ORDER : 1. The present application is filed by the applicant – original complainant under Section 378 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short “Cr.P.C.”) seeking leave to file an appeal against the judgment and order dated 23.08.2022 passed by the learned 2nd Judicial Magistrate First Class, Mehsana in Criminal Case No. 3971 of 2020, whereby the original accused – respondent herein came to be acquitted from the charge leveled against him under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act”). 2. The brief facts culled out from the memo of the present application as well as the impugned judgment are as under : 2.1. The applicant - original complainant had filed a complaint under Section 138 of the N.I. Act against the respondent No.1 - original accused mainly stating that the respondent No. 1 – original accused had borrowed an amount of Rs.5,00,000/- from the applicant-original complainant for his business and the amount was paid by the applicant-original complainant from his savings and the amount was to be returned within a period of six months. That, as the respondent No. 1 – original accused did not pay up the amount within the stipulated time and on demand, the respondent No. 1 – original accused gave two cheques bearing Cheque Nos. “000019” and “000020” for an amount of Rs.2,50,000/- each of Kotak Mahindra Bank, Visnagar Branch, dated 15.04.2020 to the applicant- original complainant. The the applicant- original complainant deposited a cheque No. 000019 in his account but the same returned unpaid with an endorsement “ payment stopped by drawer ” and thereafter the applicant – original complainant gave the notice through his advocate, which was received by the respondent No.1 – original accused but no reply was filed to the notice, and hence, the applicant – original complainant filed the complaint before the Court of learned 2nd Judicial Magistrate First Class, Mehsana. 2.2. The respondent No. 1 – original accused was served with summons and he appeared before the learned trial Court and his plea was recorded at Exh. 6 and the evidence of the applicant-original complainant was taken on record. 2.2. The respondent No. 1 – original accused was served with summons and he appeared before the learned trial Court and his plea was recorded at Exh. 6 and the evidence of the applicant-original complainant was taken on record. The applicant- original complainant filed his Examination-In-Chief at Exh.11 and submitted seven documentary evidences to prove his case and after the evidence of the applicant- original complainant was closed, the further statement under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. of the respondent No. 1- original accused was recorded, wherein, the respondent No.1 – original accused stated that he had paid the entire amount to the applicant - original complainant with interest and he had given two cheques as a security, which has been misused by the applicant – original complainant. The respondent No. 1 – original accused examined two witnesses and produced nine documentary evidences and after closing pursis was filed at Exh. 36, the arguments were heard and the learned trial Court, Mehsana was pleased to acquit the respondent No.1 – original accused from the offence under Section 138 of the N.I.Act. 3. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the same, the applicant – original complainant has preferred the present application seeking leave to appeal mainly stating that the learned Trial Court has not properly interpreted Sections 118, 138 and 139 of the N.I.Act.. 4. Heard learned advocate Mr. Suraj Matieda appearing for the applicant - original complainant, learned advocate Mr. Keyur Vyas for the respondent No.1 and learned APP Ms. Jirga Jhaveri for the respondent No. 2 – State. 5. Since this is an application seeking leave to appeal against an order of acquittal, at this juncture, it would be fit to refer to the observations of the Apex Court in the case of Ramesh versus State of Karnataka reported in (2024) 9 SCC 169 in para 15 as under :- “15. We may point out that, once the Trial Court found no evidence to convict the accused, the burden was upon the High Court, while reversing the said judgment, to record clear findings in relation to each of the charges and, more particularly, the charge of criminal conspiracy under Section 120B IPC. However, no such exercise was undertaken by the High Court. However, no such exercise was undertaken by the High Court. At this stage, it would be relevant to refer to the general principles culled out by this Court in Chandrappa and others vs. State of Karnataka , regarding the power of the appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against a judgment of acquittal. The principles read thus: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court. 6. In light of the above settled principles of law in acquittal appeal and considering the arguments advanced by the learned advocates for the parties and on perusal of the impugned judgment and order, it appears that the learned Trial Court has considered all the documents produced by the applicant – original complainant, the respondent No. 1 – original accused and has also considered the presumption to be drawn under Section 118 and 139 of the N.I. Act. The learned trial Court has considered the evidence produced by the respondent No. 1 – original accused and also the documentary evidences, which show that the respondent No. 1 – original accused had transferred an amount of Rs.1,00,000/- on 11/07/2019 and amount of Rs.5,00,000/- on 15/07/2019 in the account of the complainant and also an amount of Rs.1,00,000/- on 04/02/2020 and an amount of Rs.60,000/- on 21/04/2020. The bank statement of the applicant- original complainant has also been produced, which also reflect these transactions and the learned trial Court has considered this aspect and has concluded that the applicant- original complainant has not prove his case beyond reasonable doubts. The learned trial Court has also relied on the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Kali Ram Vs. Himachal Pradesh reported in 1973 SCC 1048 and has considered that the burden is upon the prosecution to prove the existence of facts, which have to be present before the presumption can be drawn and only once those facts have been shown by the prosecution to exist, the statutory presumption would be raised and the impugned judgement and order is well reasoned and just and proper and does not require any interference of this Court. 7. Consequently the present application seeking leave to prevent an appeal under Section 378(4) of the Cr.P.C fails and hereby dismissed. 8. Record and proceedings if any, be sent back to the trial court forthwith. 9. Since the leave to prefer appeal is rejected, no order is required to be passed in the Criminal Appeal, and the same stands disposed accordingly.