Order : 1. By way of filing this writ petition, a challenge has been led to the impugned order dated 21.06.2007 passed by the respondents by which the petitioner has been punished with penalty of stoppage of two annual grade increments with cumulative effect. 2. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the petitioner preferred a departmental appeal, however, the same was rejected vide order dated 19.04.2008 and the order passed by the disciplinary authority has been upheld. 3. Counsel for the petitioner submits that a chargesheet under Rule 16 of the Rajasthan Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958 (for short, ‘the Rules of 1958’) was served upon the petitioner with seven charges levelled therein and out of which six charges were not found to be proved against the petitioner and charge No. 7 was partly proved against the petitioner. Counsel submits that the charge against the petitioner was that correct name of the Khatedar was “Jamni” S/o Ramnarayan, but due to mistake on the part of the petitioner, the name “Jamni” was entered as “Jagni” in the Jamabandi/revenue record. Counsel submits that the aforesaid mistake on the part of the petitioner was minor and inadvertent but this minor mistake, on the part of the petitioner, was taken seriously and an exorbitant punishment of stoppage of two annual grade increments with cumulative effect has been imposed upon him which has affected his service career. Counsel submits that a departmental appeal against the aforesaid order was preferred by the petitioner under Rule 23 of the Rules of 1958 wherein the petitioner has stated that the aforesaid mistake has occurred inadvertently, therefore a prayer was made for quashing the punishment order. Counsel submits that without considering the plea, taken by the petitioner, the appeal preferred by the petitioner has been rejected vide order dated 19.04.2008. Counsel submits that in view of the submissions made herein above, interference of this Court is warranted. 4. Per contra, counsel for the respondents opposes the arguments raised by counsel for the petitioner and submits that because of a wrong entry made with incorrect name in the revenue record, chaos was created with regard to the name of the Khatedar. Counsel submits that the correct name of the Khatedar was ‘Jamni’ and not ‘Jagni’. 4. Per contra, counsel for the respondents opposes the arguments raised by counsel for the petitioner and submits that because of a wrong entry made with incorrect name in the revenue record, chaos was created with regard to the name of the Khatedar. Counsel submits that the correct name of the Khatedar was ‘Jamni’ and not ‘Jagni’. The aforesaid act of the petitioner amounts to misconduct and that is why the impugned punishment order was passed, which requires no interference of this Court and the writ petition filed by the petitioner is liable to be rejected. 5. Heard and considered the submissions made at Bar and perused the material available on record. 6. Perusal of the record indicates that a charge-sheet under Rule 16 of the Rules of 1958 was served upon the petitioner with seven charges levelled therein, out of which six charges were not found to be proved and charge No. 7 was found to be partly proved against the petitioner that because of mistake on his part, the name of the Khatedar -”Jamni” S/o Ramnarayan was entered as “Jagni” S/o Ramnarayan. The aforesaid act has been admitted by the petitioner stating that, the same has occurred inadvertently and there was no mala fide intention behind the same and this fact was overlooked by the Disciplinary Authority as well as by the Appellate Authority. The aforesaid act of the petitioner was treated as misconduct on his part and accordingly, he was punished with penalty of stoppage of two annual grade increment with cumulative effect. 7. This court is conscious enough about the scope of interference with the decision of Disciplinary Authority. The scope of interference is very narrow and limited in such like matters, but the High Court has powers of moulding the relief in case where the punishment/penalty imposed shocks the judicial conscience. 8. The principle of proportionality of punishment vis-a-vis misconduct have been recognised by the Courts of various European countries as well as British Courts. It has time and again been held that if the punishment imposed on an employee is out of proportion, the Court has power to interfere with the same. In Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Services (1984) 3 All. It has time and again been held that if the punishment imposed on an employee is out of proportion, the Court has power to interfere with the same. In Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Services (1984) 3 All. E.R. 935, it has been held:- "Judicial review has I think developed to a stage today when, without reiterating any analysis of the steps by which the development has come about, one can conveniently classify under three heads the grounds on which administrative action is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground I would call 'illegality;, the second 'irrationality' and the third 'procedural impropriety'. This is not to say that further development on a case by case basis may not in course of time add further grounds. I have in mind particularly the possible adoption in the future of the principle of 'proportionality' which is recognized in the administrative law of several of our fellow members of the European Economic Community." Their Lordships of the Supreme Court also recognised the theory of proportionality of punishment when they said that "an order imposing punishment, which is shockingly disproportionate or is highly excessive having regard to the gravity of misconduct, is liable to be declared as arbitrary and thus violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India." 9. In Bhagat Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh 1983-IILLJ-1, the Apex Court held that it is equally true that the penalty imposed must be commensurate with the gravity of the misconduct and that any penalty disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution". 10. Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Chairman cum Managing Director, Coal India Limited v. Mukul Kumar Choudhuri (2009) 15 SCC 620 , has dealt with the doctrine of proportionality and the limited scope of High Court under judicial review in paras 19, 20, 21 and 22 as under :- “19. The doctrine of proportionality is, thus, well recognized concept of judicial review in our jurisprudence. What is otherwise within the discretionary domain and sole power of the decision-maker to quantify punishment once the charge of misconduct stands proved, such discretionary power is exposed to judicial intervention if exercised in a manner which is out of proportion to the fault. The doctrine of proportionality is, thus, well recognized concept of judicial review in our jurisprudence. What is otherwise within the discretionary domain and sole power of the decision-maker to quantify punishment once the charge of misconduct stands proved, such discretionary power is exposed to judicial intervention if exercised in a manner which is out of proportion to the fault. Award of punishment which is grossly in excess to the allegations cannot claim immunity and remains open for interference under limited scope of judicial review. 20. One of the tests to be applied while dealing with the question of quantum of punishment would be : would any reasonable employer have imposed such punishment in like circumstances? Obviously, a reasonable employer is expected to take into consideration measure, magnitude and degree of misconduct and all other relevant circumstances and exclude irrelevant matters before imposing punishment. 21. In a case like the present one where the misconduct of the delinquent was unauthorized absence from duty for six months but upon being charged of such misconduct, he fairly admitted his guilt and explained the reasons for his absence by stating that he did not have any intention nor desired to disobey the order of higher authority or violate any of the Company's Rules and Regulations but the reason was purely personal and beyond his control and, as a matter of fact, he sent his resignation which was not accepted, the order of removal cannot be held to be justified, since in our judgment, no reasonable employer would have imposed extreme punishment of removal in like circumstances. The punishment is not only unduly harsh but grossly in excess to the allegations. 22. Ordinarily, we would have sent the matter back to the appropriate authority for reconsideration on the question of punishment but in the facts and circumstances of the present case, this exercise may not be proper. In our view, the demand of justice would be met if the Respondent No. 1 is denied back wages for the entire period by way of punishment for the proved misconduct of unauthorized absence for six months.” 11. In fact, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that while deciding the quantum of penalty, there should be compelling and strong circumstances which must be recorded and such interference cannot be on the basis of misplaced sympathy and generosity. In fact, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that while deciding the quantum of penalty, there should be compelling and strong circumstances which must be recorded and such interference cannot be on the basis of misplaced sympathy and generosity. Considering the said concept of rendering justice, this court has no hesitation to hold as far as the present case on hand is concerned, that interference is called for, which is not based on misplaced sympathy or generosity, but on the basis of rendering equitable justice which is a hallmark of judicial review by this court which is exercising its constitutional jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 12. The word “m” was written as “g” and the aforesaid misconduct on the part of the petitioner is nothing sort of a major misconduct, which warrants exorbitant punishment, as has been awarded by the disciplinary authority. Looking to the misconduct on the part of the petitioner, a lesser punishment could have been awarded, such as censure or issuing a warning to remain careful in future but instead of doing so, a heavy punishment of stoppage of two annual grade increments with cumulative effect has been imposed upon the delinquent. 13. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case, the impugned orders dated 21.06.2007 and 19.04.2008 passed by the Disciplinary Authority as well as by the Appellate Authority respectively are not sustainable in the eyes of law and the same are liable to be quashed and set aside. 14. The only question which remains for consideration for this Court is that whether this Court can impose any penalty against the petitioner for which he could be held liable with regard to the aforesaid mistake of entering incorrect name. 15. It has been apprised at Bar by counsel for the parties that during pendency of this writ petition, the petitioner has retired after attaining the age of superannuation, hence, under these circumstances, the respondents may pass fresh order in accordance with law. 16. In view of the discussions made hereinabove, the present writ petition stands disposed of. 17. Needless to observe that the respondents would award consequential benefits to the petitioner after passing fresh order in accordance with law. 18. No costs.