JUDGMENT : R.DEVDAS, J. This is an appeal filed under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (for short, the ‘Act’) at the hands of the appellant-wife seeking to set aside the judgment and decree dated 30.10.2024 in M.C. No. 666/2024 on the file of the learned Additional Senior Civil Judge & JMFC, Karwar. 2. At the outset, since office objections were raised regarding the maintainability of the appeal, we requested the learned Government Advocate Sri G.K. Hiregoudar to assist the Court on the question of maintainability of the appeal, before issuing notice to the respondent. 3. Learned Amicus, while placing reliance on a decision of a Division Bench of Gujarat High Court in the case of Manisha Anand Vs. Nilesh Anand in R.F.A. No. 4223/2024 dated 03.12.2024 , submitted that the Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court considered similar issue as to whether an appeal would be maintainable against the judgment and decree passed by a Family Court on an application for divorce by mutual consent, under Sec. 13-B of the Act. The Gujarat High Court took note of the various earlier decisions on the issue and considered the relevant provisions, such as Sec.19(2) of the Family Courts Act, which provides that no appeal shall lie from a decree or order passed by the Family Court with the consent of the parties. 4. The Gujarat High Court took note of Sec. 28 of the Act including Sec. 9 and 10 of the Family Courts Act and held that as a first appellate Court it cannot go into the question whether the decree was obtained by fraud, undue influence or misrepresentation. It was therefore directed that such a contention could be raised only before the Family Court which decided the matter. Learned Amicus would further submit that the said decision was taken up before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 4530/2025 and the Hon’ble Supreme Court by order dated 24.02.2025 held that the proper remedy available to the petitioner is to approach the Family Court itself for recall of the consent decree rather than filing of appeal. With those observations the SLP was dismissed. 5. Learned Amicus would also draw the attention of this Court to another decision of a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in the case of Anshu Malhotra Vs. With those observations the SLP was dismissed. 5. Learned Amicus would also draw the attention of this Court to another decision of a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in the case of Anshu Malhotra Vs. Mukhesh Malhotra , [2020 SCC OnLine Delhi 3255] which considered Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC and Sec. 96(3) CPC, while comparing those provisions with the provisions contained in the Hindu Marriage Act and the Family Courts Act and held that it is not as if the position under Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC is any different from that Sec. 13-B or 23 of the Act, however once the Court is satisfied that the compromise arrived at is lawful and has passed a decree, against that decree, Sec. 96(3) of the CPC bars an appeal. It proceeded to hold that the law with respect to consent decree is that though appeal is not maintainable against such a decree but the remedy for an eventuality of consent having been obtained forcibly or fraudulently or having been obtained by misrepresentation, is by applying to the same Court. It was held that it is only the Court which passed the consent decree which is capable of going into the facts and if it finds any prima facie merit therein, it may make enquiry by recording evidence with respect therein and thereafter take a final decision. 6. Learned Amicus would therefore submit that consistently the view taken by all the High Courts and the affirmation of such orders at the hands of the Hon’ble Supreme Court lay down the position that such an appeal cannot be maintained. 7. However, learned counsel for the appellant seeks to place reliance on the decision of the learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court in the case of Damayanti Kirit Jani (Smt.) Vs. 7. However, learned counsel for the appellant seeks to place reliance on the decision of the learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court in the case of Damayanti Kirit Jani (Smt.) Vs. Kireet Lalubhai Jani , [ 1992(2) Bom.CR 620 ] and submits that similar contention was considered by the learned Single Judge and held that the Court, while considering a petition under Section 13-B of the Act was required to enquire, including the hearing or examination of the parties for the purpose of satisfying itself whether the averments made in the petition are true and if the Court was satisfied that the consent of parties was not obtained by force, fraud or undue influence and that the parties had mutually agreed that the marriage should be dissolved, only then decree of divorce was required to be passed by the Court. 8. Learned counsel submits that in the present case, in the petition filed under Sec. 13-B of the Act it is clearly stated that when the husband came to know that the wife is suffering from mental disorder and she used to take medicine for that reason for several years, it was clear from the averments made in the petition itself that the husband claimed that the wife had mental disorder and therefore obviously, the consent of such a person who was suffering from mental disorder could not have been taken as a valid consent given by the other party. The learned counsel would therefore point out from the cause title in the appeal that this Miscellaneous First Appeal is filed by the wife the wife through her next friend and father. In that view of the matter, the learned counsel would submit that when it is apparent on the face of the record that the consent given by the wife was not valid, since it is alleged in the petition itself that the wife was suffering from mental disorder, the Family Court should have at least examined the wife in that regard. The learned counsel would therefore submit that this is not a case akin to any other case law that have been cited by the learned Amicus. Learned counsel would therefore submit that the appeal is maintainable. 9. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant, learned Amicus and perused the appeal memo and the judgments cited by learned counsels. 10. The learned counsel would therefore submit that this is not a case akin to any other case law that have been cited by the learned Amicus. Learned counsel would therefore submit that the appeal is maintainable. 9. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant, learned Amicus and perused the appeal memo and the judgments cited by learned counsels. 10. Although the position of law is quite clear that even if it is a case of a alleged fraud or misrepresentation, an appeal cannot be maintained and the aggrieved party is required to approach the same Court which passed the judgment and decree, this Court is required to consider the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellant. It is sought to be contended on behalf of the appellant-wife that when the petition filed under Sec. 13-B of the Act contain such an allegation made by the husband against the wife that she was suffering from mental disorder, it became incumbent upon the trial Court to have examined the parties in that regard. The trial Court was required to find out on examination of the parties and it should have conducted a mini trial to find out whether the wife was capable of giving consent. 11. In the considered opinion of this Court, even if such contention, on the face of it, deserves appreciation, nevertheless it does not change the position of law as found in the judgments cited by the learned Amicus. In all the cases referred to by the learned Amicus, we find similar allegations that the consent and the decree was obtained by one party fraudulently or by misrepresentation, nevertheless the unequivocal stance taken by all the Courts is that such averments are required to be alleged or submitted before the same Court which passed the decree. The Courts have clearly held, having regard to Sec. 19(2) of the Family Courts Act that an appeal in respect of a consent decree, cannot be questioned by filing an appeal. It is open for the appellant who is represented by her father to file such an application before the Court which passed the consent decree and raise such an issue and it is for the same Court to consider such averments. 12. For the reasons stated above, we are of the considered opinion that the appeal is not maintainable. It is open for the appellant who is represented by her father to file such an application before the Court which passed the consent decree and raise such an issue and it is for the same Court to consider such averments. 12. For the reasons stated above, we are of the considered opinion that the appeal is not maintainable. We place on record our appreciation to the learned Amicus for assisting the Court ably to decide the issue. Consequently, the appeal stands dismissed while granting liberty to the appellant to approach the learned Additional Senior Civil Judge & JMFC, Karwar, who passed the impugned judgment and decree, to redress her grievance. All contentions are kept open.