Judgment : (Rajani Dubey, J.) 1. Since the aforesaid criminal appeals arise out of the same judgment of conviction and order of sentence, they are being heard together and decided by this common judgment. 2. There are two victims/prosecutrix in the case and they are referred herein as Prosecutrix (P-1) and Prosecutrix (P-2). 3. The aforesaid appeals are directed against the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 11.08.2004 passed by learned Special Judge, Ambikapur at Surguja (C.G.), in Special Sessions Trial No.50/2003 whereby and whereunder, the appellants have been held guilty for commission of offence and sentenced them as described below. Conviction Sentence Under Sections 376(2) (g) of IPC. R.I. for 10 years and fine of Rs.200/- each, in default of payment of fine to undergo additional R.I. for 01 month. 4. The prosecution story, in brief, is that prosecutrix (P-1) had come from village Devri to her sister prosecutrix (P-2) at village Sara and after staying for about one week at village Sara, on 29.12.2002, she (P-1) along with her sister (P-2) left for village Devri. The prosecutrix (P-1 and P-2) were travelling in passenger vehicle Jeep from Amarpur at around 4.00 PM, which was being driven by accused/appellant Saheba Ram and other accused/appellants were also in the vehicle. When the vehicle reached near village Modipara at around 8.00 PM and the prosecutrix (P-1 and P-2) were getting off the vehicle, the accused/appellants told them that they would drop the prosecutrix (P-1 and P-2) to village Devri and compelled them to sit in the vehicle and took them to Bhandarpara forest where the accused/appellants committed rape with them and satiated their lust one after another. Thereafter, the accused/appellants took the prosecutrix (P-1 and P-2) to village Jaampara and kept them there in a house whole night and at morning they brought the prosecutrix (P-1 and P-2) at village Kathghodi and thereafter dropped them near Baikunthpur Bus stand. Thereafter, the prosecutrix (P-1 and P-2) boarded the bus at Baikunthpur and came to village Devri and after reaching home, the information was given to their mother. PW/14 - husband of prosecutrix (P-2) who had come to village Devri to take his wife whom also the information of incident was given and on 08.01.2003, the report of the incident was made by Prosecutrix (P-2) at police station Baikunthpur. PW/14 - husband of prosecutrix (P-2) who had come to village Devri to take his wife whom also the information of incident was given and on 08.01.2003, the report of the incident was made by Prosecutrix (P-2) at police station Baikunthpur. After obtaining consent, both the prosecutrix were medically examined and after completing the usual investigation, vaginal slides were prepared. Spot map was prepared by the police. Statement of the prosecutrix (P-1 and P-2) were recorded under Section 164 of Cr.P.C. Clothes of the prosecutrix and accused/appellants were seized and sent for its chemical examination to FSL. 5. After usual investigation, charge sheet was filed against the accused/appellants under Section 376 (2) (g) of IPC and Section 3 (1) (xii) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act and charges were framed against the accused/appellants under Section 376 (2) (g) of IPC read with Section 3 (1) (v) of the SC/ST Act and Section 3 (2) (xii) of the SC/ST Act by the trial Court. 6. So as to hold the accused/appellants guilty, the prosecution examined as many as 15 witnesses. Statement of the accused/appellants were also recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. in which they denied the circumstances appearing against them in the prosecution case, pleaded innocence and false implication. 7. The trial Court after hearing counsel for the respective parties and considering the material available on record, by the impugned judgment convicted and sentenced the appellants as mentioned in para-1 of this judgment. 8. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the impugned judgment is perverse, erroneous, contrary to law & facts and circumstances of the case, therefore, the conviction and sentence are liable to be set aside. Learned counsel further submits that there is delay in lodging the FIR and no plausible explanation has been given by the prosecution which renders the whole prosecution story suspicious. The learned trial Court has blindly and arbitrarily believed the prosecution story without any proper analysis and judicial scrutiny of the evidence on record. It is apparent from the documents filed by the prosecution that both the prosecutrix (P-1 and P-2) that the prosecutrix are major and possibility of their consent for sexual intercourse cannot be ruled out. There is material contradiction in their statement to that of the medical evidence. It is apparent from the documents filed by the prosecution that both the prosecutrix (P-1 and P-2) that the prosecutrix are major and possibility of their consent for sexual intercourse cannot be ruled out. There is material contradiction in their statement to that of the medical evidence. Learned counsel also submits that the learned trial Court ought to have come to the conclusion that neither both the prosecutrix were forcefully confined or restrained in jeep by the appellants nor threatened in any way causing any reasonable apprehension on their mind. There was implied consent of the prosecutrix in the light of their evidence. The medical report of the prosecutrix also do not support the prosecution case that they were subjected to rape by the accused/appellants but the learned trial Court did not appreciate oral and documentary evidence properly and recorded perverse finding, which is not sustainable in the eye of law. Therefore, the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence is liable to be set aside and the appellants deserve for acquittal. 9. Reliance has been placed on the decisions of Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of Lalliram and Anr. V. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in (2008) 10 SCC 69 , Rai Sandeep alias Deepu V. State (NCT of Delhi) and this Court’s judgment dated 18.07.2024 passed in Cr.A.No.45/2021 [Rajendra Kumar V. State of C.G.] and other connected appeal. 10. On the other hand, learned State counsel supporting the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence submits that the learned trial Court minutely appreciated oral and documentary evidence and has rightly convicted the accused/appellants. As such, the impugned judgment is well merited and no interference is called for by this Court. 11. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material on record. 12. It is clear from the record of the learned trial Court the the learned trial Court framed charges against the accused/appellants under Sections 376 (2) (g) IPC read with Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act for commission of rape of prosecutrix (P-1) and Section 376 (2) (g) of IPC read with Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act for commission of rape of prosecutrix (P-2) and Section 3(1)(xii) of the SC/ST Act. 13. 13. The learned trial Court, after appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, while acquitting the accused/appellants from the charge under Section 3 (2) (v) and 3 (1) (xii) of the SC/ST Act, convicted them under Section 376 (2) (g) of IPC on two counts and sentenced them as described in para 1 of this judgment. 14. According to the story of prosecution, on the date of incident, the accused/appellants committed gang rape with the prosecutrix (P-1 and P-2). 15. Learned counsel for the appellant impeached the judgment of conviction mainly on the ground that there is delay in lodging the FIR and no plausible explanation has been offered by the prosecution; the prosecutrix (P-1 and P-2) were major and they were consenting party to the act of the accused/appellants & there is contradiction in their statements to that of the medical evidence. 16. To sum up this issue, this Court firstly delve into the evidence of (P-2) Prosecutrix (PW/4), who has stated that on the date of incident, she was going with her sister (PW/5) Prosecutrix (P-1) to drop her at village Devri. They left the house at around 2.00 PM and near Amarpur they boarded a vehicle Jeep for Baikunthpur. They reached Baikunthpur at around 6.00 PM and from there they boarded the vehicle Marshal which was being driven by accused/appellant Saheba and in the said vehicle other accused/appellants were also present. Apart from them, other passengers were also present in the vehicle. This witness has also stated that when the vehicle reached Modipara, passengers were getting off the vehicle and they (P-1 and P-2) were also getting off the vehicle but the accused/appellant did not allowed them to get off the vehicle and told them that they would drop them to their destination and door was closed by accused/appellants Bhola and Hari & also threatened them. Thereafter, all the accused/appellants took them (P-1 and P- 2) to Devripara forest where they committed rape with them one after another. After committing rape, when they told the accused/appellants to drop them to their house but they did not do so and kept them in a house at Jampara whole night where the accused/appellants also committed forcible sexual intercourse with them one after another. After committing rape, when they told the accused/appellants to drop them to their house but they did not do so and kept them in a house at Jampara whole night where the accused/appellants also committed forcible sexual intercourse with them one after another. This witness also went on to state that at around 4-5.00 PM, they took them near Shiv Temple at Katghodi where they kept them for about two hours and then in the same vehicle Marshal they dropped them at Baikunthpur Bus stand. Thereafter, they (P-1 and P-2) boarded a bus of Mini Rajababu and reached home. This witness has also stated that after reaching home, they informed the incident to their mother as their father and brother had gone to other village for guesting. This witness, in para 6, has stated that they had gone to police station after one week for lodging the report of the incident as their father and brother had gone to other village and after one week of their arrival, the report of the incident was lodged in the police station. 17. (P-1) Prosecutrix (PW/5) has made almost similar statement as has been made by Prosecutrix (PW/4). Prosecutrix (PW/4), in para 21 of her cross-examination, has admitted this fact that on the date of incident, her husband (PW/14) had come to her parental house for new year celebration. Further, in para 22, prosecutrix (PW/4) has admitted that as soon as they (P-1 and P-2) reached home, she narrated the incident to her mother and when she was informing the incident to her mother, at the relevant time, her husband (PW/14) was present in the house sitting in courtyard. She has also stated that on the date when she reached home, she had narrated the incident to her husband at evening. 18. (P-1) Prosecutrix (PW/5), in para 17 of her cross-examination, has admitted that when they reached home, the family members asked them that when they left village Sara then they told them that they had left yesterday. Thereafter family members asked them that where they were yesterday, then they informed whole incident. This witness has also admitted that their family members scolded them as to where they were whole night yesterday and thereafter she informed the incident to them. 19. Thereafter family members asked them that where they were yesterday, then they informed whole incident. This witness has also admitted that their family members scolded them as to where they were whole night yesterday and thereafter she informed the incident to them. 19. A bare perusal of evidence of both the prosecutrix (PW-1 and P-2) goes to show that both the witnesses have admitted that many vehicles ply on the route to Baikunthpur but they did not make any hue and cry and resist the act of the accused/appellants. They have also admitted that the place which they have mentioned in the incident was rocky one and they had sustained injury in the incident. 20. As regards the injury and commission of rape with prosecutrix (P-1 and P-2), this Court has gone through the evidence of Dr. (Smt.) Kalawati Patel (PW/10), who medically examined the prosecutrix and gave her report under Ex.P/20 and P/21. She has stated that on 08.01.2023, police had brought (PW/4) Prosecutrix (P-1) before her for medical examination and upon examination she found no external or internal injury on the body of Prosecutrix (PW/4) and gave her opinion that no definite opinion can be given regarding forceful sexual intercourse and gave her report under Ex.P/20. Similarly, on the same day, she examined (PW/5) Prosecutrix (P-2) upon examination she found no external or internal injury on the body of Prosecutrix (PW/5) and opined that no definite opinion can be given regarding forceful sexual intercourse and gave her report under Ex.P/21. This witness has admitted this suggestion in her cross-examination that if a woman is raped against her will, she will suffer injuries on her body. 21. The learned counsel for the appellants argued that there is delay in lodging the FIR and no plausible explanation has been offered in this regard and in absence of any plausible explanation, the prosecution case became fatal. 22. 21. The learned counsel for the appellants argued that there is delay in lodging the FIR and no plausible explanation has been offered in this regard and in absence of any plausible explanation, the prosecution case became fatal. 22. As per the FIR (Ex.P/14), the date of incident is 29.12.2002 and the date of FIR is 08.01.2003 and the cause of delay as explained by the prosecutrix was that after arrival of husband they narrated the incident and report came to be lodged, but this Court finds from the cross-examination of both the prosecutrix (P-1 and P-2) that they informed and narrated whole incident to their mother same day and it is also apparent from the evidence of Prosecutrix (PW/4) that when P-1 Prosecutrix (PW/4) was narrating the incident to her mother, her husband (PW/14) was present in the house sitting in courtyard, who (PW/14) has also admitted in para 9 of his cross-examination that on 29.12.2002, prosecutrix (P-1 and P-2) left for village Devri and on 30.12.2002 they reached village Devri & he came to know about this at village Devri itself. He has also admitted that after reaching village Sara and having food, he had asked his wife Prosecutrix (PW/4) that they left on 29.12.2002 and why they reached Devri on 30.12.2002 and also scolded his wife as to where had she stayed and thereafter she told that the accused/appellants had taken them away. This witness (PW/14) has also admitted in para 10 of his cross- examination that the accused/appellants were resident of village Devri and they were in acquaintance with prosecutrix (P-1 and P-2). He has also stated that when he asked her wife about the incident, she did not tell and upon 1-2 slapping, she informed the incident. He has admitted that after coming to know that his wife (PW/4) went with the accused/appellants, he got the FIR lodged by his wife. The aforesaid testimony undoubtedly makes it clear that the incident was informed by the prosecutrix same day. 23. In the instant case, the FIR was lodged by the prosecutrix after an inordinate delay of 10 days at Police Station and no plausible explanation has been offered by the prosecution, which renders the FIR in this case wholly unreliable. The delay in lodging the FIR corrodes the credibility of the prosecution story. 23. In the instant case, the FIR was lodged by the prosecutrix after an inordinate delay of 10 days at Police Station and no plausible explanation has been offered by the prosecution, which renders the FIR in this case wholly unreliable. The delay in lodging the FIR corrodes the credibility of the prosecution story. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in several cases held that delay in loading the FIR creates a doubt, if the said delay is not properly explained. 24. In Thulia Kali V. The State of Tamil Nadu , (1972) 3 SCC 393 , the Supreme Court, emphasizing the necessity of explaining the delay in lodging FIR, has held as follows: “12... First Information Report in a criminal case is an extremely vital and valuable piece of evidence for the purpose of corroborating the oral evidence adduced at the trial. The importance of the above report can hardly be overestimated from the standpoint of the accused. The object of insisting upon prompt lodging of the report to the police in respect of commission of an offence is to obtain early information regarding the circumstances in which the crime was committed, the names of the actual culprits and the part played by them as well as the names of eye witnesses present at the scene of occurrence. Delay in lodging the First Information Report quite often results in embellishment which is a creature of afterthought. On account of delay the report not only gets bereft of the advantage of spontaneity danger creeps in of the introduction of coloured version, exaggerated account or concocted story as a result of deliberation and consultation. It is, therefore, essential that the delay in the lodging of the first information report should be satisfactorily explained...." 25. Delay in lodging FIR often results in embellishment, which is a creature of an afterthought and on account of delay, FIR not only gets bereft of advantage of spontaneity, danger of coloured version or exaggerated story being introduced in FIR, creeps in. It further held that extraordinary delay in lodging FIR raises grave doubt about the truthfulness of allegations made therein. 26. Another aspect of matter is that there is contradiction in the version of Prosecutrix. It further held that extraordinary delay in lodging FIR raises grave doubt about the truthfulness of allegations made therein. 26. Another aspect of matter is that there is contradiction in the version of Prosecutrix. The prosecutrix have stated that they were gang raped by the accused/appellants near the place which was rocky and they sustained injuries but the medical report did not spell about the commission of forceful sexual intercourse and sustaining any injury, which renders the testimonies of Prosecutrix (P-1 and P-2) wholly unreliable and doubtful. 27. In Rai Sandeep (supra), Hon’ble Apex Court held in para 30 and 31 as under :- “30. In the decision reported as Lalliram v. State of M.P. , in regard to an offence of gang rape falling under Section 376(2)(g) IPC this Court laid down the principles as under in paras 11 and 12: (SCC p. 72) "11. It is true that injury is not a sine qua non for deciding whether rape has been committed. But it has to be decided on the factual matrix of each case. As was observed by this Court in Pratap Misra v. State of Orissa where allegation is of rape by many persons and several times but no injury is noticed that certainly is an important factor and if the prosecutrix's version is credible, then no corroboration is necessary. But if the prosecutrix's version is not credible then there would be need for corroboration. (See Aman Kumar v. State of Haryana 8 12. As rightly contended by the learned counsel for the appellants, a decision has to be considered in the background of the factual scenario. In criminal cases the question of a precedent particularly relating to appreciation of evidence is really of no consequence. In Aman Kumar cases it was observed that a prosecutrix complaining of having been a victim of the offence of rape is not an accomplice. There is no rule of law that her testimony cannot be acted upon without corroboration in material particulars. She stands on a higher pedestal than the injured witness. In the latter case there is injury in the physical form while in the former both physical as well as psychological and emotional. However, if the court finds it difficult to accept the version of a prosecutrix on the face value, it may search for evidence direct or circumstantial." (emphasis added) 31. In the latter case there is injury in the physical form while in the former both physical as well as psychological and emotional. However, if the court finds it difficult to accept the version of a prosecutrix on the face value, it may search for evidence direct or circumstantial." (emphasis added) 31. When we apply the above principles to the case on hand, we find the prevaricating statements of the prosecutrix herself in the implication of the accused to the alleged offence of gang rape. There is evidence on record that there was no injury on the breast or the thighs of the prosecutrix and only a minor abrasion on the right side of neck below the jaw was noted while according to the prosecutrix's original version, the appellants had forcible sexual intercourse one after the other against her. If that was so, it is hard to believe that there was no other injury on the private parts of the prosecutrix as highlighted in the said decision. When on the face value the evidence is found to be defective, the attendant circumstances and other evidence have to be necessarily examined to see whether the allegation of gang rape was true. Unfortunately, the version of the so-called eyewitnesses to at least the initial part of the crime has not supported the story of the prosecution. The attendant circumstances also do not co-relate to the offence alleged against the appellants. Therefore, in the absence of proper corroboration of the prosecution version to the alleged offence, it will be unsafe to sustain the case of the prosecution. 28. The minor variations and contradictions in the evidence of the witnesses or the victim will not tilt the benefit of doubt in favour of the accused but when the contradictions in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses proves to be fatal to the prosecution case then those contradictions go to the root of the matter and in such cases the accused gets the benefit of doubt. 29. In the present case also, after perusing the testimony of both the prosecutrix (P-1 and P-2) this Court finds that there are material contradictions which create a serious doubt on the story of the prosecution and therefore such type of testimony of the witnesses is liable to be discredited. 29. In the present case also, after perusing the testimony of both the prosecutrix (P-1 and P-2) this Court finds that there are material contradictions which create a serious doubt on the story of the prosecution and therefore such type of testimony of the witnesses is liable to be discredited. The evidence of both the prosecutrix are not so reliable for basing the conviction of the accused/appellants beyond all reasonable doubt. Further, both the prosecutrix offered false explanation for delay in lodging FIR that the same has been lodged after arrival of husband but the evidence of prosecutrix itself shows that they informed the incident same day to their mother and at the relevant time, husband of (P- 2) prosecutrix was present in the house sitting in courtyard but they did not lodge the FIR on same day or next day of the incident. That apart, medical evidence and the medical reports (Ex.P/20 and P/21) also do not support the prosecution case that the prosecutrix were subjected to rape. The evidence of both the Prosecutrix (P-1 and P-2) unerringly points towards their consensus to the act of the accused/appellants and the benefit of doubt, of course, has to go the accused/appellants. 30. In the instant case, the prosecution has miserably failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The material contradictions in the ocular testimonies of Prosecutrix (P-1 and P-2) (PW-4 and PW/5) about the commission of rape and the evidence of Doctor (PW/10) and the reports (Ex.P/20 and P21) also do not support the ocular evidence regarding the rape of the prosecutrix. The present appellants is convicted for the offence punishable under Section 376 (2) (g) of IPC. The FIR was lodged after 10 days and delay in lodging the FIR was also not properly explained. 31. The appellate Court is under an obligation to consider and identify the error in the decision of the trial Court and then to decide whether the error is gross enough to warrant interference. The appellate Court is not expected to merely substitute its opinion for that of the trial Court and it has to exercise its discretion very cautiously to correct an error of law or fact, if any, significant enough to warrant reversal of the verdict of the trial Court. 32. The appellate Court is not expected to merely substitute its opinion for that of the trial Court and it has to exercise its discretion very cautiously to correct an error of law or fact, if any, significant enough to warrant reversal of the verdict of the trial Court. 32. The prosecution case, when judged on the touchstone of totality of the facts and circumstances, does not generate the unqualified and unreserved satisfaction indispensably required to enter a finding of guilt against the appellants. Having regard to the evidence on record as a whole, it is not possible for this Court to unhesitatingly hold that charge levelled against the appellants has been proved beyond reasonable doubt. In contrast, the findings of the trial Court are decipherably strained in favour of the prosecution by overlooking many irreconcilable inconsistencies, anomalies and omissions rendering the prosecution case unworthy of credit. This Court is of the unhesitant opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove the charge against the appellants to the hilt as obligated in law and thus, they are entitled to the benefit of doubt. The aforesaid appeals thus succeed and are allowed. 33. Keeping in view the above facts and circumstances, the criminal appeals filed by the appellants are allowed and the impugned judgment dated 11.08.2004 passed by learned Special Judge, Ambikapur (Surguja) set aside. The appellants are acquitted for the offence punishable under Section 376 (2) (g) of IPC. 34. The appellants are on bail, therefore, their bail bonds shall continue for a period of six months from today in view of provision of Section 437-A of Cr.P.C. 35. Let a copy of this judgment and the original record be transmitted to the trial Court concerned forthwith for necessary information and compliance.