JUDGMENT : (Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi, J.) Heard Mr. Arun Kumar Pandey, the learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Bibhash Sinha, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the O.P.Nos.1 to 5 as well as Mr. Arun Kumar, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the O.P.Nos.6 and 7. 2 . By Order dated 10.12.2024, the service of notice upon the O.P.Nos.8 to 11 has been dispensed with as they are the performa Opposite parties. 3. This petition has been filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India for setting aside the Order dated 19.07.2022 passed in Misc. Civil Application No.334 of 2019 by learned Civil Judge, Senior Division-XII, Ranchi, whereby the application filed for amendment by the petitioner has been rejected. The further prayer is made for setting aside the order dated 21.7.2023 passed in Civil Misc Application No.778 of 2022 arising out of Suit No.729 of 2018 by learned Civil Judge, Senior Division -XII, Ranchi. 4. Mr. Arun Kumar Pandey, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submits that Original (Damage) Suit No.729 of 2018 was instituted before the learned Sub Judge-I, Ranchi, against the defendant /respondent nos.1 to 7 praying therein to direct the defendants to pay an amount of Rs.2 Crores (two crores) as the compensation for damage caused to the petitioner/ plaintiff by the defamatory actions of the defendants/ respondents and to pay Rs.1 Crores 50 lacs (one crore fifty lacs) as compensation for causing economic loss. Hence a decree for total of Rs.3 Crores 50 lacs (three crores fifty lacs) only as compensation was prayed in the said suit. He submits that the name of father of the defendant nos.2 and 5 were not known and that was found later on and in view of that, the petition has been filed for inserting the correct name of the defendant nos.2 and 5. However, the learned court has erroneously allowed the same to correct the name of father of defendant nos.3 and 4. He submits that in view of that, the said order is fit to be rectified by this Court. He further submits that another amendment was sought for correcting the cause of action that is the first cause of action, 28.4.2016, however, the learned court has rejected the same on the erroneous ground. He submits that in view of that, the said order is fit to be rectified by this Court. He further submits that another amendment was sought for correcting the cause of action that is the first cause of action, 28.4.2016, however, the learned court has rejected the same on the erroneous ground. He submits that in the plaint the cause of action is disclosed 27.4.2016 and the second date of cause of action is 29.01.2018, however, inadvertently, it was wrote as 28.4.2018. He submits that the cause of action is also of 22.01.2018 and 29.01.2018. He submits that the disclosure is already there, however, due to typographical error such wrong year has been typed and only to that effect the amendment was sought which is formal in nature as such, the said order may kindly be set aside and appropriate order may kindly be passed. He relied in the case of A.K.Gupta and Sons Limited v. Damodar Valley Corporation reported in AIR 1967 (SC) 96 and refers to paragraph nos.7, 8, 11, 23, 27, 36 and 42 of the said judgment, are quoted below: “7. It is not in dispute that at the date of the application for amendment, a suit for a money claim under the contract was barred. The general rule, no doubt, is that a party is not allowed by amendment to set up a new case or a new cause of action particularly when a suit on the new case or cause of action is barred: Welch v. Neale(1887) 19 QBD 394 But it is also well recognised that where the amendment does not constitute the addition of a new cause of action or raise a different case, but amounts to no more than a different or additional approach to the same facts, the amendment will be allowed even after the expiry of the statutory period of limitation : see Charan Das v. Amir Khan 47 Ind App 255 ( AIR 1921 PC 50 ) and L. J. Leach & Company Ltd. v. Jardine Skinner and Co.( AIR 1957 SC 357 ). 8. 8. The principal reasons that have led to the rule last mentioned are, first, that the object of Courts and rules of procedure is to decide the rights of the parties and not to punish them for their mistakes (Cropper v. Smith) (1884) 26 Ch D 700 (710-711) and secondly, that a party is strictly not entitled to rely on the statute of limitation when what is sought to be brought in by the amendment can be said in substance to be already in the pleading sought to be amended (Kisandas Rupchand v. Rachappa Vithoba) (1909) ILR 33 Bom 644 at p.651, approved in (Pirgonda Hongonda Patil v. Kalgonda Shidgonda 1957 SCR 595 (603): ( AIR 1957 SC 363 at p.366) 11. This, therefore, seems to us to be pre-eminently a case for allowing the amendment. The authorities also lead us to the same view. In L. J. Leach & Co’s case, 1957 SCR 438 : ( AIR 1957 SC 357 ), a suit for damages for conversion was by amendment allowed to be converted into a suit for damages for breach of contract after that claim had become barred, the necessary facts as in the case in hand, being already in the plaint. In Charan Das’s case, 47 Ind App 255 ( AIR 1921 PC 50 ) an amendment adding a claim for possession after a suit for such claim had become barred was allowed in a suit which originally had only claimed a declaration of a right to pre-empt. In the last mentioned case, the plaintiff bad in spite of warning at the earliest stage refused to make the amendment which he later sought and got. It was, therefore, a case where the plaintiff had initially deliberately refused to make a claim and an amendment being allowed later permitting that claim to be raised after it had become barred. It was in a sense a stronger case than the present one where the plaintiff had omitted to make the claim initially on a wrong notion and a wrong legal advice. Punishing of mistakes is, of course, not administration of justice. 23. It was in a sense a stronger case than the present one where the plaintiff had omitted to make the claim initially on a wrong notion and a wrong legal advice. Punishing of mistakes is, of course, not administration of justice. 23. Learned counsel for the appellant has contended that there exists such special circumstances in the case which would have justified, in the interests of justice, the grant of the application for amendment of the plaint and, in the alternative, contended that the High Court should not have allowed the respondent to object to the maintainability of the suit on the basis of the proviso to s. 42 of the Act and if the Court had allowed such an objection it should have, as a matter of course, allowed the application for amendment. 27. It is now well-settled that the Court has power to allow amendments in connection with claims which had become time- barred, if special circumstances exist and it be in the interests of justice. This is not disputed for the respondent. The real dispute between the parties is whether the circumstances of the case come within the principle laid down in the various cases. This necessarily leads to a consideration of the circumstances and the amendments sought in those cases. 36. It would appear from the various cases discussed above that an amendment which would enable a plaintiff to make a claim which has become time-barred is as a rule to be refused and that the Court would exercise its special power to allow such amendment only when there be special circumstances in the case. The nature of those special circumstances is to be gathered from those cases in which such an amendment was allowed. It appears to me that such special circumstances can be only when the amended claim was at least intended to be made by the plaintiff who had given in the plaint all the necessary facts to establish the claim but had due to clumsy drafting not been able to express himself clearly in the plaint and to couch his relief in the proper legal form. Such circumstances justify an amendment not really as a judicial concession to the plaintiff to save him from any possible loss but on the ground that the original claim in the plaint, though defectively stated, really amounted to the claim sought to be made by the amendment. Looked at in this way, the permission to amend does not in reality offend against the law of limitation and serves the interests of justice. 42. The appeal is allowed in accordance with the majority judgment.” 5 . On these grounds, he submits that said order may kindly be set aside. 6 . Mr. Bibhash Sinha, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the O.P.Nos.1 to 5 opposes the prayer and submits that the suit is for damage whereas in view of Article 75 the limitation is only one year in filing of the suit, however, by way of changing the date of cause of action of 2016, a bald claim is being sought to be amended and in view of that the said order is not illegal. He further points out that in the petition for amendment the name of the father of O.P.Nos.2 and 5 in paragraph no.2 the mistake has been done by the petitioner himself and therein prayer is made for amendment of the name of father of the O.P.Nos.3 and 4 and in view of that the learned court has passed the said order as the said disclosure is made in the petition itself. He relied in the case of Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Sanjeev Builders Private Limited and Another reported in (2022) 16 SCC 1 and refers to paragraph no.71.3.2 and para no.71.4.1 and relying on the said judgment, he submits that a bald claim may not be allowed to substitute and in view of that, he submits that this petition may kindly be dismissed. 7 . Mr. Arun Kumar, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the O.P.Nos.6 and 7 has adopted the argument of Mr. Bibhash Sinha, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the O.P.Nos.1 to 5. 8 . From the petition it transpires that the petitioner in paragraph no.2 has stated to correct name of father of the defendant nos.3 and 4, however, in the next paragraph, paragraph no.3, the defendant no.2 name and father name has been disclosed and defendant no.5 name and father’s name has been disclosed. 8 . From the petition it transpires that the petitioner in paragraph no.2 has stated to correct name of father of the defendant nos.3 and 4, however, in the next paragraph, paragraph no.3, the defendant no.2 name and father name has been disclosed and defendant no.5 name and father’s name has been disclosed. From the petition, it appears that the intention was to correct the name of defendant nos.2 and 5, however, it appears that inadvertently in para no.2 the amendment was sought for defendant nos.3 and 4 and in view of that the learned court has passed the said order. 9 . It appears that inadvertently that has occurred and the name of the father of defendant nos.2 and 5 has been disclosed in paragraph no.3 and in view of that, the prayer appears to be a bona-fide and that will not change the nature of the suit and in view of that, the order of the learned court dated 19.7.2022 and 21.7.2023 are required to be modified to the extent that the petitioner/plaintiff will amend the father’s name of defendant nos.2 and 5. 10 . So far the cause of action is concerned, it appears from the plaint that in paragraph no.9 it has been disclosed that on the next date, that is, 28.4.2016 the defendant no.3 published a news item in Daily Dainik Bhaskar describing the whole incident and further in paragraph no.22 the cause of action said to be arose on 27.4.2016 and further on 28.4.2018 when the defamatory article against the plaintiff was first time published and on 22.01.2018 when again the said article published and further on 29.01.2018 the plaintiff sent notice to defendant no.6. 11 . Thus, from the plaint, it transpires that the cause of action is said to be disclosed as 28.04.2016 and only the year has been wrongly typed in paragraph no.22, in place of 2016, it has been typed as 2018, and further two cause of actions have been disclosed therein, i.e., 22.01.2018 and 29.01.2018 and in paragraph no.9, the cause of action is said to be 28.4.2016. It appears that it is a typographical error and if that is allowed, the nature of the suit will not be changed. 12 . So far as limitation is concerned, it is a mixed question of facts and law and that can be decided by the learned court in the trial. It appears that it is a typographical error and if that is allowed, the nature of the suit will not be changed. 12 . So far as limitation is concerned, it is a mixed question of facts and law and that can be decided by the learned court in the trial. 13 . The judgment relied by Mr. Bibhash Sinha, the learned counsel for the O.P.Nos.1 to 5 are not in dispute. It is well settled that a bald claim cannot be allowed to be amended, however, in the facts of the present case, which has been discussed hereinabove, it is otherwise and the cause of action is further said to be 22.01.2018 and 29.01.2018 as well as of the year 2016 that can be decided by the learned court in the trial, and as such, the orders dated 19.07.2022 and 21.7.2023 are set-aside. 14 . The petition filed by the petitioner in M.C.A. No.334 of 2019 and M.C.A No.778 of 2022 are allowed subject to a cost of Rs.2500/- to be paid to the defendant before the learned trial court. 15 . The rights of the defendants are preserved to rebut the amendment allowed by way of additional written statement. 16 . C.M.P. No.1109 of 2023 is accordingly disposed of.