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Himachal Pradesh High Court · body

2025 DIGILAW 932 (HP)

State of H. P. v. M

2025-05-06

RAKESH KAINTHLA

body2025
JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The present revision is directed against the order dated 15.12.2018 passed by learned Principal Magistrate, Juvenile Justice Board, Solan, District Solan (H.P) (PMJJB), vide which the final report submitted by the police was ordered to be returned to the police as it was filed beyond the period of two months mentioned in Rule 10(6) of the Rules framed under JuvenileJustice Act, 2015. (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner in which they are arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present revision are that police presented a charge-sheet against the accused for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 379 read with Section 34 of the IPC. It was asserted that the informant had parked his motorcycle bearing registration No. HP-12-B-0714 outside his home on 01.02.2017 at 09:30 pm. The motorcycle was found missing on 11.02.2017 at 08:00 pm. The police apprehended the juveniles at the Tunuhatti barrier on the same day with two motorcycles bearing registration numbers. HP-12B-0714 and HR-08T-1338. The police seized the motorcycles, conducted the investigation and filed the charge sheet before the Court on 10.12.2018. 3. Learned PMJJB held that Rule 10(6) of Juvenile Justice Care & Protection of Children Model Rules, 2016 (Rules) provides that the final report has to be filed before the Board at the earliest and not beyond the period of two months from the date of intimation to the police. This provision is mandatory. The report was filed beyond the period of two months, and no action could have been taken on it. Therefore, it was ordered to be returned to the police. 4. Being aggrieved from the order passed by learned PMJJB, the State has filed the present revision asserting that learned PMJJB erred in returning the challan without hearing the prosecution. The case was registered for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 379 read with Section 34 of the IPC, which is punishable with imprisonment of three years. The limitation period under Section 468(2) (c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr. P.C.) is three years. The challan was filed within the period of limitation. The State was not afforded any opportunity to explain the delay. The limitation period under Section 468(2) (c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr. P.C.) is three years. The challan was filed within the period of limitation. The State was not afforded any opportunity to explain the delay. Therefore, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and the order passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 5. I have heard Mr. Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the Revisionist/State and Mr. Ashok Kumar, Advocate, vice Mr. Nishant Khidta, learned counsel for the respondents. 6. Mr. Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the Revisionist/State submitted that learned PMJJB erred in ordering the return of the report to the police. The offence punishable under Section 379 of the IPC is punishable with imprisonment up to three years, and the limitation period of three years will apply to the present case. Learned PMJJB, erred in holding that the challan was to be filed within two months. Therefore, he prayed that the present revision be allowed and the order passed by the learned PMJJB be set aside. 7. Mr. Ashok Kumar, learned counsel for the respondents, submitted that the learned PMJJB had rightly passed the order and there is no infirmity in it. The provision of Rule 10(6) of the Juvenile Justice Act is mandatory, hence, he prayed that the present revision be dismissed. He relied upon the judgment of this Court in Cr. Revision No.158/2021 titled State of H.P. Vs. Saurabh & Ors, decided on 22.05.2023, in support of his submission. 8. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 9. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh , (2022) 8 SCC 204 : (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that the revisional court is not an appellate court and it can only rectify the patent defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed on page 207: - “10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a detailed appreciation of the material and evidence brought on record. It was observed on page 207: - “10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a detailed appreciation of the material and evidence brought on record. The High Court in criminal revision against conviction is not supposed to exercise the jurisdiction like the appellate court, and the scope of interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short “CrPC”) vests jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error which is to be determined on the merits of individual cases. It is also well settled that while considering the same, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case to reverse those findings. 10. This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294, wherein it was observed: “13. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under Section 397 Cr. P.C., which vests the court with the power to call for and examine records of an inferior court, is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceeding or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept into such proceedings. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chandra, (2012) 9 SCC 460 , where the scope of Section 397 has been considered and succinctly explained as under: “ 12 . Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error, and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with the law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits. 13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even framing of charge is a much-advanced stage in the proceedings under the CrPC.” 11. The present revision has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 12. Rule 10(6) of the Juvenile Justice (Care & Protection of Children) Model Rules, 2016, provides that in case of petty or serious offences, the final report shall be filed before the Board at the earliest and in any case not beyond the period of two months from the date of information to the police except in those cases where it was not reasonably known that the person involved in the offence was a child in which case extension of time may be granted by the Board for filing the final report. 13. 13. The term petty offence has been defined in Section 245 as including the offence for which the maximum punishment under the Indian Penal Code (IPC) or any other law for the time being in force is imprisonment up to three years. The challan was filed in the present case for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 379 of the IPC, which is punishable with imprisonment of three years or fine or both. Therefore, the challan was filed for the commission of the petty offence, and it was required to be filed within two months as per Rule 10(6) of the Juvenile Justice (Care & Protection of Children) Model Rules, 2016. 14. The Juvenile Justice Rules deal with the procedure to be followed by the Board whereas Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C) deals with the procedure related to the criminal cases generally Section 5 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.PC) provides that nothing contained in the Code shall, in the absence of a specific provision to the contrary, affect any special or local law for the time being in force or any special jurisdiction or power conferred or any special form of procedure prescribed by any other law for the time being in force. Therefore, the Code of Criminal Procedure itself recognises the existence of special procedures provided by local or special laws. Hence, the provision of Cr. P.C. cannot be resorted to when the special or local law governs the field. In the present case, the matter is covered by the special provision contained in the Juvenile Justice Rules, and recourse cannot be had to the provision of Cr.PC. Hence, the submission that the limitation of three years would be available in the present case is not acceptable, and the present matter would be covered by the limitation of two months provided in Rule 10(6) of the Juvenile Justice (Care & Protection of Children) Model Rules, 2016. 15. It was laid down by this Court in State of Himachal Pradesh VS Monu @ Gulu 2019 4 ILR(HP) 497 that the period of two months provided in Rule 10(6) is mandatory. It was observed: 4. Having heard learned Additional Advocate General and perused material available on record vis-a-vis reasoning assigned by the Juvenile Justice Board while passing impugned order dated 3.10.2018, this Court is not persuaded to agree with Mr. It was observed: 4. Having heard learned Additional Advocate General and perused material available on record vis-a-vis reasoning assigned by the Juvenile Justice Board while passing impugned order dated 3.10.2018, this Court is not persuaded to agree with Mr. Sudhir Bhatnagar, learned Additional Advocate General that learned court below, while passing impugned order has failed to appreciate the facts as well as law, rather this Court finds that though final report after lodging of FIR was prepared much before the prescribed period of two months, but same came to be filed before the Juvenile Justice Board after nineteen months of lodging of FIR. Rule 10 (6) clearly provides that final report by the Investigating Agency should be filed before the Juvenile Justice Board at the earliest and in any case not beyond the period of two months from the date of information to the police, save and except in those cases where, it was reasonably not known that the person involved in the offence was a child, but even in such like cases, application is required to be filed before the Juvenile Justice Board seeking extension of time. In the case at hand, it is not the case of the prosecution that the delay in presenting the final report occurred on account of the fact that it was not reasonably known to the prosecution that the accused involved in the offence was a child. 5. The words "in any case not beyond the period of two months" used in Rule 10 (6) clearly suggest that provision contained under Rule 10 (6) is mandatory and same is to be scrupulously adhered to. No cogent and convincing reasons came to be assigned by the Investigating Agency in support of delay in presenting the final report, which admittedly came to be filed after nineteen months of lodging of FIR. Since Juvenile justice Act, 2016 and Rules framed thereunder are special enactment, learned court below while returning the final report to the police concerned, rightly observed that procedure provided under the Code of Criminal Procedure would not prevail upon the special enactment. 16. A similar view was taken in the State of H.P. Vs. Chanprit Singh (2019) 3 Shim.LC 1322 . 16. A similar view was taken in the State of H.P. Vs. Chanprit Singh (2019) 3 Shim.LC 1322 . It was held by this Court in Saurabh (supra) that the provision of Rule 10(6) is mandatory, and where the final report was filed after eight months of the registration of the FIR, the cognisance could not have been taken on the same. It was observed; 3. There is no error in the impugned order passed by the learned Principal Magistrate Juvenile Justice Board. Sub Rule 6 of Rule 10 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Model Rules 2016 reads as under:“(6) In cases of petty or serious offences, the final report shall be filed before the Board at the earliest and in any case not beyond the period of two months from the date of information to the police, except in those cases where it was not reasonably known that the person involved in the offence was a child, in which case extension of time may be granted by the Board for filing the final report.” It is now well settled that the period of two months prescribed in Rule10(6) of the Rule is mandatorily required to be followed by the prosecution in filing the police report. The final report in cases of petty or serious offences has to be filed before the Board at the earliest and in any case not beyond the period of two months from the date of information to the police. The only exception is such kind of cases where it was not reasonably known that the person involved in the offence was a child, in which case the prosecution can move for extension of time for filing the final report. The instant case does not fall in this exception. In any eventuality, the respondents who at the relevant time were juveniles have been accused of commission of petty offences in the FIR. The final report was presented on 20.03.2019 i.e. about 8 months after registration of the FIR. We are now in the year 2023. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Writ Petition (Civil) No.473/2005 titled as Sampurna Behura Vs. Union of India, has held that the provisions of Juvenile justice Act are required to be implemented in the best interest of the children. We are now in the year 2023. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Writ Petition (Civil) No.473/2005 titled as Sampurna Behura Vs. Union of India, has held that the provisions of Juvenile justice Act are required to be implemented in the best interest of the children. Not filing the final report within the stipulated period cannot be in the best interest of the children in conflict with law. 17. Therefore, there is no infirmity in the order passed by the learned PMJJB in refusing to take cognisance based on the charge-sheet filed beyond the period of two months. 18. In view of the above, the present petition fails and the same is dismissed. 19. Records of the learned Trial Court be transmitted along with copy of the judgment.