Bussa Narayana, S/o. Pedda Venkataiah v. Muda Raja Venkateswarlu (Died)
2025-08-07
V.GOPALA KRISHNA RAO
body2025
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : V. GOPALA KRISHNA RAO, J. This second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure (“C.P.C.” for short) is filed aggrieved against the Judgment and decree, dated 22.02.2019 in A.S.No.63 of 2015, on the file of learned VI Additional District Judge, Markapur, confirming the Judgment and decree, dated 04.06.2012 in O.S.No.204 of 2000, on the file of learned Principal Junior Civil Judge, Giddalur. 2. The appellant herein is the defendant, the respondents 1 to 5 herein are the plaintiffs in O.S.No.204 of 2000, on the file of learned Principal Junior Civil Judge, Giddalur. 3. The 1 st plaintiff initiated action in O.S.No.204 of 2000, on the file of learned Principal Junior Civil Judge, Giddalur, with a prayer for permanent injunction restraining the defendant not to disturb the peaceful possession and enjoyment of plaintiff in plaint schedule land and for costs of the suit. During the pendency of the suit, the 1 st plaintiff died and his legal representatives were brought on record as plaintiffs 2 to 5. 4. The trial Court decreed the suit in O.S.No.204 of 2000, on the file of learned Principal Junior Civil Judge, Giddalur. Felt aggrieved of the same, the defendant in the above said suit filed A.S.No.63 of 2015, on the file of learned VI Additional District Judge, Markapur. The learned VI Additional District Judge, Markapur, dismissed the appeal by confirming the decree and judgment passed by the trial Court. Aggrieved thereby, the defendant in the suit approached this Court by way of second appeal. 5. For the sake of convenience, both parties in the appeal will be referred to as they are arrayed in the original suit. 6. The case of the plaintiffs, in brief, as set out in the plaint averments in O.S.No.204 of 2000, is as follows: (a) The 1 st plaintiff purchased the plaint schedule land from one Karampudi Krishnamacharyulu, son of Garudacharyulu of Ayyavaripalli village, hamlet of Pedda Kandukur, Ardhaveedu Mandal, Prakasam District, at present Ravvaram Village of Nujerlla Mandal, Guntur District, under a registered sale deed dated 23.11.1999 for consideration of Rs.30,000/-. The plaint schedule property was the ancestral property of 1 st plaintiff’s vendor. On th same day of registration, the 1 st plaintiff was given possession and enjoyment of plaint schedule land by his vendor.
The plaint schedule property was the ancestral property of 1 st plaintiff’s vendor. On th same day of registration, the 1 st plaintiff was given possession and enjoyment of plaint schedule land by his vendor. Ever since, the 1 st plaintiff has been in possession and enjoyment of plaint schedule land without any interruption. (b) Subsequently, the 1 st plaintiff got pattadar passbook and title deed book from the office of Mandal Revenue Officer, Ardhaveedu Mandal. Neither the defendant nor anybody else is having any right, title, possession or enjoyment in the plaint schedule land except the plaintiff. At the time of purchase, the defendant also wanted to purchase the land from the vendor of the plaintiff. But the 1 st plaintiff’s vendor sold the plaint schedule land to the 1 st plaintiff, as the 1 st plaintiff offered more price than the defendant. As such, the defendant developed grudge against the 1 st plaintiff. (c) The defendant since 01.08.2000 is proclaiming in the village that he would disturb the peaceful possession and enjoyment of plaintiff in plaint schedule land. Hence the 1 st plaintiff filed the suit. (d) During pendency of the suit, the 1 st plaintiff died leaving the plaintiffs 2 to 5 as his legal representatives, as such, they came on record to prosecute the suit. 7. The defendant filed written statement before the trial Court denying the material averments in the plaint and contended as follows: The suit filed by the plaintiff for bare injunction without asking the relief of declaration of title is not maintainable and plaintiff is not in possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property at any time. Originally the plaint schedule property belonged to one Alluri Rangacharyulu and it is his self- acquired property and he acquired the same more than 40 years back and said Rangacharyulu had been in possession and enjoyment of the same till his death. Said Rangacharyulu had no male issues. He had one daughter by name Karampudi Narayanamma. After the death of said Rangacharyulu, his daughter Narayanamma alone succeeded to his properties and she alone has got right, title, possession and enjoyment in the suit schedule property. The plaintiff’s vendor Karampudi Krishnamacharyulu is the husband of said Karampudi Narayanamma.
Said Rangacharyulu had no male issues. He had one daughter by name Karampudi Narayanamma. After the death of said Rangacharyulu, his daughter Narayanamma alone succeeded to his properties and she alone has got right, title, possession and enjoyment in the suit schedule property. The plaintiff’s vendor Karampudi Krishnamacharyulu is the husband of said Karampudi Narayanamma. He further contended that said Krishnamacharyulu addicted to bad vices and there is no cordial relationship between them, as such, both of them are living separately since more than 15 years. There is land of the defendant’s family to the east of suit schedule land. During the lifetime of Alluri Rangacharyulu, the defendant is continuously cultivating the suit land on behalf of Karampudi Narayanamma. Said Narayanamma to meet her family necessities, sold the suit schedule property under a registered sale deed dated 13.01.2000 to the defendant for consideration of Rs.80,000/-. Since then, the defendant has been in possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property with full and absolute rights. The question of sale of suit schedule property to the 1 st plaintiff by his vendor does not arise. The plaintiff in collusion with V.A.O. fabricated the pattadar passbook and title deed. Hence, sought for dismissal of the suit. 8. On the basis of above pleadings, the learned trial Judge, framed the following issues for trial: (1) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for permanent injunction as prayed for? (2) To what relief? 9. During the course of trial in the trial Court, on behalf of the plaintiffs, P.Ws.1 to 4 were examined and Exs.A.1 to A.4 were marked. On behalf of the defendant, D.Ws.1 to 5 were examined and Exs.B.1 and B.2 were marked. 10. The learned Principal Junior Civil Judge, Giddalur, after conclusion of trial, on hearing the arguments of both sides and on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, decreed the suit. Felt aggrieved thereby, the defendant filed the appeal suit in A.S.No.63 of 2015, on the file of learned VI Additional District Judge, Markapur, wherein, the following points came up for consideration: 1) Whether the deceased plaintiff is in possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property as on the date of filing of the suit? 2) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for permanent injunction as prayed for? 3) To what relief? 11.
2) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for permanent injunction as prayed for? 3) To what relief? 11. The learned VI Additional District Judge, Markapur i.e., the first appellate Judge, after hearing the arguments, answered the points, as above, against the defendant and dismissed the appeal filed by the defendant. Felt aggrieved of the same, the defendant in O.S.No.204 of 2000 filed the present second appeal before this Court. 12. On hearing both side counsels at the time of admission of the appeal, on 04.04.2025 , this Court framed the following substantial questions of law: (1) Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the suit of the respondent / plaintiff for the relief of bare permanent injunction is maintainable without seeking relief of declaration of title in view of the fact that the plaintiff’s title is defective and under cloud as evolved and settled by many decisions of apex Court in the interest of justice? (2) Whether the findings of the Court below that the appellant/ defendant had not proved his title and possession to the plaint schedule property legally sustainable? 13. Heard Smt.Nimmagadda Revathi, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri Devalaraju Anil Kumar, learned counsel for the respondents through virtual mode. 14. In a second appeal under Section 100 of CPC the High Court cannot substantiate its own opinion for that of First Appellate Court unless the Court finds that the conclusions drawn by both the Courts are erroneous being, (i) contrary to the mandatory provisions of the applicable law or (ii) contrary to the law as pronounced by the Apex Court or (iii) based on inadmissible or no evidence. 15. The jurisdiction of the High Court in second appeal under Section 100 of CPC is strictly confined to the case involving substantial question of law and while deciding the second appeal under Section 100 of CPC, it is not permissible for the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence on record and interfere with the findings recorded by both the Courts below and if the First Appellate Court has exercises in its discretion in a judicial manner, its decision cannot be recorded as suffering from an error either of law or of procedure requiring interference in a second appeal. 16. The undisputed facts are originally the suit schedule property belongs to one Alluri Rangacharyulu and he died intestate.
16. The undisputed facts are originally the suit schedule property belongs to one Alluri Rangacharyulu and he died intestate. The claim of the plaintiffs is that the 1 st plaintiff purchased the plaint schedule property from one Karampudi Krishnamacharyulu on 23.11.1999 and the plaint schedule property is the ancestral property of Krishnamacharyulu. The claim of the defendant is that he purchased the plaint schedule property from one Karampudi Narayanamma, daughter of Alluri Rangacharyulu and after death of her father Rangacharyulu, Narayanamma alone succeeded his properties and enjoying the same with absolute rights. 17. As could be seen from the above pleadings of both the parties, originally, the suit schedule property belongs to one Alluri Rangacharyulu. The vendor of the defendant claimed that she is the daughter of said Alluri Rangacharyulu. While so, the vendor of the 1 st plaintiff claimed he is nephew of late Alluri Rangacharyulu and said Rangacharyulu had no male issues and as per the own admissions of vendor of the 1 st plaintiff i.e. P.W.3, the vendor of the defendant is none other than his wife. As noticed supra, the vendor of the 1 st plaintiff is not a Class-I heir of late Rangacharyulu. In Ex.A.1 sale deed, the source of acquisition of the property is mentioned as ancestral property of vendor of 1 st plaintiff. Whereas, the vendor of the 1 st plaintiff admitted in his evidence in cross-examination itself that he has no properties on his own and he did not get any property from his ancestors. Furthermore, he admits in his evidence itself that Narayanamma i.e. vendor of the defendant is his wife. He further admits that he does not know the father name of Rangacharyulu. 18. The plaintiffs relied on Ex.A.3 certificate said to have been issued by Village Revenue Officer. The Village Revenue Officer is examined as P.W.4. As per the statement of P.W.4, he issued Ex.A.3 certificate in favour of Bhumavath Sreenu Naik. He deposed that Narayanamma is the daughter of Sreepathi Venkata Sudarshanacharyulu @ Venkateswarlu and P.W.3 married said Narayanamma. In his evidence in cross-examination, he admits that Ex.A.3 certificate is not entered in the revenue records and there is no round seal on Ex.A.3 certificate. There is no whisper in the evidence of P.W.4 that the vendor of the 1 st plaintiff is the nephew of Rangacharyulu.
In his evidence in cross-examination, he admits that Ex.A.3 certificate is not entered in the revenue records and there is no round seal on Ex.A.3 certificate. There is no whisper in the evidence of P.W.4 that the vendor of the 1 st plaintiff is the nephew of Rangacharyulu. As per the statement of wife of vendor of the 1 st plaintiff, by name Narayanamma, the vendor of the 1 st plaintiff Krishnamacharyulu is not the nephew of Rangacharyulu. 19. The defendant relied on Ex.B.2 certificate dated 03.03.2006 said to have been issued by the Mandal Revenue Officer and Mandal Revenue Officer is examined as D.W.5. As per his evidence, he got issued a residence certificate to the defendant’s vendor by name Ayyaluri Narayanamma, daughter of Rangacharyulu and said certificate was given after verification of the particulars of party and Village Revenue Officer of Vellaturu Village of Bollapalli Mandal also signed on the said residence certificate and the said certificate is issued by him. Though he was cross-examined by learned counsel for the plaintiffs, in cross-examination, his evidence is not shattered on the material aspects of the case. It is also evident that Ex.B.2 certificate is issued on 03.06.2006. Ex.A.3 certificate is obtained by the 1 st plaintiff on 05.01.2009, moreover, Ex.A.3 certificate is alleged to have been issued by Village Revenue Officer. Whereas, Ex.B.2 certificate is said to have been issued by the Mandal Revenue Officer, in which, the Village Revenue Officer has also signed in Ex.B.2 certificate. 20. In a mere suit for permanent injunction, the general principles are where the plaintiff is in lawful or peaceful possession of a property and such possession is interfered or threatened by the defendant, a suit for injunction simplicitor will lie. A person has a right to protect his possession against any person, who does not prove a better title by seeking prohibitory injunction. But a person in wrongful possession, is not entitled to an injunction against a rightful owner. 21. In the case on hand, to prove their possession, the plaintiffs relied on Ex.A.1 registered sale deed, Ex.A.2 pattadar passbook and Ex.A.4 title deed passbook. Ex.A.1 is not a conclusive proof to show that the 1 st plaintiff is in possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property. Moreover, Ex.A.1 sale deed is dated 23.11.1999.
21. In the case on hand, to prove their possession, the plaintiffs relied on Ex.A.1 registered sale deed, Ex.A.2 pattadar passbook and Ex.A.4 title deed passbook. Ex.A.1 is not a conclusive proof to show that the 1 st plaintiff is in possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property. Moreover, Ex.A.1 sale deed is dated 23.11.1999. Within 10 months from the date of sale deed, the 1 st plaintiff approached the civil Court for seeking the relief of prohibitory injunction. In the written statement itself, the defendant specifically pleaded that the suit filed by the plaintiffs for bare injunction without asking the relief of declaration of title, is not at all maintainable. It is the specific case of both parties that originally the plaint schedule property belongs to one Alluri Rangacharyulu. The vendor of the 1 st plaintiff claims that he is the nephew of Rangacharyulu. Whereas, the vendor of the defendant claims that she is the daughter of Rangacharyulu. It is also relevant to say that both the vendors of the 1 st plaintiff and defendant, are none other than the husband and wife. 22. The plaintiffs relied on Ex.A.2 pattadar passbook and Ex.A.4 title deed passbook. In Exs.A.2 and A.4, the revenue authorities made an endorsement on 31.01.2000 about the purchase of the plaint schedule property under Ex.A.1 and the nature of the land is a wet land. Even, it is the specific case of the plaintiffs that since the date of purchase, he is raising paddy, red gram, horse gram and sunflower. In such a case, what prevent the plaintiff to file No.3 Revenue Adangal to prove his possession over the plaint schedule property. As stated supra, both the parties herein are claiming possession over the plaint schedule property. No doubt, the defendant has not yet filed pattadar passbook and title deed. Moreover, the plaint schedule property is not a small extent of land, it is an extent of Ac.4-21 cents. 23. In a case of Smt. Sawarni vs Smt. Inder Kaur and others , [(1996) 6 Supreme Court Cases 223] , the Hon’ble Apex Court held mutation in revenue records entitled the person in whose favour mutation is done to pay the land revenue in question.
23. In a case of Smt. Sawarni vs Smt. Inder Kaur and others , [(1996) 6 Supreme Court Cases 223] , the Hon’ble Apex Court held mutation in revenue records entitled the person in whose favour mutation is done to pay the land revenue in question. Admittedly, in the case on hand, the plaintiffs did not file any land revenue receipts to show that from the date of sale deed, the 1 st plaintiff is paying land revenue to the Government. 24. In a suit for permanent injunction to restrain the defendants from interfering with the plaintiff’s possession, the plaintiff will have to establish that as on the date of suit, he was in lawful possession of the suit schedule property and the defendants tried to interfere to disturb such lawful possession in respect of landed property. Possession may be established with reference to the actual use and cultivation. Admittedly, the plaintiffs did not file any revenue Adangals and land revenue receipts to prove the actual use and cultivation of huge extent of Ac.4-21 cents of wet land. In fact, there is no specific averment in the plaint itself that the defendant tried to disturb the possession of the plaintiff in the plaint schedule property. In the plaint, it was simply averred that since 01.08.2000, the defendant is proclaiming in the village that he would disturb the possession and enjoyment of plaintiff. 25. Both the Courts below failed to consider the complicated questions of fact and law and failed to consider the important crucial aspects, those are as follows: (i) The claim of the plaintiffs is that the 1 st plaintiff got title from his vendor under a registered sale deed dated 23.11.1999 and the same is entered in pattadar passbook and title deed on 31.01.2000 and within a span of eight months, the 1 st plaintiff filed a simple suit for prohibitory injunction. Even assume the 1 st plaintiff is in possession of the plaint schedule property, his possession is only a months’ possession just prior to filing of the suit. (ii) The claim of the plaintiffs is that the 1 st plaintiff purchased the suit schedule property on 23.11.1999 under Ex.A.1 from one Krishnamacharyulu i.e. P.W.3, who himself admitted that his wife sold away the plaint schedule property to the defendant under a registered sale deed dated 13.01.2000.
(ii) The claim of the plaintiffs is that the 1 st plaintiff purchased the suit schedule property on 23.11.1999 under Ex.A.1 from one Krishnamacharyulu i.e. P.W.3, who himself admitted that his wife sold away the plaint schedule property to the defendant under a registered sale deed dated 13.01.2000. In Ex.A.1, the vendor of the 1 st plaintiff referred the source of property is his ancestral property. Whereas, the vendor of the 1 st plaintiff admits in his evidence in cross-examination itself that he has no properties on his own and he did not get any property from his ancestors. (iii) It is undisputed by both sides that originally the plaint schedule property belongs to late Rangacharyulu. Even it is the case of the vendor of the 1 st plaintiff that he is the nephew of said Rangacharyulu and in Ex.A.1 registered sale deed, the source of acquisition of property is mentioned as ancestral property. Whereas, as noticed supra, as per the own admissions of P.W.3, i.e. the vendor of the 1 st plaintiff, he has no properties on his own and he did not get any property from his ancestors. It is the specific case of the vendor of the defendant that she is the only daughter of late Rangacharyulu and after death of Rangacharyulu, she succeeded the plaint schedule property. But the vendor of the 1 st plaintiff has strongly disputing the parentage of the vendor of the defendant. It is admitted by both the parties that both the vendor of the 1 st plaintiff and vendor of the defendant are none other than the husband and wife and husband alienated the plaint schedule property under Ex.A.1 registered sale deed to the 1 st plaintiff and wife alienated the plaint schedule property under Ex.B.1 registered sale deed to the defendant. (iv) Both the Courts below failed to consider that the defendant specifically pleaded in the written statement itself that the suit filed by the 1 st plaintiff for bare injunction without seeking the relief of declaration of title is not at all maintainable.
(iv) Both the Courts below failed to consider that the defendant specifically pleaded in the written statement itself that the suit filed by the 1 st plaintiff for bare injunction without seeking the relief of declaration of title is not at all maintainable. In the written statement itself, the defendant specifically pleaded that originally the plaint schedule property belongs to one Alluri Rangacharyulu and his vendor Narayanamma is the daughter of said Rangacharyulu and 1 st plaintiff’s vendor Krishnamacharyulu is the husband of Narayanamma and there are disputes in between both Krishnamacharyulu and Narayanamma and Krishnamacharyulu addicted to bad vices and there is no cordial relationship in between both of them. Though the defendant has specifically pleaded in the written statement itself that the simple suit for bare injunction is not at all maintainable without seeking the relief of declaration of title, but the learned trial Judge failed to frame the issue on the said aspect and even the first appellate Judge also has not even framed the point for determination on the said aspect. In fact, there is a serious cloud over the title of the 1 st plaintiff. 26. The first appellate Judge and the trial Court held in their judgments that the plaintiffs relied on pattadar passbook and title deed, but the defendant failed to take steps to cancel the pattadar passbook and title deed before the revenue authorities. As noticed supra, within a span of months after obtaining the sale deed, the 1 st plaintiff filed the suit against the defendant and the defendant herein is pursuing his remedies before the civil Court, therefore, the defendant is not at all expect to fight before the revenue authorities. In fact, the plaint schedule property is the wet land in an extent of Ac.4-21 cents. To prove the possession of the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs have not filed any revenue Adangals. The revenue Adangals will prove the possession of the property. It is also relevant to say to prove the possession of the vendor of the 1 st plaintiff, the plaintiffs have not even filed pattadar passbook and title deed passbook of the vendor of the 1 st plaintiff. 27. The first appellate Judge held in its judgment that the defendant failed to prove his possession over the plaint schedule property.
It is also relevant to say to prove the possession of the vendor of the 1 st plaintiff, the plaintiffs have not even filed pattadar passbook and title deed passbook of the vendor of the 1 st plaintiff. 27. The first appellate Judge held in its judgment that the defendant failed to prove his possession over the plaint schedule property. In a suit for permanent injunction, the plaintiff has to prove that he is in lawful possession over the plaint schedule property. But the learned first appellate Judge thrown the burden on the defendant to prove his possession, which is nothing but perversive finding. 28. As noticed supra, both the Courts below ignored the aforesaid complicated questions of fact and law and failed to consider the aforesaid crucial aspects. 29. Learned counsel for the respondents / plaintiffs would contend that both the Courts below have given a concurrent finding that the plaintiff is in possession over the plaint schedule property and therefore, there is no need to interfere with the concurrent findings arrived by both the Courts. 30. The general rule is that the High Court will not interfere with the findings of facts arrived by both the Courts below, but does not absolute rule. Some of the well recognized exceptions are where:- (1) The Courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (2) The Courts have drawn wrong inference from proved facts by applying the law wrongfully; or (3) The Courts have wrongfully cast the burden of proof. 31. In the case on hand, both the Courts below have ignored material evidence viz., there was a cloud over the title of the vendor of the 1 st plaintiff and both the Courts below have not considered the Ex.B.2 said to have been issued by the Mandal Revenue Officer, which is much prior to obtaining Ex.A.3 certificate said to have been issued by the Village Revenue Officer. Whereas, Ex.B.2 is issued by the Mandal Revenue Officer and signature of Village Revenue Officer is also there in Ex.B.2. The Courts below have failed to consider that after obtaining Ex.A.1 sale deed, within a span of ten months, the 1 st plaintiff filed the suit for bare injunction.
Whereas, Ex.B.2 is issued by the Mandal Revenue Officer and signature of Village Revenue Officer is also there in Ex.B.2. The Courts below have failed to consider that after obtaining Ex.A.1 sale deed, within a span of ten months, the 1 st plaintiff filed the suit for bare injunction. Moreover, the entry of the sale deed of the 1 st plaintiff is made on 31.01.2000 in pattadar passbook and title deed by the revenue authorities, just seven months prior to filing of the suit. The plaintiffs did not file any authenticated documents of proof of possession viz., the revenue Adangals to prove the possession of the 1 st plaintiff. In such a case, it is not safe to come to conclusion that the plaintiff is in possession of plaint schedule property. 32. In the written statement itself, the defendant specifically pleaded that his vendor is the daughter of Alluri Rangacharyulu and the plaint schedule property is the self-acquired property of said Rangacharyulu and after the death of Rangacharyulu, Narayanamma, being the sole daughter of Rangacharyulu, is in possession of the plaint schedule property and the defendant purchased the same from said Narayanamma. According to the plaintiffs, the vendor of the 1 st plaintiff is the nephew of Rangacharyulu and originally, the plaint schedule property belongs to Rangacharyulu. In such a case, the simple suit for permanent injunction is not at all maintainable without seeking the relief of declaration of title. The learned trial Judge and first appellate Judge have not even considered the aforesaid aspects. There is a serious title dispute in between both the parties to the suit. In such a case, a simple suit for bare injunction is not at all maintainable, since there is a cloud over the title of the 1 st plaintiff in respect of the plaint schedule property. 33. In a case of Yabdyarlaros.Dajiba Shrawane (Dead) v. Ma&Niolrasl. Harakchand Shah (Dead) and others , [(2002) 6 Supreme Court Cases 404] , the Hon’ble Apex Court held as follows: “…..The position is well settled that when the judgment of the final Court of fact is based on mis-interpretation of documentary evidence or on consideration of inadmissible evidence or ignoring material evidence the High Court in second appeal is entitled to interfere with the judgment.
The position is also well settled that admission of parties or their witnesses are relevant pieces of evidence and should be given due weightage by Courts. A finding of fact ignoring such admissions or concessions is vitiated in law and can be interfered with by the High Court in second appeal….” 34. The law is well settled that if the judgment of the first appellate Court is based on mis-interpretation of documentary evidence or consideration of inadmissible evidence by ignoring material evidence, then the High Court in second appeal is entitled to interfere with the said judgment passed by the learned first appellate Judge. 35. For the aforesaid reasons, I am of the considered view that both the Courts below came to wrong conclusion and decreed the suit for bare injunction filed by the plaintiffs. Therefore, the decree and judgment passed by the both the Courts below are liable to be set aside. Resultantly, the suit in O.S.No.204 of 2000 on the file of learned Principal Junior Civil Judge, Giddalur, is hereby dismissed. 36. In the result, the Second Appeal is allowed. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, each party do bear their own costs in the second appeal. As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in the Appeal shall stand closed.