Judgment : (Rajani Dubey, J.) 1. This present acquittal appeal is preferred under Section 378 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, against the judgment dated 03.10.2016 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, District- Bilaspur (C.G.) in Complaint Case No. 13856/2014, whereby the respondent /accused was acquitted of the charge under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. 2. Brief facts of the case as adumbrated is that appellant/complainant company and the respondent/accused had entered into an agreement, on 14.08.2008, wherein the respondent/accused had obtained signal for free during the period from month of September 2008 to month of November 2008 and thereafter made payment of the cost of the signal obtained. That, the respondent/accused had obtained signal from appellant/complainant company in the month of June 2009 and had issued question cheque no. 327252 dated 15.06.2009 to the tune of Rs. 49,158/- of Punjab National Bank Branch Sadar Bazar Bilaspur for the cost of signal the respondent had obtained. The appellant/complainant company presented the said cheque before Axis Bank branch Bilaspur for withdrawal , where the appellant/complainant company was apprised that Cheque No. 327252 was dishonoured due to insufficient funds in his bank account on 17.06.2009. Thereafter, appellant/complainant company sent a legal notice dated 16.07.2009 through his advocate and the same was received by the respondent/accused. Despite receiving the notice, the respondent/accused did not pay the cheque amount within the stipulated time period, as such, a complaint under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was instituted before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Bilaspur, which was registered as Complaint Case No. 13856/2014. Upon appreciation of the evidence and record and after hearing the parties, learned Trial Court has acquitted the respondent/accused of the said charge levelled against him on the ground that the complaint has not been filed by the competent authority and preferred the breach of section 142-A of the Negotiable Instrument Act,1881. Hence, this acquittal appeal filed by the appellant/complainant company. 3. In support of the complaint, the appellant/complainant company examined its Director Abhishek Agrawal as CW-01 and in his defence the accused/respondent has examined 02 defence witnesses. 4. The learned trial Court after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence by judgment dated 03.10.2016, acquitted the respondent of the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. Hence, this acquittal appeal filed by the appellant/complainant. 5. 4. The learned trial Court after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence by judgment dated 03.10.2016, acquitted the respondent of the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. Hence, this acquittal appeal filed by the appellant/complainant. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the impugned judgment is illegal, erroneous and contrary to the facts and circumstances of the case as well as law and passed against the provisions of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The learned trial Court acquitted the respondent on this ground that the complaint has been filed by the power of attorney holder beyond power of filing the complaint which is illegal and perverse in the eyes of law. The learned trial Court ignored Ex. P/08 and concluded that Mukesh Mishra has no rights to file complaint on behalf of Complainant Company. The learned trial Court wrongly concluded that the complaint is not filed in accordance with law because Director namely Abhishek Agrawal has not verified and produced the complaint and the learned trial Court overlooked the principle that complaint could not have been dismissed on the ground that complaint was defective and company could with the permission of the court at any stage also rectify the alleged defect, as per 2006(2) MPHT 396 . The learned trial Court wrongly acquitted the appellant on the basis of defect of the power of attorney and signature. These defects are curable as per the principle laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of Indra Kumar Patodiya and Ors. Vs. Reliance Industries Limited and Ors. reported in 2013(1) Crimes 84(SC). So, the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside and the respondent is liable to be convicted. 6. Reliance has been placed on the decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of M.M.T.C. Ltd. and Anr. Vs. Medchl Chemicals and Pharma (P) Ltd. reported in (2002) 1 SCC 234 . 7. Learned counsel for the respondent supporting the impugned judgment submits that the learned trial Court has minutely appreciated the oral and documentary evidence and rightly acquitted the respondent, in appeal against acquittal, the scope is very limited. As such, this judgment is well merited and this appeal being devoid of any merit is liable to be dismissed. 8. Reliance has been placed on the decisions of Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of M/s TRL Krosaki Refractories Ltd. Vs. As such, this judgment is well merited and this appeal being devoid of any merit is liable to be dismissed. 8. Reliance has been placed on the decisions of Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of M/s TRL Krosaki Refractories Ltd. Vs. M/s SMS Asia Private Limited and Anr. passed in CRA No. 270 of 2022 on 22.02.2022. 9. I have heard both the counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 10. From bare perusal of the record of learned trial Court it is evident that the complainant company filed complaint against the respondent/accused under Section 138 of NI Act and the complaint was filed by the power of attorney holder viz. Mukesh Mishra. The learned trial Court finds in para 16 which is reproduced herein for ready reference as under:- ^^16^mijksDr of.kZr dafMdkvksa esa ;g fu/kkZfjr fd;k tk pqdk gS fd izdj.k esa eqds'k feJk dks ifjoknh daiuh dh vksj ls ifjokn is'k djus dh vf/kdkfjrk ugha gS rFkk Mk;jsDVj vfHk"ksd vxzoky }kjk vius i{k esa izLrqr mDr nLrkost iz0ih0 7 ls iz0ih0 10 ds nLrkostksa ls ifjoknh dks dksbZ ykHk ugh feyrk gSA ftlls Li"V gS fd izLrqr ifjokn vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 142&, ds vuqlkj l{ke eq[rkjukek /kkjd] ;k vknkrk }kjk fyf[kr esa izkf/kd`r O;fDr ds }kjk lafLFkr ugha fd;k x;k gSA Qyr% ,sls ifjokn esa vfHk;qDr dks vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 138 ds vijk/k esa nks"kh ugha ekuk tk ldrk gSA bl izdkj mijksDr laiw.kZ foospuk ls ;g Li"V gS fd ifjoknh vius }kjk izLrqr ifjokn dks vfHk;qDr ds fo:} ;qfDr;qDr lansg ls ijs lkfcr djus esa vlQy jgk gSA^^ 11. Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of M.M.T.C Ltd. and Anr (supra) held in para 12 as under:- “ 12 . In the case of Associated Cement Co. Ltd. v. Keshavanand it has been held by this Court that the complainant has to be a corporeal person who is capable of making a physical appearance in the court. It has been held that if a complaint is made in the name of an incorporeal person (like a company or corporation) it is necessary that a natural person represents such juristic person in the court. It is held that the court looks upon the natural person to be the complainant for all practical purposes. It has been held that if a complaint is made in the name of an incorporeal person (like a company or corporation) it is necessary that a natural person represents such juristic person in the court. It is held that the court looks upon the natural person to be the complainant for all practical purposes. It is held that when the complainant is a body corporate it is the de jure complainant, and it must necessarily associate a human being as de facto complainant to represent the former in court proceedings. It has further been held that no Magistrate shall insist that the particular person, whose statement was taken on oath at the first instance, alone can continue to represent the company till the end of the proceedings. It has been held that there may be occasions when different persons can represent the company. It has been held that it is open to the de jure complainant company to seek permission of the court for sending any other person to represent the company in the court. Thus, even presuming, that initially there was no authority, still the company can, at any stage, rectify that defect. At a subsequent stage the company can send a person who is competent to represent the company. The complaints could thus not have been quashed on this ground. 12. Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of Kaptan Singh Thakur Vs. M/s. Betwa Developers Ltd. reported in 2006(2) M.P.H.T. 396 held in paragraph 25 as under:- “25. So far as the objection in regard to the defective resolution of the complainant company is concerned, merely because the resolution is not happily worded, at the threshold, and that too at the time of framing of the charge, the compalint can not be dismissed. The Supreme Court in the case of M/s. M.M.T.C. Ltd. (supra); has taken much care of it and has held that merely because complainant has signed and presented by a person who is neither as authorized agent nor a person empowered under the Articles of Association or by any resolution of the Board to do so, is no ground to quash the complaint. The Supreme Court has further held that it is open to the complainant company to seek permission of the Court for sending any other person to represent the company in the Court and therefore, even presuming that initially there was no authority, still the company can at any stage, rectify that defect. Since sufficient light on the controversy has been thrown by the Supreme Court in this decision, therefore, it is not necessary to discuss the decision of M/s. Nibro Limited (supra) and M/s. Satish and Company (supra), which were placed reliance by learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner.” 13.In this case also it is clear from the order sheet that this complaint was filed by the Power of Attorney holder and at the time of registration, the learned trial Court on 17.09.2009 considered the statement of the complainant and registered the case against the respondent. It is also clear from the order sheet dated 11.12.2012 that the learned trial Court allowed the application of the complainant and the complainant again filed additional documents which are related to authorised person. It is further clear from Ex. P/08 that the company authorised Mr. Mukesh Mishra to file complaint case against the respondent. So, it is evident that the company’s Director Mr. Abhishek Agrawal filed his affidavit under Order 18 Rule 4 as examination-in-chief and he appeared in witness box for cross-examination. However, the learned trial Court did not appreciate the statement of Abhishek Agrawal and also not considered Ex. P/08. It is clear from Ex. P/01 cheque, that this cheque was issued by the respondent and the respondent Shrikant Verma did not appear before the learned trial Court for cross-examination. 14.It is clear from statement of accused/respondent in question No. 2 and he admitted this fact that “QthZ Vhi vafdr djkbZ xbZ” and thereby, denied all the allegations. The respondent also examined Manager Dileep Chawde (DW/01), where he stated that the account of Shrikant Verma is Ex. D/02. The complainant filed cheque vide Ex. P/01, Bank memo vide Ex. P/02 and notice vide Ex. P/03 and also agreement vide Ex. P/06 and as per complainant this agreement was signed by the respondent, but he did not appear before the learned trial Court. D/02. The complainant filed cheque vide Ex. P/01, Bank memo vide Ex. P/02 and notice vide Ex. P/03 and also agreement vide Ex. P/06 and as per complainant this agreement was signed by the respondent, but he did not appear before the learned trial Court. The learned trial Court also finds that the agreement was executed between the complainant company and the respondent Shrikant Verma and the respondent Shrikant Verma issued post dated cheque, but the learned trial Court dismissed the complaint on technical ground. It is clear from the finding that the learned trial Court did not appreciate Ex. P/08 which is authority letter company in favour of Mukesh Mishra to file legal cases against the respondent’s company. It is also clear that the learned trial Court on the basis of statement of Mukesh Mishra, registered the complaint and as per the guideline of the Hon’ble Apex Court even presuming that initially there was no authority still the company can at any stage rectify the defect and in this case at the time of statement company filed Ex. P/05 to Ex. P/09 documents and Ex. P/07 and Ex. P/08 are authority letter in favour of Mukesh Mishra, who filed this complaint. However, the learned trial Court did not appreciate these documents, as such the findings recorded by the learned trial Court are not according to the guideline of Hon’ble Apex Court. So impugned judgment dated 03.10.2016 is not sustainable. 15. Ex consequenti, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment dated 03.10.2016 is liable to be set aside and is hereby set aside. The respondent/accused is convicted under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act and he is sentenced to pay fine of Rs. 60,000/- (Rupees Sixty Thousand only) to the appellant/complainant as compensation under Section 357(3) of Cr.P.C. to the appellant/complainant within a period of six months from the date of receipt of copy of this judgment. In case of default of payment of fine, he shall undergo simple imprisonment for 01 year.