Venkateswara Rao Chintapalli v. Chintapalli Shreeyash Nivedit Rao
2025-03-03
K.SUJANA
body2025
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER : K. Sujana, J. Challenging the order dated 03.01.2024 passed in I.A.No.331 of 2022 in F.C.O.P.No.59 of 2021 by the learned Judge, Family Court-cum-IV Additional District and Sessions Judge, Karimnagar, the present Civil Revision Petition is filed. 2. The brief facts of the case are that the respondents filed I.A.No.331 of 2022 in F.C.O.P.No.59 of 2021 before the trial Court seeking interim maintenance for them, the legitimate children of the petitioner and his wife, Beeravelli @ Chintapalli Deepthi. In the said petition it is stated that the parents of the respondents were married on 19.05.2006, at Karimnagar, and their children were born in India and the UK. The mother of the respondents claims that despite her efforts to mediate, the petitioner has refused to contribute to the children's maintenance, education, and well-being. It is further stated that the petitioner earns significantly, having acquired British citizenship in October 2002 and working in the UK. 3. The petitioner filed counter in the said petition stating that he has been paying £60,000 (approximately Rs.60 lakhs) monthly for family maintenance in the UK. He claims that despite his willingness to continue supporting the children, his wife dislocated him from their family home. He also states that he purchased properties worth over Rs.20 crores in the name of his wife and provided her with gold and diamonds. The petitioner further asserts that he is willing to bear the education expenses of the children if they live with him, but his wife refused. He claims that his wife works in the UK and that there is no merit in the petition. 4. The trial Court has examined the evidence presented by both parties, including Ex.A1 to A16 and Ex.B1 to B27. After hearing both sides, vide order dated 03.01.2024 allowed the petition with a direction to the petitioner that the respondent shall pay interim monthly maintenance of Rs.2,12,500/- to the respondents from 01.11.2021, until the disposal of F.C.O.P.No.59 of 2021. The payment should be made on or before the 5 th of every month, preferably through direct deposit into the bank account of the respondents. Further, the respondents must file a memo providing their bank account details to facilitate the deposit. The petitioner is also required to pay the arrears of interim monthly maintenance from 01.11.2021, to the date of this order within two months.
Further, the respondents must file a memo providing their bank account details to facilitate the deposit. The petitioner is also required to pay the arrears of interim monthly maintenance from 01.11.2021, to the date of this order within two months. Aggrieved by the said order, the present civil revision petition is filed. 5. Heard Sri D.V. Seeta Rama Murthy, learned Senior Counsel, representing Sri Sudarshan Mulugari, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner as well as Sri Raja Sreepathi Rao, learned Senior Counsel representing Sri G. Aditya Goud, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner is challenging the interim maintenance order, stating that the Family Court made several errors. Firstly, the trial Court failed to consider the contention of the petitioner that the petition was not maintainable, as the parties are UK citizens governed by UK laws, specifically the Children Act, 1989 and the Child Abduction Act, 1984. He further submitted that the trial Court overlooked the permanent residence of the petitioner and his children in the UK, their renunciation of Indian citizenship, and his acquisition of British citizenship. The petitioner has been living in the UK since 2002 and obtained British citizenship in the year, 2012. The petitioner also asserts that the trial Court ignored the pendency of matrimonial disputes and ancillary issues in UK Courts, which have jurisdiction over the parties. The UK courts have already seized the matter, and an anti-suit injunction has been granted to prevent the ex-wife of the petitioner from pursuing maintenance claims in India. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the petitioner claims that his ex-wife has mismanaged finances, suppressed material facts, and acted with malicious intentions. The petitioner also alleges that his ex-wife has failed to provide a conducive environment for their children, instead teaching them negative and harmful opinions about him. Therefore, learned counsel for the petitioner is seeking to set aside the interim maintenance order, stating that the Family Court lacked jurisdiction and competency to adjudicate the matter. The petitioner believes that the UK Courts are better equipped to assess the financial conditions of the parties, needs, and expenses, and to provide an effective and efficacious remedy. 8.
Therefore, learned counsel for the petitioner is seeking to set aside the interim maintenance order, stating that the Family Court lacked jurisdiction and competency to adjudicate the matter. The petitioner believes that the UK Courts are better equipped to assess the financial conditions of the parties, needs, and expenses, and to provide an effective and efficacious remedy. 8. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surinder Kaur Sandhu v. Harbax Singh Sandhu and another, (1984) 3 SCC 698 , wherein in paragraph No.10, it is held as under: 10. We may add that the spouses had set up their matrimonial home in England where the wife was working as a clerk and the husband as a bus driver. The boy is a British citizen, having been born in England, and he holds a British passport. It cannot be controverted that, in these circumstances, the English Court had jurisdiction to decide the question of his custody. The modern theory of Conflict of Laws recognises and, in any event, prefers the jurisdiction of the State which has the most intimate contact with the issues arising in the case. Jurisdiction is not attracted by the operation or creation of fortuitous circumstances such as the circumstance as to where the child, whose custody is in issue, is brought or for the time being lodged. To allow the assumption of jurisdiction by another State in such circumstances will only result in encouraging forum-shopping. Ordinarily, jurisdiction must follow upon functional lines. That is to say, for example, that in matters relating to matrimony and custody, the law of that place must govern which has the closest concern with the well-being of the spouses and the welfare of the offsprings of marriage. The spouses in this case had made England their home where this boy wasborn to them. The father cannot deprive the English Court of its jurisdiction to decide upon his custody by removing him to India, not in the normal movement of the matrimonial home but, by an act which was gravely detrimental to the peace of that home.
The spouses in this case had made England their home where this boy wasborn to them. The father cannot deprive the English Court of its jurisdiction to decide upon his custody by removing him to India, not in the normal movement of the matrimonial home but, by an act which was gravely detrimental to the peace of that home. The fact that the matrimonial home of the spouses was in England, establishes sufficient contacts or ties with that State in order to make it reasonable and just for the courts of that State to assume jurisdiction to enforce obligations which were incurred therein by the spouses. (See International Shoe Company v. State of Washington [90 L Ed 95 (1945) : 326 US 310] which was not a matrimonial case but which is regarded as the fountainhead of the subsequent developments of jurisdictional issues like the one involved in the instant case.) It is our duty and function to protect the wife against the burden of litigating in an inconvenient forum which she and her husband had left voluntarily in order to make their living in England, where they gave birth to this unfortunate boy.” 9. Learned counsel further relied upon the Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sondur Gopal v. Sondur Rajini , [ (2013) 7 SCC 426 ] , wherein in paragraph No.18, it is held as follows: “18. Rival submission necessitates examination of extent and applicability of the Act. Section 1(2) of the Act provides for extent of the Act. The same reads as follows: “1.Short title and extent.—(1)*** (2) It extends to the whole of India except the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and applies also to Hindus domiciled in the territories to which this Act extends who are outside the said territories.” From a plain reading of Section 1(2) of the Act, it is evident that it has extra-territorial operation. 10. Learned counsel further relied upon the judgment of the Bombay High Court in Sucheta Dilip Ghate and another v. Dilip Shantaram Ghate , [2003 SCC OnLine Bom 316] , wherein in paragraph No.6, it is held as follows: “6.
10. Learned counsel further relied upon the judgment of the Bombay High Court in Sucheta Dilip Ghate and another v. Dilip Shantaram Ghate , [2003 SCC OnLine Bom 316] , wherein in paragraph No.6, it is held as follows: “6. The order of the Family Court is based upon section 20 to hold that the petition of the appellants has to be instituted in a Court within local limits of whose jurisdiction the defendant at the time of commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain, or where the cause of action, wholly or in part arises. Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of section 20 are independent of each other. Clause (c) of section 20 confers jurisdiction on a Court within local limits of whose jurisdiction the cause of action, wholly or in part arises. Whether the cause of action either wholly or in part arises in a suit would depend on the averments made in the suit or marriage petition for that matter. In other words, the cause of action for filing of the suit should be ascertained from the facts stated in the plaint/petition. The cause of action means the circumstances forming infraction of the right or immediate occasion for action. It is left to be determined in each individual case as to where the cause of action arises. The cause of action in suit/petition has no reference to the defence taken in the suit nor is it related to the evidence by which the cause of action is established. Keeping this settled principle of law in view, we would now like to examine the averments in the said petition. It seems from the body of the petition that the appellants in the circumstances mentioned in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the said petition were compelled to leave matrimonial house and reside separately at Ahmedabad itself. The circumstances further compelled the appellants to shift to Pune where they started residing with the father of appellant No. 1. On the date of filing of the marriage petitioner i.e. 5th August, 2000 they were residing at Pune. The petition is filed for maintenance with effect from 8th April, 1998 till filing of the petition. It is true that till April 2000 the appellants were residing at Ahmedabad. However, admittedly they started residing at Pune since April 2000.
On the date of filing of the marriage petitioner i.e. 5th August, 2000 they were residing at Pune. The petition is filed for maintenance with effect from 8th April, 1998 till filing of the petition. It is true that till April 2000 the appellants were residing at Ahmedabad. However, admittedly they started residing at Pune since April 2000. Whether the appellants are entitled for maintenance or not would be decided by the Family Court. The facts itself undoubtedly indicate that the cause of action in part did arise at Pune. By no stretch of imagination it could be said that the cause of action arose only at Ahmedabad. As a matter of fact the circumstances forming infraction of the right of the appellants continues and exists at Pune. In other words the suffering of the appellants due to lack of means of maintenance continues in Pune and in view thereof we have no hesitation in holding that the cause of action also arose at Pune. The Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act has no provision regarding the jurisdiction of the Court to which the application for maintenance is to be presented. The provisions of Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act are beneficial and social legislation for the benefit of women and infirm old parents for their maintenance while in distress. It cannot be imagined by any stretch of imagination that such person in distress would have to run from pillar to post for relief under the provision of Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, if the husband or son keeps on changing his residence or prefers to reside in far away town from the town of wife or parents. In view of this we are of the considered view that taking recourse to clause (c) of section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the proceedings could be instituted at a place of residence of wife who is residing at different place than her husband. The Family Court at Pune, therefore, shall have jurisdiction to entertain the said petition filed by the appellants under the provisions of Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act and Special Marriage Act.” 11. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents filed counter denying the averments of the petitioner stating that the contention of the petitioner regarding jurisdiction is unfounded and devoid of merit.
On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents filed counter denying the averments of the petitioner stating that the contention of the petitioner regarding jurisdiction is unfounded and devoid of merit. The Respondents, being Overseas Citizen of India (OCI) cardholders, are entitled to legal protections under Indian law, including due process rights. The reliance of the petitioners on the fact that the parties are UK citizens is misconceived, as the OCI status of the respondents confers upon them the right to seek legal remedies in India. He submitted that the relocation of the petitioner to India in August 2020 and the Respondents' subsequent visit to India established domicile in India, making the Family Court at Karimnagar the appropriate forum for the maintenance claim. The attempt of the petitioner to argue that the UK courts have jurisdiction over the matter is unfounded, as the Respondents have a legitimate claim to seek maintenance in India. 12. Learned counsel for the respondents contended that the ex-parte divorce decree of the petitioner from the UK court is unrecognizable under Indian law, as it was obtained without the contest of the respondents and on the principle of "no- fault divorce," which is not recognized in India. This decree is therefore not enforceable in India, and the reliance of the petitioner on it is misconceived. He further contended that the anti-injunction suit order of the English Court is incompatible with Indian laws and natural justice, restricting the rights of the respondents to seek legal remedies in India. This order is also in contravention of the principles of comity of nations and the doctrine of forum non conveniens and that the assertions of the petitioner of bona fide intentions and love are contradicted by the report of the Child Arrangement Committee, which states that the child shall live with the petitioner. The deliberate omission of the petitioner of this critical information misleads the Court and obscures the true living arrangements and intentions of the parties involved. Therefore, he prayed the Court to dismiss the civil revision petition as there are no merits. 13. In support of his submissions, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents relied upon the Judgment of the Madras High Court in Kiran Kumar Chava v. Usha Kiran Anne , [2023 SCC OnLine Mad 474] , wherein in paragraph Nos.75 and 77, which are reads as follows: “75.
13. In support of his submissions, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents relied upon the Judgment of the Madras High Court in Kiran Kumar Chava v. Usha Kiran Anne , [2023 SCC OnLine Mad 474] , wherein in paragraph Nos.75 and 77, which are reads as follows: “75. As far as the ex parte orders of US Courts are concerned, though the foreign judgments are not conclusive and it is only a factor to be decided, the facts and circumstances would reveal that the respondent as well as the twin children have taken a decision to reside at Chennai peacefully and they are not interested to return back to United States as they are terribly afraid of going back, since they have no trust on the revision petitioner. In the event of sending them back to United States, forcibly, they will be practically on the streets in United States and the conscious of this Court does not permit to take such a decision, since the rights ensured under the Indian Constitution to the OCI Cardholders are to be protected. 77. In view of the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, as elaborately discussed in the aforementioned paragraphs and considering the deposition of the 15 year old twin children before this Court and also the decision of the respondent to continue to reside at Chennai, India as Overseas Cardholder, this Court has no hesitation in arriving a conclusion that the respondent is entitled to institute and maintain matrimonial proceedings, DVC proceedings and any other proceedings under the relevant Statutes in Indian Courts having jurisdiction for appropriate reliefs.” 14. This Court has examined the submissions made by both the learned counsel and reviewed the material on record. The primary contention raised by the counsel of the petitioner concerns the jurisdiction of the Court, emphasizing that both parties are UK citizens. However, it is essential to note that the petition was filed while the minor respondents and the petitioner were in Karimnagar during the COVID-19 pandemic. The minor children were attending online classes from a UK school while residing in Karimnagar, and their school fees were being paid accordingly. The petitioner does not dispute being in India at that time. Instead, he obtained an ex-parte divorce from a UK Court subsequent to filing the present petition.
The minor children were attending online classes from a UK school while residing in Karimnagar, and their school fees were being paid accordingly. The petitioner does not dispute being in India at that time. Instead, he obtained an ex-parte divorce from a UK Court subsequent to filing the present petition. This raises questions about his sincerity in challenging the jurisdiction of the Indian Court. 15. Furthermore, the petitioner admits to paying maintenance of £60,000 per month to the minor children in the UK. Given his acknowledgment of this financial responsibility, it is reasonable to expect him to comply with the maintenance order issued by the Family Court in Karimnagar. The petitioner repeatedly emphasizes that both parties are UK citizens and that the UK Court has better jurisdiction over the matter. He cites the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Surinder Kaur Sandhu (supra), which discusses the jurisdiction of courts in child custody cases. However, the facts of the present case differ significantly from those in the cited judgment, as both parties are not contesting the custody of the minor child. The petitioner also objects to the adjudication of the proceedings in India, citing that both parties are British Citizens. However, this objection lacks merit, as OCI card holders are subject to Indian jurisdiction. Further, there is no averment in the counter that the petitioner is unfit to pay maintenance to the minor children, despite his financially stable situation. Given his admission of the relationship between the parties and his financial expenses, there is no illegality in the order of the trial Court. The trial court has passed a reasoned order, and therefore, there are no merits in the civil revision petition, making it liable for dismissal. 16. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed confirming the order dated 03.01.2024 passed in I.A.No.331 of 2022 in F.C.O.P.No.59 of 2021 by the learned Judge, Family Court-cum-IV Additional District and Sessions Judge, Karimnagar. There shall be no order as to costs. Miscellaneous applications, if any pending, shall stand closed.