JUDGMENT : (Moushumi Bhattacharya, J.) 1. The present Appeal arises out of an order dated 19.07.2024 passed by the learned Principal Special Court in the Cadre of District Judge for Trial and Disposal of Commercial Disputes, at Hyderabad (‘the Commercial Court’) dismissing the appellant’s application (C.O.P.No.83 of 2016) for setting aside the arbitral Award dated 15.03.2016. The Appeal has been preferred under section 37 of The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (‘the 1996 Act’). 2. M/s.Visaka Industries Limited (‘Visaka’) was the claimant in the arbitration namely, COP No.83 of 2016. The dispute between the parties arose out of the Agreement dated 16.10.2004. The appellant terminated the said Agreement on 16.07.2011 and Visaka invoked the arbitration clause i.e., clause 15(iii) of the Agreement dated 16.10.2004 by way of a Notice dated 08.10.2010. 3. The brief facts forming the background to the arbitral Award and the impugned order are as follows. Facts: 3.1. Hyderabad Cricket Association (‘HCA’) and Visaka entered into an Agreement dated 16.10.2004 for in-stadia advertisement rights for construction of an International Cricket Stadium at Uppal Kancha, Hyderabad, to conduct domestic and international cricket matches, training and other programmes for the development and popularization of the game of cricket. The Recitals to the Agreement state, inter alia, that Visaka (referred to as ‘the Company’ in the Agreement) paid Rs.6.50 Crores to HCA for the exclusive vesting of the irrevocable right to name the Stadium as ‘Visaka International Cricket Stadium’ in the Company/Visaka and for the advertisement, publicity and display rights granted by HCA to Visaka. While things remained so, HCA claimed that it had received a letter dated 15.03.2008 from the Board of Control for Cricket in India (‘BCCI’) with regard to the proposed DLF-Indian Premier League (‘IPL’) matches to be conducted at the Stadium and also stipulated the terms and conditions towards the conduct of the IPL matches and on 02.04.2008, wrote to Visaka expressing its inability to honour its obligations under the Agreement dated 16.10.2004 by stating that their Agreement is not binding on the BCCI-IPL arrangement. 3.2. On 19.04.2008, Visaka filed an Application under section 9 of the 1996 Act vide O.P.No.689 of 2008 before the learned III Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, for restraining HCA from denying in-stadia advertisement rights during the IPL matches between 22.04.2008 to 01.06.2008, in violation of the Agreement dated 16.10.2004. 3.2. On 19.04.2008, Visaka filed an Application under section 9 of the 1996 Act vide O.P.No.689 of 2008 before the learned III Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, for restraining HCA from denying in-stadia advertisement rights during the IPL matches between 22.04.2008 to 01.06.2008, in violation of the Agreement dated 16.10.2004. By order dated 19.04.2008, the Trial Court granted a temporary injunction. On 08.10.2010, Visaka issued a Notice under section 11 of the 1996 Act to resolve the disputes pertaining to the rights and privileges arising out of the Agreement dated 16.10.2004 nominating Mr.M.R.Vikram as the Arbitrator. The fact that Mr.M.R.Vikram was a partner of M/s. Anandam & Co. was specifically mentioned in the said notice. 3.3. On 07.03.2011, HCA addressed a letter to Visaka stating that as per the License Agreement between the HCA and Visaka, the IPL matches are not included in the aforesaid Agreement. In response, Visaka issued a reply on 14.03.2011 asserting that the Agreement dated 16.10.2004 is not a License Agreement but an agreement specifically acknowledging various rights of Visaka. It also denied that IPL matches were excluded from the Agreement. 3.4. HCA terminated the Agreement dated 16.10.2004 by a letter dated 16.07.2011 on the ground of impossibility of performance. Visaka objected to the said termination by a letter dated 19.07.2011 and filed an application under section 9 of the 1996 Act vide O.P.No.754 of 2011 for interim protection before the learned Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, in September 2011. Visaka was granted interim protection by the City Civil Court, Hyderabad, on 16.09.2011 by way of a temporary injunction restraining HCA from interfering with any of the rights available to Visaka under the Agreement dated 16.10.2004. 3.5. Other orders were passed against HCA including one on 16.09.2011 finding HCA guilty of disobedience of the ad-interim injunction orders granted in favour of Visaka and ordering attachment of the properties of HCA. An Appeal filed by HCA under section 37(1)(a) of the 1996 Act, against the aforesaid order, was dismissed by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad on 17.10.2011. On 16.03.2012, the Supreme Court dismissed the SLP filed by the HCA against the order dated 17.10.2011. HCA wrote several letters to Visaka thereafter from 29.03.2012 to 29.05.2012 regarding its commitment under the Agreement dated 16.10.2004. 3.6. On 16.03.2012, the Supreme Court dismissed the SLP filed by the HCA against the order dated 17.10.2011. HCA wrote several letters to Visaka thereafter from 29.03.2012 to 29.05.2012 regarding its commitment under the Agreement dated 16.10.2004. 3.6. The arbitral Award was made on 15.03.2016 wherein Visaka’s claim of Rs.25.92 Crores was allowed with costs including the fee of the Arbitrators paid by Visaka as well as the incidental costs incurred by Visaka. Visaka was also held to be entitled to receive an interest @18% per annum till the date of realization. Aggrieved by the Award, HCA filed COP No.83 of 2016 for setting aside of the arbitral Award and the same was dismissed by the Commercial Court by the impugned order dated 19.07.2024. 4. Although the Memorandum of Appeal contains several grounds for challenging the impugned order dated 19.07.2024, the appellant/HCA has restricted the challenge in the present Appeal, essentially, to three grounds. Arguments: 5. The grounds argued by learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant are with regard to the dominant position of Mr.G.Vinod and Dr.G.Vivekanand as the Vice-President and Executive Member of the HCA, respectively. According to Senior Counsel, Mr.G.Vinod served as the President of HCA as well as the Director of Visaka in 2010 and 2004 respectively, whereas Dr.G.Vivekanand was the Executive Member from July 2012 to September 2014 and the President of HCA from March 2017- 2018 while also holding the position of the Managing Director in Visaka. Senior Counsel argues that the dominance and influence of these two persons resulted in HCA executing the Agreement dated 16.10.2004 under economic duress which unduly served the interests of Visaka. 6. Senior Counsel further argues that the appointment of Mr.M.R.Vikram as a nominee arbitrator on behalf of Visaka violates the requirements of fair disclosure as mandated under section 12(1)(a) of the Act as Mr.M.R.Vikram was a partner of M/s. M.Anandam & Co., which was the statutory auditor of Visaka. Senior Counsel has also urged that the Award is in conflict with sections 73 and 74 of The Indian Contract Act, 1872 (‘the 1872 Act’). 7. The particulars of these arguments will be discussed in the captioned heading in the later part of this judgment. 8. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent No.1/Visaka places emphasis on the limited scope of interference in an appeal filed under section 37 of the 1996 Act. 7. The particulars of these arguments will be discussed in the captioned heading in the later part of this judgment. 8. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent No.1/Visaka places emphasis on the limited scope of interference in an appeal filed under section 37 of the 1996 Act. Senior Counsel contends that the appellant is not entitled to raise factual issues for challenging the Award and the impugned order. Senior Counsel submits that the three grounds raised by the appellant in the present Appeal lack any factual basis since neither Mr.G.Vinod nor Dr.G.Vivekanad exerted any influence on HCA at the relevant time i.e., at the time of executing the Agreement dated 16.10.2004. It is further argued that the HCA acted upon the terms of the Agreement for more than three years and the rights granted to Visaka were minuscule in comparison to the total rights available in relation to the Stadium. 9. Senior Counsel further submits that Visaka invoked the arbitration clause by a Notice dated 08.10.2010 nominating Mr.M.R.Vikram as an Arbitrator upon full disclosure of Mr.Vikram’s position as a partner of M/s.M.Anandam & Co. This is also evidenced by Mr.M.R.Vikram’s letter dated 18.09.2011, which brought this information to the attention of the appellant and was endorsed by Mr.K.Suryanarayana, Advocate, who was representing HCA at the relevant time. 10. Counsel further relies on section 73 of The Indian Contract Act, 1872 to argue that the compensation/damages were rightly awarded by the Arbitral Tribunal since Visaka was denied its rights under the Agreement dated 16.10.2004 and consequentially suffered immeasurable losses due to the appellant’s termination of the Agreement. Decision: 11. The claim of the respondent No.1/Visaka (claimant before the Arbitral Tribunal consisting of three learned Arbitrators) encompassed the following facts: 12. HCA was looking for corporate entities for considering part-financing the construction of an International Cricket Stadium in Uppal Kancha, Hyderabad. HCA requested Visaka to act as one of the sponsors and to part-finance the project. Visaka agreed to the proposal and invested a sum of Rs.4.32 Crores. In return, HCA granted specific rights to Visaka for advertisement, publicity and display of Visaka’s company name, product, logo, trademark, promotional material or devices and certain other benefits/privileges to Visaka and its nominees. Incorporating the same, the parties executed an Agreement dated 16.10.2004 and agreed to be bound by the terms and conditions therein. In return, HCA granted specific rights to Visaka for advertisement, publicity and display of Visaka’s company name, product, logo, trademark, promotional material or devices and certain other benefits/privileges to Visaka and its nominees. Incorporating the same, the parties executed an Agreement dated 16.10.2004 and agreed to be bound by the terms and conditions therein. Though some of the clauses in the Agreement were later modified, Visaka continued to enjoy advertisement rights and other benefits under Clauses 2A and 2B of the Agreement. 13. Disputes arose between the parties leading to HCA terminating the Agreement dated 16.10.2004 on the ground of alleged impossibility of performance. Visaka invoked the arbitration clause i.e., clause 15(iii) of the Agreement dated 16.10.2004 and sought an award against HCA for recovery of damages amounting to Rs.25.92 Crores, being six times the consideration paid by Visaka to HCA under the Agreement dated 16.10.2004. Visaka also claimed interest @ 18% per annum and for an award declaring that the termination conveyed in HCA’s communication dated 16.07.2011 is void and non-est. Visaka also sought for a direction on HCA to pay one- time damages in terms of Clause 6(v) of the Agreement dated 16.10.2004. 14. The Arbitral Tribunal framed six issues, namely, (i) whether the Agreement dated 16.10.2004 was unenforceable for being executed by HCA under financial duress; (ii) whether HCA was entitled to terminate the said Agreement on the ground of impossibility of performance; (iii) whether only ‘Test Cricket Matches’ and ‘One Day International Cricket Matches’ were within the purview of the Agreement; (iv) whether Visaka was entitled to an award of Rs.25.92 Crores; (v) whether Visaka was entitled to a declaration that the termination of the Agreement dated 16.10.2004 was void and non-est and (vi) whether Visaka was entitled to any other reliefs?. 15. The Arbitral Tribunal found that HCA had failed to bring the existing rights of Visaka and the difficulties that would arise if Visaka was denied its rights under the terms of the Agreement to the notice of the BCCI. The Arbitral Tribunal also relied on the evidence given by the witness examined on behalf of HCA (RW.1), who specifically deposed that BCCI was never informed about the existing rights of Visaka/sponsor with regard to the Cricket Stadium. The Arbitral Tribunal also relied on the evidence given by the witness examined on behalf of HCA (RW.1), who specifically deposed that BCCI was never informed about the existing rights of Visaka/sponsor with regard to the Cricket Stadium. The Tribunal found that HCA failed to take necessary steps to inform BCCI about Visaka’s rights in the Stadium, particularly in the context of IPL matches to be held there. The Arbitral Tribunal accordingly held that the termination of the Agreement dated 16.10.2004 was unsustainable and further that IPL matches were within the purview of the said Agreement. The Arbitral Tribunal also held that the Agreement dated 16.10.2004 was enforceable and had not been executed by HCA under financial duress. 16. The Arbitral Tribunal found the termination of the Agreement by the HCA to be unjustified since HCA had failed to establish the element of impossibility or duress. The Award contains a specific finding that HCA did not allow Visaka to enjoy its rights under the Agreement and relied on Clause 6(v) of the Agreement dated 16.10.2004 which provided that HCA would be liable to pay Visaka liquidated damages amounting to six times the consideration paid by Visaka to HCA in the event HCA failed to provide to Visaka advertisement space and benefits in any year during the currency of the Agreement. The Arbitral Tribunal held that Visaka was entitled to Rs.25.92 Crores which is six times the amount paid by Visaka i.e., Rs.4.32 Crores along with 18% interest till realization. Visaka was also awarded costs of Rs.35,15,731/- along with 12% interest till realization. Positions of Conflict and Execution of the Agreement dated 16.10.2004 by HCA under Economic Duress 17. The case of the appellant/HCA is that Mr.G.Vinod and Dr.G.Vivekanand, who were the Chairman/Director and shareholders of Visaka, held important positions as the President/Vice-President and Executive Committee Member in HCA and exercised rampant control in the affairs of HCA. The appellant says that Mr.G.Vinod and Dr.G.Vivekanand were instrumental in HCA executing the Agreement dated 16.10.2004 giving undue privileges to Visaka. 18. Before giving our view on this argument, it is important to note that the alleged dominant position and exercise of power by these two gentlemen do not form the grounds in the Memorandum of Appeal. The only ground taken is that the Agreement was executed under economic duress and was impossible to perform. 19. 18. Before giving our view on this argument, it is important to note that the alleged dominant position and exercise of power by these two gentlemen do not form the grounds in the Memorandum of Appeal. The only ground taken is that the Agreement was executed under economic duress and was impossible to perform. 19. The appellant sought to take the ground of the alleged dominant position exercised by Mr.G.Vinod and Dr.G.Vivekanand only as part of the additional grounds in February, 2025, whereas the Award is of 15.03.2016 and the impugned order forming the basis of the present Appeal is dated 19.07.2024. 20. We have perused the 20th Annual Report of Visaka, which is a part of the Appeal papers. Clause 2 of the Annual Report for the Year 2001-2002 specifically records that Mr.G.Vinod ceased to be a Director of Visaka under section 283(1)(g) of The Companies Act, 1956. The Certified Copy of the Company Certificate of Visaka is also part of the records. Since the Agreement was executed after two years of the cessation of office by Mr.G.Vinod on 16.10.2004, we do not find any conflict of interest in the management of affairs of HCA or any basis to the argument of Mr.G.Vinod coercing HCA into executing the Agreement dated 16.10.2004. The HCA also has a Managing Committee as is reflected from the Annual Report for the year 2004-2005 which also discloses a list of office bearers consisting of former Test Cricketers, IPS Officers and members of the Managing Committee. Therefore, the argument of a single individual (Mr.G.Vinod) exercising all-pervasive control over the affairs of HCA and forcing the Agreement on HCA to the exclusion of its Managing Committee and office bearers is far- fetched. The evidence of Mr.N.Shivlal Yadav (RW.1) who was the Honorary Secretary of the HCA at the time of execution of the Agreement reinforces the all-important role of the Managing Committee of HCA at the relevant point of time. HCA has also not led any evidence in the Arbitration or before the Commercial Court or even in the present Appeal to substantiate such allegations. 21. Dr.G.Vivekanand also ceased to be the President of HCA after 2018. The reasons given for rejecting the allegations made against Mr.G.Vinod would be equally applicable for Dr.G.Vivekanand since there is no evidence of any conflict of interest on the part of this gentleman as well. 21. Dr.G.Vivekanand also ceased to be the President of HCA after 2018. The reasons given for rejecting the allegations made against Mr.G.Vinod would be equally applicable for Dr.G.Vivekanand since there is no evidence of any conflict of interest on the part of this gentleman as well. In such a case, it is impossible to accept a case of unilateral control over the affairs of HCA to the exclusion of its Managing Committee and office bearers. 22. The appellant/HCA has laboured to make out a case of undue influence and economic duress only to nullify the Agreement dated 16.10.2004 and to justify its termination on 16.07.2011. The appellant’s plea of impossibility of performance of the Agreement is linked to this argument. However, it is undisputed that the appellant acted upon and gave effect to the Agreement from 2004 till 2011 or at least four years before disputes arose between the parties. 23. The argument of impossibility of performance on the ground of the Agreement being one-sided i.e., in favour of Visaka, is purely a matter of construction of the contractual terms and one which is within the decision-making domain of the Arbitral Tribunal. The absence of any evidence on the conflict of interest of Mr.G.Vinod or Dr.G.Vivekanand or economic duress deflates the substance of the appellant’s argument. The appellant failing to even include these grounds in the Memorandum of Grounds in the present Appeal and seeking to supplement the same in February, 2025 that too by way of Additional Grounds goes to the root of the credibility of the argument. 24. I.A.No.1 of 2025 was filed by HCA on 10.02.2025 seeking permission to raise additional Grounds ‘W’ and ‘X’. 25. Ground ‘W’ pertains to the alleged dominant position wielded by Visaka in the management of HCA through Mr. G. Vinod and Dr.G.Vivekanand. Ground ‘X’ relates to the alleged ineligibility of Mr. M.R.Vikram as an Arbitrator including the contention that the letter issued by Mr. M.R.Vikram dated 18.09.2011 and the letter issued by HCA’s Advocate dated 20.09.2011 were not part of the records before the Arbitral Tribunal. 26. It is pertinent to note that the Appeal was filed by HCA on 27.09.2024 and was heard on several occasions by a Co- ordinate Bench commencing from 29.10.2024. The Appeal was thereafter considered by this Bench from 27.01.2025. 26. It is pertinent to note that the Appeal was filed by HCA on 27.09.2024 and was heard on several occasions by a Co- ordinate Bench commencing from 29.10.2024. The Appeal was thereafter considered by this Bench from 27.01.2025. However, the I.A. for raising additional grounds was filed only on 10.02.2025, and that too, only after the respondent pointed out that the Memorandum of Appeal did not contain any grounds pertaining to Mr.G.Vinod or Dr.G.Vivekanand. 27. The proceeding sheets would further show that the filing of the I.A. was brought to the notice of the Court only on 21.04.2025. Therefore, the inordinate delay on the part of the appellant in raising additional Ground ‘W’ remains unaccounted for. This delay is palpable in view of the fact that the appellant failed to raise such a ground either during the arbitration proceedings, which culminated in the Award dated 15.03.2016, or in the Trial Court proceedings including in the application for setting aside the Award. The dilatory tactics of the appellant even in the present Appeal are evident from the proceeding sheets and further weaken the appellant’s case for introducing additional grounds at this belated stage. 28. Ground ‘X’ is completely misconceived and devoid of merit, since the disclosure letters of Mr.M.R.Vikram dated 18.09.2011 and the acknowledgment thereof by HCA’s Advocate on 20.09.2011 were produced before this Court during the course of the hearing of the Appeal. HCA did not dispute the existence or content of these letters. 29. We, hence, do not find any reason to allow I.A.No.1 of 2025, which is clearly an afterthought and is liable to be rejected. I.A.No.1 of 2025 is accordingly dismissed. 30. The contention of economic duress would also be contradicted by the admitted fact of Visaka taking a loan of Rs.4.32 Crores from the Industrial Development Bank of India for the purpose of investing in the construction of an International Cricket Stadium at a huge interest rate liability. Having availed of the loan from Visaka and utilizing the same for construction of the International Cricket Stadium, it certainly does not behove HCA from the unsubstantiated and ex post-facto allegations of irregularities and misappropriation of funds of HCA on the part of the office bearers of Visaka. 31. Having availed of the loan from Visaka and utilizing the same for construction of the International Cricket Stadium, it certainly does not behove HCA from the unsubstantiated and ex post-facto allegations of irregularities and misappropriation of funds of HCA on the part of the office bearers of Visaka. 31. The orders passed by the Ombudsman on 08.03.2018 with regard to Dr.G.Vivekanand or the orders of the High Court and thereafter by the Supreme Court are not relevant for the overall factual conspectus including the attempt to link Mr.G.Vinod and Dr.G.Vivekanand on their commercial interest in HCA. The orders are of 2017 and 2018 whereas the disputes between the parties arose in 2008 and the Agreement was terminated on 16.07.2011. Ineligibility of Mr.M.R.Vikram as Arbitrator 32. Learned Senior Counsel has argued on behalf of the appellant/HCA that the third Arbitrator, is a Partner of M/s.M.Anandam & Co., which served as the statutory auditors of Visaka. HCA urges that Mr.M.R.Vikram’s appointment as one of the three Arbitrators is hit by section 12(1) of The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. 33. The documents forming part of the Appeal reflect the undisputed facts which include the Notice of invocation of the Arbitration Agreement by Visaka dated 08.10.2010 nominating Mr.M.R.Vikram as an Arbitrator. The Notice specifically mentions that Mr.M.R.Vikram is a Partner of M/s.M.Anandam & Co., Chartered Accountants, 7-A Surya Towers, S.P. Road, Secunderabad. This was followed by a letter issued by Mr.M.R.Vikram on 18.09.2011 informing both the parties that he is one of the partners of the statutory auditors of Visaka. This letter bears an endorsement of Mr.K.Suryanarayana, Advocate who was representing HCA at the material point of time. Mr.K.Suryanarayana also sent a letter dated 20.09.2011 on his letterhead which refers to the disclosure made by Mr.M.R.Vikram on 18.09.2011. 34. Both these documents were filed by Visaka along with its counter affidavit which is part of the record. HCA has not filed any reply affidavit to the aforesaid letters disclosed by Visaka or denied their existence. Admittedly, HCA did not raise the issue with regard to the alleged conflict of interest of Mr.M.R.Vikram till the proceedings before the Commercial Court in the section 34 application filed by HCA. 35. It is also undisputed that Mr.M.R.Vikram did not sign on the Balance Sheet of Visaka at any point of time and only served as one of the many partners of M/s. M.Anandam & Co. 35. It is also undisputed that Mr.M.R.Vikram did not sign on the Balance Sheet of Visaka at any point of time and only served as one of the many partners of M/s. M.Anandam & Co. Further, there is no evidence of M/s. M.Anandam & Co., exercising any control over the management of Visaka which would give rise to the possibility of bias or conflict of interest on the part of Mr. M.R. Vikram. 36. The issue of conflict of interest and bias of arbitrators has been addressed in section 12 of the 1996 Act read with the Fifth and Seventh Schedules thereto. Both these Schedules were introduced into the Act by the 2016 Amendment, which came into effect on 23.10.2015. In the present case, the arbitration agreement was invoked by Visaka’s Notice dated 08.10.2010 nominating Mr.M.R.Vikram as an Arbitrator much prior to the Amendment. As stated above, Mr.M.R.Vikram’s disclosure letter was sent to both the parties on 18.09.2011 followed by the letter of the HCA’s Advocate – Mr.Suryanarayana dated 20.09.2011. Therefore, the nomination of Mr.M.R.Vikram, the disclosure thereof and HCA’s acceptance of the same without demur were all completed prior to the amendment to the 1996 Act in 2016, which came into effect on 23.10.2015: West Bengal Housing Board Vs. Abhishek Construction, 2023 SCC OnLine Cal 827 . 37. It is undisputed that the date of the commencement of the arbitral proceedings in the present case was 08.10.2010, when Visaka invoked the arbitration clause in the agreement. The notice was received by HCA on 12.10.2010. Section 21 of the 1996 Act defines ‘commencement of arbitral proceedings’ as the date on which the request for reference of the dispute to arbitration is received by the respondent, unless otherwise agreed to by the partners. Both Visaka’s notice of invocation and HCA’s receipt/acknowledgment of the same are part of records. 38. Hence, it is undisputed that the arbitral proceedings commenced at least 5 years prior to the amendment to the 1996 Act, particularly, section 12(1) thereof. The amendment provided for a challenge to the appointment of an Arbitrator under clauses (a) and (b) of section 12(1) i.e. for failure to disclose any direct or indirect relationship or interest with any of the parties or the subject matter of the dispute which would give rise to justifiable doubts as to the Arbitrator’s independence: West Bengal Housing Board v. Abhishek Construction. Although section 12(1) of the 1996 Act guards against the possibility of bias or conflict of interest on the part of the Arbitrator, the very fact that Mr. M.R.Vikram disclosed his position as a partner of Visaka’s statutory auditor and that Visaka accepted the same without raising any objection as far back as in 2011 renders the Amendment argument irrelevant and settles the issue in favour of Visaka. 39. The decisions relied on by the appellant on the issue of bias and conflicts are distinguishable on facts. In Vinod Bhaiyalal Jain Vs. Wadhwani Parmeshwari Cold Storage Private Limited, 2019 SCC OnLine SC 904 counsel for one of the parties was appointed as the Arbitrator and had proceeded to deal with the dispute despite objections raised to his appointment. The Advocate had also not disclosed his association as counsel for the party concerned. In V.K.Dewan and Company Vs. Delhi Jal Board , [ 2010 15 SCC 717 ] , the Arbitrator was hired as a full-time consultant of Delhi Jal Board prior to his appointment as an Arbitrator. The issue before the Supreme Court in the recent decision of Central Organisation for Railway Electrification Vs. Eci Spic Smo Mcml (Jv) A Joint Venture Company , [2024 SCC OnLine SC 3219] was empanelment of the Arbitrators by Public Sector Undertakings and the restriction imposed on the other party in the matter of selection of its arbitrator from a panel curated by the Public Sector Undertakings. The Supreme Court however made a distinction between ‘ineligibility’ and ‘unilateral’ appointment of an arbitrator and held that the appointment of an arbitrator who is otherwise eligible under the Seventh Schedule to the Act should be permitted and that the impartiality of the arbitrator must be examined within the statutory framework of section 12(5) read with section 18 of the 1996 Act. 40. It is also relevant that Central Organisation (supra) frowned upon one of the parties to an arbitration agreement unilaterally constituting the Arbitral Tribunal or appointing a Sole Arbitrator which would hinder equal participation of the other party in the appointment process. The Supreme Court opined that such denial would militate against section 18 of the 1996 Act, which provides for equal treatment of the parties in the arbitration. The Supreme Court opined that such denial would militate against section 18 of the 1996 Act, which provides for equal treatment of the parties in the arbitration. The conclusions of the majority view in Central Organisation (supra) in paragraph 169 of the Report do not align with the factual conspectus of the present day. 41. In the facts before us, there is no doubt that Mr.M.R.Vikram duly disclosed his partnership in M/s.M.Anandam & Co., to the appellant which was acknowledged and referred to by the appellant’s counsel two days later. The appellant did not raise any objection regarding a potential conflict of interest or bias on the part of Mr. M.R. Vikram at any point during the arbitration proceedings which culminated in the Award dated 15.03.2016. The objection was raised much later before the Commercial Court in the section 34 proceedings. 42. As stated earlier, the appellant also did not respond to the disclosure letter of Mr. M.R.Vikram or to the letters of HCA’s Advocate dated 18.09.2011 and 20.09.2011 respectively, which formed part of Visaka’s counter affidavit filed on 12.02.2020. The appellant’s conduct and acquiescence would clearly fall under the express waiver exception in section 12(5) of the 1996 Act. The appellant’s acceptance of the appointment of Mr. M.R. Vikram is not one which is drawn by inference but one which is explicitly reflected in the communications between Mr.M.R.Vikram and the appellant in September, 2011. 43. The appellant subjecting itself to the Panel of the Arbitrators consisting of Mr.M.R.Vikram for the next five years amounts waiver of any objection to the appointment which is now being raised under the bar contained in section 12(1) read with the Fifth and Seventh Schedules thereto. 44. To sum up, we do not find the appointment of Mr.M.R.Vikram as one of the three Arbitrators in the panel to be in violation of the statutory safeguards against bias and lack of independence. Needless to say, there is a palpable difference between the unilateral appointment of a sole Arbitrator and the nomination of one Arbitrator in a panel of three Arbitrators. The 1996 Act guards against both unilateral and ineligible appointments. The perception of conflict or bias is relevant in cases involving the latter where the Act specifies the relationships which would give rise to conflict. The 1996 Act guards against both unilateral and ineligible appointments. The perception of conflict or bias is relevant in cases involving the latter where the Act specifies the relationships which would give rise to conflict. Allegations of bias or conflict are serious in nature and cannot be used to dismantle an Arbitral Tribunal or discredit an Arbitrator unless the appointment falls under one or more of the prohibited relationships. Moreover, any claim of conflict or bias would stand negated in the face of an express waiver by the objecting party as is in the present case. The conduct of HCA amounted to such an express waiver even if it is assumed that Mr.M.R. Vikram was disqualified from acting as an Arbitrator. 45. We accordingly reject the issue of eligibility of Mr.M.R. Vikram as one of the three Arbitrators constituting the Arbitral Tribunal. Is the Award in Conflict with sections 73 and 74 of The Indian Contract Act, 1872 ? 46. The appellant has sought to make out a case of the Arbitral Tribunal awarding damages to the respondent No.1/Visaka without considering the settled legal principles of sections 73 and 74 of The Indian Contract Act, 1872. The appellant argues that the Arbitral Tribunal failed to provide reasons for treating the amount specified in Clause 6(v) of the Agreement dated 16.10.2004 as a genuine pre-estimate of damages. According to Senior Counsel, liquidated damages can only be recovered if an actual loss has been suffered and not otherwise. Senior Counsel has also argued that the party alleging breach is under an obligation to lead evidence substantiating the compensation being claimed. 47. The intention of the parties, particularly HCA, as reflected in the Agreement dated 16.10.2004, is crucial for our decision under the captioned heading. 48. Clause 6(v) of the Agreement clearly stipulates that HCA shall be liable to pay Visaka liquidated damages equivalent to six times the consideration paid by Visaka to HCA. 47. The intention of the parties, particularly HCA, as reflected in the Agreement dated 16.10.2004, is crucial for our decision under the captioned heading. 48. Clause 6(v) of the Agreement clearly stipulates that HCA shall be liable to pay Visaka liquidated damages equivalent to six times the consideration paid by Visaka to HCA. The specific words of Clause 6(v) of the Agreement is set out below: ‘In the event respondent fails to provide to the petitioner in any year during the currency of the agreement advertisement and publicity and display place or space or any one or more of the facilities, privileges and benefits aforesaid, the respondent shall all be liable to pay to the company liquidated damages of an amount equal to six times the consideration paid by the company to the association.’ 49. It is undisputed that HCA entered into the Agreement with Visaka unequivocally agreeing to this clause. It is also undisputed that HCA neither raised any complaint nor objection to any clause thereof during or after signing the Agreement for almost four years thereafter. Hence, HCA’s objection to the award of damages to Visaka which is stipulated within the parameters of Clause 6(v) of the Agreement is not only an afterthought but also contrary to section 74 of the Act, as discussed in the following paragraphs. 50. Section 74 of the 1872 Act is relevant to the present proceeding. Section 74 provides for compensation for breach of contract where the penalty has been stipulated, following the allegation of breach alleged by the claiming party. Section 73, on the other hand, provides for compensation for loss or damage caused by a breach of a contract entitling the aggrieved party to receive compensation from the party in breach. Compensation for the loss suffered by the first party naturally arises in the course of events following such a breach. The key difference between the two sections lies in the quantification or stipulation of the penalty which is to be paid by the party committing the breach to the other. 51. The present case falls under section 74 of the 1872 Act since Clause 6(v) of the Agreement clearly stipulates that HCA shall be liable to pay Visaka liquidated damages equal to six times the consideration paid by Visaka to HCA. 51. The present case falls under section 74 of the 1872 Act since Clause 6(v) of the Agreement clearly stipulates that HCA shall be liable to pay Visaka liquidated damages equal to six times the consideration paid by Visaka to HCA. Considering the intention of the parties, as reflected in Clause 6(v) of the Agreement, the decision of the Arbitral Tribunal to award Rs.25.92 Crores (i.e., Rs.4.32 Crores x 6) is straightforward and strictly in accordance with the contractual terms. The award does not constitute any deviation from the Agreement nor any reflection of an unreasonable quantum arrived at by the Arbitral Tribunal. We accordingly do not find the amount of Rs.25.92 Crores awarded towards damages as unfounded or arbitrary. 52. We also wish to reiterate that section 74 of the Act specifies, inter alia, that the party complaining of the breach is entitled to receive reasonable compensation from the other party whether or not actual damage or loss is proved to have been caused thereby (underlined for emphasis). In other words, section 74 does not require the complaining party to adduce evidence of loss, provided the contract stipulates the quantum of damages to be payable in the event of a breach. 53. We should briefly refer to the nature of the rights granted to Visaka under the Agreement in this context and the near- impossible task of quantifying the damages. Clause 2A(ix) of the Agreement dated 16.10.2004 specifically records that the rights/facilities extended to Visaka under the Agreement shall be reserved for the exclusive use of Visaka at all times, irrespective of whether any matches or other events are being held or conducted in the Stadium or at any part thereof. Clause 2A specifically provides for exclusive development/promotion space for the use of Visaka’s name, products, logo, trademark and other promotional material for advertisement and publicity. The extent of the space provided to Visaka for in-stadia advertisement would show that Visaka’s right cannot be restricted to designated places but must be measured in terms of the visibility of its advertisements in relation to the viewers present in the stadium seeing advertisement at a given point of time. 54. The broadcast coverage of the IPL matches would have ensured that the advertisements were viewed by millions of eyeballs during the telecast of the match with shots of the Cricket Stadium in the background prominently displaying Visaka’s branding. 54. The broadcast coverage of the IPL matches would have ensured that the advertisements were viewed by millions of eyeballs during the telecast of the match with shots of the Cricket Stadium in the background prominently displaying Visaka’s branding. In essence, Visaka’s in-stadia rights were secured for the lifetime of the stadium, regardless of the nature of the match being played. 55. Therefore, by being deprived of its contractual right to air its advertisements to millions of viewers during the telecast of IPL matches, Visaka suffered damages for an unquantifiable sum. The visibility of Visaka’s advertisements during the broadcast would have depended on the number of shots and camera angles shown on the screen making it virtually impossible to quantify the injury suffered by Visaka due to the termination of the contract by HCA. Moreover, it is undeniable that at least three seasons of IPL Matches, T20 Championship League Matches, Test Matches and 1-Day Internationals would have been played in the Stadium each year, reinforcing Visaka’s entitlement to reasonable damages for being deprived of its rights under the Agreement. The reasonableness of the amount specified in Clause 6(v) of the Agreement is further supported in the context of Visaka’s rights under the Agreement. 56. We, therefore, do not find any reason to hold that the award of damages, made strictly within the Clause 6(v) of the Agreement, was unreasonably quantified and there is no scope of coming to any finding contrary to the record. 57. The law as settled by the Supreme Court is that the terms of the contract are required to be taken into consideration before arriving at any conclusion regarding a party’s entitlement to damages particularly when the terms of the contract are clear and unambiguous. The Court is also competent to award reasonable compensation in case of breach even if no actual damage is proved to have been suffered in consequence of the breach of a contract: Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Ltd Vs. Saw Pipes Ltd. , [ (2003) 5 SCC 705 ] The fact that damages are difficult to assess with precision strengthens the position that a sum agreed to between the parties represents a genuine attempt to estimate it and to overcome difficulties of proof at the trial: Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. Reliance Communication Limited , [6 (2011) 1 SCC 394 ] 58. In Kailash Nath Associates Vs. Reliance Communication Limited , [6 (2011) 1 SCC 394 ] 58. In Kailash Nath Associates Vs. Delhi Development Authority, (2015) 4 SCC 136 the Supreme Court held that the requirement to prove actual damage or loss is not dispensed with where it is possible to prove such damage or loss. However, the liquidated amount named in the contract, as a genuine pre-estimate of damage or loss, can be awarded when the damage or loss is difficult or impossible to prove. A similar view was taken in Larsen & Toubro Limited Vs. Puri Construction Private Limited, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 830 where it was held that the correct method of computing damages would be to determine the prevailing market rate at the time of the breach and the proceeds which the party would have received from the sale of its shares at the relevant point of time. 59. The above reasons persuade us to reject the argument that the Award is contrary to sections 73 and 74 of The Indian Contract Act,1872. The Impugned Order dated 19.07.2024 60. The appellant/HCA (the petitioner before the Commercial Court in the application under section 34 of the 1996 Act for setting aside of the Award dated 15.03.2016), raised several objections with regard to the illegality in the constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal, denial of equal treatment to the appellant and the procedure adopted by the Arbitral Tribunal. 61. We do not find it necessary to deal with these points since the appellant has limited the scope of the present Appeal only to the captioned headings, i.e., undue influence exerted by Mr.G.Vinod and Dr.G. Vivekanand, conflict of interest involving Mr.M.R. Vikram and the award of damages being contrary to The Indian Contract Act, 1872. We, accordingly propose to examine only the view taken by the Commercial Court on these three issues. 62. The Commercial Court relied on the Notice issued by Mr.M.R.Vikram on 08.10.2010 wherein Mr.Vikram had disclosed his position in M/s.Anandam & Co. and the fact that HCA failed to raise any objection before the Arbitral Tribunal regarding his appointment or participation as an Arbitrator. The Commercial Court also noted that HCA raised this objection only in an I.A. filed in 2017 under Order VII Rule 14 of The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for deciding the point as a preliminary issue. and the fact that HCA failed to raise any objection before the Arbitral Tribunal regarding his appointment or participation as an Arbitrator. The Commercial Court also noted that HCA raised this objection only in an I.A. filed in 2017 under Order VII Rule 14 of The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for deciding the point as a preliminary issue. The Commercial Court relied on section 12 of the 1996 Act, as it stood prior to the 2015 Amendment, and held that HCA’s failure to establish justifiable doubt on Mr.M.R.Vikram’s independence could not amount to a challenge to his appointment. 63. On the ground of financial duress exerted by Mr. Vinod and Dr.G.Vivekanand, the Commercial Court found that HCA failed to raise any such objection after the execution of the Agreement on 16.10.2004. The Commercial Court noted that the Arbitral Tribunal found no evidence suggesting that the Agreement was either unenforceable or obtained under financial duress. The Commercial Court also noted that HCA adhered to the terms and conditions of the Agreement from 2004 to 2011, granting Visaka in-stadia advertisement rights for all matches which were to be held in the stadium but had failed to mention the ground of economic duress or undue influence in its termination notice dated 16.07.2011. 64. The Commercial Court further found that after having honoured the terms and conditions of the Agreement dated 16.10.2004 for seven years till 2011, HCA cannot now take the stand of impossibility of performance as a justification for terminating the Agreement. The Commercial Court also held that HCA had agreed to discuss the matter with BCCI to protect the interest of Visaka in its letter dated 19.04.2009 but admitted in the cross-examination that it had failed to bring existing rights of Visaka under the Agreement to the notice of BCCI. 65. The Commercial Court also relied on sections 73 and 74 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 which provides for compensation for loss or damage caused as a result of breach of contract and relied on Clause 6(v) of the Agreement to hold that the parties had already specified the amount to be paid as liquidated damages in case of breach. 66. The Commercial Court accordingly found that HCA had failed to make out valid grounds for setting aside the Award dated 15.03.2016 and that the Award did not call for interference. 66. The Commercial Court accordingly found that HCA had failed to make out valid grounds for setting aside the Award dated 15.03.2016 and that the Award did not call for interference. The Commercial Court accordingly dismissed HCA’s application (COP.No.83 of 2016) under section 34 of the 1996 Act for setting aside of the Award dated 15.03.2016. 67. We have given a comprehensive narration of the Arbitral Award as well as the impugned order for a complete understanding of the reasons given by the Arbitral Tribunal for awarding damages to the claimant/Visaka and for declaring that HCA’s termination of the Agreement to be void ab initio. The reasons given by the Commercial Court for upholding the Arbitral Award would show that both the Award as well as the impugned order are not only replete with reasons but also articulate Visaka’s entitlement to damages and a declaration against the termination of the Agreement. The reasons are strictly within the statutory parameters including of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 and within the interference-barriers under the scheme of The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. 68. We have no doubt that the Arbitral Tribunal considered the entire material before it including the evidence given by the witnesses for HCA for coming to just conclusions. There is no scope for holding that the Arbitral Tribunal took into account irrelevant considerations or ignored the actual issues brought before it. Likewise, the Commercial Court in the application for setting aside of the Award, gave due weightage to the findings of the Arbitral Tribunal as the Master of facts and refused to interfere with the Award since there was, in fact, no scope for interference in the findings arrived at by the Arbitral Tribunal. In other words, we do not find the Award or the impugned order to be patently illegal, perverse or contrary to the law of the land. Curtailment of Interference 69. We started the judgment with the important caveat of the limited powers of the Appeal Court in re-appraising the factual conspectus before the Arbitral Tribunal. This restriction is an inalienable part of section 34(2)(b) and the Explanation 2 thereto. The proviso to 34(2)(a) of the 1996 Act only strengthens the position. 70. Section 34(2)(b) of the 1996 Act and the Explanation 2 thereto are set out below: ‘(2) An arbitral award may be set aside by the Court only if – (a)................ This restriction is an inalienable part of section 34(2)(b) and the Explanation 2 thereto. The proviso to 34(2)(a) of the 1996 Act only strengthens the position. 70. Section 34(2)(b) of the 1996 Act and the Explanation 2 thereto are set out below: ‘(2) An arbitral award may be set aside by the Court only if – (a)................ (b) the Court finds that – (i) the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law for the time being in force, or (ii) the arbitral award is in conflict with the public policy of India. ….. Explanation 2.—For the avoidance of doubt, the test as to whether there is a contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law shall not entail a review on the merits of the dispute.’ 71. The scope of interference of the Appeal Court under section 37 is a continuation of proceedings from section 34 of the said Act and hence puts further fetters on a re-assessment of the decision of the setting-aside proceeding. In other words, the Act contemplates tightening the contours of interference as the Award travels up the litigation-ladder. 72. The consensus which can be gleaned from the cited cases is that interference in an appeal under section 37 of the 1996 Act cannot travel beyond the restrictions laid down under section 34 of the 1996 Act i.e., the Court cannot undertake an independent assessment of the merits of the award and must only ascertain whether the power exercised by the section 34 Court had exceeded beyond the recourse under the said provision: MMTC Limited Vs. Vedanta Limited , [ (2019) 4 SCC 163 ] . The Supreme Court expressed its agreement with the aforesaid view in S.V. Samudram Vs. State of Karnataka, (2024) 3 SCC 623 and relied upon UHL Power Company Ltd. Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh , [ (2022) 4 SCC 116 ] to emphasize the circumscribed nature of the exercise of power under sections 34 and 37 of the Act unless the award is found to be perverse or contrary to public policy. The hands-off approach of the Court in a section 37 appeal was again reiterated by the Supreme Court in C&C Constructions Ltd. Vs. IRCON International Ltd. , [2025 SCC OnLine SC 218] and in Somdatt Builders – NCC – NEC(JV) Vs. National Highways Authority of India, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 170. The hands-off approach of the Court in a section 37 appeal was again reiterated by the Supreme Court in C&C Constructions Ltd. Vs. IRCON International Ltd. , [2025 SCC OnLine SC 218] and in Somdatt Builders – NCC – NEC(JV) Vs. National Highways Authority of India, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 170. Cases cited on behalf of the Appellant/Award-debtor 73. Vinod Bhaiyalal Jain Vs. Wadhwani Parmeshwari Cold Storage Private Limited (supra) involved a case where the Arbitrator had filed a Vakalath to represent one of the parties to the arbitration but appeared as the Arbitrator in the dispute two years thereafter. The Supreme Court found that the Arbitrator had failed to disclose that he had appeared as counsel for one of the parties in another case. In V.K.Dewan and Company Vs. Delhi Jal Board (supra) the respondent – Delhi Jal Board had appointed the Arbitrator as a full-time consultant on a stipulated salary during the course of Arbitration. 74. Central Organisation (supra) involved a clear case of denying equal participation to the other party by limiting the choice to a panel curated by the Railways. A majority of the 5- Judge Bench accordingly found the clause to be in violation of equal rights enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 75. Ellora Paper Mills Limited Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2022) 3 SCC 1 was a case of actual bias since the Arbitral Tribunal consisted of the Stationery Purchase Committee comprising of the officers of the respondent State. The Supreme Court thus found the Arbitral Tribunal to be ineligible under section 12(5) of the 1996 Act read with Seventh Schedule. 76. Thus, it can be seen that the cases relied on by the appellant/Award-debtor are wholly different on facts and involved a direct possibility of bias and lack of neutrality. In the present case, apart from the arbitration being commenced much before the 2015 amendment to the 1996 Act, there was also a specific disclosure by the Arbitrator at the time of his appointment which was received and acknowledged on behalf of the Award-debtor. 77. In Kailash Nath Associates Vs. Delhi Development Authority (supra) the Supreme Court reinforced that damages can be awarded in cases where the damage or loss is difficult or impossible to prove and the liquidated amount is named in the contract. Fateh Chand Vs. 77. In Kailash Nath Associates Vs. Delhi Development Authority (supra) the Supreme Court reinforced that damages can be awarded in cases where the damage or loss is difficult or impossible to prove and the liquidated amount is named in the contract. Fateh Chand Vs. Balkishan Dass , [ AIR 1963 SC 1405 ] laid down the legal position of section 74 of The Indian Contract Act, 1872, that the Court will award the aggrieved party only reasonable compensation not exceeding the penalty stipulated in the contract where the contract pre-determines the damages or provides for forfeiture of property by way of penalty. It was further held that the compensation is to be ascertained having regard to the conditions existing on the date of the breach. It is a settled position of law that whether a contractual provision is to be treated as penalty is a matter of construction which is to be resolved by asking whether the pre-dominant contractual function was to deter a party from breaking the contract or to compensate the innocent party for the breach. The question to be asked is whether the alleged penalty clause can pass muster as a genuine pre-estimate of loss: Chitty on Contracts 30 th Edn - paragraphs 26 – 136. 78. The case law on the subject also lays down that the terms of the contract are required to be taken into consideration and that section 74 should be read with section 73 of the 1872 Act for awarding reasonable compensation in case of breach even if there is no proof of actual damage being suffered: Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Ltd Vs. Saw Pipes Ltd., (supra). Moreover, there is no general liberty reserved to the Courts to absolve a party from the liability to perform his/her part of the contract merely on account of an uncontemplated turn of events: Travancore Devaswom Board Vs. Thanath International , (2004) 13 SCC 44 . 79. Contrary to the allegations made by the Award-debtor with regard to undue influence and financial duress on the part of the Award-holder, there is no evidence of the former registering any protest before or soon after the Agreement or taking any steps to avoid the contract at any point of time: M/s.Unikol Bottlers Ltd. vs. M/s.Dhillon Kool Drinks , ( 1994 (28) DRJ 482 ) :: Double Dot Finance Ltd. Vs. Goyal MG Gases Ltd., 2005 (80) DRJ 113 . Indeed, the Award- debtor has not brought any evidence of the Award-debtor being left with no other option but to give consent or unable to take independent action by reason of duress or coercion exerted by the Award-holder. 80. Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Ltd Vs. Western Geco International Ltd., dwelt on perversity and irrationality of decisions on the touchstone of the Wednesbury Principles of reasonableness and held that decisions which fall short of that standard are open to challenge in a Court of law. The Supreme Court however reiterated that the Arbitral Tribunal enjoys considerable latitude in making awards unless the award is untenable on the face of it or results in miscarriage of justice. The Award in the present case does not invite any interference on the ground of either being unreasonable or perverse as in ignoring relevant evidence or taking into account irrelevant matters. The Award contains sufficient reasons to justify the conclusions. Conclusion 81. The diverse judgments relied on by the Award-debtor from 2015-2018 and the orders passed by the Supreme Court in 2022 and 2023, in matters involving BCCI and the HCA are irrelevant to the present dispute. All these judgments/orders were passed on totally different factual considerations involving, inter alia, the internal affairs of HCA. We fail to see how the aforesaid judgments can have a bearing on the present matter where the dispute arises out of the Agreement dated 16.10.2004 and the Award dated 15.03.2016 passed by the Arbitral Tribunal consisting of three learned Arbitrators. The fact- situation of the present Appeal filed under section 37 of the 1996 Act is entirely different and the Court must restrict the adjudication only to the Award and the impugned order. 82. Given the said position of law and the bona fides of Visaka’s claim against HCA, we do not find any reason to mark a departure from the Award or the impugned order. We accordingly hold that HCA has failed to make out any grounds for interference in the impugned order passed by the Commercial Court on 19.07.2024 or the Arbitral Award dated 15.03.2016. 83. It is also worthwhile to mention that HCA has blown hot and cold even in the present Appeal in terms of pursuing the application for interim stay of the Arbitral Award (after nine years) and hearing of the main Appeal. 83. It is also worthwhile to mention that HCA has blown hot and cold even in the present Appeal in terms of pursuing the application for interim stay of the Arbitral Award (after nine years) and hearing of the main Appeal. HCA was never inclined to provide statutory security for stay of the Award but tested its luck at all levels only to get an unfair and shortlived edge over Visaka. In short, HCA exposed its unsportsman-like colours and whatever game it may have played, it was certainly not cricket in the fairest sense of the term. 84. COMCA.No.32 of 2024, along with I.A.No.1 of 2025, is dismissed. All other connected Applications are disposed of. Interim orders, if any, shall stand vacated.