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2025 DIGILAW 930 (ALL)

Ratnesh Kumar Singh v. Pushpraj Singh

2025-07-14

JITENDRA KUMAR SINHA, VIVEK KUMAR BIRLA

body2025
JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Shri Devendra Dahma, learned counsel for the applicant and perused the records. 2. Present contempt application has been filed by the applicant under Section 16 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971(hereinafter referred to as the Act, 1971) seeking consent/permission to initiate criminal contempt proceeding under section 16 of the Act, 1971 against opposite party/contemnor, who was the Presiding Officer in Appeal No.353/2024 which was filed against an order cancelling a fair price shop license. 3. It is alleged that the applicant was appointed as Special Counsel Revenue in Commissionerate, Prayagraj and joined on 03.04.2021. On 21.03.2024 the applicant appeared on behalf of the State in Appeal No.353/2024 (Kavita Devi vs. State of U.P.) which was filed against an order cancelling a fair price shop license. It is being claimed that he requested the Court to give opportunity of hearing on the question of admission and grant of stay, however, the Presiding Officer of the Court on 21.3.2024 while discharging judicial function openly said in the Court that it was not necessary to hear Government Advocate and admitted the appeal and stayed the operation of order cancelling fair price shop license of the appellant. It is alleged that the alleged contemnor misbehaved and insulted the applicant in open court lowering the prestige of the applicant. The complaint in this regard was lodged by the petitioner with the Commissioner of Prayagraj, Division Prayagraj as well as with the Chairman, Board of Revenue, U.P. Lucknow and also to the Under Secretary, State Government. It is further alleged that he has received one letter dated 23.07.2024 from Commissioner Prayagraj, Division Prayagraj for appearing before him on 26.07.2024 for personal hearing. Consequently, the applicant appeared before him and on 30.07.2024 filed his statement alongwith affidavit as well as affidavit of two witnesses, the advocates who were present in the Court on 21.03.2024. Ultimately, an application was filed before the learned Advocate General on 16.04.2025 in respect of the incident dated 21.03.2024 for the purpose of referring the matter for making motion of initiation of criminal contempt against the alleged contemnor-Shri Pushpraj Singh. Learned Advocate General vide order dated 23.04.2025 rejected the application and consent sought was refused. 4. Ultimately, an application was filed before the learned Advocate General on 16.04.2025 in respect of the incident dated 21.03.2024 for the purpose of referring the matter for making motion of initiation of criminal contempt against the alleged contemnor-Shri Pushpraj Singh. Learned Advocate General vide order dated 23.04.2025 rejected the application and consent sought was refused. 4. Submission of the learned counsel for the applicant is that the one of the grounds taken by the learned Advocate General for refusing to grant consent is that the application dated 16.04.2025 filed before him was beyond one year period from 21.03.2024, which is the date on which the opposite party had allegedly made statement against the applicant. It was thus held that as the limitation for filing the application expired on 21.03.2025, therefore, the application was barred by limitation. The other ground for rejection of the application by learned Advocate General was based on the interpretation of Section 15 of the Act, 1971. By placing reliance upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Vilas V. Sanghai Vs. Sumermal Misrimal Bafna , reported in (2016) 9 SCC 439 . It was held by learned Advocate General that the applicant has also no legal right under Section 15 (2) of the Act, 1971 to apply before the Advocate General for grant of consent in a case, if any criminal contempt of a subordinate Court. 5. In our opinion, if the application filed before the learned Advocate General on 16.04.2025 was beyond time and was hit by Section 20 of the Act, 1971, no other question would arise for consideration. The question of contempt application being time barred was specifically raised and in reply learned counsel for the applicant placing reliance upon the judgment of Firm Ganpat Ram Rajkumar vs. Kalu Ram and Others , AIR 1989 SC 2285 submitted that the action of the opposite party/alleged contemnor is a continuing wrong and thus, Section 20 of the Act, 1971 is not applicable. We find that the argument is misconceived and is liable to be rejected. 6. We find that the argument is misconceived and is liable to be rejected. 6. Suffice to note that in the case of Firm Ganpat Ram (Supra) the question of handing over the possession was involved and it was held by the Hon'ble Apex Court that failure to give possession amounts to continuing wrong, which is not so in the present case and as such the said judgment is not applicable in the present case. 7. Section 20 of the Act, 1971 is quoted as under:- " 20. Limitation for actions for contempt .—No court shall initiate any proceedings of contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed." 8. Question of limitation as per Section 20 of the Act, 1971 was considered by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Pallav Sheth vs Custodian and Others , reported in (2001) 7 SCC 549 in detail. Relevant paragraph nos.33, 39, 40, 41 and 44 whereof read as under:- "33. The question which squarely arises is as to what is the meaning to be given to the expression "no court shall initiate any proceedings for contempt..." occurring in Section 20 of the 1971 Act. Section 20 deals not only with criminal contempt but also with civil contempt. It applies not only to the contempt committed in the face of the High Court or the Supreme Court but would also be applicable in the case of contempt of the subordinate court. The procedure which is to be followed in each of these cases is different. 39. In the case of criminal contempt of subordinate court, the High Court may take action on a reference made to it by the subordinate court or on a motion made by the Advocate-General or the Law Officer of the Central Government in the case of Union Territory. This reference or motion can conceivably commence on an application being filed by a person whereupon the subordinate court or the Advocate-General if it is so satisfied may refer the matter to the High Court. Proceedings for civil contempt normally commence with a person aggrieved bringing to the notice of the Court the wilful disobedience of any judgment, decree, order etc. which could amount to the commission of the offence. Proceedings for civil contempt normally commence with a person aggrieved bringing to the notice of the Court the wilful disobedience of any judgment, decree, order etc. which could amount to the commission of the offence. The attention of the Court is drawn to such a contempt being committed only by a person filing an application in that behalf. In other words, unless a Court was to take a suo motu action, the proceeding under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 would normally commence with the filing of an application drawing to the attention of the Court to the contempt having been committed. When the judicial procedure requires an application being filed either before the Court or consent being sought by a person from the Advocate-General or a Law Officer it must logically follow that proceeding for contempt are initiated when the applications are made. 40. In other words, the beginning of the action prescribed for taking cognizance of criminal contempt under Section 15 would be initiating the proceedings for contempt and the subsequent action taken thereon of refusal or issuance of a notice or punishment thereafter are only steps following or succeeding to such initiation. Similarly, in the case of a civil contempt filing of an application drawing the attention of the Court is necessary for further steps to be taken under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. 41. One of the principles underlying the law of limitation is that a litigant must act diligently and not sleep over its rights. In this background such an interpretation should be placed on Section 20 of the Act which does not lead to an anomalous result causing hardship to the party who may have acted with utmost diligence and because of the inaction on the part of the Court a contemner cannot be made to suffer. Interpreting the section in the manner canvassed by Mr. Venugopal would mean that the Court would be rendered powerless to punish even though it may be fully convinced of the blatant nature of a contempt having been committed and the same having been brought to the notice of the Court soon after the committal of the contempt and within the period of one year of the same. Venugopal would mean that the Court would be rendered powerless to punish even though it may be fully convinced of the blatant nature of a contempt having been committed and the same having been brought to the notice of the Court soon after the committal of the contempt and within the period of one year of the same. Section 20 , therefore, has to be construed in a manner which would avoid such an anomaly and hardship both as regards the litigant as also by placing a pointless fetter on the part of the Court to punish for its contempt. An interpretation of Section 20 , like the one canvassed by the Appellant, which would render the constitutional power of the Courts nugatory in taking action for contempt even in cases of gross contempt, successfully hidden for a period of one year by practising fraud by the contemner would render Section 20 as liable to be regarded as being in conflict with Article 129 and/or Article 215. Such a rigid interpretation must therefore be avoided. 44. Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed." (Emphasis Supplied) 9. In the present case, admittedly the incident had taken place on 21.03.2024 whereas the application was filed by the applicant before the learned Advocate General on 16.04.2025 which was clearly beyond time. In such view of the matter, initiation of contempt proceeding at the instance of the applicant was clearly beyond time. 10. The present application is time barred and as such it is not necessary to go into any other question that may be involved in the present case. 11. The contempt application is accordingly rejected. In such view of the matter, initiation of contempt proceeding at the instance of the applicant was clearly beyond time. 10. The present application is time barred and as such it is not necessary to go into any other question that may be involved in the present case. 11. The contempt application is accordingly rejected. However, the petitioner is at liberty to pursue his remedy elsewhere, as already observed, by learned Advocate General in the second last paragraph of the judgment. 12. We make it clear that rejection of the present contempt application as being time barred would not effect the proceedings, if any, pursued by the applicant herein.