ORDER : 1. This petition arises from the judgment and order passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad dated 17-7-2017 in Second Appeal No.1152/90 by which the High Court allowed the Second Appeal filed by the respondents - herein (original defendants) and thereby quashed and set aside the judgment and order passed by the First Appellate Court allowing the suit filed by the petitioners - herein (original plaintiffs). 2. We have heard Mr. Yashvardhan Singh, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner (original plaintiff) and Mr. Udayaditya Banerjee, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents (original defendants). 3. The plaintiff instituted Original Civil Suit No.47/1977 seeking relief of possession and permanent injunction with respect to the suit property. The suit came to be dismissed by the Trial Court. The plaintiff being dissatisfied with the judgment and order passed by the Trial Court went in appeal before the First Appellate Court. The First Appellate Court allowed the appeal and thereby decreed the suit. 4. The original defendants being dissatisfied with the judgment and order passed by the First Appellate Court preferred the Second Appeal before the High Court. 5. The Second Appeal came to be allowed and the suit of the plaintiff was ordered to be dismissed. 6. In such circumstances, referred to above, the plaintiff is here before this Court with the present petition seeking leave to appeal. 7. We take notice of the fact that in the Memorandum of the Second appeal, the defendants formulated the following three substantial questions of law for the consideration of the High Court:- "(i) Whether the appellate court was justified in decreeing the suit for possession over the entire disputed property in view of categorical finding recorded by the Munsif that only a certain portion of the disputed property was situated in Plot No. 107/2? (ii) Whether the so called tenancy of the defendant was validity terminated? (iii) Whether the suit was time barred?" 8. The High Court while allowing the Second Appeal observed the following:- "Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and after having gone through the record, I am of the view that the first appeal was wrongly allowed. When the property itself was not identifiable and it was vaguely found that some portion of the disputed property fell in plot no. When the property itself was not identifiable and it was vaguely found that some portion of the disputed property fell in plot no. 107/2, then the further exercise of dealing with remaining issues, which has been undertaken by the two courts below was an exercise in futility. The Courts could have proceeded with the case had they found that the suit property was contained in the boundaries as were given in the plaint map. This finding also was not arrived at by the First Appellate Court. Also the reversal of the findings of fact as were arrived at by the Trial Court was done on absolutely irrelevant consideration. The submission of the appellant-defendant that the judgement of the court below was in contravention of order 41 Rule 31 also appears to be correct in view of the law laid down in 2017 (2) SCC 415 (Laliteshwar Prasad Singh &. Ors. Vs. S.P. Srivastava (D) Thr. Lrs.). Upon finding that the judgment of the First Appellate Court was in contravention of the provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 C.P.C., this Court ought to have remanded the matter but in view of the fact that the property was not properly identifiable (as per Order VII, Rule 3 CPC) as it was not found to be situate in plot no. 107/2 but was only found to have been located in some northern portion of it, I do not think that the case could be proceeded with and in such circumstances, there is no other option but to allow the appeal, set aside the judgment and decree dated 20.3.1990 and dismiss the suit." 9. Thus it appears that what weighed with the High Court is the fact that there was no clarity at all as regards the boundary of the suit property. This is exactly the reason why the suit also failed before the Trial Court. 10. The only argument canvassed today before us is that the High Court not have decided the Second Appeal without formulating any substantial question of law. 11. As regards the aforesaid, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner may be right in saying that the High Court should have formulated the substantial questions of law, may be not as suggested by the defendants in the Memorandum of their Second Appeal but could have formulated on its own also. 12. 11. As regards the aforesaid, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner may be right in saying that the High Court should have formulated the substantial questions of law, may be not as suggested by the defendants in the Memorandum of their Second Appeal but could have formulated on its own also. 12. However, all the relevant aspects of the matter were looked into by the High Court and ultimately the finding was arrived at that the Suit is liable to be dismissed. 13. It is too late in the day to set aside the impugned order passed by the High Court and remit the matter with a direction to formulate the substantial questions of law and decide the Second Appeal afresh. We say so because the Civil Suit instituted by the plaintiff is of the year 1977. 14. In such circumstances, referred to above, we see no good reason to interfere with the impugned order passed by the High Court now at this stage. 15. The Special Leave Petition fails and is hereby dismissed. 16. Pending applications, if any, shall also stand disposed of.