JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 01.09.2010, passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No. (I) Amb, District Una (H.P) (learned Trial Court) vide which the respondent (accused before the learned Trial Court) was acquitted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 & 304-A of the Indian Penal Code (“in short IPC”). (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 & 304-A of the IPC. It was asserted that the informant, Raj Kumar (PW1), was running a vegetable shop at the Bus Stand Amb. He was present at the bus stand on 26.11.2006. Ram Das (since deceased) was riding a bicycle at 06:00 pm. A bus bearing registration No. HP-19A- 3396 hit the bicycle at a high speed. The bicycle fell on the road. The rear tyre of the bus crushed Ram Das. Ram Das succumbed to his injuries. The accident occurred due to the negligence of the bus driver. Information was given to the police about the accident. The police recorded an entry No.18 (Ex-PW9/A) in the Daily Diary. ASI Pawan Kumar (PW11), HC Mohar Singh and HHC Pritam Chand visited the spot to verify the correctness of the information. ASI Pawan Kumar (PW11) recorded the statement of the informant (Ex-PW1/A) and sent it to the police station for registration of FIR. An FIR (Ex-PW11/B) was registered at the police station. Ashwani Kumar (PW2), took the photographs (Ex-PW2/A to Ex-PW2/C). ASI Pawan Kumar conducted the inquest on the dead body and prepared the report (Ex-PW-11/D). He prepared the site plan (Ex-PW11/E) and seized the bus bearing registration No. HP-19A-3396 vide seizure memo (Ex-PW4/A). He also seized the bicycle vide seizure memo (Ex-PW3/A). He filed an application (Ex-PW11/F) for conducting the postmortem examination of the deceased. Dr. Piara Singh conducted the postmortem examination and issued the report (Ex-PA) stating that the cause of death was a crushed injury to the head and chest bony cage. It was found that the accused, Baldev Singh, was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. He filed an application (Ex-PW11/F) for conducting the postmortem examination of the deceased. Dr. Piara Singh conducted the postmortem examination and issued the report (Ex-PA) stating that the cause of death was a crushed injury to the head and chest bony cage. It was found that the accused, Baldev Singh, was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. The accused produced the documents of the vehicle, which were seized vide seizure memo (Ex-PW6/A). The bus and the bicycle were mechanically examined, and no defect was found in them which could have led to the accident. Report (Ex-PB) was issued. The statements of remaining witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 3. Learned Trial Court put the notice of accusation to the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 & 304-A of the IPC, to which the accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined 11 witnesses to prove its case. Raj Kumar (PW1) is the informant. Ashwani Kumar (PW2) is the photographer who took the photographs of the spot. Rakesh Kumar (PW3) and Raman Kumar (PW4) are witnesses to the seizure memo. Jai Singh (PW5) is the Power of Attorney of the owner of the bus. Balwant Singh (PW6) is the witness to the recovery of the documents. Shiv Kumar (PW7) did not support the prosecution's case. Suresh Kumar (PW8) is an eyewitness. HHC Sadashiv (PW9) proved the entry in the daily dairy. Asha Rani (PW10) is the owner of the bus. ASI Pawan Kumar (PW11)conducted the investigation. 5. The accused in his statement recorded under Section 313 of CrPC admitted that he was driving the bus on 26.11.2006 at 06:00 pm. He stated that the bus was not moving at the time of the accident. A false report was lodged against him. The witnesses were related to the deceased and the complainant. No defence was adduced. 6. Learned Trial Court held that the statements of the prosecution witnesses did not establish the rashness or negligence of the accused. Therefore, the learned Trial Court acquitted the accused after giving him the benefit of doubt. 7. A false report was lodged against him. The witnesses were related to the deceased and the complainant. No defence was adduced. 6. Learned Trial Court held that the statements of the prosecution witnesses did not establish the rashness or negligence of the accused. Therefore, the learned Trial Court acquitted the accused after giving him the benefit of doubt. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal asserting that the learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. The evidence was appreciated in a slipshod and perfunctory manner. Learned Trial Court failed to appreciate the prosecution's evidence in its proper perspective. The reasoning of the learned Trial Court was manifestly unreasonable. Learned Trial Court discarded the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses without any reason. Suresh Kumar (PW8) proved the negligence of the accused. It was duly proved on record that the accused was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident, and his rashness/negligence was led to the accident. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 8. I have heard Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the appellant/State and Mr. Surinder Kumar Saklani, learned counsel for the respondent/accused. 9. Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the appellant/State, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. It was duly proved by the statements of the witnesses that the accused was driving the vehicle in a rash and negligent manner, which led to the accident. Learned Trial Court did not properly appreciate the evidence on record and acquitted the accused by simply writing one line that the rashness or negligence of the accused was not established on record. This judgment of the learned Trial Court is contrary to the legal norms. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 10. Mr. Surinder Kumar Saklani, learned counsel for the respondent/accused, supported that the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court and submitted that no interference is required with it. Learned Trial Court had rightly held that rashness or negligence of the accused was not established. 10. Mr. Surinder Kumar Saklani, learned counsel for the respondent/accused, supported that the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court and submitted that no interference is required with it. Learned Trial Court had rightly held that rashness or negligence of the accused was not established. This was a reasonable view taken by the learned Trial Court, and this Court should not interfere with it even if another view is possible. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 12. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal if it is patently perverse, is based on misreading of the evidence or omits to consider the material evidence arrives at a conclusion wherein and no reasonable person could have recorded. It was observed: “11. Recently, in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4035 , a Bench of this Court to which one of us was a Member (B.R. Gavai, J.) had an occasion to consider the legal position with regard to the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal. It was observed thus: “ 38. First of all, we would like to reiterate the principles laid down by this Court governing the scope of interference by the High Court in an appeal filed by the State for challenging the acquittal of the accused recorded by the trial court. 39. This Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar [Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 31] encapsulated the legal position covering the field after considering various earlier judgments and held as below : (SCC pp. 482-83, para 29) “29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled out the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in the following words: ( Chandrappa case [Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415: (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325 ], SCC p. 432, para 42) ‘42. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled out the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in the following words: ( Chandrappa case [Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415: (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325 ], SCC p. 432, para 42) ‘42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on the exercise of such power and an appellate court, on the evidence before it, may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and law. (3) Various expressions, such as “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc., are not intended to curtail the extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with an acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is a double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused, having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 40. Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka [H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581 : (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 748] this Court summarised the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378CrPC as follows: (SCC p. 584, para 8) “8. … 8.1. Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka [H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581 : (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 748] this Court summarised the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378CrPC as follows: (SCC p. 584, para 8) “8. … 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence. 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence; 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 41. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles: 41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; 41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and 41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 12. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 13. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 14. Raj Kumar (PW1) stated that many people had gathered at a distance of a hundred feet from his shop. He went to the spot and saw that the head of Ram Das was crushed. He was not aware of how the accident had taken place. He was permitted to be cross-examined by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor. He denied in his cross-examination by learned APP that he saw Ram Das riding the bicycle towards the bus stand. He denied that the bus had hit the bicycle at high speed. He denied that Ram Das fell on the road and his head was crushed under the rear tyre. He denied that the accused was driving the bus in a rash and negligent manner, and his negligence led to the accident. He denied the previous statement recorded by the police. 15. It is apparent from his statement that he has not supported the prosecution's case. He did not state that he saw the bus hitting the bicycle or crushing the head of the deceased under the rear tyre. Hence, no advantage can be derived from his testimony. 16. Suresh Kumar (PW8) stated that he was standing near the police post on 26.11.2006 at about 6-7 pm. A person was walking with the bicycle towards his left side. The bus hit the bicycle at high speed. The bus crushed the bicycle and the person under the front and rear tyres of the bus. The person died on the spot. Many people gathered at the spot. The driver stopped the bus at some distance. 17. He stated in his cross-examination that there was a heavy rush at the bus stand. Many people board and disembark from the bus. There was no police official in the police post. He and Raj Kumar were standing near the police post, and they went to the spot together. He had mentioned to the police that the front tyre had crushed the deceased. He could not recognise the accused, and he saw him for the first time. Ram Das had been known to him since his childhood. He denied that he was making a false statement. 18. The name of this witness was not mentioned in the FIR. He had mentioned to the police that the front tyre had crushed the deceased. He could not recognise the accused, and he saw him for the first time. Ram Das had been known to him since his childhood. He denied that he was making a false statement. 18. The name of this witness was not mentioned in the FIR. Raj Kumar has not named him as the person present on the spot. He claimed that the front and rear tyres of the bus had crushed the deceased. This is contrary to the prosecution's case because, as per the prosecution's version, the rear tyre of the bus had crushed the deceased. He claimed that the bus was being driven at a high speed. He also admitted that there was a rush at the bus stand. He has not explained as to how it was possible to drive the bus at a high speed amongst the crowd. Therefore, his testimony that the bus was being driven at a high speed is not acceptable. 19. In any case, it was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mohanta Lal vs. State of West Bengal 1968 ACJ 124 that the use of the term ‘high speed’ by a witness amounts to nothing unless it is elicited from the witness what is understood by the term 'high speed'. It was observed: “Further, no attempt was made to find out what this witness understood by high speed. To one man speed of even 10 or 20 miles per hour may appear to be high, while to another, even a speed of 25 or 30 miles per hour may appear to be a reasonable speed. On the evidence in this case, therefore, it could not be held that the appellant was driving the bus at a speed which would justify holding that he was driving the bus rashly and negligently. The evidence of the two conductors indicates that he tried to stop the bus by applying the brakes; yet, Gopinath dey was struck by the bus, though not: from the front side of the bus as he did not fall in front of the bus but fell sideways near the corner of the two roads. The evidence of the two conductors indicates that he tried to stop the bus by applying the brakes; yet, Gopinath dey was struck by the bus, though not: from the front side of the bus as he did not fall in front of the bus but fell sideways near the corner of the two roads. It is quite possible that he carelessly tried to run across the road, dashed into the bus and was thrown back by the moving bus, with the result that he received the injuries that resulted in his death.” 20. This position was reiterated in State of Karnataka vs. Satish 1998 (8) SCC 493 , and it was held: “Merely because the truck was being driven at a "high speed" does not bespeak of either "negligence" or "rashness" by itself. None of the witnesses examined by the prosecution could give any indication, even approximately, as to what they meant by "high speed". "High speed" is a relative term. It was for the prosecution to bring on record material to establish as to what it meant by "high speed" in the facts and circumstances of the case. In a criminal trial, the burden of providing everything essential to the establishment of the charge against an accused always rests on the prosecution, and there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused until the contrary is proved. Criminality is not to be presumed, subject, of course, to some statutory exceptions. There is no such statutory exception pleaded in the present case. In the absence of any material on the record, no presumption of "rashness" or "negligence" could be drawn by invoking the maxim "res ipsa loquitur.” 21. This Court also held in State of H.P. Vs. Madan Lal Latest H.L.J. (2) 925 that speed alone is not a criterion for judging rashness or negligence. It was observed:- “It may be pointed out that speed alone is not a criterion to decide rashness or negligence on the part of a driver. The deciding factor, however, is the situation in which the accident occurs.” 22. This position was reiterated in State of H.P. Vs. It was observed:- “It may be pointed out that speed alone is not a criterion to decide rashness or negligence on the part of a driver. The deciding factor, however, is the situation in which the accident occurs.” 22. This position was reiterated in State of H.P. Vs. Parmodh Singh 2008 Latest HLJ (2) 1360 wherein it was held: - “Thus, negligent or rash driving of the vehicle has to be proved by the prosecution during the trial, which cannot be automatically presumed even on the basis of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Mere driving of a vehicle at a high speed or slow speed does not lead to an inference that negligent or rash driving had caused the accident resulting in injuries to the complainant. In fact, speed is no criterion to establish the fact of rash and negligent driving of a vehicle. It is only a rash and negligent act as its ingredients, to which the prosecution has failed to prove in the instant case.” 23. Thus, the accused cannot be held liable based on high speed alone without any further evidence that the accused was in breach of his duty to take care, which he had failed to do. 24. Suresh Kumar (PW8) did not attribute any negligence to the accused, and his testimony will not help the prosecution. 25. Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the appellant/State, submitted that the accused was negligent because he failed to stop the vehicle after it had hit the bicycle. This submission is not acceptable. Suresh Kumar (PW8) did not state that the bus had initially hit the bicycle, and thereafter the deceased, who was crushed under the rear tyre. He simply stated that the bus hit the bicycle, and the deceased was crushed under the front and rear tyres. Therefore, the submission that the accused could have stopped the bus after its front tyre had hit the motorcycle is not supported by the evidence on record. Hence, this submission cannot be relied upon to conclude that the accused was driving the bus in a rash or negligent manner. 26. No other person has spoken about the negligence of the accused. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while holding that the prosecution had not established the rashness or negligence of the accused. Hence, this submission cannot be relied upon to conclude that the accused was driving the bus in a rash or negligent manner. 26. No other person has spoken about the negligence of the accused. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while holding that the prosecution had not established the rashness or negligence of the accused. This Court will not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court, even if another view is possible. 27. In view of the above, the present appeal fails and the same is dismissed. 28. Records of the learned Trial Court be sent back forthwith along with copy of the judgment.