JUDGMENT : Rajnish Kumar, J. 1. Heard Shri Shantanu Mishra, learned counsel for the applicants and Shri Anurag Verma, learned Additional Government Advocate. 2. This application under Section 482 CrPC (now Section 528 BNSS , 2023) has been filed assailing the order dated 15.05.2025 passed in Case No. 111255 of 2023; Raj Kishore Sharma vs. Dhanu Krishi Sewa Kendra and another by the Additional Court No. 9 (NI Act), Lucknow and order dated 28.05.2025 passed in Criminal Revision No. 282 of 2025; Dhanu Krishi Sewa Kendra vs. Raj Kishore Sharma and others by the Session Judge, Lucknow. 3. Learned counsel for the applicants submits that the application filed under Section 143A of Negotiable Instruments Act (here-in-after referred as NI Act) for interim compensation by the respondent no. 2 has wrongly and illegally been allowed by the concerned court. He further submits that the presumption for payment of interim compensation could not have been drawn at this stage and it can be drawn only at the stage of trial after considering evidence. He further submits that the cheques- in-question were lost, therefore, a Lost Article Report (LAR) was lodged with the bank, on account of which, the stop payment was made and the cheques were returned on account of stop payment and not on account of insufficiency of funds. He further submits that the payment in cash has been said to have been made to the respondent no.2, whereas no proof thereof has been placed on record. He further submits that the total amount paid has been shown as Rs. 12,50,000/-, whereas the cheques-in-question are of Rs. 2,50,000 and Rs. 6,00,000/- i.e. total of Rs. 8,50,000/-. He further submits that being aggrieved by the order passed by the trial court, the applicants had filed a revision, which has also been dismissed without considering the grounds raised by the applicants. He relies on the judgment and order dated 15.03.2024 passed in Rakesh Ranjan Shrivastava vs. The State of Jharkhand and another ; Criminal Appeal No. 741 of 2024 by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 4. Per contra, learned AGA submits that the impugned order has rightly been passed in accordance with law after considering the pleadings of the parties. He further submits that the interim compensation under Section 143A of NI Act can be awarded even at the threshold. Even otherwise the trial has commenced. 4. Per contra, learned AGA submits that the impugned order has rightly been passed in accordance with law after considering the pleadings of the parties. He further submits that the interim compensation under Section 143A of NI Act can be awarded even at the threshold. Even otherwise the trial has commenced. He further submits that the presumption as to negotiable instruments can be drawn under Section 118 of NI Act and it can be even in regard to the part payment as per Section 139 of NI Act. He also submits that information was given to the police on 06.03.2023 and the intimation to the bank is undated, whereas the cheques-in-question are of 03.02.2023 i.e. prior to the date of alleged loss and the signatures on cheques have also been admitted by the applicants. He further submits that the conduct of the applicants has also been considered not only by the trial court but by the revisional court also, according to which, immediately after grant of bail by the concerned court, the applicant absconded and after recall of the order, again he absconded, therefore, non bailable warrant was issued. Thus, the submission is that the impugned order does not suffer from any illegality or infirmity, which may call for any interference by this Court. This application has been filed on misconceived and baseless grounds. It is liable to be dismissed. 5. Having considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties, I have perused the records. 6. The complaint under Section 138 read with Section 141 of NI Act has been filed by the respondent no. 2 alleging therein that on account of need of money for start of business by accused, the applicant had given Rs. 12,65,000/- as loan in 2022 due to family relation, on promise of accused that he will return in 1-2 months but it was not returned. For clearing his liabilities, the accused i.e. the applicant gave two cheques of Rs. 4,15,000 vide cheque no. 000029 and Rs. 2,50,000 vide cheque no. 000030 dated 03.02.2023 and Rs. 6,00,000/- vide cheque no. 000032 dated 16.05.2023 of Bank of Baroda, Branch Chathuwa, Chathuwa against the cash loan of Rs. 12,65,000/-. During pendency of the trial, an application under Section 143A of NI Act was moved by the respondent no. 4,15,000 vide cheque no. 000029 and Rs. 2,50,000 vide cheque no. 000030 dated 03.02.2023 and Rs. 6,00,000/- vide cheque no. 000032 dated 16.05.2023 of Bank of Baroda, Branch Chathuwa, Chathuwa against the cash loan of Rs. 12,65,000/-. During pendency of the trial, an application under Section 143A of NI Act was moved by the respondent no. 2 for payment of 20% of amount of cheque(s) as interim compensation on the ground that he is in need of money as he is suffering a lot of inconvenience and financial loss as the accused person has adversely affected the business of the complainant by withholding such a huge amount. The applicant filed objection to the said application denying the allegations made in the application and stating therein that the burden of proof is entirely upon the complainant. However, the relations between the parties have not been denied. The applicants have also admitted the cheques and the signatures thereon. The trial court, after considering the pleadings of the parties and the grounds raised in the application and the conduct of the applicants after issuance of the summoning order and finding prima facie case in favour of the respondent no. 2, awarded the interim compensation of 15% of the amount of the cheques. Being aggrieved by the same, the applicant no. 2 filed a revision, which has been dismissed by the revisional court considering the grounds raised therein. Hence, this application has been filed. 7. Section 143A (1) of NI Act provides that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the Court trying an offence under section 138 may order the drawer of the cheque to pay interim compensation to the complainant in a summary trial or a summons case, where he pleads not guilty to the accusation made in the complaint; and in any other case, upon framing of charge. Sub-section 2 provides that the interim compensation under sub-section (1) shall not exceed twenty percent of the amount of the cheque. Sub-section 3 provides that the interim compensation shall be paid within sixty days from the date of the order under sub- section (1), or within such further period not exceeding thirty days as may be directed by the Court on sufficient cause being shown by the drawer of the cheque. Sub-section 3 provides that the interim compensation shall be paid within sixty days from the date of the order under sub- section (1), or within such further period not exceeding thirty days as may be directed by the Court on sufficient cause being shown by the drawer of the cheque. Section 143A is extracted here-in-below: " Section 143A- Power to direct interim compensation (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the Court trying an offence under section 138 may order the drawer of the cheque to pay interim compensation to the complainant- (a) in a summary trial or a summons case, where he pleads not guilty to the accusation made in the complaint; and (b) in any other case, upon framing of charge. (2) The interim compensation under sub-section (1) shall not exceed twenty percent of the amount of the cheque. (3) The interim compensation shall be paid within sixty days from the date of the order under sub-section (1), or within such further period not exceeding thirty days as may cheque. (4) If the drawer of the cheque is acquitted, the Court shall direct the complainant to repay to the drawer the amount of interim compensation, with interest at the bank rate as published by the Reserve Bank of India, prevalent at the beginning of the relevant financial year, within sixty days from the date of the order, or within such further period not exceeding thirty days as may be directed by the Court on sufficient cause being shown by the complainant. (5) The interim compensation payable under this section may be recovered as if it were a fine under section 421 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. (6) The amount of fine imposed under section 138 or the amount of compensation awarded under section 357 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, shall be reduced by the amount paid or recovered as interim compensation under this section." 8. In view of above, the order of interim compensation to the extent of 20% of the amount of cheque(s) can be passed at any stage by the concerned court trying the offence under Section 138 of NI Act and there is no provision that it can be passed only at the stage of trial after recording of evidence. In view of above, the order of interim compensation to the extent of 20% of the amount of cheque(s) can be passed at any stage by the concerned court trying the offence under Section 138 of NI Act and there is no provision that it can be passed only at the stage of trial after recording of evidence. It is also not in dispute that the substance of the acquisitions have been denied by the applicant no. 2 and he has pleaded not guilty. It is also apparent from the impugned order, therefore, it has rightly been considered and allowed at appropriate stage in terms of Sub-section (a) of Section 143A (1), therefore, the contention of learned counsel for the applicants that the impugned order could not have been passed is misconceived and not tenable. 9. The trial court at this stage, after considering the pleadings of the parties, also finds that the cheques and the signatures thereon of the applicant no. 2 have been admitted by the applicant no. 2 as admitted in his objection against the application under Section 143A NI Act. 10. So far as the intimation given to the bank for making stop payment is concerned, the same is ambiguous, which is apparent from the perusal of the same, which has been placed on record at page No. 16 of application, which does not disclose the cheque numbers-in-question also. It is also noticed that in the intimation given to the police regarding loss of cheques on 06.03.2023, the time of loss is between 04:28 to 06:28 on 06.03.2023, whereas the cheques-in-question have been issued on 06.02.2023, therefore, the contention of learned counsel for the applicants in this regard is also misconceived and not tenable. 11. The learned trial court also recorded the conduct of the applicant no. 2 after he was admitted to bail after issuance of the summons, according to which, the case was filed on 29.02.2023 and the summoning order was issued on 07.12.2023. The accused was admitted on bail on 30.04.2024 and from the very next date, he absconded and the warrant was recalled on 09.07.2024. Again, the accused defied the orders passed by the concerned court on 18.11.2024, therefore, non bailable warrant was issued. The substance of accusations was denied on 01.08.2024. Thereafter, the complainant moved application for granting the interim maintenance. The accused was admitted on bail on 30.04.2024 and from the very next date, he absconded and the warrant was recalled on 09.07.2024. Again, the accused defied the orders passed by the concerned court on 18.11.2024, therefore, non bailable warrant was issued. The substance of accusations was denied on 01.08.2024. Thereafter, the complainant moved application for granting the interim maintenance. As per Sub- section (2) of Section 143 A, the trial is to be conducted as expeditiously as possible and an endeavour is to be made by the Court to conclude the trial within six months from the date of filing of the complaint, but on account of the aforesaid conduct of the applicant no. 2, the court also appears to be not in a position to proceed and conclude the trial as provided under law. 12. So far as the plea of the applicants is that the cheques are not of the total amount shown to have been lend by the respondent no. 2, Section 139 provides that it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, therefore, it is immaterial as to whether the cheques are of the whole amount or not and application can be filed for cheque(s) issued for part payment. Even otherwise three different cheques have been issued for the total payment and if the cheques would have been prepared after stealing, this Court failed to comprehend as to why a person will prepare three cheques. Since the applicant no. 2 has admitted the cheques-in-question and the signature thereon, therefore, the presumption under Section 139 of NI Act could have been drawn under Section 118 of the Act. Sections 139 and 118 of NI Act are extracted here-in-below:- " Section 139 . Presumption in favour of holder.— It shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability. Section 118 - Presumptions as to negotiable instruments Until the contrary is proved, the following presumptions shall be made: 1. Section 118 - Presumptions as to negotiable instruments Until the contrary is proved, the following presumptions shall be made: 1. of consideration; that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for consideration, and that every such instrument, when it has been accepted, indorsed, negotiated or transferred, was accepted, indorsed, negotiated or transferred for consideration; 2. as to date; that every negotiable instrument bearing a date was made or drawn on such date; 3. as to time of acceptance; that every accepted bill of exchange was accepted within a reasonable time after its date and before its maturity; 4. as to time of transfer; that every transfer of a negotiable instrument was made before its maturity; 5. as to order of indorsements; that the indorsements appearing upon a negotiable instrument were made in the order in which they appear thereon; 6. as to stamp; that a lost promissory note, bill of exchange or cheque was duly stamped; 7. that holder is a holder in due course; that the holder of a negotiable instrument is a holder in due course: Provided that, where the instrument has been obtained from its lawful owner, or from any person in lawful custody thereof, by means of an SP offence or fraud, or has been obtained from the maker or acceptor thereof by means of an offence or fraud, or for unlawful consideration, the burthen of proving that the holder is a holder in due course lies upon him." 13. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of Rakesh Ranjan Shrivastava vs. The State of Jharkhand and another (Supra) , has held in paragraph 14 that the power can be exercised at the threshold even before the evidence is recorded. In paragraph 16, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has disclosed the factors to be considered while exercising discretion. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has drawn the conclusions and summarised in paragraph 19 holding that the exercise of power under sub-section (1) of Section 143A is discretionary and while deciding the prayer made under Section 143A, the Court must record brief reasons indicating consideration of all relevant factors. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has drawn the conclusions and summarised in paragraph 19 holding that the exercise of power under sub-section (1) of Section 143A is discretionary and while deciding the prayer made under Section 143A, the Court must record brief reasons indicating consideration of all relevant factors. The parameters for exercising discretion under Section 143A have been given in paragraph (c) of paragraph 19, according to which, the court will have to prima facie evaluate the merits of the case made out by the complainant and the merits of the defence pleaded by the accused in the reply to the application. The financial distress of the accused can also be a consideration. A direction to pay interim compensation can be issued, only if the complainant makes out a prima facie case. Thus, the view taken by this Court is also covered by the said judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The relevant paragraph nos. 14 to 19 are extracted hereinbelow:- " 14. In the case of Section 143A, the power can be exercised even before the accused is held guilty. Sub-section (1) of Section 143A provides for passing a drastic order for payment of interim compensation against the accused in a complaint under Section 138 , even before any adjudication is made on the guilt of the accused. The power can be exercised at the threshold even before the evidence is recorded. If the word 'may' is interpreted as 'shall', it will have drastic consequences as in every complaint under Section 138 , the accused will have to pay interim compensation up to 20 per cent of the cheque amount. Such an interpretation will be unjust and contrary to the well-settled concept of fairness and justice. If such an interpretation is made, the provision may expose itself to the vice of manifest arbitrariness. The provision can be held to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. In a sense, sub- section (1) of Section 143A provides for penalising an accused even before his guilt is established. Considering the drastic consequences of exercising the power under Section 143A and that also before the finding of the guilt is recorded in the trial, the word "may" used in the provision cannot be construed as "shall". The provision will have to be held as a directory and not mandatory. Considering the drastic consequences of exercising the power under Section 143A and that also before the finding of the guilt is recorded in the trial, the word "may" used in the provision cannot be construed as "shall". The provision will have to be held as a directory and not mandatory. Hence, we have no manner of doubt that the word "may" used in Section 143A, cannot be construed or interpreted as "shall". Therefore, the power under sub-section (1) of Section 143A is discretionary. 15 . Even sub-section (1) of Section 148 uses the word “may”. In the case of Surinder Singh Deswal v. Virender Gandhi 1 , this Court, after considering the provisions of Section 148, held that the word “may” used therein will have to be generally construed as “rule” or “shall”. It was further observed that when the Appellate Court decides not to direct the deposit by the accused, it must record the reasons. After considering the said decision in the case of Surinder Singh Deswal1, this Court, in the case of Jamboo Bhandari v. Madhya Pradesh State Industrial Development Corporation Limited & Ors. 2 , in paragraph 6, held thus: “6. What is held by this Court is that a purposive interpretation should be made of Section 148 NI Act. Hence, normally, the appellate court will be justified in imposing the condition of deposit as provided in Section 148. However, in a case where the appellate court is satisfied that the condition of deposit of 20% will be unjust or imposing such a condition will amount to deprivation of the right of appeal of the appellant, exception can be made for the reasons specifically recorded.” (Emphasis added) 15.1. As held earlier, Section 143A can be invoked before the conviction of the accused, and therefore, the word “may” used therein can never be construed as “shall”. The tests applicable for the exercise of jurisdiction under sub-section (1) of Section148 can never apply to the exercise of jurisdiction under sub-section (1) of Section 143A of the N.I. Act. FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED WHILE EXERCISING DISCRETION 16. The tests applicable for the exercise of jurisdiction under sub-section (1) of Section148 can never apply to the exercise of jurisdiction under sub-section (1) of Section 143A of the N.I. Act. FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED WHILE EXERCISING DISCRETION 16. When the court deals with an application under Section 143A of the N.I. Act, the Court will have to prima facie evaluate the merits of the case made out by the complainant and the merits of the defence pleaded by the accused in the reply to the application under sub-section (1) of Section 143A. The presumption under Section 139 of the N.I. Act, by itself, is no ground to direct the payment of interim compensation. The reason is that the presumption is rebuttable. The question of applying the presumption will arise at the trial. Only if the complainant makes out a prima facie case, a direction can be issued to pay interim compensation. At this stage, the fact that the accused is in financial distress can also be a consideration. Even if the Court concludes that a case is made out for grant of interim compensation, the Court will have to apply its mind to the quantum of interim compensation to be granted. Even at this stage, the Court will have to consider various factors such as the nature of the transaction, the relationship, if any, between the accused and the complainant and the paying capacity of the accused. If the defence of the accused is found to be prima facie a plausible defence, the Court may exercise discretion in refusing to grant interim compensation. We may note that the factors required to be considered, which we have set out above, are not exhaustive. There could be several other factors in the facts of a given case, such as, the pendency of a civil suit, etc. While deciding the prayer made under Section 143A, the Court must record brief reasons indicating consideration of all the relevant factors. 17. ....................... 18. ....................... 19. Subject to what is held earlier, the main conclusions can be summarised as follows: a. The exercise of power under sub-section (1) of Section 143A is discretionary. The provision is directory and not mandatory. The word "may" used in the provision cannot be construed as "shall." b. While deciding the prayer made under Section 143A, the Court must record brief reasons indicating consideration of all relevant factors. The provision is directory and not mandatory. The word "may" used in the provision cannot be construed as "shall." b. While deciding the prayer made under Section 143A, the Court must record brief reasons indicating consideration of all relevant factors. c. The broad parameters for exercising the discretion under Section 143A are as follows: i. The Court will have to prima facie evaluate the merits of the case made out by the complainant and the merits of the defence pleaded by the accused in the reply to the application. The financial distress of the accused can also be a consideration. ii. A direction to pay interim compensation can be issued, only if the complainant makes out a prima facie case. iii. If the defence of the accused is found to be prima facie plausible, the Court may exercise discretion in refusing to grant interim compensation. iv. If the Court concludes that a case is made out to grant interim compensation, it will also have to apply its mind to the quantum of interim compensation to be granted. While doing so, the Court will have to consider several factors such as the nature of the transaction, the relationship, if any, between the accused and the complainant, etc. v. There could be several other relevant factors in the peculiar facts of a given case, which cannot be exhaustively stated. The parameters stated above are not exhaustive." 14. It is also noticed that according to Section 143A, the court can award the interim compensation up to 20 percent of the cheque amount, but the trial court, after considering the pleadings of the parties and their relations and facts of the case to be considered under law, has awarded only 15 percent as interim compensation, which appears to be adequate at this stage. 15. The revisional court also, after considering the grounds raised by the revisionist and considering the findings recorded by the trial court, has rejected the revision. This Court does not find any illegality or infirmity in the impugned orders, which may call for any interference by this Court. 16. In view of above, this application has been filed on misconceived and baseless grounds, which is liable to be dismissed. It is, accordingly, dismissed .