JUDGMENT : ROHIT W. JOSHI, J. The present petition is filed challenging the order dated 04.07.2022 passed by the Principal Secretary, Maharashtra State Excise Department, Mantralaya, Mumbai in Revision Application No.2/2022. 2. The controversy in the matter pertains to CL-III licence which was initially issued in favour of late Gangagoud Anantwar, deceased husband of original petitioner. After filing of the petition, the petitioner has expired and her two sons, a daughter and widow and sons of pre-deceased son are brought on record as legal representatives. 3. A licence for sale of country liquor in the form of CL-III was issued in the year 1973 in favour of one Gangagoud Bhimagoud Anantwar. This Gangagoud entered into a partnership for the purpose of country liquor business with respondent nos.5 and 6 on 16.07.1994. Deceased Gangagoud had 34% share and respondent nos.5 and 6 had 33% share each in the said firm. Respondent No.3 - Collector granted approval to the said firm and names of respondent nos.5 and 6 were also entered in CL-III licence along with deceased Gangagoud. Thereafter, deceased Gangagoud and respondent nos.5 and 6 executed a supplementary deed of partnership dated 20.07.1998. The supplementary deed of partnership dated 20.07.1998 enumerates the same terms and conditions as enumerated in deed of partnership dated 16.07.1994. Supplementary deed of partnership was executed since the earlier partnership deed dated 16.07.1994 was scribed on a stamp paper of inadequate denomination. 4. It appears that certain disputes had arisen between respondent nos.5 and 6 on one hand and deceased Gangagoud on the other, as a consequence of which Regular Civil Suit No.262/2003 was filed by respondent nos.5 and 6 against deceased Gangagoud and his son Shivaji. The said suit is filed in the Court of learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Nanded. Respondent Nos.5 and 6 (plaintiffs) prayed for decree of perpetual injunction restraining the defendants (deceased Gangagoud and his son) from interfering with the business of country liquor shop. The matter appears to be amicably settled between the parties and accordingly, the suit came to be disposed of vide compromise decree dated 26.06.2003. After the compromise decree was passed, deceased Gangagoud expired on 23.03.2004. The deceased petitioner has filed the suit, being Regular Civil Suit No.137/2014 seeking declaration that compromise decree dated 26.06.2003 passed in the said Civil Suit is null and void and not binding on her. After the compromise decree was passed, deceased Gangagoud expired on 23.03.2004. The deceased petitioner has filed the suit, being Regular Civil Suit No.137/2014 seeking declaration that compromise decree dated 26.06.2003 passed in the said Civil Suit is null and void and not binding on her. She also sought decree for perpetual injunction restraining respondent nos.5 and 6 (defendants) from causing interference with the business of country liquor shop. The said suit is pending for adjudication before the Civil Court. 5. After the demise of Gangagoud, on 23.03.2004, the petitioner initially filed an application dated 02.04.2004 and thereafter another application dated 28.05.2005 before respondent no.3 requesting for including her name in the licence and for deletion of the names of respondent nos.5 and 6 on the ground that partnership had come to an end. Respondent No.3 passed order dated 20.07.2008 recording that in view of demise of original licensee Gangagoud, CL-III licence in his name be transferred in the name of his widow i.e. the petitioner herein. 6. On 22.05.2012, respondent no.5 filed an application before respondent no.3 seeking review of the order dated 20.07.2008 whereby the licence was ordered to be issued in the name of petitioner. The petitioner opposed the said application by filing reply. The said application was allowed by respondent no.3 vide order dated 14.11.2013. Respondent No.3 directed that the names of the petitioner and other two partners i.e. respondent nos.5 and 6 be recorded in the licence. 7. Being aggrieved by the said order dated 14.11.2013, the petitioner filed appeal under Section 137 of the MAHARASHTRA PROHIBITION ACT before respondent no.2, being appeal no.319/2013. The said appeal came to be allowed by respondent no.2 on the ground that Respondent No.3-Collector while exercising authority under the MAHARASHTRA PROHIBITION ACT did not have jurisdiction to review his own decision. Respondent Nos.5 and 6 thereafter preferred Revision under Section 138 of the MAHARASHTRA PROHIBITION ACT before respondent no.1, being Revision Application No.2/2022, which came to be allowed vide order dated 4 th July, 2022. The present petition is filed assailing the said order. 8. Heard Mr. Rajendra Deshmukh, learned Senior Advocate for the petitioners. He contends that there is no provision under the MAHARASHTRA PROHIBITION ACT conferring jurisdiction or authority upon the Collector to review his decisions. The present petition is filed assailing the said order. 8. Heard Mr. Rajendra Deshmukh, learned Senior Advocate for the petitioners. He contends that there is no provision under the MAHARASHTRA PROHIBITION ACT conferring jurisdiction or authority upon the Collector to review his decisions. He contends that review is a creature of statute and orders once passed cannot be reviewed by any authority unless power of review is expressly conferred. He contends that order dated 14.11.2013 passed by respondent no.3 by which earlier order dated 20.07.2008 came to be reviewed is absolutely without jurisdiction and was accordingly rightly set aside by respondent no.2. He contends that respondent no.1 has committed serious jurisdictional error in ignoring well settled legal principle in allowing the revision application preferred by respondent nos.5 and 6. As regards the compromise decree in Regular Civil Suit No.262/2003, Mr. Deshmukh, learned Senior Advocate contends that the licence was being operated from Dharmabad, Tq. Dharmabad and deceased was resident of Bhishi, Tq. Kinwat and despite this suit was filed at Nanded, which creates serious suspicion as regards veracity of the compromise decree. 9. Per contra, Mr. U.A. Bhadgaonkar, learned advocate for respondent no.5 and Mr.V.S. Undre, learned advocate for respondent no.6 justify the order. They contend that after filing of the application dated 02.04.2004 by the petitioner for deletion of the names of respondent nos.5 and 6, on 21.05.2004 a fresh partnership deed was executed between the petitioner and respondent nos.5 and 6. They contend that the matter was fully and finally resolved on execution of partnership deed dated 21.05.2004. 10. It is contended that during the course of inquiry pursuant to the application dated 02.04.2004 filed by the petitioner, an inquiry was conducted by the office of respondent no.4 and during the course of this inquiry, the deceased petitioner as also her three sons namely Shivaji, Bhimrao and Balaji had made statement before the authorities that they did not intend to pursue the application dated 02.04.2004 and that they are willing to continue the business in the partnership with respondent nos.5 and 6. The said statements are filed by respondent no.6 along with affidavit in reply dated 30 th August, 2022. Their statements assert that the partnership deed dated 21.05.2004 was also simultaneously executed on the same day on which the statements were recorded and as such the matter was fully and finally settled between the parties. 11. The said statements are filed by respondent no.6 along with affidavit in reply dated 30 th August, 2022. Their statements assert that the partnership deed dated 21.05.2004 was also simultaneously executed on the same day on which the statements were recorded and as such the matter was fully and finally settled between the parties. 11. The respondent nos.5 and 6 contend that after the application dated 02.04.2004 by the petitioner for recording her name as licensee in place of deceased husband, the matter was amicably settled between the parties as is apparent from the statements recorded on 21.05.2004 as also execution of partnership deed on the same date i.e. on 21.05.2004. 12. The learned advocates for respondent nos.5 and 6 contend that thereafter the petitioner clandestinely got her name recorded in the licence to the exclusion of respondent nos.5 and 6, vide order dated 20.07.2008. It is contended that after the statements were recorded during the course of inquiry on 21.01.2004 and partnership deed was executed, they did not receive any notice from the office of Collector before passing of the order dated 20.07.2008. 13. Mr. Rajendra Deshmukh, learned Senior Advocate has placed reliance on following judgments to contend that the respondent no.3/Collector did not have any power of review, and therefore, assuming all that the respondent nos.5 and 6 stated to be correct, the order dated 14.11.2013 passed by the respondent no.3/Collector, reviewing the earlier order dated 20.07.2008 is unsustainable :- (i) Patel Narshi Thakershi Vs. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji { 1970 AIR (SC) 1273 } (ii) Judgment in the matter of Balabai Vasantrao Patil Vs.The Collector of Kolhapur and others in Writ Petition No.4994/2004 dated 15.06.2004. (iii) Judgment in the matter of Mrs. Kamaladevi Satyanaran Gupta Vs. State of Maharashtra and 3 ors in Writ Petition No.8776/2007 dated 16.04.2008. (iv) Judgment in the matter of Shri Abhijit Ramrao Bachewar Vs. The State of Maharashtra and others in Writ Petition No.3315/2015 dated 29.10.2015. (v) Judgment in the matter of Rajesh Matadinlalji Jaiswal Vs. State of Maharashtra and others in Writ Petition No.5460/2015 dated 01.03.2016. (vi) Judgment in the matter of Somnath Pandurang Kate Vs. The State of Maharashtra and others in Writ Petition No.12204/2019 dated 18.01.2021. (vii) Judgment in the matter of Shri Suresh Shantaram Todankar Vs. The State of Maharashtra and others in Writ Petition No.1088/2021 dated 20.06.2022. 14. State of Maharashtra and others in Writ Petition No.5460/2015 dated 01.03.2016. (vi) Judgment in the matter of Somnath Pandurang Kate Vs. The State of Maharashtra and others in Writ Petition No.12204/2019 dated 18.01.2021. (vii) Judgment in the matter of Shri Suresh Shantaram Todankar Vs. The State of Maharashtra and others in Writ Petition No.1088/2021 dated 20.06.2022. 14. All the judgments, except Balabai (supra), reiterate the settled legal principle that no judicial or quasi- judicial authority can revisit its own order, in the absence of express enabling provision. It is held in all these cases that right to review emanates from statute and therefore, unless the statute provides for authority to review its orders, a judicial or quasi-judicial authority cannot exercise powers of review. 15. There cannot be any quarrel with the legal proposition laid down in the aforesaid cases, however, the aforesaid principle applies only to judicial and quasi-judicial orders. The said principle does not apply to administrative orders. The law with respect to review of administrative orders is otherwise. In this regard, reference can be made to judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of R.R. Verma and others Vs. Union of India and others reported in (1980)3 SCC 402 , wherein it is held as under :- "5. The last point raised by Shri Garg was that the Central Government had no power to review its earlier orders as the rules do not vest the government with any such power. Shri Garg relied on certain decisions of this Court in support of his submission : Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradvamunsinghji Arjunsinghji; D.N. Roy Vs. State of Bihar and State of Assam Vs. J.N. Roy Biswas. All the cases cited by Shri Garg are cases where the government was exercising quasi-judicial power vested in them by statute. We do not think that the principle that the power to review must be conferred by statute either specifically or by necessary implication is applicable to decisions purely of an administrative nature. To extend the principle to pure administrative decisions would indeed lead to untoward and startling results. Surely, any government must be free to alter its policy or its decision in administrative matters. To extend the principle to pure administrative decisions would indeed lead to untoward and startling results. Surely, any government must be free to alter its policy or its decision in administrative matters. If they are to carry on their daily administration they cannot be hidebound by the rules and restrictions of judicial procedure though of course they are bound to obey all statutory requirements and also observe the principles of natural justice where rights of parties may be affected." 16. It is, therefore, necessary to decide as to whether the order permitting names of the respondent nos.5 and 6 to be included in the licence is an administrative order or quasi-judicial order. 17. It is, therefore, also necessary to consider essential distinction between an administrative function and quasi-judicial or judicial function. The distinction is succinctly explained in the case of Indian National Congress (I) Vs. Institute of Social Welfare and others reported in (2002) 5 SCC 685 . The issue which fell for consideration in the matter was as to whether recognition granted to a political party by the Election Commission of India (ECI)could be withdrawn subsequently in the absence of any enabling provision. In this context, nature of order granting recognition to a political party fell for consideration before the Court. The question was considered in the backdrop that, if the power is held to be quasi-judicial, decision cannot be reviewed in the absence of enabling provision. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the order granting recognition to a political party is a quasi- judicial order, and therefore, the same cannot be withdrawn in the absence of any enabling provision, since it will amount to a review. While explaining the distinction between "administrative” and “quasi-judicial function", the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under :- "24. The legal principles laying down when an act of a statutory authority would be a quasi-judicial act, which emerge from the aforestated decisions are these: Where (a) a statutory authority empowered under a statute to do any act (b) which would prejudicially affect the subject (c) although there is no lis or two contending parties and the contest is between the authority and the subject and (d) the statutory authority is required to act judicially under the statute, the decision of the said authority is quasi-judicial. 26. 26. Coming to the second argument of learned counsel for the respondents, it is true that mere presence of one or two attributes of quasi-judicial authority would not make an administrative act as a quasi-judicial act. In some case, an administrative authority may determine question of fact before arriving at a decision which may affect the right of an appellant but such a decision would not be a quasi- judicial etc. It is a different thing that in some cases, fair play may demand affording of an opportunity to the claimant whose right is going to be affected by the act of the administrative authority, still such an administrative authority would not be a quasi-judicial authority. 27. What distinguishes an administrative act from a quasi-judicial act is, in the case of quasi-judicial functions under the relevant law the statutory authority is required to act judicially. In other words, where law requires that an authority before arriving at a decision must make an enquiry, such a requirement of law makes the authority a quasi-judicial authority." 18. It is thus apparent that the distinction between a judicial/quasi-judicial and administrative power is that in case of judicial or quasi-judicial power, the authority is statutorily obligated to exercise the power in a judicial manner by following principles of natural justice. Such is not an obligation is not imposed while exercising administrative power, although having regard to need of transparency and fair play, even while exercising administrative power, the authority may afford opportunity of hearing to rival parties. However, that by itself will not mean that the power is a judicial or quasi-judicial power. An order can be termed to be a quasi-judicial only if duty to act judicially is imposed by the statute under which the same is passed. 19. The licence which was granted initially in favour of husband of the petitioner was transferred in the name of the partnership firm comprising of husband of the petitioner and respondent nos.5 and 6. The names of all three partners were also entered into licence. Thus to privilege to trade in liquor vested with all three partners. After demise of her husband, the petitioner filed application for transferring the licence in her name alone contending that the firm had ceased to exist in view of demise of her husband. The names of all three partners were also entered into licence. Thus to privilege to trade in liquor vested with all three partners. After demise of her husband, the petitioner filed application for transferring the licence in her name alone contending that the firm had ceased to exist in view of demise of her husband. There are two provisions which fall for consideration in this backdrop, one is Rule 28 which provides for transfer of licence and other is clause 17 in Form CL-III. The form of licence is a statutory form and therefore, it also has force of statute. 20. As stated above, licence is a privilege granted by the State to a licensee. Whether the power to permit transfer of this privilege and to permit the legal heirs/legal representative of a deceased licensee to enjoy this privilege is a administrative function or quasi-judicial function is a question which falls for consideration in the present matter. 21. Perusal of both these provisions will demonstrate that the Collector, who is the licensing authority has discretion in the matter of permitting transfer and permitting legal heirs/legal representatives of deceased licensee to enjoy the privilege. There is no statutory obligation on the Collector to to hear and decide the matter judicially like a judge, although the Collector may choose to afford hearing to the concerned parties before taking decision in the matter. 22. The power exercised by the Collector under Rule 28 and clause 17 of Form CL-III of the Country Liquor Rules is not a quasi judicial power. It is essentially an administrative function. While exercising this administrative function, having regard to need of transparency and fair play, the Collector may choose to hear the parties concerned before taking decision, however, that by itself will not alter the nature of power. Since, the power exercised by the Collector is administrative in nature, the said authority will have power to review its decisions even in the absence of any express enabling provision in view of law laid down in the matter of R.R.Verma (supra). 23. Now let us deal with the judgments relied upon by the petitioner. None of the judgments lay down the ratio that an administrative order cannot be reviewed in the absence of any enabling provision. (a) The judgment in the matter of Patel Narshi Thakershi (supra) pertains to a judicial function. 23. Now let us deal with the judgments relied upon by the petitioner. None of the judgments lay down the ratio that an administrative order cannot be reviewed in the absence of any enabling provision. (a) The judgment in the matter of Patel Narshi Thakershi (supra) pertains to a judicial function. The first paragraph of the judgment itself indicates the same. In this context, it is held that power of review is not an inherent power and that the same cannot be exercised unless specifically conferred. (b) The judgment in the case of Balabai Vasantrao Patil (supra), the question which fell for consideration was as to whether the Collector had power of review under the MAHARASHTRA PROHIBITION ACT . It is observed in the judgment that no express provision was brought to the notice of this Court enabling the Collector to exercise power of review. The judgment also records that the respondents had also accepted that the Collector is not vested with power to review his own decisions. This judgment is based on concession. A Judgment based on concession cannot be followed as a precedent. Apart from this, the judgment does not take into consideration difference in the legal position with respect to power to review administrative decisions and judicial or quasi-judicial decisions. The judgment does not lay down that the principle that power of review is not inherent is also applicable to administrative orders. (c) The judgment in the matter of Kamaladevi Satyanaran Gupta (supra) pertains to revisional powers under Section 138 of the MAHARASHTRA PROHIBITION ACT . The power under Section 138 to adjudicate a revision is essentially a quasi-judicial power. Judgment holds that in the absence of any enabling provision to review orders passed by him, the Minister could not change or alter earlier orders passed under Section 138 of the Act. (d) The judgment in the case of Abhijit Ramrao Bachewar (supra). the State Government had revisited its earlier decision. The power to take subsequent decision was sought to be justified placing reliance on Section 138 of the MAHARASHTRA PROHIBITION ACT . Section 138 of the MAHARASHTRA PROHIBITION ACT provides for power of revision against orders passed by Prohibition Officers working under the MAHARASHTRA PROHIBITION ACT . the State Government had revisited its earlier decision. The power to take subsequent decision was sought to be justified placing reliance on Section 138 of the MAHARASHTRA PROHIBITION ACT . Section 138 of the MAHARASHTRA PROHIBITION ACT provides for power of revision against orders passed by Prohibition Officers working under the MAHARASHTRA PROHIBITION ACT . It is held that the State Government does not fall within the definition of "Prohibition Officer" as defined under the MAHARASHTRA PROHIBITION ACT , and therefore, Section 138 could not be invoked by the State Government to review decisions taken by it earlier. The judgment in the matter of Somnath Pandurang Kate (supra) lays down the same proposition of law. (e) The judgment in the matter of Rajesh Matadinlalji Jaiswal does not deal with power of review. (f) In the matter of Suresh Shantaram Todankar (supra), the State Government had passed orders granting renewal of dormant licences by charging renewal fees. Subsequently, the Government reviewed the decision and directed the licensees to pay interest on the outstanding licence fees. It will be pertinent to mention that the order was passed in suomotu review proceeding. It is held that the said power of review cannot be traced to Sections 137 and 138 of the MAHARASHTRA PROHIBITION ACT . It is obvious that powers under Sections 137 and 138 being appellate and revisional powers respectively are quasi-judicial powers, and therefore, the principle that review is a creature of statute and power of review cannot be exercised in the absence of any express enabling provision will apply to Sections 137 and 138 of the MAHARASHTRA PROHIBITION ACT . As regards section 139, it is held that the said provision also could not be invoked to impose condition of payment of interest on outstanding licence fees. The judgment does not deal with the issue as to whether power of review is inherent with respect to administrative orders. The judgment also does not consider distinction between judicial and quasi-judicial order on one side and administrative orders on the other. The ratio of the judgment is not that administrative orders cannot be reviewed in the absence of express enabling provision and that there has to be an express enabling provision for review of administrative orders. 24. The matter can be viewed from another angle. The ratio of the judgment is not that administrative orders cannot be reviewed in the absence of express enabling provision and that there has to be an express enabling provision for review of administrative orders. 24. The matter can be viewed from another angle. Admittedly, respondent nos.5 and 6 were inducted as partners and subsequently their names were included in the licence along with deceased husband of the petitioner. If the contention of the petitioner that Collector cannot review orders passed under the Prohibition Act is accepted, then it is obvious that the decision for inclusion of names of respondent nos.5 and 6 also cannot be reviewed by ordering deletion of their names from the licence, in the absence of any subsequent development entailing disqualification to hold the licence. Mere death of one of the partners cannot be a ground to delete the names of respondent nos.5 and 6 from the licence. The privilege granted to them could not be withdrawn only on account of death of one of the partners i.e. husband of the petitioner. Deletion of names of respondent nos.5 and 6 from the licence also amounts to review of the decision taken earlier to permit inclusion of their names in the licence. 25. The learned Commissioner has erred in holding that the order dated 20.07.2008 is bad in law on the ground that the Collector does not have power to review his decisions. As is held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of R.R. Verma and others Vs. Union of India, (1980)3 SCC 402 , the legal principle is that power of review is not available in the absence of enabling provision applies to judicial or quasi-judicial functions and not to administrative functions. The learned Commissioner has lost sight of this vital aspect of the matter. Even if it is assumed that power is quasi-judicial, yet unless the respondent nos.5 and 6 incur any disqualification the earlier order permitting inclusion of their names in the licence could not be reviewed by directing deletion of their names as has been done vide impugned order dated 20.07.2008 on the ground that one of the partners had expired. 26. The respondent no.1 has rightly interfered with the order passed by the Commissioner. 26. The respondent no.1 has rightly interfered with the order passed by the Commissioner. While allowing the revision, the respondent no.1 has had due regard to the compromise decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No.262/2003 and the fact of execution of partnership deed dated 21.05.2004 between the petitioner and respondent nos.5 and6 after demise of the husband of petitioner. 27. In this regard it is necessary to refer to pleadings in the petition with respect to the partnership deed dated 21.05.2004. It is stated in paragraph 9 of the petition that there was no occasion for execution of the said partnership deed since the application was already filed for deleting names of respondent nos.5 and 6. It is stated that this partnership deed was never approved by the Collector. However, execution of this partnership deed is not specifically denied. It is averred that the partnership deed appears to be an attempt of taking unfair advantage of close relations between the petitioner and respondent nos.5 and 6. The averments pertaining to execution of partnership deed dated 21.05.2004 are evasive. 28. It appears from pleadings in paragraph 11 of the petition that after execution of partnership deed dated 21.05.2004, the petitioner again made an application on 28.05.2005 for recording her name in the licence. It is stated that after a detailed enquiry in the matter by the State Excise Department, the Collector passed order dated 20.07.2008 to transfer the licence in the name of petitioner. It is stated that intimation about the order dated 20.07.2008 is received by the petitioner vide communication dated 24.07.2008 issued by the Collector. It is not the case of the petitioner that the respondent nos.5 and 6 were noticed in the matter after she made fresh application dated 28.03.2005 for recording her name. There is no pleading participation of respondent nos.5 and 6 in the enquiry pursuant to application dated 28.03.2005. The order dated 20.07.2008 is passed behind the back of respondent nos.5 and 6. 29. Likewise, the statements in replies filed by respondent nos.5 and 6 that the petitioner and her sons had confirmed the fact of settlement before the Officers of State Excise Department vide statements recorded on 21.05.2004 is also not denied by filing any counter affidavit. As stated above, execution of the partnership deed dated 21.05.2004 is also not specifically denied in the petition. 30. As stated above, execution of the partnership deed dated 21.05.2004 is also not specifically denied in the petition. 30. It must also be stated that Regular Civil Suit No.137/2013 filed by the petitioner in order to challenge compromise decree dated 26.06.2003 in Regular Civil Suit No.262/2003 is not yet decided and is pending. Copy of plaint dated 11.03.2014 in the said suit is filed on record as Exhibit-E. 31. The petitioner has not made any avernment in the plaint in the said suit with respect subsequent partnership deed dated 21.05.2004. She has not challenged the said partnership deed. 32. Having regard to the facts of the case, the respondent no.1 has rightly appreciated that the compromise decree is still holding the field and fresh deed of partnership is executed on 21.05.2004 by petitioner and respondent nos.5 and 6 after demise of husband of the petitioner and in such circumstances, the petitioner filed second application dated 28.05.2005 and obtained the order for inclusion of her individual name in the licence by excluding the names of other two partners i.e. respondent nos.5 and 6. No fault can be found with the reasons recorded by the respondent no.1 in reversing the order passed by the learned Commissioner and restoring the order dated 14.11.2013 passed by the Collector. For the reasons aforesaid, no case is made out for interference with the order dated 04.07.2022 passed by the respondent no.1. 33. The Writ Petition stands dismissed with no orders as to cost. 34. Civil Applications, if any, stand disposed of. 1. At this stage, the learned Advocate for the petitioner makes a request to continue the interim order dated 19.07.2022. 2. Learned Advocate for the respondent nos.5 and 6 strongly opposes the request. 3. However, having regard to the fact that the interim order is operating almost for a period of three years, the same is extended upto 22.08.2025.