ORDER : B.R. Madhusudhan Rao, J. 1. The Writ of Certiorari is filed by the petitioners to quash the judgment passed by the respondent No.1 in OA.No.2832 of 2017, dated 31.05.2019. 2. Respondent No.2 - Life Insurance Corporation of India (hereinafter referred to as LIC henceforth) has filed OA.No.2832 of 2017 (Old OA.No.1381 of 1999 of DRT-1, Hyderabad) under Section 19 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (for short ‘the Act, 1993’) for recovery of Rs.44,04,025/- from the defendants/petitioners herein jointly and severally together with costs and future interest @ 14% per annum with quarterly rests from the date of filing O.A. till the date of realization. 3. LIC has examined Sri R.Murali, Assistant Secretary (L & HPF) as AW.1, got marked Exs.A1 to A27. Defendants have examined Sri S.B.P.S. Krishna Mohan, Managing Director of defendant No.2- company as DW.1. 4.1. The Tribunal after going through the evidence and documents has allowed the O.A. directing the defendants jointly and severally liable to pay to the Applicant Corporation a sum of Rs.44,04,025/- with future interest @ 14% per annum simple from the date of filing the O.A. till the date of realization. The Applicant Corporation is entitled to proceed against the properties of the defendants towards the realization of its debt and also entitled for costs, directed to issue recovery certificate accordingly. 4.2. The Tribunal came to a conclusion that the over drawn amount falls within the definition of ‘debt’ as defined in Section 2 (g), the applicant falls within the meaning of ‘Financial Institution’ as defined under Section 2 (h)(i) and that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to try the O.A. under Section 19 of the Act, 1993. 5.1. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that there is no debt between LIC and the petitioners in terms of Section 2 (g) and question of recovery of debt under RDDB Act, 1993 is without jurisdiction. Alleged excess amount is neither a debt nor a liability and except on the principle of unjust enrichment/Restitution the question of initiation of a recovery proceeding for such an amount would not lie not only in DRT but also in Civil Court even under Section 72 of CONTRACT ACT , 1872. 5.2. Alleged excess amount is neither a debt nor a liability and except on the principle of unjust enrichment/Restitution the question of initiation of a recovery proceeding for such an amount would not lie not only in DRT but also in Civil Court even under Section 72 of CONTRACT ACT , 1872. 5.2. Counsel submits that the DRT has recorded perverse findings since there is no quantification and itemization of the claim amount by LIC and at any rate the claim is totally misdirected against the petitioners when the excess payment has been made to the retiring employees, who are not before the DRT, and no amount much less excess amount was ever paid to the petitioners company even as per the pleadings in the OA and there cannot be any recovery proceedings against the petitioners, non-payment of the Policy premium amount, payment of the alleged excess amount of the retiring employees and the alleged overdrawal of the policy amount are all self-contradictory claims made by LIC and hence the certificate ought not have been granted to the 2 nd respondent-LIC. 5.3. Counsel submits that the alternative remedy is not a bar for maintaining a writ petition, hence the entire recovery proceedings are misdirected against the petitioners and resultantly the impugned judgment of the DRT is liable to be set aside, in the absence of details relating to the alleged excess payment made to the retiring employees/retired employees of the petitioners company, the money claim is impermissible in law, the findings recorded by the DRT that whenever there was a running account, constituted a debt under the RDDB Act, 1993 and that the petitioners company has made some payments towards the alleged excess amount or unpaid/part paid/short paid policy amounts, does not legally entitle LIC to make the present claim, neither the principle amount nor the interest amount decreed by the DRT have any legal basis much less legal sanctity. In support of his contentions has relied on the decisions in (1) Whirlpool Corporation Vs. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and Others (1998) 8 SCC 1 , (2) Syed Yakoob Vs. K.S. Radhakrishnan and Others AIR 1964 SC 477 (3) Jagmittar Sain Bhagat and Others Vs. Director, Health Services, Haryana and Others (2013) 10 SCC 136 , (4) Mahabir Kishore and Others Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (1989) 4 SCC 1 , (5) PHR Invent Educational Society Vs. K.S. Radhakrishnan and Others AIR 1964 SC 477 (3) Jagmittar Sain Bhagat and Others Vs. Director, Health Services, Haryana and Others (2013) 10 SCC 136 , (4) Mahabir Kishore and Others Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (1989) 4 SCC 1 , (5) PHR Invent Educational Society Vs. UCO Bank and Others (2024) 4 S.C.R. 541 : 2024 INSC 297 , (6) Eureka Forbes Limited Vs. Allahabad Bank and Others , (2010) 6 SCC 193 . 6. Learned counsel for the respondent No.2 submits that Writ Petition is not maintainable in view of Section 2 0 of Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993. The Appellate Tribunal has become functional immediately after filing the Writ Petition and the petitioners have not made out any case which falls within the exceptions enumerated by the Apex Court in PHR Invent Educational Society. LIC is a Financial Institution under RDB Act, 1993 and it is Public Financial Institution within the meaning of Section 4(a) of the COMPANIES ACT , 1956 and that LIC is legally entitled to invoke the provisions of RDB Act for recovery of its dues. Claim of LIC is a debt and which falls under Section 72 of the CONTRACT ACT , 1872. Counsel further submits that the petitioners have addressed letters admitting the excess payments made by the LIC and they requested time for clearing the over dues i.e., Exs.A14, A19, A23 and A25, and also relied on the decision in Eureka Forbes Limited Vs. Allahabad Bank, (supra). 7. Heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the records in detail. 8. By the date of filing the Writ Petition (i.e., 17.06.2019), there was no provision in Act, 1993 for an Appeal. Section 20 of the Act, 1993 was instituted by the Act 30 of 2004 (w.r.e.f: 11-11-2004). Even thereafter writ petition was pending. 9.1 Writ petition was listed on 18.06.2019 on which date interim stay is granted by the Co-ordinate Bench. Interim order granted on 18.06.2019 is modified vide I.A.No.1 of 2019, dated 07.01.2020 as “There shall be interim stay of execution of judgment and decree dated 31.05.2019 in O.A. No.2832 of 2017 passed by first respondent-Tribunal on condition of the petitioners depositing 50% of the decreetal amount before the first respondent within a period of eight weeks and on such deposit, the second respondent is permitted to withdraw the same without furnishing any security”. 9.2. 9.2. Petitioners have challenged the impugned order dated 07.01.2020 in I.A.No.1 of 2019 in W.P.No.12009 of 2019 before the Supreme Court vide Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No.15177 of 2020. The Supreme Court vide order dated 02.02.2024 disposed of the matter ‘‘As the order impugned is interim in nature, we are not inclined to interfere with the impugned judgment passed by the High Court. Hence, the Special Leave Petition is dismissed. However, we would request the High Court to dispose of the Writ Petition as expeditiously as possible.” 9.3 Petitioners have not complied with the orders passed by the Co-ordinate Bench in I.A.No.1 of 2019, dated 07.01.2020 directing to deposit 50% of the amount. 10. Section 2 (h) of the Act, 1993 says Financial Institution means (i) a public Financial Institution within the meaning of Section 4(a) of the COMPANIES ACT , 1956 (1 of 1956). Section 4(a) of the COMPANIES ACT , 1956 says that (1) Each of the Financial Institutions specified in the sub-section shall be recorded for the purpose of this Act as a Public Financial Institution namely: (iv) Life Insurance Corporation of India, established under Section 3 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 (31 of 1956). In view of the definition of the COMPANIES ACT , 1956, Life Insurance Corporation falls under Financial Institution within the meaning of Section 2 (h)(i) of the Act, 1993. 11. The word ‘debt’ is defined in Section 2 (g) of the Act, 1993, it says debt means any liability, which is claimed as due from any person by a Bank or Financial Institution in cash or otherwise whether secured or unsecured or assigned or whether payable under a decree or order of a Civil Court. 12.1. Ex.A1 is the Master Policy No.62333. Scheduled conditions, Part-II, premiums at paragraph No.4 deals with gratuity, which reads as under: “When gratuity becomes payable to a Member on his retirement or cessation of service, the Corporation shall pay to the Grantee the benefits according to the Schedule IV of the Policy out of the accumulated balance remaining in the running account. Upon death of a Member, the Corporation shall draw from the running account necessary amount which together with the sum assured under the Term Assurance Plan in respect of the Member will make up the gratuity payable to the Nominee.” 12.2. Similar condition is also shown in Ex.A2 Master Policy No.62722. 13. Upon death of a Member, the Corporation shall draw from the running account necessary amount which together with the sum assured under the Term Assurance Plan in respect of the Member will make up the gratuity payable to the Nominee.” 12.2. Similar condition is also shown in Ex.A2 Master Policy No.62722. 13. As per Exs.A1 and A2 the word running account is used. Running account does constitute a debt, it is an open, unsettled account between two parties where they regularly exchange goods or services and the outstanding balance fluctuates. While it is a one continuous account and each individual transactions still represents a debt owned by the one party to the other party. A running account is characterized by ongoing transactions and a constantly shifting balance. Each transaction on the running account represents a debt incurred by the party receiving the services. Hence it falls under Section 2 (9) of the Act, 1993. 14. Section 72 of the Indian CONTRACT ACT , 1872 deals with the liability of a person to whom money is paid, or something is delivered by mistake or under coercion. The mandate is that such a person must repay or return the money or thing. As rightly contended by learned counsel for respondent No.2 that the debt falls within the definition of Section 72 of the CONTRACT ACT . 15. Section 19 of Act, 1993, says a Financial Institution has to recover any debt from any person, it may make an application to the Tribunal within the Local Limits of its jurisdiction. LIC has rightly invoked the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. 16. LIC has got marked Exs.A1 to A27 during the course of evidence of PW.1. Those documents are pertaining to the communications between the parties i.e., LIC, with that of the petitioners in respect of the master policy – Remittance towards arrears of premium. 17.1. Ex.A14 is the letter of the petitioners dated 19.01.1995, wherein it is stated that they will be clearing the gratuity claims pending with LIC as mutually agreed. 17.2. Ex.A19 is the letter dated 26.07.1995 addressed by the petitioners to LIC, wherein they admitted that they will be clearing substantial amounts due to the LIC. 17.3. 17.1. Ex.A14 is the letter of the petitioners dated 19.01.1995, wherein it is stated that they will be clearing the gratuity claims pending with LIC as mutually agreed. 17.2. Ex.A19 is the letter dated 26.07.1995 addressed by the petitioners to LIC, wherein they admitted that they will be clearing substantial amounts due to the LIC. 17.3. Ex.A23 is the letter dated 12.12.1995 addressed by the petitioners to the LIC stating that considering the reputation of the Company they sought time till 31.03.1996 before which date they will try to repay the amount of about Rs.32,00,000/- by installments and will be sending the cheques to the Visakhapatnam Branch in token of sincere efforts to fulfill the obligations. 17.4. Petitioners have also addressed letter to the LIC on 08.04.1996 under Ex.A25 requesting to extend the time up to 30.06.1996 on or before which date they will be able to refund the amount payable to the LIC against the Master Policies (Exs.A1 and A2). 18. Exs.A14, A15, A19, A23 and A25 letters goes to show that the petitioners having admitted about the amounts and sought extension to repay the same. The amounts due to the LIC are reflected in Exs.A26 and A27. Now the petitioners cannot go back and say that they are not liable to pay any amount to the Respondent No.2/LIC. Petitioners have made payment of Rs.2,00,000/- and Rs.5,00,000/- in the month of January and March, 1995 in furtherance of their liability and also paid Rs.2,00,000/- by way of Cheque on 15.11.1996, Rs.2,00,000/- by way of Demand Draft vide letter, dated 13.12.1996. 19. It is to be noted here that the petitioners by letter, dated 15.11.1996 had sent three Cheques, dated 19.11.1996 for Rs.2,00,000/-; dated 30.11.1996 for Rs.2,00,000/- and dated 15.12.1996 for Rs.1,00,000/-, the first cheque is only cleared. As the account between the petitioners and the LIC is running account, Section 2 4 of the LIMITATION ACT is applicable. It cannot be said that the O.A. filed by the LIC is barred by limitation in view of the fact that the petitioners made payments in the month of January and March, 1995. 20. As the account between the petitioners and the LIC is running account, Section 2 4 of the LIMITATION ACT is applicable. It cannot be said that the O.A. filed by the LIC is barred by limitation in view of the fact that the petitioners made payments in the month of January and March, 1995. 20. The principles laid down in Whirlpool Corporation1 and Syed Yakoob,(supra) are not applicable to the case on hand in view of the fact that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to try the O.A. under Section 19 of the Act, 1993 and also the relationship of debtor and creditor and existence of Debt under Section 2 (g) of the Act, 1993 is established and there is no perversity in the Judgment passed in the Tribunal. 21. In Jagmittar Sain Bhagath, (supra) the Supreme Court held that the findings of a Court or Tribunal becomes irrelevant and unenforceable/inexecutable once the Forum is found to have no jurisdiction. It is a coram non judic; when a special statute gives a right and also provides for a forum for adjudication of the rights, the remedy has to be sought only under the provisions of that Act and the common Law Court has no jurisdiction. The law does not permit any Court/Tribunal/Authority to usurp Jurisdiction on any ground whatsoever in case such as authority does not have jurisdiction on the subject matter. In view of our findings in paragraph Nos.10 and 15 we hold that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to try the O.A. 22. We have already held that the transactions between the petitioners and the respondent No.2/LIC falls under the definition of Debt and covered under Section 72 of the CONTRACT ACT , 1872. Hence the decision in Mahabir Kishore 4 is not applicable to the case on hand. 23. Petitioner’s do not fall in any of the exceptions enumerated by the Supreme Court in PHR Invent Educational Society, (supra). Moreover, it is dealt in Educational Institutions but whereas in the present Writ Petition the matter is pertaining to the debt arising in between the petitioners and respondent No.2. 24.1. In Eureka Forbes Limited, (supra), the Supreme Court held at paragraph No.51, which is as under: “51. Moreover, it is dealt in Educational Institutions but whereas in the present Writ Petition the matter is pertaining to the debt arising in between the petitioners and respondent No.2. 24.1. In Eureka Forbes Limited, (supra), the Supreme Court held at paragraph No.51, which is as under: “51. We may notice some of the general expressions used by the framers of law in this provision: a) any liability b) claim as due from any person c) during the course of any business activity undertaken by the bank d) where secured or unsecured e) and lastly legally recoverable” 24.2. Learned counsel for the petitioners has also relied on Eureka Forbes Limited, (supra). In fact, it is applicable to LIC’s case as the claim of the respondent No.2/LIC falls under the expression ‘a’ to ‘e’ of the above said judgment. 25. As rightly held by the Tribunal that the LIC is a Financial Institution under Section 2 (h)(i) and the transaction between the parties is a debt as in Section 2 (g) and under Section 19 of the Act, 1993, the Tribunal has jurisdiction to try the O.A. The findings of the Tribunal need not be interfered in respect of the jurisdiction, debt, Financial Institution. 26. The learned Tribunal has answered the points raised by the petitioners in detail prospective and rightly held that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to entertain the O.A. under Section 19 taking into consideration the correspondence made between the parties i.e., Exs.A14, A15, A19, A23 and A25 and has also held that the LIC falls within the ambit of Financial Institution. In view of Exs.A1 and A2 the transaction between the petitioners with that of LIC is a running account and falls within the definition of ‘Debt’ under Section 2 (g) of Act, 1993. 27. We are of the view that Writ Petition is not maintainable and there is no perversity or illegality in the order passed by the learned Tribunal and we are not inclined to interfere with the same. 28. In view of the reasons stated by us supra, the petitioners are not entitled for Writ of Certiorari and the same is liable to be dismissed. 29. W.P. No.12009 of 2019 is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. All connected applications, if any, shall stands closed.