application for condonation of delay for lack of sufficient cause has concluded in Paragraph 15 as follows: “15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.” 14. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the High Court did not commit any mistake in dismissing the delay condonation application of the present appellant." Thus, it is crystal clear that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based on facts and circumstances of each case and that, the expression 'sufficient cause' cannot be liberally interpreted, if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is attributed to the party. 5.1. In Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through his legal heir 6 , wherein, one of us (J.B.Pardiwala, J) was a member, after referring to various decisions on the issue, it was in unequivocal terms observed by this Court that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity and rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The relevant passage of the same is profitably extracted below: “24. In the aforesaid circumstances, we made it very clear that we are not going to look into the merits of the matter as long as we are not convinced that sufficient cause has been made out for condonation of such a long and inordinate delay. 25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party or a State or Union of India when it comes to condoning the gross delay of more than 12 years. If the litigant chooses to approach the court long after the lapse of the time prescribed under the relevant provisions of the law, then he cannot turn around and say that no prejudice would be caused to either side by the delay being condoned. This litigation between the parties started sometime in 1981. We are in 2024. Almost 43 years have elapsed. However, till date the respondent has not been able to reap the fruits of his decree. This litigation between the parties started sometime in 1981. We are in 2024. Almost 43 years have elapsed. However, till date the respondent has not been able to reap the fruits of his decree. It would be a mockery of justice if we condone the delay of 12 years and 158 days and once again ask the respondent to undergo the rigmarole of the legal proceedings. 26. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the appellants, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay. 27. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the ‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging over the head of the respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants. xxx xxx xxx 34. In view of the aforesaid, we have reached to the conclusion that the High Court committed no error much less any error of law in passing the impugned order. Even otherwise, the High Court was exercising its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 35. xxx xxx xxx 34. In view of the aforesaid, we have reached to the conclusion that the High Court committed no error much less any error of law in passing the impugned order. Even otherwise, the High Court was exercising its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it has been said that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity. Rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The appellants have failed to prove that they were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter and this vital test for condoning the delay is not satisfied in this case. 36. For all the foregoing reasons, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.” Applying the above legal proposition to the facts of the present case, we are of the opinion that the High Court correctly refused to condone the delay and dismissed the appeal by observing that such inordinate delay was not explained satisfactorily, no sufficient cause was shown for the same, and no plausible reason was put forth by the State. Therefore, we are inclined to reject this petition at the threshold. 6. At the same time, we cannot simply brush aside the delay occurred in preferring the second appeal, due to callous and lackadaisical attitude on the part of the officials functioning in the State machinery. Though the Government adopts systematic approach in handling the legal issues and preferring the petitions/applications/appeals well within the time, due to the fault on the part of the officials in merely communicating the information on time, huge revenue loss will be caused to the Government exchequer. The present case is one such case, wherein, enormous delay of 1788 days occasioned in preferring the second appeal due to the lapses on the part of the officials functioning under the State, though valuable Government lands were involved. Therefore, we direct the State to streamline the machinery touching the legal issues, offering legal opinion, filing of cases before the Tribunal / Courts, etc., fix the responsibility on the officer(s) concerned, and penalize the officer(s), who is/are responsible for delay, deviation, lapses, etc., if any, to the value of the loss caused to the Government. Such direction will have to be followed by all the States scrupulously. 7. Such direction will have to be followed by all the States scrupulously. 7. There is one another aspect of the matter which we must not ignore or overlook. Over a period of time, we have noticed that whenever there is a plea for condonation of delay be it at the instance of a private litigant or State the delay is sought to be explained right from the time, the limitation starts and if there is a delay of say 2 years or 3 years or 4 years till the end of the same. For example if the period of limitation is 90 days then the party seeking condonation has to explain why it was unable to institute the proceedings within that period of limitation. What events occurred after the 91st day till the last is of no consequence. The court is required to consider what came in the way of the party that it was unable to file it between the 1st day and the 90 th day. It is true that a party is entitled to wait until the last day of limitation for filing an appeal. But when it allows the limitation to expire and pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal earlier, the sufficient cause must establish that because of some event or circumstance arising before the limitation expired it was not possible to file the appeal within time. No event or circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation can constitute such sufficient cause. There may be events or circumstances subsequent to the expiry of limitation which may further delay the filing of the appeal. But that the limitation has been allowed to expire without the appeal being filed must be traced to a cause arising within the period of limitation. (See: Ajit Singh Thakur Singh and Another v. State of Gujarat , AIR 1981 SC 733 ). 12. In the instant case, R.F.A. No.59/2018 was filed in time by the legal heirs of the plaintiffs through additional appellants 3 to 6. Sri.Sahadevan, the predecessor of the petitioners/appellants herein, who is the original 1 st defendant was recorded dead in the cause title of the judgment in R.F.A. No.59/2018 and the legal heirs of Sri.Sahadevan got impleaded as additional respondents 13 and 14, who are the petitioners/appellants herein. 13. Sri.Sahadevan, the predecessor of the petitioners/appellants herein, who is the original 1 st defendant was recorded dead in the cause title of the judgment in R.F.A. No.59/2018 and the legal heirs of Sri.Sahadevan got impleaded as additional respondents 13 and 14, who are the petitioners/appellants herein. 13. It is relevant to note that, the decree and judgment under challenge in this case were passed as early on 28.07.2017 and Sri.Sahadevan admittedly died on 07.08.2022 as evident from Annexure.D. Thus, it is perceivable that, even though Sri.Sahadevan was alive for a period about five years from 28.07.2017 till 07.08.2022, he did not choose to file an appeal challenging the decree and judgment. It is pertinent to note further that, Sri.Sahadevan raised complaint against his lawyer by issuing notice dated 31.07.2021 and made complaint against him as early on 25.11.2021, as averred in paragraph No.5 of the affidavit in support of C.M.Appl.No.1 of 2024. But, he did not choose to file an appeal during his time in between 28.07.2017 to 07.08.2022 and he even failed to apply for a certified copy of the verdict impugned. 14. But, R.F.A. No.59/2018 was filed by the plaintiffs, where additional respondents 13 and 14 got impleaded as the legal heirs of Sri.Sahadevan (the appellants/petitioners herein). Thereafter, the appellants in R.F.A. No.59/2018 not pressed the appeal and the same was dismissed on 21.11.2023. The present regular first appeal has been filed on 21.02.2024, without opting the procedure of transposition at the instance of the additional respondents 13 and 14 as appellants, though the appeal is a continuation of a parition suit. It is true that, Sri.Sahadevan raised allegations against his lawyer. But he did not file an appeal challenging the verdict of the trial court for a pretty long period of five years. Now, the legal heirs of Sri.Sahadevan, after allowing dismissal of R.F.A. No.59/2018 filed by the appellants therein as not pressed where they are parties, filed the present appeal, after a delay of four months from the dismissal of the earlier appeal and after long delay of 2380 days, out of which the delay countable is 1580 days. 15. In such a case, it is difficult to hold that ‘sufficient cause’ shown by the petitioners/appellants to condone long delay of 1580 days in filing the appeal, where the actual delay is 2380 days. 15. In such a case, it is difficult to hold that ‘sufficient cause’ shown by the petitioners/appellants to condone long delay of 1580 days in filing the appeal, where the actual delay is 2380 days. It is true that, the discretion to condone the delay to be exercised judicially based on facts and circumstances of the particular case, with a liberal approach. However, in the instant case, there is no scope for any liberal approach, for the reasons discussed above. Therefore, the delay cannot be condoned even on payment of cost. In view of the matter, C.M.Appl. No.1 of 2024 is liable to fail and the same stands dismissed. 16. Consequently, the regular first appeal also stands dismissed as time barred. All other interlocutory applications pending in this matter also stand dismissed.