JUDGMENT : Rajesh Rai K, J. In this appeal, the appellant/complainant has assailed the judgment of acquittal dated 20.07.2017 in Crl.A.No.112/2013 passed by the Principal District and Sessions Judge, Bagalkot (hereinafter referred to as the 'First Appellate Court'), whereby the learned First Appellate Court allowed the appeal filed by the accused and acquitted him for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short 'N.I. Act') by setting aside the judgment of conviction and sentence dated 21.09.2013 in C.C.No.216/2011 passed by the Additional Civil Judge and JMFC, Hungund (hereinafter referred to as the ‘trial Court'). 2. For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to as per their rankings before the trial Court. 3. The abridged facts of the case are as under: The complainant is the proprietor of Taj Stones Industries situated at Hanamsagar Road, Ilkal city. The accused is a proprietor of Chetak Enterprises situated at Madalthuruth, Moothukunnam, Ernakulam district, Kerala. They both were well acquainted. In the month of April, 2010 the accused approached the complainant for financial assistance of Rs.6,00,000/-. Based on the request, the complainant advanced an amount of Rs.6,00,000/- to the accused by way of cash. After two months, the complainant demanded to repay the said amount. However, the accused failed to repay the loan amount and finally he issued a cheque dated 14.10.2010, bearing No.927999 drawn on UCO Bank, Ernakulam, Cochin for a sum of Rs.6,00,000/-. The said cheque was presented by the complainant through his banker i.e., State Bank of Mysore, Ilkal Branch for encashment, the same was returned with an endorsement ‘exceeds arrangements’. The said aspect was intimated by the complainant to the accused through legal notice dated 10.11.2010, though the notice sent to the resident of accused served, however the notice sent to the office of the accused returned with an endorsement ‘door locked’. Thereafter, left with no other option, the complainant filed a private complaint under Section 200 of Cr.P.C., before the learned Magistrate against the accused for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. 4. To prove the case before the trial Court, the complainant himself examined as PW.1 and examined one more witness on his behalf as PW.2 and marked 8 documents as Exs.P1 to P8. 5. 4. To prove the case before the trial Court, the complainant himself examined as PW.1 and examined one more witness on his behalf as PW.2 and marked 8 documents as Exs.P1 to P8. 5. On assessment of oral and documentary evidence, the learned Magistrate convicted the accused for the offence punishable under Section 138 of N.I Act and ordered as follows: “ORDER Acting U/s. 255(2) of Cr.P.C. the accused is convicted for the offence punishable under section 138 of N.I. Act. The accused is sentenced to pay fine of Rs.6,10,000/- in default the accused shall undergo simple imprisonment for a period of 6 months. Acting under section 357 of Cr.P.C. out of the fine amount that being deposited by the accused an amount of Rs.6,00,000/- shall be paid to the complainant as compensation and remaining amount shall be appropriated to the state.” 6. Aggrieved by the same, the accused preferred an appeal before the First Appellate Court in Crl.A.No.112/2013. 7. On reassessment of the evidence on record, the First Appellate Court allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the trial Court and acquitted the accused for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. The said judgment of the First Appellate Court is under challenge in this appeal. 8. Heard the learned counsel Sri R.H. Angadi for the appellant-complainant and the learned counsel Smt. Sonu Suhel for the respondent-accused. 9. The primary contention of the learned counsel for the appellant-complainant is that the First Appellate Court grossly erred in allowing the appeal by setting aside the judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the trial Court. He contended that the First Appellate Court has not considered the primary aspect that the accused has not replied the legal notice issued by the complainant, despite service of the same. Further, he has not disputed his signature on Ex.P1-cheque. The complainant has complied the mandatory requirements under the N.I. Act before filing the complaint. As such, the presumption lies against the accused under Sections 118 and 139 of the N.I. Act. He further contended that the First Appellate Court has acquitted the accused for the reason that the complainant has failed to establish the legally recoverable debt and the accused has rebutted the initial presumption. As such, the presumption lies against the accused under Sections 118 and 139 of the N.I. Act. He further contended that the First Appellate Court has acquitted the accused for the reason that the complainant has failed to establish the legally recoverable debt and the accused has rebutted the initial presumption. As a matter of fact, no contrary evidence has been led on behalf of the accused to disprove the legally recoverable debt. The evidence of PWs.1 and 2 is corroborative to each other and both the witnesses have categorically deposed that the complainant had advanced the loan amount to the accused by obtaining hand loan of Rs.2,00,000/- each from his friends one Abdulgani Bepari and Mundasjanab. Initially, the accused issued two cheques for repayment of the said loan, however on his request the complainant returned those 2 cheques and finally the accused issued the cheque in question. The accused failed to disprove this aspect and the accused has taken multiple defence in his evidence, at one breath he states that the cheque in question was stolen and on the other breath he states that the cheque in question was pertaining to the granite business between accused and complainant and the complainant misused the same for unlawful gain. However, at no point of time, the accused has denied the legally enforceable debt owing by the accused to the complainant. As such, the judgment passed by the First Appellate Court is erroneous and against the settled principle of law. Accordingly, he prays to set aside the judgment of acquittal and to uphold the judgment of conviction passed by the trial Court. 10. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-accused contended that the judgment challenged in this appeal does not suffer from any perversity or illegality. She further contended that the First Appellate Court after meticulously examining the entire evidence and documents on record, passed a well reasoned judgment by setting aside the judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the trial Court. She further contended that the complainant has failed to state the date of advancing the loan amount of Rs.6,00,000/- to the accused. Further, according to him, at the time of advancing the loan amount he has not executed any document or received the cheque in question. The complainant admitted in cross- examination that there was a granite business between him and accused. Further, according to him, at the time of advancing the loan amount he has not executed any document or received the cheque in question. The complainant admitted in cross- examination that there was a granite business between him and accused. Admittedly, the notice sent by the complainant was not served to the accused. In such circumstance, the accused was unable to reply the legal notice issued by the complainant. He further contended that complainant failed to examine the persons from whom he borrowed a hand loan of Rs.2,00,000/- each to pay the loan to the accused. The accused also failed to state, when he borrowed the said hand loan from them. PW.2 deposed contrary to the evidence of PW.1 and stated that at the time of advancing the loan amount the accused had issued 2 cheques and those cheques were dishonored and subsequently, the cheque in question was issued. Further, the complainant has not disclosed the transaction in the ITR(Income Tax Return). In such circumstance, the complainant miserably failed to prove the lending of loan amount of Rs.6,00,000/- to the accused and as such, the First Appellate Court has rightly set aside the judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the trial Court and acquitted the accused for the offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. Accordingly he prays to dismiss the appeal. 11. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the entire material available on record, the only point that would surface for my consideration is: “Whether the First Appellate Court is justified in acquitting the accused for the offence punishable under section 138 of the N.I. Act by setting aside the judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the trial court in C.C.No.216/2011? 12. I have given my anxious consideration to the arguments advanced by both the learned counsel and perused the materials on record. 13. On careful scrutiny of the evidence available on record, it could be gathered that the cheque in question and the signature of the accused on it is not seriously disputed by the accused. It is the specific defence of the accused that, himself and complainant were into granite business and at that time the signed cheques of the accused left with the complainant and later, he misused the same for unlawful gain. It is the specific defence of the accused that, himself and complainant were into granite business and at that time the signed cheques of the accused left with the complainant and later, he misused the same for unlawful gain. Be that as it may, coming to the complaint and the evidence of complainant, in the complaint he has not stated the date of advancing the loan to the accused and the purpose for obtaining the said amount by the accused. According to the complainant, he paid the huge sum of Rs.6,00,000/- by obtaining hand loan from two of his friends namely Abdulgani Bepari and Mundas Janab to the tune of Rs.4,00,000/-. However, both these witnesses have not examined before the Court to substantiate the said aspect. The complainant also failed to state the source of the balance sum of Rs.2,00,000/- which he had paid to the accused. He admitted in his cross examination that he was an income tax assessee, however did not disclosed this loan transaction in the ITR. He also admitted in his evidence that he has not executed any documents while advancing the loan amount to the accused and the cheque in question was received later. PW.2 deposed contrary to this evidence and stated that at the time of payment of loan amount, the complainant received a cheque and presented the same and the same was dishonored, further the accused had given one more cheque, the same was also dishonored and finally, the cheque in question was issued and presented. On a careful perusal of the Ex.P1-cheque in question, the same is a self cheque signed by the accused on both sides. Further, the complainant also failed to produce any such ledger extract for having paid the loan amount. In such circumstance, the complainant has failed to prove advancing of a huge sum of Rs.6,00,000/- to the accused. 14. No doubt, initial presumption under Sections 118 and 139 of the N.I. Act favours the complainant, however the complainant is duty bound to prove his financial capacity to lend the huge amount as a hand loan to the accused. In the instant case, the complainant himself admitted that he obtained hand loan from two others and paid the same to the accused. In such circumstance, he is duty bound to examine those two persons to prove the same. In the instant case, the complainant himself admitted that he obtained hand loan from two others and paid the same to the accused. In such circumstance, he is duty bound to examine those two persons to prove the same. One of the defence put forth by the accused that himself and complainant were in granite business and at that time, the cheque in question was misused by the complainant is quite probable one. Further, this appeal is against the judgment of acquittal and it is settled position of law that the Appellate Court shall not interfere with the acquittal judgment unless the trial Court had not taken a plausible view. In the instant case, the First Appellate Court has taken a plausible view. In such circumstance, I find no good grounds to interfere in the acquittal judgment passed by the First Appellate Court. In that view of the matter, I answer point raised above in the affirmative and proceed to pass the following : ORDER The Criminal Appeal No.100348/2017 is dismissed.