JUDGMENT : (ROBIN PHUKAN, J.) Heard Mr. P. Taffo, learned counsel for the petitioners. Also heard Mr. T. Tagum, learned Standing Counsel for the Education Department, appearing for the respondent Nos.1, 2 and 3 as well as Ms. P. Pangu, learned Government Advocate for the State respondent No.4. 2. In this petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner, namely, Shri Lopa Nilling, has challenged the correctness or otherwise of the Order No.EED-12015/5/2023, dated 23.11.2023, issued by the Commissioner (Education), Government of Arunachal, whereby the service of the petitioner as Multi-Tasking Staff was terminated. 3. Mr. Taffo, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner was appointed on compassionate ground, in place of his brother, late Tadung Jeke, who died in harness while serving as Chowkidar at Government Secondary School, Sikarijo, Upper Subansiri District, on 04.12.2018, and he joined on 05.12.2018 and had completed his probation period on 05.12.2020. Thereafter, on 23.10.2023, a show cause notice was served upon him, which was signed on 27.09.2023, asking him to show cause as to why his fake and fabricated and illegal appointment order, issued by the then Director of Elementary Education or Deputy Director of School Education, Upper Subansiri District or procured through forged, fake and fabricated, should not be cancelled. Thereafter, the petitioner had submitted his reply to the show cause notice on 26.10.2023. However, without holding any departmental proceeding in terms of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, the respondent authorities had terminated his service, along with 7(seven) others, vide order dated 23.11.2023, in a most illegal and arbitrary manner. 3.1. Mr. Taffo, further submits that the termination order was issued without following any procedure, and in total violation of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, and also in contravention of the principle of natural justice. Referring to the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the respondent authorities, Mr. Taffo, submits that the respondent authorities had in clear terms, admitted in their affidavit that there was only a procedural lapse in not obtaining approval from the Office of the Directorate/Head of the Department/Head Office for issuance of appointment order. However, Mr. Referring to the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the respondent authorities, Mr. Taffo, submits that the respondent authorities had in clear terms, admitted in their affidavit that there was only a procedural lapse in not obtaining approval from the Office of the Directorate/Head of the Department/Head Office for issuance of appointment order. However, Mr. Taffo, has pointed out that the petitioner was selected by a Committee in District level and the said selection was approved by the Deputy Commissioner of Upper Subansiri District, Daporijo and failing to obtain approval from the Office of the Directorate/Head of the Department /Head Office is the lapse on the part of the respondent authority and no fault can be found the petitioner for the same and this lapse on the part of the authority would not render his appointment illegal. Further, referring to Annexure-2 at Page No.87 of the affidavit-in-reply, Mr. Taffo also submits that the respondent authorities in the case of similarly situated staffs, had later on, re-instated them and also regularized their services, vide order dated 17.12.2024, and the present petitioner also, being similarly situated, is entitled to similar benefits. Therefore, Mr. Taffo has contended to allow the petition. 4. Per contra, Mr. Tagum, learned Standing Counsel for the respondents in Education Department, referring to notification dated 02.06.2011, submits that the Selection Board, after selection of candidates, is required to forward the select list to the Directorate/Head of the Department/Head Office for issuance of appointment order and for maintenance of the combined seniority list of staff for further cadre management. However, the same was not followed in the case of the present petitioner, and accordingly, the respondent authorities in their affidavit-in-opposition, have stated that the lapse was procedural in nature. Nevertheless, Mr. Tagum, has admitted that in the case of similarly situated cases, the respondent authorities had regularized the service of some staffs, vide order dated 17.12.2024, and he has also no objection if similar benefit is extended to the present petitioner also. 5. Having heard the submissions of learned counsels for both the parties, I have carefully gone through the petition and the documents placed on record and also, perused the notification dated 02.06.2011 and the Annexure-2, at Page No.87 of the writ petition. 6. The basic facts, herein this case, are not in dispute. 5. Having heard the submissions of learned counsels for both the parties, I have carefully gone through the petition and the documents placed on record and also, perused the notification dated 02.06.2011 and the Annexure-2, at Page No.87 of the writ petition. 6. The basic facts, herein this case, are not in dispute. The petitioner was selected by a district level committee and the same was approved by the Deputy Commissioner Daporijo. Besides, the respondent authorities, in their affidavit-in- opposition also admitted that there was only a procedural lapse, in not obtaining the approval from the Office of the Directorate/Head of the Department/Head Office for issuance of appointment order and the same is required for maintenance of the combined seniority list of staff for further cadre management. Moreover, for the lapse of the respondent authority, the petitioner cannot be faulted with. By no stretch of imagination, the appointment of the petitioner can be termed as illegal, in light of the Notification dated 02.06.2011, which requires obtaining of the approval from the Office of the Directorate/Head of the Department/Head Office. He was selected and appointed after following due procedure, though the respondent authority had failed to obtain approval for the Office of the Directorate/Head of the Department/Head Office. 7. Admittedly, termination order of the petitioner was based on show cause reply only. It was not preceded by any inquiry. Though ’termination’ is not mentioned as a form of major penalty under Rule 11 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, yet it is related to removal and dismissal from service, which are indisputably major penalty, under the said Rule. Rule 14 of the said Rules provides that no order imposing any of the penalties specified in clauses (v) to (ix) of Rule 11 shall be made except after an inquiry held, as far as may be, in the manner provided in this rule and rule 15, or in the manner provided by the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850 (37 of 1850), where such inquiry is held under that Act. 8. However, in the case of the petitioner, no disciplinary proceeding, in terms of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, was drawn up. On this count also the impugned termination order is illegal and arbitrary. 9. 8. However, in the case of the petitioner, no disciplinary proceeding, in terms of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, was drawn up. On this count also the impugned termination order is illegal and arbitrary. 9. And further, from Annexure-2, it appears that in the case of similarly situated candidates, the respondent authorities had revoked the termination orders of some of the Multi-Tasking Staff and reinstated them in service. Since the present petitioner is also similarly situated, he is also entitled to similar benefit. Reference in this context can be made to a decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Karnataka and Others vs. C. Lalitha, reported in (2006) 2 SCC 747 , wherein it has been held that- “ service jurisprudence evolved by this court from time-to-time postulates that all persons similarly situate, should be treated similarly .” 10. Thus, taking note of the submissions, so advanced by the learned counsels for both the parties, and also considering the facts and circumstances on the record, this Court is of the view that the petitioner has succeeded in establishing a case for interference. Therefore, this Court is inclined to allow this petition. For the reason discussed herein above, the impugned termination order of the petitioner, dated 23.11.2023, issued vide Memo. No. No.EED- 12015/5/2023, fails to withstand legal scrutiny. Accordingly, the impugned termination order, concerning the petitioner, stands set aside and quashed. 11. By a mandamus of this Court, the respondent authorities are directed to re-instate the petitioner in service forthwith, with effect from the date of his termination i.e., 23.11.2023. Consequent upon setting aside of the impugned termination order, being illegal, all the service benefits, including the back wages, to which the petitioner is legally entitled to, shall be extended to him. While granting back wages, this court derived authority from a decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in BSNL v. Bhurumal , reported in (2014) 7 SCC 177 , wherein it has been held as under: - “33. It is clear from the reading of the aforesaid judgments that the ordinary principle of grant of reinstatement with full back wages, when the termination is found to be illegal is not applied mechanically in all cases. While that may be a position where services of a regular/permanent workman are terminated illegally and/or mala fide and/or by way of victimisation, unfair labour practice, etc. …………………...” 12. While that may be a position where services of a regular/permanent workman are terminated illegally and/or mala fide and/or by way of victimisation, unfair labour practice, etc. …………………...” 12. The aforementioned exercise(s) shall be carried out within a period of 4 (four) weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order. 13. The petitioner shall obtain a certified copy of this order and place the same before the respondent authorities within a period of 1(one) week from today. The parties have to bear their own costs.