JUDGMENT : MITALI THAKURIA, J. 1. Heard Mr. N. K. Luikham, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Ms. V. Suokhrie, learned Additional Advocate General, representing the respondent Nos.1 & 2 and Mr. Imti. Longjem, learned counsel for the respondent No.3. 2. This application is filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, praying for the quashing and setting aside of the impugned order dated 02.12.2020, passed by the learned Principal District and Sessions Judge, Dimapur, in Civil Appeal No. 01/2020, and for the restoration of the order dated 13.02.2020 in IA (C) No. 98/2019, passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Dimapur. 3. The case, in a nutshell, is that the petitioner herein, as plaintiff, filed a suit being Civil Suit No. 5/2019 in the Court of the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Dimapur, Nagaland, against the present respondent No. 3/defendant, praying for a declaration and reconfirmation of his right, title, interest, and possession over the suit land. He also sought for setting aside of the order dated 19.09.2018 passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Dimapur (in short ‘DC’), and prayed for a permanent injunction restraining respondent No. 3/defendant No. 3 and his agents from interfering with the petitioner’s possession of the suit land. It is further the case of the petitioner that he purchased the said plot of land in the year 1995, ½ specifically, a plot measuring 04B-04K-03 Ls under Dag No. 98 and 01B- 03L-09Ls under Dag No. 113 of Block No. 3, Dimapur Town, covered by Patta No. 64, from the landowner Smti. Meithanlu Rongmei, through a registered Sale Deed No. 84/95 dated 31.05.1995. He also obtained mutation over the said plot of land. The land was further demarcated by the ADC, Dimapur. Subsequently, the petitioner filed another representation for further demarcation of the aforesaid land, and accordingly, vide letter dated 15.10.1998, the DC directed the Land Records & Survey Officer (in short ‘LRSO’), Dimapur, to demarcate the land at Block No. 3 under Dag Nos. 98 and 113. The Surveyor accordingly submitted a spot verification report on 15.04.1999, wherein it was ascertained that one Shri Gaidibung had wrongly occupied a portion of the land under Dag No. 113. Consequently, the DC passed an order dated 13.05.1999, directing Shri Gaidibung to occupy only the area allotted to him and to vacate the encroached portion under Dag No. 113. 4. The Surveyor accordingly submitted a spot verification report on 15.04.1999, wherein it was ascertained that one Shri Gaidibung had wrongly occupied a portion of the land under Dag No. 113. Consequently, the DC passed an order dated 13.05.1999, directing Shri Gaidibung to occupy only the area allotted to him and to vacate the encroached portion under Dag No. 113. 4. However, in February 2016, respondent No. 3 began digging on a portion of land illegally under Dag No. 113. The petitioner filed a complaint on 18.02.2016, and accordingly, a restraining order was passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Dimapur, on 19.02.2016. The DC also directed the LRSO, Dimapur, to carry out a joint spot verification on 07.10.2016, which could not be completed due to the absence of one of the parties. Eventually, a spot verification report was submitted by the LRSO on 28.11.2017. It is further stated that the petitioner/plaintiff has been in continuous possession and occupation of the disputed land under Dag No. 113, and at no point in time did respondent No. 3 own or possess the said disputed land. The petitioner also applied for mutation before the DC vide letter dated 15.08.1998, over a portion of land measuring 00B- 01K-15Ls under Dag No. 113, covered by Patta No. 64 of Block No. 3. However, the mutation process could not be completed due to the misplacement of mutation papers. He applied again, but the process remained pending in view of the restraining order dated 19.02.2016 issued by the DC. Further, based on the LRSO's report dated 28.11.2017, the DC, Dimapur, dismissed the petitioner's complaint and allowed respondent No. 3/defendant No. 3 and one Dr. Jalhutsu Chase to occupy the suit land vide order dated 19.09.2018. 5. Being aggrieved by the order dated 19.09.2018, the petitioner preferred Civil Suit No. 5/2019, along with I.A. (C) No. 98/2019 under Order 39 Rule 1 CPC, praying for a temporary injunction against the defendants (Nos. 1, 2, and 3), restraining them from entering, disturbing, or interfering with his peaceful possession of the suit land. The learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), after hearing both parties, granted an interim injunction vide order dated 13.02.2020. Challenging the said order of injunction, respondent No. 3 filed an appeal before the learned Principal District & Sessions Judge, Dimapur, which was registered as Civil Appeal No. 01/2020. The learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), after hearing both parties, granted an interim injunction vide order dated 13.02.2020. Challenging the said order of injunction, respondent No. 3 filed an appeal before the learned Principal District & Sessions Judge, Dimapur, which was registered as Civil Appeal No. 01/2020. After hearing arguments from both parties, the appellate court allowed the appeal and set aside the order dated 13.02.2020 passed in I.A. (C) No. 98/2019 by the Civil Judge (Senior Division). 6. Being highly aggrieved and dissatisfied with the appellate court's order, the present petition has been filed. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner has raised the following issues: i. The findings in the order dated 19.09.2018 passed by the DC is completely contradictory to the report submitted by the LRSO dated 28.11.2017, wherein it is specifically stated that Patta No. 238, Dag No. 400, measuring an area of 00B-01K-18Ls, is in the name of one Gaipikhon, and one Shri Inaka V. was mutated from this Dag, i.e., Plot No. 621. ii. The spot verification report dated 15.04.1999 of the LRSO, available on record, clearly states that Shri Gaidibung was allotted a plot of land under Dag No. 98 but had occupied land under Dag No. 113. Accordingly, the DC passed an order dated 13.05.1999 directing Shri Gaidibung to vacate the area and to take possession of his allotted land with immediate effect. In compliance with the said order, the plaintiff/petitioner took possession of the land, which was lying vacant at the time the restraining order dated 19.02.2016 was passed by the DC. iii. Respondent No. 3's documents reflect various inconsistencies. The sale deed referred to in the written statement was registered on 14.02.1998, whereas the application for mutation was made earlier on 16.01.1998, i.e., prior to the registration of the sale deed. The Jamabandi was also issued on 16.02.1998. Furthermore, another Jamabandi in the name of respondent No. 3 was issued on 21.09.2015, by which time the elder brother of respondent No. 3 was already died. 8. Mr. Luikham, learned counsel for the petitioner, primarily emphasized that the report of the LRSO and the findings of the DC are clearly contradictory. The Jamabandi was also issued on 16.02.1998. Furthermore, another Jamabandi in the name of respondent No. 3 was issued on 21.09.2015, by which time the elder brother of respondent No. 3 was already died. 8. Mr. Luikham, learned counsel for the petitioner, primarily emphasized that the report of the LRSO and the findings of the DC are clearly contradictory. Considering this aspect of the case, and also the continuous possession of the petitioner over the disputed land, the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) rightly passed the order of temporary injunction restraining respondent No. 3 from entering the disputed land and disturbing the petitioner’s peaceful possession. He further submitted that if the parties are not directed to maintain the status quo or if the respondent is not restrained from making further construction over the suit land, the entire nature and character of the suit land will be irreversibly altered. In such a situation, the very purpose of filing the title suit would become infructuous, and execution of a decree in favor of the petitioner would be rendered extremely difficult and complicated. 9. He further submitted that the learned Principal District & Sessions Judge, Dimapur, committed a grave jurisdictional error by holding that the petitioner’s case was solely based on the weaknesses in the respondent's case, while disregarding the petitioner’s allegations of encroachment substantiated by earlier official records and orders, including that the order dated 19.09.2018 passed by the DC. The learned appellate court also failed to consider the entire material on record and arrived at a perverse finding, concluding that the petitioner had failed to establish a prima facie case to the satisfaction of the court. Furthermore, Mr. Luikham submitted that, taking undue advantage of the interim stay order passed by the appellate court, respondent No. 3 had continued to carry out permanent construction works over the suit land, thereby altering its entire nature and character. 10. Mr. Luikham further submitted that interim order passed based on prima facie findings are tentative in nature, and the object of an interlocutory injunction is to protect parties against injury or irreparable harm. The grant of interim relief, including its nature and extent, depends upon the specific facts and circumstances of each case, and there can be no straightjacket formula for granting temporary injunctions. The grant of interim relief, including its nature and extent, depends upon the specific facts and circumstances of each case, and there can be no straightjacket formula for granting temporary injunctions. To substantiate his arguments, he relied on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Assam vs. Barak Upatyaka D.U. Karmachari Sanstha , (2009) 5 SCC 694 . 11. He also placed reliance on another judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Zenit Mataplast (P) Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (2009) 10 SCC 388 , wherein, the Supreme Court reiterated similar principles regarding the grant of temporary injunctions. In particular, he relied on paragraphs 30 and 31 of the said judgment, which read as under: “30. Interim order is passed on the basis of prima facie findings, which are tentative. Such order is passed as a temporary arrangement to preserve the status quo till the matter is decided finally, to ensure that the matter does not become either infructuous or a fait accompli before the final hearing. The object of the interlocutory injunction is, to protect the plaintiff against injury by violation of his right for which he could not be adequately compensated in damages recoverable in the action if the uncertainty were resolved in his favour at the trial. (vide Anand Prasad Agarwalla v. State of Assam vs. Tarkeshwar Prasad & Ors. AIR 2001 SC 2367 and Barak Upatyaka D.U. Karmachari Sanstha, (2009) 5 SCC 694 ) 31. Grant of an interim relief in regard to the nature and extent thereof depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case as no strait-jacket formula can be laid down. There may be a situation wherein the defendant/respondent may use the suit property in such a manner that the situation becomes irretrievable. In such a fact situation, interim relief should be granted (vide M. Gurudas & Ors. Vs. Rasaranjan & Ors. AIR 2006 SC 3275 and Shridevi & Anr. vs. Muralidhar & Anr. (2007) 14 SCC 721). Grant of temporary injunction, is governed by three basic principles, i.e. prima facie case; balance of convenience; and irreparable injury, which are required to be considered in a proper perspective in the facts and circumstances of a particular case. But it may not be appropriate for any court to hold a mini trial at the stage of grant of temporary injunction (Vide S.M. Dyechem Ltd. Vs. But it may not be appropriate for any court to hold a mini trial at the stage of grant of temporary injunction (Vide S.M. Dyechem Ltd. Vs. M/s.Cadbury (India) Ltd., AIR 2000 SC 2114 and Anand Prasad Agarwalla (supra). 12. He further submitted that the appellate court cannot interfere with an order passed by the learned trial court unless it is shown that the order suffers from perversity or a jurisdictional error. He argued that the grant or refusal of temporary injunctions must be decided based on three well- established principles: prima facie case , balance of convenience, and irreparable injury, along with considerations of equity. In support of this contention, he relied on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Skyline Education Institute (India) Private Limited vs. S. L. Vaswani & Anr. , (2010) 2 SCC 142 and placed particular emphasis on paragraph 22 of the judgment, which reads as under: “22. The ratio of the above noted judgments is that once the court of first instance exercises its discretion to grant or refuse to grant relief of temporary injunction and the said exercise of discretion is based upon objective consideration of the material placed before the court and is supported by cogent reasons, the appellate court will be loath to interfere simply because on a de novo consideration of the matter it is possible for the appellate court to form a different opinion on the issues of prima facie case, balance of convenience, irreparable injury and equity.” 13. In the same context, he also relied on the decision passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Makers Development Services Private Limited vs. M. Visvesvaraya Industrial Research and Development Centre , (2012) 1 SCC 735 and placed emphasis on paragraphs 11 and 12 of the said judgment, which read as under: “11. It is settled law that while passing an interim order of injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the Court is required to consider three basic principles, namely, a) prima facie case, b) balance of convenience and inconvenience and c) irreparable loss and injury. In addition to the above mentioned three basic principles, a court, while granting injunction must also take into consideration the conduct of the parties. 12. It is also established law that the Court should not interfere only because the property is a very valuable one. In addition to the above mentioned three basic principles, a court, while granting injunction must also take into consideration the conduct of the parties. 12. It is also established law that the Court should not interfere only because the property is a very valuable one. Grant or refusal of injunction has serious consequences depending upon the nature thereof and in dealing with such matters the court must make all endeavours to protect the interest of the parties.” 14. He further submitted that the scope of interference by the appellate court is limited and not permissible unless the exercise of discretion by the trial court is palpably incorrect, arbitrary, or untenable in law. In this context, he relied on the decision rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mohd. Mehtab Khan & Ors. vs. Khushnuma Ibrahim Khan & Anr. , (2013) 9 SCC 221 . 15. Mr. Luikham further submitted that while exercising supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court is not expected to correct every error of fact or even an error in law when the final findings are justified or can be supported. The exercise of power under Article 227 involves a constitutional duty on the High Court to ensure that subordinate courts and tribunals act within the bounds of their authority and discharge their duties in a lawful manner. In support of this submission, he placed reliance on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Garment Craft vs. Prakash Chand Goel , (2022) 4 SCC 181 and specifically relied on paragraphs 15 and 16 of the said judgment, which read as under: “15. Having heard the counsel for the parties, we are clearly of the view that the impugned order is contrary to law and cannot be sustained for several reasons, but primarily for deviation from the limited jurisdiction exercised by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The High Court exercising supervisory jurisdiction does not act as a court of first appeal to reappreciate, reweigh the evidence or facts upon which the determination under challenge is based. Supervisory jurisdiction is not to correct every error of fact or even a legal flaw when the final finding is justified or can be supported. The High Court exercising supervisory jurisdiction does not act as a court of first appeal to reappreciate, reweigh the evidence or facts upon which the determination under challenge is based. Supervisory jurisdiction is not to correct every error of fact or even a legal flaw when the final finding is justified or can be supported. The High Court is not to substitute its own decision on facts and conclusion, for that of the inferior court or tribunal.1 The jurisdiction exercised is in the nature of correctional jurisdiction to set right grave dereliction of duty or flagrant abuse, Celina Coelho Pereira and Others v. Ulhas Mahabaleshwar Kholkar and Others, (2010) 1 SCC violation of fundamental principles of law or justice. The power under Article 227 is exercised sparingly in appropriate cases, like when there is no evidence at all to justify, or the finding is so perverse that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion that the court or tribunal has come to. It is axiomatic that such discretionary relief must be exercised to ensure there is no miscarriage of justice. Explaining the scope of jurisdiction under Article 227, this Court in Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd. has observed:- 16. The scope and ambit of exercise of power and jurisdiction by a High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is examined and explained in a number of decisions of this Court. The exercise of power under this article involves a duty on the High Court to keep inferior courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and to see that they do the duty expected or required of them in a legal manner. The High Court is not vested with any unlimited prerogative to correct all kinds of hardship or wrong decisions made within the limits of the jurisdiction of the subordinate courts or tribunals. Exercise of this power and interfering with the orders of the courts or tribunals is restricted to cases of serious dereliction of duty and flagrant violation of fundamental principles of law or justice, where if the High Court does not interfere, a grave injustice remains uncorrected. Exercise of this power and interfering with the orders of the courts or tribunals is restricted to cases of serious dereliction of duty and flagrant violation of fundamental principles of law or justice, where if the High Court does not interfere, a grave injustice remains uncorrected. It is also well settled that the High Court while acting under this article cannot exercise its power as an appellate court or substitute its own judgment in place of that of the subordinate court to correct an error, which is not apparent on the face of the record. The High Court can set aside or ignore the findings of facts of an inferior court or tribunal, if there is no evidence at all to justify or the finding is so perverse, that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion, which the court or tribunal has come to.” 16. In the same context, he also relied on the decisions passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Yeshwant Sakhalkar & Anr. vs. Hirabat Kamat Mhamai & Anr. , (2004) 6 SCC 71 and B.K. Muniraju vs. State of Karnataka & Ors. , (2008) 4 SCC 451. 17. Citing these decisions, the learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Luikham has submitted that the order passed by the learned appellate court, whereby the order granting temporary injunction passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) was set aside, is erroneous, perverse, and palpably incorrect on the face of the record. He argued that the appellate court failed to consider the entire factual matrix of the case, including the contradictory findings in the reports submitted by the LRSO and the DC. Without addressing these material discrepancies and without appreciating the petitioner’s continuous possession of the disputed land, the appellate court erroneously dismissed the trial court’s reasoned order of temporary injunction. Accordingly, it is submitted that interference by this Hon’ble Court is warranted under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to set aside and quash the impugned order dated 02.12.2020 passed by the learned appellate court. 18. Mr. Longjem, learned counsel for respondent No. 3, submitted that the learned Trial Court passed its order after duly considering all relevant materials and documents, and had issued a detailed judgment while disposing of the injunction application. Therefore, he submits, interference by this Court is unwarranted. 18. Mr. Longjem, learned counsel for respondent No. 3, submitted that the learned Trial Court passed its order after duly considering all relevant materials and documents, and had issued a detailed judgment while disposing of the injunction application. Therefore, he submits, interference by this Court is unwarranted. He pointed out that the case was initially registered as a civil revision, but was subsequently converted into an application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India vide order dated20.11.2020. He further submitted that the petitioner failed to disclose any prima facie case in the application before the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Divn), and the sole contention raised by the petitioner pertained to alleged discrepancies between the findings of the DC and the report of the LRSO. He contended that both the injunction application and the title suit were filed solely for the purpose of challenging the order of the DC dated19.09.2018. 19. Mr. Longjem contended that in order to obtain an order of temporary injunction, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case in his favour. In this context, he relied on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kashi Math Samsthan & Anr. vs. Shrimad Sudhindra Thirtha Swamy , (2010) 1 SCC 689 , wherein it was held that a party seeking injunction must not only establish a prima facie case, but also demonstrate that the balance of convenience lies in their favour and that they will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted. It was further held that if a prima facie case is not established, then the questions of balance of convenience or irreparable injury do not arise. 20. He further submitted that, according to the plaintiff’s own claim, the land was purchased from one Smti. Meithanlu Rongmei on 31.05.1995. As per the sale deed, it is stated that Smti. Meithanlu Rongmei was the owner of land under Patta No. 64, measuring 4 Bighas, 4 Kathas, and 3½ Lechas under Dag No. 98, and land measuring 1 Bigha, 3 Kathas, and 9 Lechas under Dag No. 113. However, the Jamabandi annexed by the plaintiff clearly shows that Smti. Meithanlu Rongmei was not the sole owner of the land under Patta No. 64, Dag No. 98, and that the land under Dag No. 113, measuring 1 Bigha, 3 Kathas, and 9 Lechas, was recorded in the name of one Shri Thsapongchem. However, the Jamabandi annexed by the plaintiff clearly shows that Smti. Meithanlu Rongmei was not the sole owner of the land under Patta No. 64, Dag No. 98, and that the land under Dag No. 113, measuring 1 Bigha, 3 Kathas, and 9 Lechas, was recorded in the name of one Shri Thsapongchem. Thus, based on the plaintiff’s own document (Jamabandi), it is evident that Smti. Meithanlu Rongmei had no legal right to sell the land under Dag No. 113, and therefore could not have conveyed valid title to the petitioner. 21. On the other hand, respondent No. 3 claims that in the year 1998, his late brother, Kazheto Nurumi, purchased land measuring 1 Katha, 18 Lechas covered by Patta No. 573, Dag No. 753 under Block No. 3 of Dimapur town, from one Smti. Gaithuilu through a registered sale deed dated 15.01.1998. The land was subsequently mutated in the name of the respondent’s brother, and a Jamabandi was issued in his favour. Permanent structures, including thatched houses and an Assam-type house, were constructed on the land, and tenants resided therein, paying rent to the respondent's brother. After his death, a family settlement took place, and the land was transferred to respondent No. 3, who had the land mutated in his own name on 21.01.2015. Subsequently, the petitioner made a proposal to exchange land with respondent No. 3, which was rejected. Thereafter, respondent No. 3 began leveling the land for construction purposes, but was served with a Restraining Order dated 19.02.2016 issued by the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Dimapur. Following an enquiry, the DC, by Order dated 19.09.2018, dismissed the petitioner’s complaint and allowed respondent No. 3 to peacefully occupy the land. 22. Mr. Longjem also pointed out that the State respondents filed a written statement highlighting discrepancies and anomalies in the documents filed by the plaintiff. He argued that the petitioner’s claims are contradictory. On one hand, the petitioner states that he purchased the entire land under Patta No. 64 on 31.05.1995, while on the other hand, he claims to have purchased 1 Katha, 15 Lechas of land under the same Patta No. 64 from Shri Thsapongchem Sangtam through a registered sale deed dated 07.08.1998. Thus, the petitioner is claiming rights over lands covered under Dag Nos. 98 and 113 of Patta Nos. Thus, the petitioner is claiming rights over lands covered under Dag Nos. 98 and 113 of Patta Nos. 64 and 804, while the land of respondent No. 3 is under Patta No. 573, Dag No. 753, Block No. 3 of Dimapur Town. The dispute, therefore, does not relate to the land in possession of respondent No. 3, and the petitioner cannot claim title or possession over the same. 23. He further submitted that while passing the order dated 19.09.2018, the DC provided both parties an opportunity of hearing, and the revenue authorities conducted a spot verification in their presence. The findings were recorded after due consideration of the site inspection. 24. Mr. Longjem also emphasized that the boundary descriptions provided by the petitioner in the plaint are inconsistent and contradictory. The petitioner, therefore, filed the suit based on a false and concocted story, without even properly describing the land over which he claims right, title, and interest. The case of the plaintiff is riddled with contradictions and inconsistencies, which are evident from the face of the record. Nevertheless, the learned Trial Court, without adequately considering the materials on record, erroneously concluded that the plaintiff had been in possession of the suit land for over 20 years and held that the balance of convenience lay in the petitioner’s favour. He further submitted that the Trial Court relied solely on a Jamabandi dated 11.07.1995 filed by the petitioner, while ignoring the valid Jamabandi submitted by respondent No. 3, and thus wrongly concluded that a prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable loss were in the petitioner’s favour. 25. In support of his argument, Mr. Longjem relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajinder Singh vs. State of J&K, (2008) 9 SCC 368 , wherein, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that revenue records do not confer title on a party; such entries are relevant only for fiscal purposes and cannot be treated as conclusive evidence of ownership or title. 26. He further contended that the learned Principal District & Sessions Judge rightly considered all relevant materials in detail and in true perspective while passing the impugned order dated 02.12.2020. The appellate court correctly held that the lands of respondent No. 3 and the petitioner are covered under different patta and dag numbers. 26. He further contended that the learned Principal District & Sessions Judge rightly considered all relevant materials in detail and in true perspective while passing the impugned order dated 02.12.2020. The appellate court correctly held that the lands of respondent No. 3 and the petitioner are covered under different patta and dag numbers. It also rightly observed that there are multiple discrepancies in the documents filed by the petitioner in support of his claim of right, title, and interest over the suit land. 27. He further submitted that reliance may be placed on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. & Ors. vs. Coca Cola Co. & Ors. , (1995) 5 SCC 545 , wherein in paragraph 43, it was held that the object of an interlocutory injunction is to protect the plaintiff from injury by violation of his right for which he may not be adequately compensated in damages if the dispute is ultimately decided in his favour at the trial. It was further held that the need for such protection must be weight against the corresponding need of the defendant to be protected against injury resulting from being prevented from exercising his own legal rights, for which he too may not be adequately compensated. 28. Accordingly, he submitted that there is no valid ground for interference with the order dated 02.12.2020 passed by the learned Principal District and Sessions Judge, Dimapur in Civil Appeal No. 01/2020. 29. Ms. Suokhrie, learned Additional Advocate General, also submitted that the land documents produced by the petitioner are riddled with discrepancies and anomalies. According to the records maintained by the State respondents, only an area of 04B-04K-3½ Ls under Dag No. 98 and 01B-00K-19 Ls under Dag No. 113/991 amounting to a total of 06B-00K- 2½ Ls is recorded in the name of the plaintiff. However, in the sale deed, corrections are apparent and the total area is shown as 6B-2K-12½ Ls, whereas the Jamabandi annexed to the plaint shows the area as 06B-0K-17½ Ls. 30. She further submitted that the learned appellate court rightly passed the impugned order after carefully considering all relevant documents, factual circumstances, and the evident discrepancies in the documents filed by the petitioner. Therefore, she contended, no interference by this Hon’ble Court is warranted in the order dated 02.12.2020 passed by the learned Principal District and Sessions Judge, Dimapur. 31. 30. She further submitted that the learned appellate court rightly passed the impugned order after carefully considering all relevant documents, factual circumstances, and the evident discrepancies in the documents filed by the petitioner. Therefore, she contended, no interference by this Hon’ble Court is warranted in the order dated 02.12.2020 passed by the learned Principal District and Sessions Judge, Dimapur. 31. After hearing the submissions made by the learned counsels for both sides, I have perused the case record, the annexures attached to the petition, as well as the judgment and order passed by the learned Appellate Court. The petitioner/plaintiff's case is primarily that respondent No. 3/defendant interfered with his peaceful possession of the suit property under Dag No. 113 of Patta No. 64, which he claims to have purchased from one Thsapongchem Sangtam through a registered sale deed dated 07.08.1998. However, the property has yet to be mutated in the name of the present petitioner. It is also noted that, prior to the present dispute between the petitioner and respondent No. 3, the petitioner had an earlier land dispute with one Gaidibung. However, that dispute was settled by the DC vide letter dated 13.05.1999, with an order passed in favour of the petitioner. 32. The learned counsel for the petitioner mainly emphasized the discrepancies between the report submitted by the LRSO and the findings of fact recorded in the DC's order dated 19.09.2018. According to the petitioner, these two findings are contradictory. Consequently, challenging the DC's order, he filed the title suit, claiming right, title, and interest over the suit property, and also prayed for a temporary injunction. The learned Civil Judge (Sr.Dvn), after considering the petitioner's possession of the suit property and noting certain discrepancies in the order passed by the DC, granted a temporary injunction in favour of the petitioner, restraining respondent No. 3/defendant from carrying out further construction on the suit property. 33. It is the petitioner’s contention that respondent No. 3, relying on the DC’s order dated 19.09.2018, began constructing a permanent structure on the suit land, which necessitated the prayer for an injunction before the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Dvn.). However, respondent No. 3/defendant claims ownership only over his plot of land covered by Patta No. 573, Dag No. 753 of Block No. 3 of Dimapur, and does not claim any land under Patta No. 64, Dag Nos. Dvn.). However, respondent No. 3/defendant claims ownership only over his plot of land covered by Patta No. 573, Dag No. 753 of Block No. 3 of Dimapur, and does not claim any land under Patta No. 64, Dag Nos. 98 and 113/991, which the petitioner claims as the suit property. Furthermore, there are several discrepancies in the area of land claimed by the petitioner/plaintiff. According to State Respondents Nos. 1 and 2, there are inconsistencies between the area of land described in the sale deed and the land under the patta, which was mutated in the petitioner’s name. 34. The learned Appellate Court recorded following discrepancies, which were raised by the State respondents in their written statement, and stated as follows: a) That a plot of land measuring 00B-01K-15Ls, at DAG No.113, covered by Patta No.64 at Block No.3 Dimapur Town standing in the name of one Shri. Thsapongchem Sangtam was purchased by the plaintiff/respondent 1 vide sale deed no.146/98 dated 07.08.1998 which is yet to be mutated in the name of the plaintiff/respondent 1. Records of the case reveal that the present suit land was in dispute way back in 1999 with one Shri. Gaidipung and the disputed-land was settled in favour of the plaintiff/respondent 1 by the DC Dimapur vide order dated 13.05.1999. As such the plaintiff/respondent 1 has a prima facie case to go into trial. b) That it is evident on records that the spot verification report dated 28.11.2017 of LRSO Dimapur and the finding of facts arrived at in the order dated 19.09.2018 passed by DC Dimapur are contradictory to each other. c) That the Jamabandi/land patta issued as early as 11.07.1995 in favour of the plaintiff and the actual possession of the suit land by the plaintiff for over 20 years cannot be dispossessed on the basis of the order dated 19.09.2018. As such, the balance of convenience is in favor of the plaintiff. 35. Moreover, it is the claim of the State respondents that Dag No. 113 under Patta No. 64 covers a vast area, and several plots under this Dag have been allotted different Patta numbers. Therefore, Dag No. 113 does not belong exclusively to the petitioner/plaintiff. From the pleadings of both parties, including those of the State respondents, it is evident that the disputed land claimed by the petitioner/plaintiff is not the same land claimed by respondent No. 3. Therefore, Dag No. 113 does not belong exclusively to the petitioner/plaintiff. From the pleadings of both parties, including those of the State respondents, it is evident that the disputed land claimed by the petitioner/plaintiff is not the same land claimed by respondent No. 3. Both parties appear to be claiming different plots of land, and there is no supporting document to establish that the land claimed by the petitioner as his purchased property is being illegally possessed or encroached upon by respondent No. 3 through the construction of permanent structures. 36. Although there may be some discrepancies in the LRSO report or in the findings of the DC, as alleged by the petitioner, these are matters that can only be adjudicated at the stage of evidence. However, prima facie, it appears that the plaintiff has not been able to establish possession over the land allegedly being occupied by respondent No. 3, which he claims to have received as a gift from his father after the death of his elder brother. Therefore, it is evident that the petitioner has failed to establish a prima facie case for the grant of a temporary injunction. The description and area of the disputed land, as claimed by the petitioner, contain several discrepancies, a fact also supported by the State respondents through documentary evidence and their pleadings before the learned Trial Court. 37. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of Kashi Math Samsthan (supra), held that a party seeking an injunction must not only establish a prima facie case but also demonstrate that the balance of convenience lies in their favour and that they would suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted. It was further held that if a prima facie case is not made out, then the issues of balance of convenience and irreparable injury do not arise. 38. In the present case, due to discrepancies in the land records pertaining to the property claimed by the petitioner, and the fact that the land claimed by respondent No. 3 appears to be different, covered by distinct Dag and Patta numbers. Thus, it is clear that the petitioner has failed to establish a prima facie case in his favour. However, these matters may be examined in greater detail during trial, and the petitioner shall have the liberty to prove his case through both documentary and oral evidence. Thus, it is clear that the petitioner has failed to establish a prima facie case in his favour. However, these matters may be examined in greater detail during trial, and the petitioner shall have the liberty to prove his case through both documentary and oral evidence. For the purpose of granting a temporary injunction, however, it has been rightly held by the learned Appellate Court that the petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case. Additionally, the petitioner has also failed to establish the balance of convenience or the likelihood of suffering irreparable loss, both of which have been discussed in detail by the said Court. 39. It is well established that the High Court, while exercising supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, does not act as a court of first appeal to reappreciate or reweigh the evidence or facts upon which the determination under challenge is based. The supervisory jurisdiction is not meant to correct every error of fact or law if the final finding is justified or can be supported [ Garment Craft (supra)]. It is also settled law that the High Court, while acting under Article 227, cannot substitute its own judgment for that of the subordinate court or correct an error that is not apparent on the face of the record. 40. In the present case, based on the discussion above, it is apparent that there are discrepancies in the description of the land as stated by the petitioner in the plaint filed before the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Dvn.), and his claim over the land is also found to be in dispute. It is prima facie established that the land belonging to the petitioner is different from the land claimed by respondent No. 3. 41. In view of the detailed discussion above, this Court is of the opinion that the learned Principal District & Sessions Judge, Dimapur has adequately addressed all the facts and circumstances of the case, properly described the land in question, and duly considered the land records produced by State respondents Nos. 1 and 2 while passing the order in Civil Appeal No. 01/2020 dated 02.12.2020. Therefore, this Court finds no ground to interfere with the order of the Appellate Court. 42. In view of the aforesaid discussions, reasons and decision, the present civil revision petition stands dismissed. Parties to bear their own cost.