JUDGMENT : K. SUJANA, J. Challenging the judgment and decree dated 10.07.2003 passed in O.S.No.196 of 1999 by the learned II Additional Senior Civil Judge, Warangal, the present appeal suit is filed. 2. The brief facts of the case are that the plaintiff filed a suit against the defendant seeking specific performance of an agreement for sale of a house bearing No.5-11-522/1 at Naimnagar, Hanamkonda, or alternatively, return of the sale consideration of Rs.2,37,500/- with interest. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant, known to him since 1996, agreed to sell the house to clear debts, received the full sale price over time, and signed a sale agreement dated 15.03.1998 after delivering possession. Despite assurances, the defendant allegedly avoided executing a registered sale deed, prompting the plaintiff to issue a legal notice. In contrast, the defendant contended that he never agreed to sell the house, nor received any sale consideration. Instead, he alleged that under pressure from the plaintiff and others (who were creditors of a finance company where the defendant worked), he was forced to sign blank stamp papers and white papers, which were later misused to fabricate the alleged sale agreement. The defendant asserted that the plaintiff was misusing the signed papers to claim ownership and that no actual transaction of sale ever took place. 3. Basing on the above pleadings, the trial Court framed four issues and on behalf of the plaintiffs i.e., PWs.1 to 4 were examined and Ex.A1 to A10 are marked. DWs.1 to 4 are examined and no documents were marked on behalf of the defendants. 4. After examining the evidence, the trial Court, vide order dated 10.07.2003, dismissed the suit hold that several inconsistencies and deficiencies in the plaintiff’s case. It was noted that no receipts or proof of payment were produced, and it was considered improbable that such a large amount was paid in cash without documentation. The evidence also revealed that signatures on the alleged agreement were obtained under coercion related to disputes with the finance company, corroborated by witnesses who supported the defendant’s version. The trial Court further observed that corrections made in the sale agreement document (Ex.A1) appeared suspicious. Consequently, the trial Court held that the sale agreement was not genuine, that no sale consideration was paid, and that the plaintiff was not entitled to specific performance or return of the amount. Aggrieved thereby, the present appeal suit is filed. The trial Court further observed that corrections made in the sale agreement document (Ex.A1) appeared suspicious. Consequently, the trial Court held that the sale agreement was not genuine, that no sale consideration was paid, and that the plaintiff was not entitled to specific performance or return of the amount. Aggrieved thereby, the present appeal suit is filed. 5. Heard Sri Tangeda Dayananda Rao, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant as well as Smt. N. Kamala, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the judgment and decree of the trial Court is contrary to law, weight of evidence, and probabilities of the case. He further submitted that the trial Court failed to properly appreciate the pleadings, oral and documentary evidence, and committed a grave error in placing the initial burden of proof on the appellant instead of the respondent, who alleged coercion and fabrication of the document Ex.A1. He argued that once execution and signature on Ex.A1 were admitted by the respondent, the burden shifted onto the respondent to establish that the document was obtained under coercion, as per Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act. Despite alleging illegal detention and manipulation of signatures, the respondent admittedly did not lodge any police complaint or issue any notice denying Ex.A1 immediately, which, according to the appellant, severely undermines the respondent's defense. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the trial Court drew unwarranted presumptions against the appellant regarding non-production of receipts for the payment of sale consideration, overlooking the fact that the respondent never seriously disputed the possession and payment arrangements post-Ex.A1. He further contended that even after the alleged coercion, the respondent allowed the appellant to pay municipal taxes and collect rents, which was inconsistent with the claim of a fabricated transaction. The counsel for the appellant criticized the trial Court for placing undue reliance on the evidence of D.Ws. 2 to 4, whose testimony was branded as concocted and self-serving. It was urged that the erroneous approach regarding onus of proof and the misappreciation of evidence led to a perverse judgment. Therefore, he prayed the Court to set aside the judgment of the trial Court by allowing this appeal suit. 8. 2 to 4, whose testimony was branded as concocted and self-serving. It was urged that the erroneous approach regarding onus of proof and the misappreciation of evidence led to a perverse judgment. Therefore, he prayed the Court to set aside the judgment of the trial Court by allowing this appeal suit. 8. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Janak Dulari Devi and another v. Kapildeo Rai and another , [ (2011) 6 SCC 555 ] , wherein in paragraph No.9, it is held as under: “9. The first appellate court after analysing the evidence held that the evidence was contrary to the pleadings and therefore liable to be rejected. When what is pleaded is not proved, or what is stated in the evidence is contrary to the pleadings, the dictum that no amount of evidence, contrary to the pleadings, howsoever cogent, can be relied on, would apply. The first appellate court also found that there was no endorsement in the sale deed by the Sub-Registrar about payment of Rs. 17,000 in his presence, nor any separate receipt existed to show the payment of Rs. 17,000 prior to the preparation and the execution of the sale deed.” 9. He further relied upon the judgment of High Court of Delhi in Prakash Rattan lal v. Mankey Ram , [ 2010 (166) DLT 629 ] , wherein in paragraph Nos. and 5, it is held as under: “4. The sole purpose of pleadings is to bind the parties to a stand. When the plaintiff makes certain allegations, the defendant is supposed to disclose his defence to each and every allegation specifically and state true facts to the court and once the facts are stated by both the parties, the court has to frame issues and ask the parties to lead evidence. It is settled law that the parties can lead evidence limited to their pleadings and parties while leading evidence cannot travel beyond pleadings. If the parties are allowed to lead evidence beyond pleadings then the sacrosancy of pleadings comes to an end and the entire purpose of filing pleadings also stand defeated. The other purpose behind this is that no party can be taken by surprise and new facts cannot be brought through evidence which have not been stated by the defendant in the written statement. The other purpose behind this is that no party can be taken by surprise and new facts cannot be brought through evidence which have not been stated by the defendant in the written statement. The law provides a procedure for amendment of the pleadings and if there are any new facts which the party wanted to bring on record, the party can amend pleadings, but without amendment of pleadings, a party cannot be allowed to lead evidence beyond pleadings. 5. I am supported in this view by judgments of Supreme Court in AIR (1975) 1 SCC 212 ; Harihar Prasad Singh & Ors. Vs. Balmiki Prasad Singh wherein the Supreme Court has held that evidence adduced cannot travel beyond the pleadings. In AIR (1987) 2 SCC 555 ; Ram Sarup Gupta by LRs Vs. Bishun Narain Inter College & Ors., the Supreme Court again reiterated that the evidence cannot travel beyond the pleadings.” 10. Further, he also relied upon the judgment of High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Vivek Sharma v. Vani Sharma , [Civil Revision No.2147 of 2018] wherein in paragraph Nos.8 to 12, it is held as under: “8. Order 6, Rule 2 CPC applies to the pleadings only and the same cannot be extended to the stage of evidence in the form of evidence for leading examination-in-chief. Similarly Order 18, Rule 4 CPC does not apply to the facts of this case. The pleadings made by the petitioner in para nos.2 and 7 to 10 in the petition under section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act would be tested by the Court with reference to the affidavit in the form of examination- in-chief. On being cross-examined by the respondent, the trial Court would be at liberty to take final call on merits. 9. The trial Court would be at liberty to appreciate the relevancy, admissibility and genuineness of the evidence on legal parameters, if the same is found to be in consonance with the pleadings, the same can be relied. If the evidence led by the petitioner is found to be beyond pleadings, the same can be eschewed by the Court. 10. 9. The trial Court would be at liberty to appreciate the relevancy, admissibility and genuineness of the evidence on legal parameters, if the same is found to be in consonance with the pleadings, the same can be relied. If the evidence led by the petitioner is found to be beyond pleadings, the same can be eschewed by the Court. 10. The Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Bipin Shantilal Panchal vs. State of Gujarat 2001 (1) criminal RCR 859, has castigated the practice of holding up trial on objections taken at the time of tendering of documents in evidence and held such a practice to be archaic practice. Though, the aforesaid view was expressed in a criminal case but the same was followed in civil cases also. 11. Leading of evidence at this stage would not crystallize any substantial right in favour of the petitioner. The execution of document with the endorsement of objection by the respondent would be tested at the threshold of admissibility, validity and genuineness of the documents in terms of its execution and its nature can be considered at a later stage. Even though, there is no provision in law for de-exhibiting documents already exhibited in evidence but if the execution of an document is objected to then the same has to be answered in terms of its admissibility at a later stage and in the event of failure to prove its execution, the evidence can be eschewed by the Court. 12. For the reasons recorded hereinabove, the impugned order dated 29.04.2017 passed by the Addl. District Judge, Amritsar is set aside. However, the trial Court would be at liberty to decide the relevancy, authenticity and genuineness of the plea taken in the examination-in-chief at the appropriate stage. If the evidence is found to be in consonance with the pleadings, the same can be relied, however if the evidence is found to be not in consonance with the pleadings, the same can be eschewed in accordance with law.” 11. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent contended that the appeal is devoid of merit and that the trial Court rightly dismissed the suit after thoroughly considering the evidence. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent contended that the appeal is devoid of merit and that the trial Court rightly dismissed the suit after thoroughly considering the evidence. He further contended that the respondent never intended to sell the suit schedule property and that the alleged agreement of sale (Ex.A1) was fabricated by the appellant by misusing blank signed papers obtained under duress when the respondent was unlawfully detained by the appellant and others. He submitted that the appellant failed to produce any convincing evidence showing actual payment of consideration, and that it was highly improbable for such a huge sum of Rs.2,37,500/- to be paid without a single receipt or acknowledgment. 12. Learned counsel for the respondents further submitted that the conduct of the appellant, including discrepancies regarding possession and the delay in asserting rights, coupled with the respondent’s continuous possession and later sale of the property to a third party, clearly disproves the claim of the appellant and that the trial Court rightly gave credence to the testimonies of D.Ws.2 to 4, who corroborated the version of coercion and fabrication. Further, learned counsel pointed out that the appellant had misled the Court by misrepresenting his residential address, thus casting serious doubt on his version. Therefore, he prayed the Court to dismiss the appeal suit. 13. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the respondents relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Seth Loonkaran Sethiya and others v. Mr. Ivan E. John and Others , [ (1977) 1 SCC 379 ] , wherein in paragraph No.23, it is held as under: “23. Question 5 : Before proceeding to determine this question, it would be well to advert to the legal position bearing on the matter. Ivan E. John and Others , [ (1977) 1 SCC 379 ] , wherein in paragraph No.23, it is held as under: “23. Question 5 : Before proceeding to determine this question, it would be well to advert to the legal position bearing on the matter. As aptly stated in para 1378 of Volume 12 of Halsbury's Laws of England (Fourth Edition) “if an alteration (by erasure, interlineation, or otherwise) is made in a material part of a deed, after its execution, by or with the consent of any party to or person entitled under it, but without the consent of the party or parties liable under it, the deed is rendered void from the time of the alteration so as to prevent the person who has made or authorised the alteration, and those claiming under him, from putting the deed in suit to enforce against any party bound by it, who did not consent to the alteration, any obligation, covenant, or promise thereby undertaken or made. 24. A material alteration, according to this authoritative work, is one which varies the rights, liabilities, or legal position of the parties as ascertained by the deed in its original state, or otherwise varies the legal effect of the instrument as originally expressed, or reduces to certainty some provision which was originally unascertained and as such void, or which may otherwise prejudice the party bound by the deed as originally executed. 25. The effect of making such an alteration without the consent of the party bound is exactly the same as that of cancelling the deed. 26. To the same effect are the observations made by the Privy Council in Nathu Lal v. Musammat Gomti [ AIR 1940 PC 160 : 67 IA 318] .” 14. 25. The effect of making such an alteration without the consent of the party bound is exactly the same as that of cancelling the deed. 26. To the same effect are the observations made by the Privy Council in Nathu Lal v. Musammat Gomti [ AIR 1940 PC 160 : 67 IA 318] .” 14. He further relied upon the Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Nathu Lal and Ors v. Musammat Gomti Kuar and Ors , [1940 SCC OnLine PC 26] , wherein the relevant paragraphs are extracted hereunder: “The rule relating to the effect of material alterations in a deed made after its execution, by or with the consent of any party thereto, as it prevails in English Courts, can be briefly summarised as follows:- "If an alteration (by erasure, interlineation or otherwise) is made in a material part of a deed after its execution, by or with the consent of any party thereto or person entitled thereunder, but without the consent of the party or parties liable thereunder, the deed is thereby made void. The avoidance however is not ab initio or so as to nullify any conveyancing effect which the deed has alreadyhad; but only operates as from the time of such alteration and so as to prevent the person who has made or authorised the alteration and those claiming under him, from putting the deed in suit to enforce, against any party bound thereby who did not consent to the alteration, any obligation, covenant or promise thereby undertaken or made. A material alteration is one which varies the rights, liabilities, or legal position of the parties ascertained by the deed in its original state or otherwise varies the legal effect of the instrument as originally expressed, or reduces to certainty some provision which was originally unascertained and as such void, or may otherwise prejudice the party bound by the deed as originally executed. The effect of making such an alteration without the consent of the party bound is exactly the same as that of cancelling the deed. The avoidance of the deed is not retrospective and does not revest or reoonvey any estate or interest in property which passed under it. The effect of making such an alteration without the consent of the party bound is exactly the same as that of cancelling the deed. The avoidance of the deed is not retrospective and does not revest or reoonvey any estate or interest in property which passed under it. And the deed may be put in evidence to prove that such estate or interest so passed or for any other purpose than to maintain an action to enforce some agreement therein contained."* Is there anything in the principle or origin of this rule which makes it inapplicable to conditions prevailing in India? Their Lordships have no difficulty in answering the question in the negative. The rule is based on "great good sense." It is dictated by public policy and is independent of considerations of clime or race. It is consistent with the principles of equity and good conscience which have generally prevailed in India, unless they conflicted with Hindu or Mahommedan law. In their Lordships' opinion, there is no such conflict and there is no reason why the rule should not be made applicable to India. Their Lordships are not therefore surprised to find that the rule has in fact been adopted in Indian decisions which are numerous. It is enough to refer to a few, one from each of the important provinces.” 15. He further relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Lakha Singh v. Balwinder Singh and anr , [ 2024 INSC 744 ] wherein in paragraph No.27, it is held as under: “27. At this stage, a very crucial fact which is noticeable from the disputed agreement needs to be highlighted. It is not in dispute that the stamp papers were not purchased by the appellant- defendant and rather Amarjeet Singh was the person who purchased the same. The document was typed out in Gurmukhi language and the photostat copy thereof is available on record. A visual overview of the disputed agreement would show that it runs into three pages. The signature of the respondent- plaintiff, and the thumb impression of the appellant-defendant are marked only on the last page thereof. The first and second pages of the agreement, do not bear the signature of the respondent-plaintiff or the thumb impression of the appellant-defendant. A visual overview of the disputed agreement would show that it runs into three pages. The signature of the respondent- plaintiff, and the thumb impression of the appellant-defendant are marked only on the last page thereof. The first and second pages of the agreement, do not bear the signature of the respondent-plaintiff or the thumb impression of the appellant-defendant. There exist significant blank spaces at the foot of the first two pages below the transcription typed out on these two pages. These observations give rise to a strong inference fortifying the contention of the appellant-defendant's counsel that the thumb impression of the appellant- defendant may have been taken on a blank stamp paper and the disputed agreement was typed thereon subsequently. 28. It cannot be denied that the respondent-plaintiff being a Police Constable was mandatorily required to seek permission from his department before entering into an agreement to purchase property of such a high value. However, admittedly, he did not seek any such permission from the department. As per the disputed agreement, the appellant- defendant agreed to sell the suit land to the respondent-plaintiff @ Rs. 5,00,000/- per Killa, which was just about half of the market rate of the land at the relevant point of time, as admitted by the respondent-plaintiff. Going by the rate as fixed in the disputed agreement, the total sale consideration would have amounted to approximately, Rs. 18,87,000/-. The disputed agreement recites that the appellant-defendant had received earnest money to the tune of Rs. 16,00,000/- for the purpose of doing agriculture and to buy cheaper and better land nearby. Thus, a lion's share of the sale consideration was already paid to the appellant-defendant at the time of the execution of the disputed agreement and the remaining amount was hardly 15% of the total value of the suit land as agreed upon between the parties. Therefore, it does not stand to reason that the respondent-plaintiff being a Police Constable would part with a huge sum of Rs. 16,00,000/- towards a transaction to purchase land and thereafter, agree to defer the execution of the sale deed to a date almost 16 months later with the balance amount being a fraction of the total sale consideration. 29. Therefore, it does not stand to reason that the respondent-plaintiff being a Police Constable would part with a huge sum of Rs. 16,00,000/- towards a transaction to purchase land and thereafter, agree to defer the execution of the sale deed to a date almost 16 months later with the balance amount being a fraction of the total sale consideration. 29. Apparently thus, there was no rhyme or reason as to why, the respondent-plaintiff would agree to defer the execution of the sale deed to a date more than a year and four months after the execution of the disputed agreement. Thus, the disputed agreement i.e., the agreement to sell read in entirety is highly suspicious and does not inspire confidence at all.” 16. He further relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ranjit Singh and Anr. v. State of uttarakhand and Ors , [ 2024 INSC 724 ] , wherein in paragraph No.5, it is held as under: “5. On 1st July, 2002, the defendants applied for setting aside the order dated 3rd May, 2002 by which their defence was struck out. The application proceeds on the allegation that on 3rd May, 2002, the Court proceeded to strike out the defendants' defence without giving them an opportunity of being heard and the hearing was conducted ex parte. Very interestingly, a reply was filed to the said application by the plaintiffs in which a stand has been taken that as the suit was directed to proceed ex parte, there was no occasion to give an intimation to the defendants or their counsel that the application will be taken up on 3rd May, 2002. Therefore, it is an accepted position that the application for striking out the defence of the defendants was taken up on the cause list on 3rd May 2002 without issuing notice to the defendants, though on 22nd April, 2002, the next date was already fixed as 30th May 2002. The application for setting aside the order dated 3rd May, 2002 was rejected. At this stage, we must clarify the legal position. Even if a defendant does not file a written statement and the suit is ordered to proceed ex parte against him, the limited defence available to the defendant is not foreclosed. A defendant can always cross-examine the witnesses examined by the plaintiff to prove the falsity of the plaintiff's case. At this stage, we must clarify the legal position. Even if a defendant does not file a written statement and the suit is ordered to proceed ex parte against him, the limited defence available to the defendant is not foreclosed. A defendant can always cross-examine the witnesses examined by the plaintiff to prove the falsity of the plaintiff's case. A defendant can always urge, based on the plaint and the evidence of the plaintiff, that the suit was barred by a statute such as the law of limitation. Therefore, notwithstanding an order passed earlier to proceed ex parte, while deciding an application for striking out the defence, it was the duty of the Court to give an opportunity of being heard to the defendants. However, that was not done. As the suit was fixed on 30th May, 2002, the defendants were entitled to a notice that the suit would be taken up on an earlier date for hearing the application for striking out the defence. When the defendants had appeared in the suit, the act of preponing the date without notice to them or their advocate was completely illegal and contrary to elementary principles of natural justice. Therefore, it follows that the order striking out the defendants' defence is completely illegal, and the said order deserves to be set aside.” 17. The points that arise for consideration in this appeal are: i. Whether the agreement of sale is true, valid and binding on the respondents? ii. Whether the judgment of the trial Court warrants any interference? Point No.i: 18. In the light of the submissions made by both the learned counsel and a perusal of the material available on record, it is the case of the plaintiff that the defendant agreed to sell the suit schedule property for a consideration of Rs.2,37,500/- and that the entire consideration was paid, following which the defendant executed the agreement of sale (Ex.A1) and delivered possession. The plaintiff further contended that despite repeated requests, the defendant failed to execute a registered sale deed, compelling the plaintiff to issue a legal notice. 19. Conversely, the defendant has categorically denied the execution of a genuine sale agreement, alleging that the plaintiff, along with others, exerted coercion upon him at a police station and obtained his signatures on blank stamp papers and white papers, which were subsequently misused to fabricate Ex.A1. 19. Conversely, the defendant has categorically denied the execution of a genuine sale agreement, alleging that the plaintiff, along with others, exerted coercion upon him at a police station and obtained his signatures on blank stamp papers and white papers, which were subsequently misused to fabricate Ex.A1. The defendant further contended that he neither received any sale consideration nor intended to alienate the property. 20. Admittedly, the defendant acknowledges his signatures on Ex.A1. However, he asserts that the same were obtained under coercion. In such circumstances, the burden lies upon the defendant to establish coercion, as laid down under Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act. Nevertheless, it is significant that no police complaint or immediate legal action was initiated by the defendant alleging coercion or fabrication, which casts some doubt on the plea of coercion. 21. That said, mere non-filing of a police complaint, while a relevant factor, is not the sole criterion for judging the credibility of the defense. The surrounding circumstances and evidence must be closely scrutinized. 22. Upon a perusal of Ex.A1, it is apparent that there are corrections, alterations, and overwriting in the document, without any initials or attestation explaining such corrections. No explanation has been furnished by the plaintiff regarding these material corrections. The principle laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Seth Loonkaran Sethiya and Nathu Lal (supra) squarely applies. It is well-settled that material alterations made in a document without the consent of the party bound thereby render the document void and unenforceable. 23. Furthermore, the evidence of P.W.1 (plaintiff) in cross- examination reveals admissions detrimental to his case. He admitted that he had invested Rs.1,00,000/- in the finance company of the defendant and that the said amount was not returned, yet no independent legal action was taken to recover the deposit amount. This fact corroborates the defense version that there were prior monetary disputes between the parties, providing a context for the possibility of coercion and misuse of signed papers. 24. Additionally, P.W.1 admitted that he did not obtain permission from his employer (being a government employee) before entering into the transaction. The principle laid down in Lakha Singh (supra) is applicable here, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of an agreement, such as dealing with a substantial transaction without requisite departmental permissions, cast serious doubts on the genuineness of the transaction. 25. The principle laid down in Lakha Singh (supra) is applicable here, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of an agreement, such as dealing with a substantial transaction without requisite departmental permissions, cast serious doubts on the genuineness of the transaction. 25. The absence of any documentary evidence like receipts, acknowledgments, or bank transactions showing payment of the alleged consideration of Rs.2,37,500/- further weakens the case of the plaintiff. In transactions involving significant sums, the absence of proof of payment is a strong indicator against the credibility of the transaction, as recognized in Janak Dulari Devi (supra). 26. It is also to be noted that possession is a critical indicator in cases of specific performance. The plaintiff failed to adduce cogent evidence showing that possession was transferred to him. Contrarily, the defendant continued in possession and subsequently sold the property to a third party, which negates the claim of the plaintiff. 27. The learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the judgment in Prakash Rattan Lal (supra) to contend that evidence must not travel beyond the pleadings. However, in the present case, the defense of coercion was sufficiently pleaded and supported by evidence. The plaintiff, having failed to establish the genuineness of Ex.A1 by clear and convincing evidence, cannot seek the benefit of the doctrine prohibiting evidence beyond pleadings. 28. The reliance placed by the respondents on Ranjit Singh (supra) on the principle of natural justice and fairness in procedure also supports the contention that suspicious and unfair conduct around the transaction cannot be ignored. 29. Specific performance is a discretionary and equitable relief. It is trite law that a plaintiff must approach the Court with clean hands and prove readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract. In the present case, considering the suspicious nature of Ex.A1, the corrections without explanation, absence of evidence of consideration, and the circumstances surrounding the execution, the plaintiff has failed to establish a case warranting specific performance. 30. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court concurs with the findings of the trial Court that the agreement of sale (Ex.A1) is not genuine, and that the plaintiff failed to prove payment of sale consideration or entitlement to the relief of specific performance. Point No.ii: 31. In view of the above discussion in point No.i, there is no illegality in the judgment of the trial Court. Point No.ii: 31. In view of the above discussion in point No.i, there is no illegality in the judgment of the trial Court. The trial Court discussed all the issues and it is a well reasoned judgment and there are no grounds to interfere in the judgment. 32. In view thereof, this Appeal Suit is dismissed confirming the judgment and decree dated 10.07.2003 passed in O.S.No.196 of 1999 by the learned II Additional Senior Civil Judge, Warangal. There shall be no order as to costs. Miscellaneous applications, if any pending, shall stand closed.