JUDGMENT : 1. “Death is certain in life but yet the timing remains uncertain.” Death of a 15-year old child is inconsolable. No amount can compensate the parents for loss of their ward. Yet the award of compensation will remain thin commiseration.” 1.1 In these appeals this Court is called upon to decide the quantum of compensation required to be awarded on account of the death of a minor Child. M.A.C.A. No. 45 of 2021 is preferred by the insurance company and M.A.C.A. No. 2000 of 2022 is preferred by the claimants aggrieved by the quantum of compensation awarded by the tribunal. 2. Brief facts for disposal of these appeals are as follows: On 24.04.2018 at 12.30 pm, while one Yasin Hydar A.P. a student, aged 15 years, was travelling in a car bearing Registration No. KL-57-K-4410 and when it reached at Kalandithazham, it hit against an autorickshaw bearing Registration No. KL-57-4074. As a result of the accident, the deceased was thrown out of the car resulting in serious injuries and later succumbing to the injuries. On behalf of the claimants, Exts.A1 to A6 documents were marked. No oral or documentary evidence was produced on the side of the insurance company. The tribunal proceeded to fix the notional income of the deceased at Rs. 18,000/- per month and deducted half (½) of the same towards the personal expenses and granted a total compensation of Rs. 17,47,000/- (Rupees Seventeen Lakh Forty Seven Thousand only). 3. According to the Insurance Company the grant of compensation is exorbitant whereas, the claimants contended that the compensation awarded by the tribunal is insufficient. 4. Heard Sri. Mathews Jacob, the learned Senior counsel assisted by Smt. Preethi R. Nair, the learned counsel appearing for the insurance company, Sri. M. Sadiqali, the learned counsel appearing for the claimants and Sri. Nimod A.R. the learned Amicus Curiae appointed by this Court. 5. The appeal preferred by the insurance company shall be dealt with first since the decision of this Court in this appeal will have an impact on the appeal preferred by the claimants. Sri. Mathews P. Jacob, the learned Senior counsel assisted by Smt. Preethy R Nair, appearing for the insurance company contended that the tribunal erred in fixing the notional income at Rs. 18,000/- per month. Sri. Mathews P. Jacob, the learned Senior counsel assisted by Smt. Preethy R Nair, appearing for the insurance company contended that the tribunal erred in fixing the notional income at Rs. 18,000/- per month. In respect of a child who is aged less than 15 years, according to the learned Senior counsel, the tribunal could not have fixed the notional income and should have applied the principles of global compensation as enunciated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Meena Devi vs. Nunu Chand Mahto @ Nemchand Mahto and Others, 2023 (1) SCC 204 . Reliance is also placed on the judgment of this Court in Preethu and others vs. Sukumaran P and another, MACA No. 595 of 2021 dated 6.9.2024 rendered by E.S. (J). It is further submitted that the tribunal had applied 50% of the income towards future prospects whereas, only 40% can be taken. This, according to the learned Senior counsel, is an alternate submission if this Court finds that the fixation of the notional income is inevitable. 6. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the claimants contended that it has become the necessity of the day to revisit the law laid down by this Court on this point. Referring to the decision of this Court in National Insurance Company vs. K.K. Assainar and others, 2019 (4) KLT 39 , the learned counsel submitted that the principles laid down by this Court in the above decision requires to be revisited in the light of the subsequent judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 7. Sri. Nimod A.R., the learned Amicus Curiae submitted that irrespective of the age of the deceased/claimant, even if the claimant or the victim being a minor, the Court should apply the minimum wages to arrive at the notional income. This according to the learned Amicus Curiae is inevitable because the principle enshrined under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 requires the tribunal and the court to fix just and fair compensation. The learned Amicus Curiae, referring to the reasoning given by this Court in Assainar (Supra), submitted that since this Court wanted to devise a formula while dealing with a claim arising out of the death of a minor, the compensation should not go below the schedule fixed under Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act and therefore, this Court had undertaken the exercise the Assainar (supra). However, the Parliament, by an amendment to the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 omitted the Second Schedule and the same was notified with effect from 1-4-2022. This omission will have an impact on the consideration of the claim petitions. 8. I have considered the rival submissions raised across the Bar. 9. The primary question that falls for consideration of this Court is as to whether this Court should follow the principles laid down by the learned Single Bench in Assainar (Supra) and if so, what would be the impact of the omission of the second schedule to the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. 10. Although while considering the claim for compensation on account of the death of a minor child, the courts and tribunal should always adopt a liberal approach, the empathy alone cannot govern the consideration of court. 11. Before delving deep into the issue, it is expedient to consider various precedents on this point. 12. In National Insurance Company vs. K.K. Assainar and others, 2019 (4) KLT 39 , a learned Single Bench of this Court formulated a method by which, the claim of the minor child could be dealt with by the tribunal and court. Paragraph No. 18 of the judgment in Assainar (Supra) reads as under: “18. Once it is accepted that the multiplier to be applied while computing compensation for dependency is ‘15’ and the mode of assessment is as provided for in the Second Schedule to the Act, viz. that one third shall only be deducted from the notional income to determine the multiplicand, as it is found that the compensation payable under the un amended S.163A is Rs. 2,40,000/- it can be seen, though it is provided in the Second Schedule that the notional income of a non earning person shall be reckoned at Rs. 15,000/- the notional income in respect of children below the age of 15 is actually contemplated to be reckoned at Rs. 24,000/-. In other words, having regard to the fact that S.163A is a provision introduced only with effect from 14/11/1994, and having regard to the compensation granted by various Courts in cases involving death of children during the said period, I am of the view that Rs. 24,000/-. In other words, having regard to the fact that S.163A is a provision introduced only with effect from 14/11/1994, and having regard to the compensation granted by various Courts in cases involving death of children during the said period, I am of the view that Rs. 24,000/- can be fixed, except in exceptional cases where a different yardstick has to be followed, as the notional income of the children died in accidents till the end of the financial year 1995-96. But the said amount cannot be reckoned as the notional income in cases arising in the subsequent years, as it is common knowledge that rupee value has come down drastically thereafter and the effect of inflation in the subsequent years has therefore, to be off setted. In Chetan Malhotra & Others v. Lala Ram & Others, CDJ 2016 DHC 865, the Delhi High Court has made an endeavour to bring in uniformity in the compensation granted in cases involving death of children. In the said case, it was found that having regard to the fluctuating trends in consumer price index, the cost inflation index determined and notified by the Ministry of Finance in Government of India under S.48 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for each financial year would be a better method to offset the effect of inflation on the real value of money. The view expressed in the said case appears to be sound and can be accepted. A table showing the cost inflation index notified by the Government of India from time to time, the corresponding money value for Rs. The view expressed in the said case appears to be sound and can be accepted. A table showing the cost inflation index notified by the Government of India from time to time, the corresponding money value for Rs. 24,000/- applying the cost inflation index up to the year 2018-19 and the nearest thousand of the money value arrived at, is furnished hereunder for ready reference: SCHEDULE 2 S. No. Financial Year Cost Inflation Index Cost Inflation New Index Value Value to Nearest Thousand 1 1995-96 281 24000 24000 2 1996-97 305 26.050 26,000 3 1997-98 331 28,270 28,000 4 1998-99 351 29,979 30,000 5 1999-00 389 33,224 33,000 6 2000-01 406 34,676 35,000 7 2001-02 426 100 36,384 36,000 8 2002-03 105 38,204 38,000 9 2003-04 109 39,659 40,000 10 2004-05 113 41,114 41,000 11 2005-06 117 42.570 43,000 12 2006-07 122 44,389 44,000 13 2007-08 129 46,936 47,000 14 2008-09 137 49,847 50,000 15 2009-10 148 53,849 54,000 16 2010-11 167 60,762 61,000 17 2011-12 184 66,947 67,000 18 2012-13 200 72,769 73,000 19 2013-14 220 80,046 80,000 20 2014-15 240 87,322 87,000 21 2015-16 254 92,416 92,000 22 2016-17 264 96,055 96,000 23 2017-18 272 98,965 99,000 24 2018-19 280 101,876 102,000 In other words, the notional income of children died after the financial year 1995-96 can be determined applying the above table and I have no doubt, the same would certainly provide uniformity in the awards.” 13. The primary reason given by this Court while rendering the above judgment appears to be that while the tribunal or the court considers the claim for compensation in respect of the death of a minor, at any rate, the compensation should not go below the amount fixed under the Second Schedule to Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act. 14. In Kajal Vs. Jagadish Chand and Others, 2020 (4) SCC 413 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court considered the claim for compensation in respect of a 100% disabled minor child wherein the Apex Court held that while fixing the claim for compensation on account of permanent disability, the minimum wages prevailing in the State has to be applied. 15. In Master Ayush vs. The Branch Manager, Reliance General Insurance Company Limited and Another, 2022 (7) SCC 738 , the same method was adopted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 15. In Master Ayush vs. The Branch Manager, Reliance General Insurance Company Limited and Another, 2022 (7) SCC 738 , the same method was adopted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. In fact in Master Ayush (Supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court went one step further from the decision of Kajal (Supra) and granted the compensation for permanent disability by fixing the notional income in terms of the minimum wages prevalent in the State. 16. In Meena Devi vs. Nunu Chand Mahto @ Nemchand Mahto and Others, 2023 (1) SCC 204 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court dealt with the claim for compensation in respect of the death of a minor and found that the Apex Court itself had deviated from the Second Schedule to the Motor Vehicles Act in Kishan Gopal vs. Lala and Others, 2014 (1) SCC 244 and fixed the notional at Rs. 30,000/- per annum. 17. In Kusmi Devi vs. Md. Kasim and Another, 2023 ACJ 1658 the Hon’ble Supreme Court applied the principles of global compensation and granted an amount of Rs. 6 Lakhs as a consolidated amount towards compensation on account of the death of a minor. 18. The principle that could be deciphered from a reading of the exposition of the law is that the Supreme Court had formed a clear cleavage of opinion while fixing the compensation in respect of the death of a minor and disability compensation to a minor. At one hand, the Hon’ble Supreme Court adopted fixation of a consolidated amount as well as applied the global compensation method, but, whereas, in the case of disability, it applied the notional income. Therefore, it is quite natural that the courts will be in a dilemma as to whether in case of a death, a global compensation method must be adopted whereas, in the case of a disabled person, the calculation of the compensation is done by adopting a multiplier system by fixing the notional income. 19. Can it be said that a claim under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act on account of a death has to be ranked lower in pedestal than that of a claim in respect of a 100% disabled person? By holding that in cases of compensation on account of 100% disability of a minor child would be ranked above that of a case of a death would certainly create two classes. By holding that in cases of compensation on account of 100% disability of a minor child would be ranked above that of a case of a death would certainly create two classes. Such a differentiation is not permissible while entertaining a claim under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act. The Parliament never intended to create two classes of claimants while dealing with an application under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Perhaps, this is a strong indication as to the manner in which the court should proceed to deal with a claim arising on account of the death of a minor child. 20. What will be the impact of the omission of the Second Schedule to the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 with effect from 1.4.2022? Normally, when the Parliament amends the provisions of any Statute it is common to be accompanied by a repeal and saving clause. However, in this case there is none. That means that the Second Schedule of the Motor Vehicles Act is taken away from the Statute. 21. The impact of the said omission on the claim petitions which are pending either before the tribunal or before this Court in appeal is also required to be addressed. As stated earlier, when the Second Schedule itself is omitted, this Court will have to presume that the Second Schedule was never in the Statute and, therefore, such claim petitions or appeals arising out of the claim petitions must be considered as though there is no Second Schedule in the Statute. It must be noted that the omission will not have any impact on the claim petitions preferred under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Suffice to say, while considering the claim petition filed under Section 166, the tribunal is not fettered by any ceiling limit, especially in the absence of a Second Schedule. 22. The Second Schedule was necessitated because of the provisions of Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act as it stood prior to the amendment. Suffice to say, while considering the claim petition filed under Section 166, the tribunal is not fettered by any ceiling limit, especially in the absence of a Second Schedule. 22. The Second Schedule was necessitated because of the provisions of Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act as it stood prior to the amendment. Section 163A reads as follows: “Special Provisions as to Payment of Compensation on a structured formula basis: (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force or instrument having the force of law, the owner of the motor vehicle or the authorised insurer shall be liable to pay in the case of death or permanent disablement due to accident arising out of the use of motor vehicle, compensation, as indicated in the Second Schedule, to the legal heirs or the victim, as the case may be. Explanation: For the purposes of this sub-section, “permanent disability” shall have the same meaning and extent as in the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923. (2) In any claim for compensation under sub-section (1), the claimant shall not be required to plead or establish that the death or permanent disablement in respect of which the claim has been made was due to any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the vehicle or vehicles concerned or of any other person. (3) The Central Government may, keeping in view the cost of living by notification in the Official Gazette, from time to time amend the Second Schedule.” 23. It is pertinent to mention that the Second Schedule was later amended by the parliament by raising the limit of compensation to Rs. 5 lakhs which was later omitted w.e.f. 1.4.2022. But it must be noted that with effect from 1.4.2022, the payment of compensation under Section 163A is replaced by Section 164 of the new Act which reads as under: 164. 5 lakhs which was later omitted w.e.f. 1.4.2022. But it must be noted that with effect from 1.4.2022, the payment of compensation under Section 163A is replaced by Section 164 of the new Act which reads as under: 164. Payment of compensation in case of death or grievous hurt: (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force or instrument having the force of law, the owner of the motor vehicle or the authorised insurer shall be liable to pay in the case of death or grievous hurt due to any accident arising out of the use of motor vehicle, a compensation, of a sum of five lakh rupees in case of death or of two and a half lakh rupees in case of grievous hurt to the legal heirs or the victim, as the case may be. (2) In any claim for compensation under sub-section (1), the claimant shall not be required to plead or establish that the death or grievous hurt in respect of which the claim has been made was due to any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the vehicle or of the vehicle concerned or of any other person. (3) Where, in respect of death or grievous hurt due to an accident arising out of the use of motor vehicle, compensation has been paid under any other law for the time being in force, such amount of compensation shall be reduced from the amount of compensation payable under this section. 24. It must be borne in mind that Section 164 has been brought into the Statue with effect from 1.4.2022. If that be so, it cannot have any retrospective operation. Still further, Section 166 and Section 164 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 as amended by Act 32 of 2019 intend to operate on a different field altogether. Therefore, in the light of the aforesaid provisions, this Court is of the considered opinion that Section 164 of the new Act having come into effect from 1.4.2022 will apply to those applications which are filed after 1.4.2022 and cannot govern the consideration of the claim petitions which were filed prior to that. 25. Therefore, in the light of the aforesaid provisions, this Court is of the considered opinion that Section 164 of the new Act having come into effect from 1.4.2022 will apply to those applications which are filed after 1.4.2022 and cannot govern the consideration of the claim petitions which were filed prior to that. 25. Even otherwise the operation of the erstwhile Second Schedule or the newly inserted provision under Section 164 of the Act cannot govern the consideration of a claim petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and the courts or tribunal need not confine itself to the ceiling limit fixed under the aforementioned provisions. 26. On a close exploration of the various principles guiding the interpretation of the Statute, it becomes inevitable to conclude that once the Parliament decided to do away with the Second Schedule to the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the court will have to proceed as though the said schedule is not under the Statute and therefore the principles laid down by this Court in Assainar (Supra) can no longer govern the field and therefore, the change become inevitable. 27. Still further, the impact of omission to the Second Schedule of the Motor Vehicles Act must be considered in the light of the well-known principles of interpretation. As stated above, this Court could not find any repeal and saving clause when the Parliament decided to omit the Second Schedule of the Motor Vehicles Act. Under the common law rule, the consequences of repeal of a Statute are very drastic. Except as to the transactions past and closed, the Statute after its repeal is completely obliterated as if it had never been enacted. The effect is to destroy all inchoate rights and all causes of action that may have arisen under the repealed Statute. Therefore, leaving aside the cases where proceedings commenced, prosecuted, and brought to the finality before the repeal, no proceeding under the repealed Statute can be commenced or continued after the repeal. Another result of repeal under the common law rule is to revive the law in force at the commencement of the repealed Statute. Thus, if one Statute is repealed by a second, which, in turn is repealed by a third, the effect is to revive the first Statute unless a contrary intention is indicated in the third Statute. Another result of repeal under the common law rule is to revive the law in force at the commencement of the repealed Statute. Thus, if one Statute is repealed by a second, which, in turn is repealed by a third, the effect is to revive the first Statute unless a contrary intention is indicated in the third Statute. The confusion resulting from all these consequences gave rise to the practice of inserting saving clauses in repealing Statute. The practice of inserting a saving clause in a repealing Statute is traceable to the general provisions made under Section 38(2) of the Interpretation Act, 1889. A similar provision was made in India under Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and in corresponding State legislation. 28. The result of the application of the principles of obliteration associated with repeal is the continuation of the pending proceedings under a repealed Statute. It will however depend upon the wording of the saving clause contained in the repealing Act or under Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. Therefore, the Parliament has the power to lay down the conditions for continuation of the pending proceedings and to provide that in cases those conditions are not satisfied the proceedings will terminate. 29. However, though Section 6 of the General Clauses Act applies to all types of repeals whether expressed or implied, entire or partial or whether it be repeal simpliciter or repeal accompanied by fresh legislation, it has its own limitations. Can it be said that Section 6 will operate when the provision is omitted from the Statute? Answer is “no.” It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rayala Corporation (P) Ltd & Another vs. Director of Enforcement, Delhi, AIR 1970 SC 494 that Section 6 will apply only to repeals and not omissions. Therefore, this Court needs to tread the path carefully while applying Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. Under normal circumstances the omission of a provision results in abrogation or obliteration of that provision in the same way as it happens in a repeal. 30. Therefore, this Court needs to tread the path carefully while applying Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. Under normal circumstances the omission of a provision results in abrogation or obliteration of that provision in the same way as it happens in a repeal. 30. In M/s General Finance Company & Another vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Punjab, AIR 2002 SC 3126 the question arose before the Two Judge Bench of the Supreme Court as to the effect of omission of Section 276-DD of the Income Tax Act, 1961 from 1.4.1989 on a prosecution pending for its violation. Following the earlier Constitution Bench decisions, it was held by the Supreme Court that neither the prosecution could be continued nor could the punishment be imposed as Section 6 of the General Clauses Act was inapplicable to the omissions. Therefore, it can be safely concluded that, in a case of omission, the provisions of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 will not apply. 31. Hence it is inevitable for this Court to conclude that once the Second Schedule is omitted then the court and tribunal need not confine itself to any particular limit while granting the compensation on account of the death of a minor. However, having said so, what should be the way forward. The only way the impasse could be resolved is by fixing the notional income of the minor child for which this Court has to deviate from the principles laid down in Assainar (Supra) 32. Be that as it may, the more vexatious question as to what should be next course of action? Should the matter require a reference before a Larger Bench or can this Court proceed to consider the claim for compensation by fixing the notional income. The answer would depend upon how far the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court could be applied here. 33. In Master Ayush (Supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while considering a case of a minor lying in a paraplegic stage applied the notional income by calculating it with reference to the notification issued under the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act which was prevalent in the State from which the claim arose. This gives a clear indication that the application of the Second Schedule to the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 was never accepted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 34. This gives a clear indication that the application of the Second Schedule to the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 was never accepted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 34. Pertinently, it must be noted that the income fixed in the Second Schedule to the Motor Vehicles Act is Rs. 15,000/- per annum. However, this was felt highly inadequate and therefore, the Hon’ble Supreme Court did not apply while considering the case in Kishan Gopal (Supra) and applied Rs. 30,000/- as the notional income per annum. The decision in Kishan Gopal (Supra) has been referred to by this Court only to indicate that the Hon’ble Supreme Court had always felt that the notional income fixed in the Second Schedule of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 was inadequate. Be that as it may, now that the Second Schedule of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 stands omitted by the Parliament, it becomes irrelevant insofar as the decision in these appeals are concerned. 35. Now the crucial question would be what should be the method to be followed while fixing the notional income in the case of a death of a minor. The stand of the insurance company that the claim for compensation for permanent disability and claim on account of death are to be considered differently is deplorable. It is pointed out that in a case of 100% paraplegic child, the penury caused to the family will be more than that in the case of death of a minor child. The tragic loss of a minor child in a motor accident is an unspeakable sorrow that transcends beyond the boundaries of monetary valuation. No amount of compensation can restore the innocence lost or joy extinguished. 36. The expectations of the parents while upbringing a child with a fervent hope that once he reaches the expected heights, the burden of the family will be taken over by the child and the parents will be relieved. The said hope can never be compensated by any monetary value. However, having said so, the compensation can only be a step in aid to pacify the sorrow that was caused to the family on account of the accident. 37. While fixing the compensation in respect of the death of a minor child, the court will have to take into consideration the legal obligation of a child under the prevalent law qua the maintenance of the parents. 37. While fixing the compensation in respect of the death of a minor child, the court will have to take into consideration the legal obligation of a child under the prevalent law qua the maintenance of the parents. While keeping in mind that the quantum of compensation to be awarded is only once, the component of future dependency will have to include the element of just and fair compensation. Although all children may not live up to the expectations of the parents, both under the societal norms and the law as it stands today, the court will have to recognize the expectations of every parent, which imposes a legal obligation on the children to maintain them. 38. Sri. A.R Nimod, the learned Amicus Curiae brought to the notice of this Court the judgment rendered by a learned Single Bench of the Delhi High Court in MAC. APP. No. 242 of 2024 decided on 30.9.2024 in the case title Royal Sundaram General Insurance Company Ltd. vs. Zeenat Khan and Others. The issue that arose for consideration before the Delhi High Court was how to calculate the notional income while considering a claim under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Referring to the decision in Oriental Insurance Company vs. Reena Raghav, 2023 SCC Online Del. 6695, the learned judge proceeded to hold that the notional income must be fixed adopting the minimum wages of a skilled labourer. While arriving at a conclusion, the Delhi High Court relied on the principles laid down by the Apex Court in Kajal (Supra) and applied the same principles in the case of death also. 39. In United India Insurance Company limited Vs Jamaluddin Khan and others, 2023 SCC Online Delhi 5417, it was held that the loss of dependency has to be calculated by applying the multiplier system and while fixing the notional income of a minor child the notification fixing the minimum wage of a skilled worker has to be applied. 40. The complexity of the application of the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kajal (Supra) and Master Ayush (Supra) arises, since those cases were concerning the determination of disability compensation payable to a minor child on account of 100% permanent disability and were lying in a vegetative state. 40. The complexity of the application of the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kajal (Supra) and Master Ayush (Supra) arises, since those cases were concerning the determination of disability compensation payable to a minor child on account of 100% permanent disability and were lying in a vegetative state. But it must be noted that when an argument is raised that the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Kajal (Supra) and Master Ayush (Supra) cannot be applied to the facts of the present case since the claim arises on account of the death of a minor, this Court cannot remain oblivious of the fact that the non-application of the principles would lead to a clear disparity and would create two classes of claimants. In one class the victim would be lying in a paraplegic stage and in the other, the claimants will be imbedded in profound grief over the death of their child, but cannot claim parity in compensation. Does the Statute namely, Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 create different classes of person. We must remember when it is permissible for the tribunal and courts to apply the multiplier system even if the claimant is a minor, in case of permanent disability, but to hold that the multiplier system cannot apply while considering the claim for compensation on account of death of a minor defies logic and cannot find support of law. By holding so, the court will create two classes of persons which the statute never intended. 41. In various classes of persons, whether it is a skilled worker, coolie worker, home maker or any person doing any specialized work, the only difference would be the extent of application of the multiplicand. Otherwise, there is a prescribed system to be followed for calculating the compensation under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Therefore, it is evident that the Parliament never intended to create two classes of persons while dealing with an application under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act. It may be true that in a case of a minor, the question of applying the extent of multiplicand will always under serious doubt because the minor will be a non-earning person. It is at this point where the intervention of the Courts is required. 42. In Angad Tiwari Vs. It may be true that in a case of a minor, the question of applying the extent of multiplicand will always under serious doubt because the minor will be a non-earning person. It is at this point where the intervention of the Courts is required. 42. In Angad Tiwari Vs. National Insurance Company Ltd. (Civil Appeal 10950 of 2024 decided on 1.10.2024), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that in a claim under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the courts and tribunals shall not fix the monthly income of the claimant below that of the minimum wage prescribed under the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act. 43. However, the doubt will still linger in the minds of the Court as to what should be the criteria being adopted in the case of the death of a minor. Considering the prospects in education as well as the probable income that a minor child may earn in future, it is quite natural that the court will have its own difficulties in arriving at a particular figure which would represent the notional income of the minor child. Since the Second Schedule to the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, stands omitted and in the light of ratio decendi culled out from the precedents cited across the bar, this Court feels that the best way to resolve the impasse is to apply the multiplier system while considering a claim under Section 166 on account of the death of the minor child. 44. Thus, it becomes inevitable for this Court to conclude that the notional income of the minor child must be fixed before proceeding with the application of appropriate multiplier. In a given case, if the death of a student had occurred, depending upon the educational qualification or the course which was being pursued by him, the court could have arrived at a reasonable conclusion. It is in this context that the decision of the Delhi High Court in Zeenat Khan (Supra) assumes importance. In Reena Raghav (Supra) which was followed by the Delhi High Court in Zeenath Khan (Supra), the Court upheld the award of compensation and assessed the income of the deceased by adopting the minimum wage of a skilled labourer as notified in the State of Uttar Pradesh. In Reena Raghav (Supra) which was followed by the Delhi High Court in Zeenath Khan (Supra), the Court upheld the award of compensation and assessed the income of the deceased by adopting the minimum wage of a skilled labourer as notified in the State of Uttar Pradesh. Read along with the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Angad Tiwari (supra), this Court concludes that in a case of a death of a minor child, the application of the table formulated by this Court in Assainar (Supra) cannot be applied in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Kajal (Supra), Master Ayush (Supra) and Angad Tiwari (Supra). Therefore, it must be held that while calculating the notional income of the deceased minor child in a claim under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the notification issued by the State of Kerala in terms of the provisions contained in the Minimum Wages Act in respect of a skilled worker must be applied. Therefore it is ordered that the tribunal throughout the State shall apply the multiplier system by fixing the multiplicand in accordance with the notification issued by the State of Kerala under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 while considering a claim petition under Section 166 of the Act on account of death of a minor child. 45. Coming back to the facts of this case, in the light of the reasoning given by this Court as above, it becomes inevitable that the appeal preferred by the insurance company has to fail to the extent of questioning the fixation of the notional income and except to the extent of fixing 50% future prospects on the notional income. Hence M.A.C.A. No. 45 of 2021 is partly allowed. The award of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Kozhikode granting 50% of the notional income towards future prospects is set aside and it is ordered that the claimants are entitled to get only 40% of the income towards future prospects. 46. Coming to M.A.C.A. No. 2000 of 2022, in the light of the findings rendered by this Court as above, the award of the tribunal requires modification. The award of the tribunal insofar as fixing the notional income presumably in terms of the table fixed by this Court in Assainar (Supra) is liable to be interfered with. 46. Coming to M.A.C.A. No. 2000 of 2022, in the light of the findings rendered by this Court as above, the award of the tribunal requires modification. The award of the tribunal insofar as fixing the notional income presumably in terms of the table fixed by this Court in Assainar (Supra) is liable to be interfered with. Instead of the same, the notional income must be fixed in terms of the notification issued by the Government of Kerala under the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 as it applies to a skilled worker. 47. In the present case, the accident occurred on 24.4.2018 and at that point of time, G.O. (P) No. 56/2017 dated 28.4.2017 issued by the State of Kerala was in force. In accordance with the said notification, the minimum wage fixed by the State of Kerala for a skilled worker is at Rs. 18,900/-. Therefore, the compensation towards loss of dependency has to be reworked. 48. In the result, M.A.C.A. No. 2000 of 2022 is allowed. It is declared that the claimants are entitled to have the notional income of the deceased Yasin Hydar A.P. fixed at Rs. 18,900/-. While calculating 40% of the notional income towards the future prospects, the amount would come to Rs. 26,460/-. Accordingly the appellants are entitled to get an amount of Rs. 23,81,400/- [26,460 x 12 x 15 x 1/2] towards loss of dependency. The tribunal has already awarded an amount of Rs. 16,20,000/- on that head and hence the balance would come to Rs. 7,61,400/-. Under the conventional heads of loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses also, the claimants are entitled to 10% future prospects going by the decision in National Insurance Company Limited v. Pranay Sethi and Others, 2017 (16) SCC 680 and N. Jayasree and others v. Cholamandalam, MS General Insurance Company Ltd. (2022) 14 SCC 712 . Since the accident had occurred on April 2018 and the appeal being the continuation of the proceedings of the original claim, the future prospects have to be applied twice. Therefore, under the head loss of estate and funeral expenses, an additional amount of Rs. 3,000/- each is granted. Coming to the head compensation towards pain and sufferings, going by the decision of this Court in Oriental Insurance Company Limited v. Martin Xavier, 2024 KLT Online 2579 an amount of Rs. 15,000/- can be granted. Therefore, under the head loss of estate and funeral expenses, an additional amount of Rs. 3,000/- each is granted. Coming to the head compensation towards pain and sufferings, going by the decision of this Court in Oriental Insurance Company Limited v. Martin Xavier, 2024 KLT Online 2579 an amount of Rs. 15,000/- can be granted. However the tribunal has granted only Rs. 10,000/- and hence enhancement of Rs. 5,000+ future prospects is granted and the amount thus arrived at Rs. 18,000/-. Similarly, under the head loss of consortium also, the claimants are entitled for enhancement at 10% for two occasions and thus an additional amount of Rs. 8,000/- is granted. 49. In the result the appellants are entitled to get enhanced compensation as follows: Heads of claim Amount awarded by this Court Amount awarded by the tribunal Enhanced compensation Loss of dependency 23,81,400 16,20,000 7,61,400 Loss of estate 18,000 15,000 3,000 Loss of consortium 88,000 80,000 8,000 Pain and sufferings 18,000 10,000 8,000 Funeral expenses 18,000 15,000 3,000 Total 7,83,400 50. Accordingly, the appellants are entitled to get an enhanced compensation of Rs. 7,83,400/- (Rupees Seven Lakh eighty three thousand four hundred only) with 8% interest per annum from the date of petition till realization with proportionate cost. The insurance company shall deposit the amount within a period of one month from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment.