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2025 DIGILAW 926 (KAR)

Arun Kumar R. , S/O. Shri. Ramakrishnan v. Central Bureau Of Investigation, Anti-Corruption Branch

2025-11-03

MOHAMMAD NAWAZ

body2025
ORDER : MOHAMMAD NAWAZ, J. The petitioner, who has been arrainged as accused No.6 in the supplementary charge sheet filed by the respondent/CBI, seeks to quash the entire proceedings pending in Special C.C.No.1629/2023, on the file of the XXI Additional City Civil and Special Judge for CBI cases (CCH-4), Bengaluru City. 2. Heard the respective learned counsels and perused the material on record. 3. The brief facts of the case, as could be seen from the material on record, are as under: The CBI/ACB, Bengaluru vide RC 16A/2020/CBI/ACB, Bangalore dated 02.12.2020 registered a case on the complaint of Sri Basanth Chakravarthy, DGM, IDBI Bank Ltd., NPA Management Group, Bangalore against M/s. Green Organics (India) Pvt. Ltd., along with three others and other unknown public servants under Sections 120B, 420, 409, 477A of the IPC and Section 13(2) r/w Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 ('P.C. Act, 1988' for short). 4. The charge sheet was filed against accused Nos.1 to 6, wherein the petitioner, DGM [then AGM], IDBI, Corporate Centre Mumbai, was shown as accused No.6, for the offences punishable under Sections 120B read with 420, 409, 471 of IPC and Sections 11, 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the P.C. Act, 1988. While submitting the final report, sanction for prosecution as against the petitioner was not submitted. The jurisdictional Court returned the complete charge sheet to investigate and to resubmit the final report after receiving the sanction order under Section 19 of the P.C. Act, 1988 against the petitioner. The sanction sought to prosecute the petitioner was however denied. A supplementary charge sheet was filed against him for the offences punishable under Sections 120B read with Sections 420, 409 and 471 of the IPC. 5. The learned Magistrate accepted the said supplementary charge sheet noting that the petitioner/accused No.6 has used forged documents as genuine by knowing that they are forged documents and there are materials to show that he has committed the offence punishable under Section 471 of IPC. It was also noted that the cognizance had already been taken earlier for the offences punishable under Section 120B read with Sections 409, 420 and 477A of the IPC and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the P.C. Act, 1988. 6. It was also noted that the cognizance had already been taken earlier for the offences punishable under Section 120B read with Sections 409, 420 and 477A of the IPC and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the P.C. Act, 1988. 6. It is vehemently contented by the learned counsel for petitioner, drawing the attention of the Court to Annexure- B, the communication dated 07.09.2023 between the Chief Vigilance Officer, IDBI Bank and the Superintendent of Police and HoB, CBI that, as per the said communication, the Chief Vigilance Officer was of the considered opinion that the acts of omission/lapses on the part of the petitioner, DGM (then AGM) indicates procedural lapses and gross negligence in discharging his duties rather than any malafide intent or deliberate attempts to cause loss to the bank and therefore, the sanction for prosecution against the officer is not warranted. 7. It is contented that the entire charge sheet material does not indicate any role played by the petitioner so as to invoke any of the offences now alleged against him and the concerned/ Competent Authority has refused to grant sanction to prosecute and therefore, the proceedings against the petitioner is an abuse of process of law. 8. Elaborating the above, the learned counsel has contented that, after an enquiry, the petitioner was found guilty of only procedural lapses by the Competent Authority of IDBI Bank and the penalty imposed was reduction to a lower procedural lapses of the Statute and not any other offence and the lapses pointed out in the supplementary charge sheet relates to lack of due diligence on the part of the petitioner in not checking the authenticity of the term loan statements submitted by the borrower, failure to obtain credit information report, not taking No Objection Certificate from the Canara Bank, not ensuring end use of funds, etc., and the charge of conspiracy cannot be alleged. It is further contended that the criminal proceedings is manifestly attended with the malafides and instituted with an ulterior motive to defame the petitioner and there is no prima facie involvement in the whole transactions. 9. The respondent/CBI has filed the statement of objections. It is further contended that the criminal proceedings is manifestly attended with the malafides and instituted with an ulterior motive to defame the petitioner and there is no prima facie involvement in the whole transactions. 9. The respondent/CBI has filed the statement of objections. The learned Special Prosecutor for the respondent has contented that it is settled law that an accused can be prosecuted under the provisions of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, even if sanction for prosecution against him is denied under Section 19 of the P.C. Act, 1988. He contented that the investigation has revealed that accused No.1 was sanctioned with a term loan of Rs.43.77 crores and a cash credit limit of Rs.3.50 crores, which was later enhanced to Rs.5.80 crores by the IDBI, for execution of the project of cultivation of English Herbs and its exporting to foreign countries. The above credit facility i.e., term loan was a takeover facility from the Canara Bank, Agri Finance Branch, Bangalore and the Cash credit limit was a fresh sanction. The investigation has revealed that the Director of M/s. Greens Organics (India) Pvt. Ltd. (accused No.1), is also a director of M/s. Pods Biotech Pvt. Ltd., which had already availed various credit facilities from Canara Bank, AFB, Bangalore in 2007 for execution of the project of cultivation of English Herbs and its exporting to foreign countries and it was further revealed that the account of M/s. Pods Biotech Pvt. Ltd was on the verge of NPA as the company defaulted repayments. To stem the issues of the NPA, the Canara Bank, AFB, Bangalore and the accused persons entered into a criminal conspiracy with the Officers of the IDBI Bank Ltd., and in pursuance of the same, they availed various credit facilities, misrepresented and cheated the Bank. He contended that petitioner/accused No.6 did not verify the veracity of the documents submitted by M/s. Greens Organics (India) Pvt. Ltd., directly from the Canara Bank, Bangalore and he with dishonest intent, relied upon the claim of the company and forwarded the same to Agri Processing Centre, Hyderabad for recommendation. However, in pursuance of criminal conspiracy with accused No.2, caused to release the term loan of Rs.43.37 crores to the account of the company, instead of transferring the same to the Canara Bank directly. 10. However, in pursuance of criminal conspiracy with accused No.2, caused to release the term loan of Rs.43.37 crores to the account of the company, instead of transferring the same to the Canara Bank directly. 10. It is not in dispute that the sanction was not granted to prosecute the petitioner at the first instance. The supplementary charge sheet was filed against the petitioner. However, the Court has not taken cognizance against the petitioner for the offence punishable under provisions of the P.C. Act, 1988, but on the other hand, taken cognizance for the offences punishable under the provisions of the IPC. It is also not in dispute that in the enquiry conducted by the Competent Authority of IDBI Bank, the petitioner was found guilty of the charges and penalty of "reduction to a lower stage in the time scale of pay by two (2) increments for a period of two (2) years, with further direction that officer will not earn increment of pay during the period of such reduction and on the expiry of such period, the reduction will not have the effect of postponing his future increments of pay", was imposed. Hence, it is not the case of the petitioner that he was completely exonerated in the enquiry. 11. It is relevant to extract paragraph No.37.2(ii) and paragraph Nos.45 and 55 to 61 of the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in A. SREENIVASA REDDY V. RAKESH SHARMA AND ANOTHER reported in (2023) 8 SCC 711 , wherein it is held as under: "37.2. (ii) Is it permissible for the Special Court (CBI) to proceed against the appellant for the offences punishable under IPC despite the fact that the sanction under Section 19 of the PC Act, 1988 to prosecute the appellant for the offences under the PC Act, 1988, is not on record as the same came to be declined? 45. The appellant was serving as an Assistant General Manager, State Bank of India, Overseas Bank at Hyderabad. State Bank of India is a nationalised bank. Although a person working in a nationalised bank is a public servant, yet the provisions of Section 197CrPC would not be attracted at all as Section 197 is attracted only in cases where the public servant is such who is not removable from his service save by or with the sanction of the Government. Although a person working in a nationalised bank is a public servant, yet the provisions of Section 197CrPC would not be attracted at all as Section 197 is attracted only in cases where the public servant is such who is not removable from his service save by or with the sanction of the Government. It is not disputed that the appellant is not holding a post where he could not be removed from service except by or with the sanction of the Government. In this view of the matter, even if it is alleged that the appellant herein is a public servant, still the provisions of Section 197CrPC are not attracted at all. 55. The offences under IPC and offences under the PC Act, 1988 are different and distinct. What is important to consider is whether the offences for one reason or the other punishable under IPC are also required to be approved in relation to the offences punishable under the PC Act, 1988. 56. It is important to draw a distinction between an order of sanction required for prosecuting a person for commission of an offence under IPC and an order of sanction required for commission of an offence under the PC Act, 1988. 57. In Kalicharan Mahapatra v. State of Orissa [Kalicharan Mahapatra v. State of Orissa, (1998) 6 SCC 411 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1455] , this Court noted : (SCC pp. 415-16, para 13) “13. … The sanction contemplated in Section 197 of the Code concerns a public servant who ‘is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty’, whereas the offences contemplated in the PC Act are those which cannot be treated as acts either directly or even purportedly done in the discharge of his official duties. Parliament must have desired to maintain the distinction and hence the wording in the corresponding provision in the former PC Act was materially imported in the new PC Act, 1988 without any change in spite of the change made in Section 197 of the Code.” (emphasis supplied) 58. In Lalu Prasad v. State of Bihar [Lalu Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2007) 1 SCC 49 : (2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 241] , this Court observed as under: “10. In Lalu Prasad v. State of Bihar [Lalu Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2007) 1 SCC 49 : (2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 241] , this Court observed as under: “10. It may be noted that Section 197CrPC and Section 19 of the PC Act, 1988 operate in conceptually different fields. In cases covered under the Act, in respect of public servants the sanction is of automatic nature and thus factual aspects are of little or no consequence. Conversely, in a case relatable to Section 197CrPC, the substratum and basic features of the case have to be considered to find out whether the alleged act has any nexus with the discharge of duties. Position is not so in case of Section 19 of the Act.” (emphasis supplied) 59. Thus, although in the present case, the appellant has been discharged from the offences punishable under the PC Act, 1988 yet for IPC offences, he can be proceeded further in accordance with law. 60. From the aforesaid, it can be said that there can be no thumb rule that in a prosecution before the Court of Special Judge, the previous sanction under Section 19 of the PC Act, 1988 would invariably be the only prerequisite. If the offences on the charge of which, the public servant is expected to be put on trial include the offences other than those punishable under the PC Act, 1988 that is to say under the general law (i.e. IPC), the court is bound to examine, at the time of cognizance and also, if necessary, at subsequent stages (as the case progresses) as to whether there is a necessity of sanction under Section 197CrPC. 61. There is a material difference between the statutory requirements of Section 19 of the PC Act, 1988 on one hand, and Section 197CrPC, on the other. In the prosecution for the offences exclusively under the PC Act, 1988, sanction is mandatory qua the public servant. In cases under the general penal law against the public servant, the necessity (or otherwise) of sanction under Section 197CrPC depends on the factual aspects. The test in the latter case is of the “nexus” between the act of commission or omission and the official duty of the public servant. To commit an offence punishable under law can never be a part of the official duty of a public servant. The test in the latter case is of the “nexus” between the act of commission or omission and the official duty of the public servant. To commit an offence punishable under law can never be a part of the official duty of a public servant. It is too simplistic an approach to adopt and to reject the necessity of sanction under Section 197CrPC on such reasoning. The “safe and sure test”, is to ascertain if the omission or neglect to commit the act complained of would have made the public servant answerable for the charge of dereliction of his official duty. He may have acted “in excess of his duty”, but if there is a “reasonable connection” between the impugned act and the performance of the official duty, the protective umbrella of Section 197CrPC cannot be denied, so long as the discharge of official duty is not used as a cloak for illicit acts." 12. In another identical circumstances, the Hon'ble Apex Court in SATYABRAT GUPTA V. THE STATE OF JHARKAND in Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No.2787/2020 disposed on 21.01.2020, has observed as under: "We decline to deviate from the view taken by the High Court that the charge against the petitioner for offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code can continue irrespective of the fact that sanction in respect of offence punishable under Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is not forthcoming. To that extent, we find infirmity in the conclusion reached by the High Court. Our understanding of the impugned judgment is that the High Court has made it clear that if sanction to prosecute the petitioner for offence punishable under Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is not or has not been granted, the question of proceeding against the petitioner for that charge does not arise. This aspect be borne in mind by the Trial Court while proceeding with the trial against the petitioner. In light of above, no further indulgence is warranted. The Special Leave Petition is dismissed accordingly. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of." 13. Learned counsel for the petitioner relying on the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT V. BIBHU PRASAD ACHARYA, ETC. in Criminal Appeal Nos.4314-4316/2024 disposed on 06.11.2024 contended that even in respect of proceedings initiated against the petitioner under the provisions of IPC, sanction has to be obtained under Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. 14. Learned counsel for the petitioner relying on the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT V. BIBHU PRASAD ACHARYA, ETC. in Criminal Appeal Nos.4314-4316/2024 disposed on 06.11.2024 contended that even in respect of proceedings initiated against the petitioner under the provisions of IPC, sanction has to be obtained under Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. 14. The petitioner is admittedly not an employee of the Government and therefore, the judgment relied on by the learned counsel is not applicable to the facts of the present case. There is no merit in the petition. Accordingly, the petition is dismissed