- JUDGMENT : V. GOPALA KRISHNA RAO, J. 1. This second appeal is filed aggrieved against the Judgment and decree dated 24.01.2015 in A.S.No.147 of 2012 on the file of learned I Additional Senior Civil Judge, Kakinada, East Godavari District, confirming the Judgment and decree dated 25.08.2011 in O.S.No.645 of 2004 on the file of learned II Additional Junior Civil Judge, Kakinada, East Godavari District. 2. The appellant herein is the plaintiff and the respondents herein are the defendants in O.S.No.645 of 2004 on the file of learned II Additional Junior Civil Judge, Kakinada, East Godavari District. 3. The plaintiff initiated action in O.S.No.645 of 2004 on the file of learned II Additional Junior Civil Judge, Kakinada, with a prayer to grant permanent injunction restraining the defendants, their henchmen, agents etc. from ever interfering with the plaintiffs peaceful possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property in any manner till completion of 99 years lease period from 12th March, 1967 and for costs of the suit. 4. The learned II Additional Junior Civil Judge, Kakinada, dismissed the suit without costs. Felt aggrieved of the same, the unsuccessful plaintiff in the above said suit filed the aforesaid appeal before the first appellate Court. The learned I Additional Senior Civil Judge, Kakinada, dismissed the first appeal with costs by confirming the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. Aggrieved thereby, the unsuccessful plaintiff/appellant approached this Court by way of second appeal. 5. For the sake of convenience, both parties in the appeal will be referred to as they are arrayed in the original suit. - 6. The case of the plaintiff, in brief, as set out in the plaint averments in O.S.No.645 of 2004, is as follows: The plaint schedule property is a vacant site. The father of the plaintiff Pepakayala Lovaraju obtained lease deed for a period of 99 years on 12.03.1967 from the father of the defendants Kompella Veerraju. The father of the plaintiff took possession of the property and raised a thatched hut therein. As per the lease agreement, the father of the plaintiff or his legal heirs are entitled to keep the schedule property in their peaceful possession and enjoyment by cultivating the same at their own will and wish for a period of 99 years. The lease consideration of Rs.1,500/- was paid by the plaintiffs father to Kompeiia Veerraju. As per the lease agreement, the father of the plaintiff or his legal heirs are entitled to keep the schedule property in their peaceful possession and enjoyment by cultivating the same at their own will and wish for a period of 99 years. The lease consideration of Rs.1,500/- was paid by the plaintiffs father to Kompeiia Veerraju. The defendants 1 to 7 are the children of Kompella Veerraju. The plaintiffs father died at about 5 years back. After the death of his father, the plaintiff alone is in peaceful possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property without any interruption. The plaintiff was given sugar card in the same door number and Panchayat Secretary also issued possession certificate to the plaintiff. The plaintiff perfected his rights over the plaint schedule property even as per the lease agreement. The defendants bore grudge against the plaintiff and without considering the lease deed, they are prociaiming in the village that they can trespass into the plaint schedule property. Hence, the plaintiff filed the aforesaid suit. 7. The defendants filed written statement denying the contents of plaint averments and further contended as follows: The alleged lease deed dated 12.03.1967 is a rank forged one and it is not true, valid and binding on the defendants. The defendants 1 to 5, late Kompella Nageswara Rao and Kompella Somaraju are the sons of late Lovaraju and these defendants are not aware who is 6th defendant Kompella Satyanarayana and to their knowledge, there is no such person in the name of defendant. Kompella Jagannadham @ Satyam (7th defendant) is son of senior paternal uncle of the defendants and he is nothing to do with the plaint schedule property. The plaintiff has not acquainted with these defendants or their father at any point of time and the plaintiff does not know even the approximate age of the defendants and their correct addresses, Further contended that the existence of thatched hut at present in the plaint schedule property is raised by the plaintiff at about 10 days prior to receiving the notices in the suit by the defendants and no door number is allotted to the thatched hut. The defendants came to know that house bearing door No.6-111 stands in the name of one Pepakayala Venkata Ramana, son of Sriramulu, who is in possession and enjoyment of the same by paying taxes up to date. The defendants came to know that house bearing door No.6-111 stands in the name of one Pepakayala Venkata Ramana, son of Sriramulu, who is in possession and enjoyment of the same by paying taxes up to date. The plaint schedule property is the ancestral property of the defendants which was originally situated in S.No.426/4, old S.No.330 in total extent of Ac.2-00 cents. The defendants’ father handed over the land to an extent of Ac. 1-88 cents to the summit office for public utility purpose around in the year 1965, after that, the father of the defendants has been in peaceful possession and enjoyment of the same till his death and after that, his wife Venkata Rattamma has been in possession and enjoyment of the same. The pattadar passbook and title deed were also issued in her favour for the schedule property, Further contended that the plaintiff with an intention to grab the schedule property, raised a small thatched house in the schedule property at about 10 days prior to receiving of notices by the defendants, as the value of the property raised in recent past and taking advantage of absence of the defendants. When the defendants questioned the plaintiff about his highhanded behavious, the plaintiff agreed to remove the same in the plaint schedule property, but contrary to his promise, he fabricated the suit documents and got filed the suit with false allegations. Hence, sought for dismissal of the suit. During pendency of the suit, the 2nd defendant died. The defendants 8 to 11 are added as legal heirs of the 2nd defendant. 8. On the basis of above pleadings, the learned II Additional Junior Civil Judge, Kakinada, framed the following issues for trial: (1) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for permanent injunction as prayed for? - (2) To what relief? 9. During the course of trial in the Trial Court, on behalf of the plaintiff, P.Ws.1 to 5 were examined and Exs.A-1 to A-4 were marked, On behalf of the defendants, D.Ws.1 to 4 were examined and Exs.B-1 and B-2 were marked. Ex.X-1 was marked through D.W.4. 10. The learned II Additional Junior Civil Judge, Kakinada, after conclusion of trial on hearing the arguments of both sides and on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, dismissed the suit without costs. Ex.X-1 was marked through D.W.4. 10. The learned II Additional Junior Civil Judge, Kakinada, after conclusion of trial on hearing the arguments of both sides and on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, dismissed the suit without costs. Felt aggrieved thereby, the unsuccessful plaintiff filed the appeal suit in A.S.No.147 of 2012 before the learned I Additional Senior Civil Judge’s Court, Kakinada wherein, the following points came up for consideration: (1) Whether the plaintiff is in lawful possession and enjoyment of the plain, schedule property? (2) Whether the possession of the plaintiff is traceable to the lease deed dated 12.02.1967? (3) Whether the findings of the trial Court requires any interference? (4) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for permanent injunction as prayed for? (5) To what relief? 11. The learned I Additional Senior Civil Judge, Kakinada, i.e., the first appellate Judge, after hearing the arguments answered the points, as above, against the plaintiff/appellant and in favour of the defendants/respondents and dismissed the appeal filed by the plaintiff. Felt aggrieved of the same, the unsuccessful plaintiff in O.S.No.645 of 2004 filed the present second appeal before this Court. 12. After institution of the second appeal by the plaintiff in the suit, this Court ordered notice to the respondents before admission and the said notices are served on the respondents/defendants. Heard Sri P. Rajesh Babu, learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff and heard Sri P. Durga Prasad, learned counsel for the respondents/defendants. - 13. It has to be kept in mind that the right of appeal is neither a natural nor an inherent right attached to the litigation. It is regulated in accordance with law. A second appeal preferred under Section 100 of CPC could be admitted only when the appellant satisfies this Court that the substantial question of law between the parties arise in this case. A proper test for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial would be or whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and if so, whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by the superior Courts or is not free from difficulty or cause for discussion of alternative views. In a case of Boodireddy Chandraiah v. Angela Laxmi, (2007) 8 SCC 155 the Apex Court held that it is not within the domain of the High Court to investigate the grounds on which the findings were arrived at by the last Court of fact namely, the first appellate Court. In a case where from a given set of circumstances two inferences of facts are possible, one drawn by the lower appellate Court will not be interfered by the High Court in a second appeal. Adopting any other approach is not permissible. Where, the facts required for a point of law have not been pleaded, a litigant should not be allowed to raise that question as a substantial question of law in second appeal. The mere appreciation of facts, the documentary evidence and the contents of the documents cannot be held to be raising a substantial question of law. 14. The plaintiff having chosen to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 100 of Civil Procedure Code, it is for him to meet the above principles and satisfy the Court whether there exists any substantial question of law. 15. This second appeal is filed against the concurrent findings arrived by both the Courts below, therefore the grounds urged in the second appeal are to be scrutinized to find out whether the appellant has shown substantial question of law. any The contention of the appellant is that the judgment and decree of the trial Court as well as the first appellate Court are contrary to law and that the second appeal may be allowed by setting aside the judgment and decree passed by both the Courts below i.e. the trial Court and the first appellate Court. 16. The appellant is the plaintiff in the suit. He filed the suit for seeking relief of prohibitory injunction restraining the defendants and their men from ever interfering with the possession and enjoyment of the plaintiff in the plaint schedule property. It is the specific case of the plaintiff that his father Pepakayala Lovaraju obtained a registered lease deed for a period of 99 years on 12.03.1967 from the father of the defendants Kompella Veerraju. Since the respondents/defendants are disputing execution of the said lease deed by their father in favour of the father of the plaintiff, the duty cast upon the plaintiff to prove the Ex.A.1 lease deed. Since the respondents/defendants are disputing execution of the said lease deed by their father in favour of the father of the plaintiff, the duty cast upon the plaintiff to prove the Ex.A.1 lease deed. Admittedly, the plaintiff is not having personal knowledge about the execution of Ex.A.1 alleged lease deed, The plaintiff admits that he never paid any rent either to father of defendants Veerraju or the defendants. It is also admitted by the appellant that the father of the defendants is the owner of the plaint schedule property. It is undisputed by the appellant that the father and mother of the defendants are no more and died intestate and therefore the defendants are having title over the plaint schedule property. Even as per the own case of the appellant, the defendants herein are the owners of the plaint schedule property. 17. As stated supra, since the defendants are disputing the alleged Ex.A.1 lease deed, the burden cast upon the plaintiff to prove the same. Admittedly, the plaintiff / P.W.1 IS not having any personal knowledge over execution of lease deed. As per the evidence of P.Ws.2 and 3 though they claim to be present at the time of execution of lease deed, it does not contain their signatures. Therefore, the presence of P.Ws.2 and 3 at the time of alleged lease deed is highly doubtful. As could be seen from the evidence of P.W.4, he stated in his chief examination affidavit that he cultivated the land belongs to father of the defendants 1 to 5 and in cross-examination, he admits that he never cultivated the agricultural land belongs to the father of the defendants. Though P.W.4 claimed that he was present at the time of execution of Ex.A.1 lease deed, his signature is not there in the lease deed. Admittedly, the alleged lease deed does not contain the signature of P.W.4. Therefore, the presence of P.W.4 at the time of alleged execution of Ex.A.1 lease deed, is highly doubtful. As could be seen from the evidence of P.W.5, he admits in cross-examination that he does not know the nature of the document and he does not know about the schedule land and he was not present at the time of execution of alleged registered lease deed. For the aforesaid reasons, the alleged lease deed is not proved by the plaintiff. - 18. For the aforesaid reasons, the alleged lease deed is not proved by the plaintiff. - 18. The recitals of Ex.A.1 alleged lease deed reveals that the period of lease is for 99 years. Therefore, it requires compulsory registration under Section 17 of the Registration Act. But it was unregistered document. As could be seen from the evidence produced by the defendants, the plaintiff has trespassed into the suit schedule property just 20 days prior to filing of the suit. A trespasser, who alleged to have been occupied just 20 days prior to filing of the suit, even cannot maintain a suit, against the true owner for seeking the relief of prohibitory injunction. The claim of the plaintiff is that he is only a lessee, but not a owner of the plaint schedule property and the plaintiff claimed leasehold rights over the plaint schedule property. As noticed supra, the plaintiff claimed that his father was the lessee under the father of the defendants in pursuance of Ex.A.1 alleged lease deed and after the death of his father, he is a lessee in view of Ex.A.1 lease deed. As stated supra, the alleged Ex.A.1 lease deed is not at all proved by the plaintiff. The ownership of the defendants in the plaint schedule property is undisputed by the plaintiff. Moreover, the defendants i instituted a suit in O.S.No.744 of 2004 before the trial Court and sought for eviction of the plaintiff herein i.e. 1st defendant in O S.No.744 of 2004 and recovery of possession of the plaint schedule property and after completion of the trial, the learned trial Judge decreed the suit in O.S.No.744 of 2004 by evicting the plaintiff herein from the plaint schedule property which was confirmed by the first appellate Judge. 19. Having regard to the reasons assigned, this Court is satisfied that the concurrent findings of fact recorded by both the Courts below on all the issues/points in favour of the defendants and against the plaintiff do not brook interference and that both the Courts below are justified in dismissing the suit of the plaintiff. The findings of fact recorded by both the Courts below were based on proper appreciation of evidence and the material on record and there was neither illegality nor irregularity in those findings and therefore the findings do not require to be upset. The findings of fact recorded by both the Courts below were based on proper appreciation of evidence and the material on record and there was neither illegality nor irregularity in those findings and therefore the findings do not require to be upset. Further, the existence of a substantial question of law is a sine qua non for the exercise of Jurisdiction by this Court as per Section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure. The questions raised, strictly speaking, are not even pure questions of law, let alone substantial questions of law. 20. Viewed thus, this Court finds that none of the questions raised are substantial questions and there is no subsistence in the questions raised and that therefore, the second appeal is devoid of merits and is liable for dismissal at the stage of admission. The law is well settled that a second appeal shall not be admitted If no substantial question of law arises for consideration and when no substantial question of law Is Involved. The view of this Court is reinforced by the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Gurdev Kaur Vs. Kaki, AIR 2006 SC 1975 . In the case on hand, as stated supra, this Court finds after careful examination of the pleadings evidence and contentions that no substantial question of law is involved, this second appeal is liable for dismissal at the stage of admission, in view of narrow compass of Section 100 of Civil Procedure Code. - 21. In the result, the second appeal is dismissed at the stage of admission, confirming the judgment and decree of both the Courts below. No costs. Pending applications, if any, shall stand closed.