JUDGMENT : SMITA DAS DE, J. 1. Affidavit of service filed by the petitioner is kept on record. 2. Heard the parties through their respective learned Counsels. 3. The petitioner No.1 is engaged in the business of providing freight forwarding, customs clearing and other shipping services. 4. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that since, the date of incorporation, the petitioner has not employed more than 6 to 8 people on its payroll as employees and does not fall within the ambit of being a factory and establishment in the light of the gazette notification dated 10 th February, 2010. As a result the petitioner No.1 does not have any statutory obligation to apply registration under the provisions of the Employees State Insurance Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘said Act’). 5. A personal hearing was given on 18 th November, 2024, accordingly submitted the balance sheet profit and loss account for the period 2019-2020 to 2023-2024. Thereafter, by an order dated 15 th January, 2025 an order was passed under Section 45A of the said Act by the respondent No.2 holding, inter alia, that the coverage of the petitioner no.1 under ESIC was valid on the basis of the inspection carried out by the social security officer on 23 rd December, 2010 which was duly intimated to the petitioner No.1 by way of notice in form C11 dated 05.01.2011. Thus the contribution was determined and calculated to the tune of Rs.3,05.750/- upon wages INR 76,43,756/-. 6. Being aggrieved by the order passed under Section 45A of the said Act by the respondent No.2 the petitioner duly filed an appeal under Section 45AA of the said Act before the respondent No.3. 7. The respondent No.3 upon hearing was pleased to dismiss the same on 25 th September, 2025, directing, inter alia, the petitioner to make the payment on account of the contribution in terms of the provision of the said Act amounting to Rs.3,05,750/- for the period December, 2019 to March, 2023. 8. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the order dated 15.01.2025 was passed by the respondent No.2 without considering the relevant documents and held the petitioner to be liable for payment of the contribution to the tune of Rs.3,05,750/- upon wages of Rs.76,43,756/- mainly on the basis of the inspection report. 9. 8. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the order dated 15.01.2025 was passed by the respondent No.2 without considering the relevant documents and held the petitioner to be liable for payment of the contribution to the tune of Rs.3,05,750/- upon wages of Rs.76,43,756/- mainly on the basis of the inspection report. 9. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the appellate authority erroneously held that the Form C11 was duly served upon the petitioner on the date of inspection and was acknowledged by the petitioner on the date of inspection. No opportunity of hearing was ever given to refute the allegations, for running an establishment by employing more than 10 employees. 10. The learned Counsel for the respondent strenuously argues on the point of maintainability since there is an alternative remedy available to agitate the issue involved herein. In this context he relies upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Employees State Insurance Corporation Ltd. Vs. Nagar Nigam Allahabad & Anr. 2024 SCC Online 977 wherein it has been held in paragraphs 23 and 24 which is reproduced below:- “23. The appellant-Corporation had issued notices to respondent Nagar Nigam to show cause as to why the recovery of statutory contribution under Section 40 of the Act of 1948 should not be effected from it. However, admittedly, no response was given by the respondent-Nagar Nigam to such notices. There is also no dispute that for the earlier periods, between 1964 to 1978, the respondent-Nagar Nigam made regular contributions under the Act of 1948 thereby conceding to the position that its workshop was covered under the definition of ‘factory’ where manufacturing process was being carried on. If, at all, this situation had changed in the period subsequent to 1978 and before issuance of the notice under Section 45A of the Act of 1948, the respondent-Nagar Nigam would be required to demonstrate the same by providing appropriate evidence to the Authorized Officer in response to the said notice and establish that it was not covered under the definition of ‘factory’ and that no ‘manufacturing process’ was being undertaken in its premises. Examining such an issue would require the collection of evidence and the appreciation thereof. Hence, only the Insurance Court constituted under Section 74 of the Act of 1948 would be in a position to examine such disputed questions of facts. 24. Examining such an issue would require the collection of evidence and the appreciation thereof. Hence, only the Insurance Court constituted under Section 74 of the Act of 1948 would be in a position to examine such disputed questions of facts. 24. We thus feel that it was a fit case wherein, rather than interfering in the matter in exercise of the writ jurisdiction, the respondent-Nagar Nigam should have been relegated by the learned Single Judge to approach the Insurance Court by filing an application under Section 75(1)(g) of the Act of 1948.” 11. In the same context the respondent further relies upon in Invincible Indian Construction v. Union of India (WPA No. 2061 of 2025], wherein this Hon'ble Court has held that proceedings challenging an order passed under Section 45AA of the ESI Act are to be instituted before the El Court under Section 75 of the ESI Act.) Act. and in also by referring to another judgment in Westing House Saxby Farmer Limited v. State of West Bengal, 2012 SCC OnLine Cal 8817 and Empire Jute Company Limited v. ESIC, 2013 SCC OnLine Cal 7537, where this Hon'ble Court has categorically held that since the ESI Act provides an equally efficacious remedy by way of El Court, the writ jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court cannot be invoked without exhausting such remedy. 12. The learned Counsel for the petitioner relies upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court on the point of maintainability in Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. Vs. Excise & Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority & Ors. 2023 SCC Online SC 95 held in paragraph 4 which is reproduced below:- “4. Before answering the questions, we feel the urge to say a few words on the exercise of writ powers conferred by Article 226 of the Constitution having come across certain orders passed by the high courts holding writ petitions as “not maintainable” merely because the alternative remedy provided by the relevant statutes has not been pursued by the parties desirous of invocation of the writ jurisdiction. The power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 is plenary in nature. Any limitation on the exercise of such power must be traceable in the Constitution itself. Profitable reference in this regard may be made to Article 329 and ordainments of other similarly worded articles in the Constitution. The power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 is plenary in nature. Any limitation on the exercise of such power must be traceable in the Constitution itself. Profitable reference in this regard may be made to Article 329 and ordainments of other similarly worded articles in the Constitution. Article 226 does not, in terms, impose any limitation or restraint on the exercise of power to issue writs. While it is true that exercise of writ powers despite availability of a remedy under the very statute which has been invoked and has given rise to the action impugned in the writ petition ought not to be made in a routine manner, yet, the mere fact that the petitioner before the high court, in a given case, has not pursued the alternative remedy available to him/it cannot mechanically be construed as a ground for its dismissal. It is axiomatic that the high courts (bearing in mind the facts of each particular case) have a discretion whether to entertain a writ petition or not. One of the self-imposed restrictions on the exercise of power under Article 226 that has evolved through judicial precedents is that the high courts should normally not entertain a writ petition, where an effective and efficacious alternative remedy is available. At the same time, it must be remembered that mere availability of an alternative remedy of appeal or revision, which the party invoking the jurisdiction of the high court under Article 226 has not pursued, would not oust the jurisdiction of the high court and render a writ petition “not maintainable”. In a long line of decisions, this Court has made it clear that availability of an alternative remedy does not operate as an absolute bar to the “maintainability” of a writ petition and that the rule, which requires a party to pursue the alternative remedy provided by a statute, is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law. Though elementary, it needs to be restated that “entertainability” and “maintainability” of a writ petition are distinct concepts. The fine but real distinction between the two ought not to be lost sight of. The objection as to “maintainability” goes to the root of the matter and if such objection were found to be of substance, the courts would be rendered incapable of even receiving the lis for adjudication. The fine but real distinction between the two ought not to be lost sight of. The objection as to “maintainability” goes to the root of the matter and if such objection were found to be of substance, the courts would be rendered incapable of even receiving the lis for adjudication. On the other hand, the question of “entertainability” is entirely within the realm of discretion of the high courts, writ remedy being discretionary. A writ petition despite being maintainable may not be entertained by a high court for very many reasons or relief could even be refused to the petitioner, despite setting up a sound legal point, if grant of the claimed relief would not further public interest. Hence, dismissal of a writ petition by a high court on the ground that the petitioner has not availed the alternative remedy without, however, examining whether an exceptional case has been made out for such entertainment would not be proper.” 13. The learned Counsel for the petitioner relies upon another judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court with regard to the point maintainability in case of Principal Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Bajaj Herbals Pvt. Ltd. 2022 SCC Online 421. 14. Let this matter appear for further hearing on 14th January, 2026 at 2 p.m. keeping the maintainability point open. 15. In the meantime the order dated 15.01.2025 passed under Section 45A of the said Act be stayed till 31.01.2026. 16. Leave is granted to the parties to exchange their law notes before the next returnable date.