JUDGMENT : M.K. THAKKER, J. 1. Rule, returnable forthwith. Learned advocate Mr.Mishra waives service of notice of Rule on behalf of the respondent. 2. This petition is filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, challenging the award dated 04.04.2022 passed by the learned Labour Court, Anand in Reference (T) No.68 of 2014, whereby the petitioner has been directed to reinstate the respondent with full back wages and costs of Rs.2,000/-. 3. It is the case of the present petitioner that the respondent was working as a Senior Manager in the Quality Control Department pursuant to the letter of appointment dated 16.03.2012, and that he resigned from service on 17.09.2013. The resignation was accepted by the petitioner, and the respondent was relieved from service on 29.09.2013. After receiving all dues, the respondent filed the Reference after a period of more than eight months, alleging illegal termination on the ground that the resignation was forcibly obtained by the petitioner’s department. The learned Labour Court, after considering the submissions, awarded the Reference in favour of the respondent, which is the subject matter of challenge before this Court. 4. Heard the learned advocate Mr.Dipak Dave for the petitioner and the learned advocate Mr.U.T.Mishra for the respondent. 5. Learned advocate Mr. Dave submits that, as the respondent was serving on the post of Senior Manager, which is evident from the appointment letter, the issue has already been decided by this Court holding that the respondent does not fall within the definition under Section 2 (s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (“the I.D. Act” hereinafter), and the said finding has been confirmed by the Division Bench in an intra-Court appeal. Therefore, the issues with regard to the status of ‘workman’ as well as the allegation of forceful resignation are no longer integra, and the petition is required to be allowed by setting aside the impugned award. 6. On the other hand, learned advocate Mr. Mishra does not dispute the issue regarding the status of ‘workman’; however, he has submitted that, as the petition was filed and stay was granted by this Court, the petitioner is bound to pay wages under Section 17B of the I.D. Act. Learned advocate Mr. 6. On the other hand, learned advocate Mr. Mishra does not dispute the issue regarding the status of ‘workman’; however, he has submitted that, as the petition was filed and stay was granted by this Court, the petitioner is bound to pay wages under Section 17B of the I.D. Act. Learned advocate Mr. Mishra relies upon the affidavit of unemployment and submits that, in the absence of any satisfactory evidence produced by the petitioner, wages under Section 17B of the I.D. Act be granted from the date of filing of the petition till date. In view of the above submissions, learned advocate Mr. Mishra has requested that an appropriate order be passed with regard to the wages under Section 17B of the I.D. Act. 7. Having considered the arguments advanced by the learned advocates for the respective parties and on referring to the reasons recorded, it emerges that the issue with regard to the status of ‘workman’ as well as the allegation of forceful resignation has already been dealt with by this Court in Special Civil Application No. 4710 of 2023 and allied matters, wherein the following observations were made: “10.1 Considering the above definition, for interpreting section 2(s) of the I.D.Act the nature of duty performed by the petitioner when he was in employment of the establishment is required to be narrated and after considering the nature of duties and work performed by him, it can be asserted that whether he is entitled to be called as workman. There is no dispute as per the proposition that the definition of workman given in section 2(s) of the I.D.Act is a inclusive and exclusive definition. The section refers to the term supervisory twice in sub-section however, at both the place, said term is used in different context. In the first place, in the main section 2(s) itself the word used in the context of a person doing supervisory work for hire or reward. The nature of such work may either be manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory. The same can be termed as inclusive definition. In the first place, in the main section 2(s) itself the word used in the context of a person doing supervisory work for hire or reward. The nature of such work may either be manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory. The same can be termed as inclusive definition. However in sub-clause IV of section 2(s) the word supervisory is used in the context that any person who is employed in such supervisory categories and drawing the wages exceeding Rs.10,000/- per mensem or exercise either by the nature of duties attached to the office or by reasons of power vested in him functions mainly of managerial nature. Thus, sub-class IV of section 2(s) lays down two requisites for excluding a person from definition of workman. Firstly, he must be a person drawing the wages of more than Rs.10,000/- per month and secondly, his duties and functions are mainly of managerial cadre. These are cumulative prerequisites and if both the conditions are satisfied, in that case the person may not be termed as a workman. ... ” 8. The aforesaid order was further carried in an intra-Court appeal by filing Letters Patent Appeal No.760 of 2025, wherein the Division Bench of this Court, while affirming the order passed by this Court, has held as under: “A) ISSUE OF RESIGNATION :- 20. It is the case of the appellant–employees that the respondent–Company misled and compelled them to tender their resignation on the false assurance that they would be re- engaged shortly thereafter. It is not in dispute that, owing to its weak financial position, the respondent–Company had called upon its workforce of approximately 1,300 employees to resign voluntarily, offering to pay them their dues upon such resignation. Pursuant to this call, 676 employees submitted their resignations, which were accepted by the Company, and a total sum of Rs.8,24,68,297/- was disbursed to them as part of the settlement. 21. Out of the total 1,300 employees, it is reported that only 30 employees have raised an industrial dispute, alleging that their resignation was obtained illegally and under compulsion. It is not in dispute that all these employees, who have raised the industrial dispute, had accepted the monetary amounts offered to them at the time of resignation. 22. 21. Out of the total 1,300 employees, it is reported that only 30 employees have raised an industrial dispute, alleging that their resignation was obtained illegally and under compulsion. It is not in dispute that all these employees, who have raised the industrial dispute, had accepted the monetary amounts offered to them at the time of resignation. 22. Before addressing the issue as to whether the appellants fall within the ambit of "workman" as defined under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act, it is imperative to first examine the core contention regarding the alleged forced resignation. Alternatively, the appellants contend that the respondent– Company misled them into tendering their resignation on the promise that they would be re-employed or reinstated in service within a period of two to three months. This foundational allegation goes to the root of the dispute and is required to be examined prior to considering the statutory classification of the appellants' employment status under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. 23. We have perused the evidence in this regard, which have been recorded by the Labour Court. A threadbare examination of the award, would reveal that in fact, no evidence is led by the employees, which would even suggest that the employee swere compelled to tender their resignation. 24. There exists a clear case of ‘word’ against ‘word’. The witness examined on behalf of the respondent– Company categorically deposed before the Labour Court that there was no element of coercion involved and that the appellants–employees had voluntarily tendered their resignation in response to an offer made by the Company, which was necessitated by its financial constraints. In light of this, the serious allegation of forced resignation or, in the alternative,the assertion that the employees were misled into resigning based on a promise of future reinstatement, was required to be substantiated by cogent, clear, and reliable evidence. The burden lay on the appellants to conclusively establish that the resignation was not voluntary, but as a result of illegal or coercive action on the part of the respondent–Company. It is difficult to accept the serious allegations, in the absence of supporting evidence, that the respondent–Company coerced or misled as many as 676 employees into resigning. The burden lay on the appellants to conclusively establish that the resignation was not voluntary, but as a result of illegal or coercive action on the part of the respondent–Company. It is difficult to accept the serious allegations, in the absence of supporting evidence, that the respondent–Company coerced or misled as many as 676 employees into resigning. The fact that only a small fraction of these employees, 30 out of 676, have chosen to challenge their resignation by raising an industrial dispute undermines the credibility of the allegation of widespread coercion or deception. Thus, in view of the aforesaid facts, the contention that the respondent– Company compelled or misled a large number of its employees to tender their resignation does not appear plausible or supported by the evidentiary record. 25. At this stage, we may incorporate the observations recorded by the learned Single Judge in paragraph Nos.13, 13.1, 14 and 14.1 of the judgment and order, which reads as under : - “13. Learned labour Court instead of framing the issue for the purpose of determining whether employees are falling under the ambit of ‘workmen’, have cursoraliy held that as no evidence was led with regard to the powers of appointment, dismissal or holding disciplinary enquiry against other employees the employee can be termed as workmen. In the decision rendered by the Apex Court in the above case where it is held that this would not be a sole criteria to conclude the employee under the umbrella of workman. The employees in high ranking position in absence of powers to appoint, dismiss or hold disciplinary enquiry would not be straight away falling under the definition of section 2(s) of the I.D.Act. In absence of any detailed findings given by the learned labour Court this Court is of the view that learned labour Court has committed jurisdictional error in awarding the reference in favour of the workman. In view of the above discussions, the claimants cannot be said to be workmen within the ambit of section 2(s) of the I.D.Act and therefore, finding recorded by the learned labour Court is required to be reversed and is accordingly reversed. 13.1. Even on the issue of resignation was forced or given voluntarily in none of the statement of claim the averment were made or any dispute was raised with regard to the resignation. 13.1. Even on the issue of resignation was forced or given voluntarily in none of the statement of claim the averment were made or any dispute was raised with regard to the resignation. The factum of the resignation was not under challenge and in absence of the same learned labour Court has arrived at the conclusion that resignation was tendered non voluntarily. It is contended that in absence of the evidence of Mr.Paneri the employer has failed to establish that the resignation was voluntarily given. This Court is of the view that if the workman has asserted that it was forceful resignation then it is duty of the workman to establish the same. When the employees have tendered resignation, dues were paid to the employees, at no point of time the resignation has been withdrawn, the complain with regard to the resignation was after more than one year and in that background learned labour Court has committed error in holding that there was forceful resignation. Some of the employees have contended that they were forced to sign however, some of the employees content that their signature was forged. But in the event of sending the application of resignation to the FSL the endorsement was made giving no objection with regard to admission of evidence of resignation. 14. The judgement relied by the workman in the case of Shankar(supra) would not come for the rescue of the workman as in the instant case after crediting the payment of amount in the bank account, it is not open for the employees to contend that this was forceful resignation, more particularly, when resignation was not withdrawn. On that count also impugned order deserves to be set aside. 14.1. The learned Labour Court has also overlooked the award passed in Reference No.483 of 1992 filed by the employees of the same company posted on the designation of Junior Engineer wherein,it is held that person engaged as Junior Engineer cannot be considered as a workman within meaning of section 2(s) of the Act. The aforesaid decision was upheld by this Court in SCA No.1869 of1999 and therefore also, learned labour Court has committed error in concluding reference in favour of the workman. Considering overall circumstances these petitions, filed by Management, deserves to be allowed. The aforesaid decision was upheld by this Court in SCA No.1869 of1999 and therefore also, learned labour Court has committed error in concluding reference in favour of the workman. Considering overall circumstances these petitions, filed by Management, deserves to be allowed. The judgment which was relied by the learned advocate for the workmen being S.K.Narayanan (supra) regarding that decision if not rendered on merits then same can be determined in the subsequent challenge is concerned, this Court is of the view that when the detailed judgment was given by the learned labour court in the identical nature of dispute which was upheld by this Court, it cannot be said that decision was not rendered on merits. Therefore,that judgment would not come for the rescue of the workmen.” 26. We are in complete agreement with the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge. If, as alleged, the entire exercise of compelling the appellants to tender their resignation was orchestrated at the instance of one officer, namely Mr. Paneri, then nothing prevented the appellants from summoning him as a witness. However, neither the appellants nor the Labour Court took any steps to secure his examination. In the absence of such crucial testimony, the claim that the resignation was forced at the behest of Mr. Paneri cannot be accepted. In view of the above, the issue with regard to the workman and the forceful resignation is no longer res integra; therefore, no further discussion is required on the said aspect. Accordingly, the findings recorded by the Labour Court in favour of the appellants on the issue of forced resignation appear to be based on an incorrect appreciation of evidence and facts. We find no reason to interfere with the well-reasoned judgment of the learned Single Judge on this point. B) WHETHER THE APPELLANTS FALL UNDER THE DEFINATION OF “WORKMAN” :- 27. As regards the second issue, whether the appellants fall within the definition of "workman" under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act., we are of the considered view that the same is rendered academic in light of our conclusion on the first issue. Nevertheless, we concur with the findings of the learned Single Judge, who, after a detailed and case-specific analysis, held that the appellants do not fall within the definition of"workman" as defined under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. Nevertheless, we concur with the findings of the learned Single Judge, who, after a detailed and case-specific analysis, held that the appellants do not fall within the definition of"workman" as defined under Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. The learned Single Judge has examined the circumstances surrounding the resignation of each of these employees,including the salary they were drawing at the relevant time. The appellants, in the present appeals, are designated as Junior Engineers, Senior Engineers, and Assistant Managers,and were drawing salaries ranging from Rs.21,000/- to Rs.53,000/- per month. In this context, we may mention that the salary drawn by the appellants exceeds the statutory limit of Rs.10,000/- per month, as prescribed under Section 2 N of the I.D.Act. So far as the submissions with regard to the wages under Section 17B are concerned, it is an undisputed fact that, after the filing of the declaration of unemployment and the rejoinder, as well as the affidavit of the petitioner stating otherwise, no order has been passed by this Court directing the present petitioner to pay wages under Section 17B of the I.D. Act. 28. The witness examined on behalf of the respondent – Company clearly denied that the appellants were performing duties as CNC Operators. It was stated that the appellants, designated as Junior Engineers, Senior Engineers, and Assistant Managers, were performing supervisory functions consistent with their roles. The appellants, before the Labour Court have not produced any evidence that though they were working in the capacity of Junior Engineers, Senior Engineers, and Assistant Managers, they were compelled to do the work of operating the machines. The appellants are treated to be encompassed within the definition of “workman” as defined under section 2(s) of the I.D.Act, by recording that the Company had failed to produce any documentary evidence showing that they were doing supervisory work. It is settled legal precedent that the onus of proving the nature of employment rests on the person claiming to be a “workman” within the definition of section 2(s) of the I.D.Act (vide Lenin Kumar Ray (Supra). The learned Single Judge has meticulously examined the nature of duties, the evidence on record, and the designation of each individual appellant, and has precisely concluded that none of them qualifies as a "workman" under the I.D. Act.” 9. The learned Single Judge has meticulously examined the nature of duties, the evidence on record, and the designation of each individual appellant, and has precisely concluded that none of them qualifies as a "workman" under the I.D. Act.” 9. In view of the foregoing discussion, in the considered opinion of this Court, the issue with regard to the workman as well as forceful resignation is no more res integra hence, the petition deserves to be allowed on that ground. 10. So far as the contention of the petitioner with regard to non-granting the wages under section 17B of the I.D.Act is concerned, it is undisputed fact that after filing of the declaration of unemployment, no order has been passed by this Court directing the present petitioner to pay the wages under section 17B of the I.D.Act therefore, this Court while allowing the petition cannot direct the petitioner to pay the wages under section 17B of the I.D.Act from the date of the petition till today. 11. In view of above, the petition is allowed. Impugned award dated 04.04.2022 passed by the learned Labour Court, Anand in Reference (T) No.68 of 2014 is quashed and set aside. Rule is made absolute accordingly. 12. In view of the order passed in main petition, Civil Application No.1 of 2023 does not survive and is disposed of accordingly.