ORDER 1. The present petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, has been filed by the petitioners being aggrieved by the order dated 26.3.2021 passed in Case No.0021/Appeal/2020-21 alongwith its proceedings whereby the learned Sub-Divisional Officer, Morar, District Gwalior without condoning of delay in filing the said had granted the interim relief as under: ^^çdj.k d¢ vkèkkj ij rglhynkj o`Ùk cM+kxkao d¨ xzke ijeiqj [ksfj;k d¢ losZ Øekad 68 esa can jkLrs d¨ [kqyokus gsrq funsZf'kr fd;k tkrk gSA t¨ fd èkkjk 131 e-ç- Ø- jk- lafgrk d¢ rgr çdj.k d¢ vfUre fujkdj.k rd ;Fkkor jgsaxsA^^ Assailing the said order and the proceedings thereof to be violative of principle of natural justice and without granting opportunity of hearing, the present petition has been filed. 2. Shri N.K. Gupta – learned Senior Advocate alongwith Shri YPS Rathore – Advocate for the petitioners has argued before this Court that the First Appellate Authority/Sub-Divisional Officer had committed error in not deciding the application for condonotion of delay preferred by the present petitioner No.2 alongwith his appeal under section 5 of the Limitation Act and had went on to pass an interim order order dated 26.3.2021 whereby the learned Tehsildar of Circle Badagon was directed to open the closed path in Survey No.68 of Village Parampur Kheria till final disposal of the appeal, whereas, it is settled principle of law that without condoning the delay, there is no appeal in existence and no appeal can be heard and the application seeking condonation of delay has to be considered by the Court first. 3. While placing reliance on the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of reported in Popat Bahiru Govardhane & Others v. Special Land Acquisition Officer & Another reported in (2013) 10 SCC 765 , it was argued that it is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. It was further submitted that the statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same and the legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation, as "inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute and a result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation. 4. It was further submitted that the Appellate Court, without providing any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner proceeded with the matter and granted interim relief to the respondents in the appeal in his absence, thus, the order impugned is liable to be quashed and the matter is required to be remanded back to the Sub-Divisional Officer, Morar to consider the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act afresh after giving proper opportunity of hearing to the petitioners and parties interested. 5. Per contra, counsel for respondent No.5 has submitted that no illegality has been committed by both the Court below in passing the impugned order herein, therefore, no interference is warranted in the matter. 6. Heard. 7. Admittedly, it is settled principle of law that without condoning the delay, there is no existence of an appeal and the record which is placed before this Court does not reflect that the First appellate Court had ever condoned the delay in filing the appeal; rather, it appears that straight away the First appellate Court had admitted the appeal and had granted interim relief vide order dated 26.3.2021 whereby the learned Tehsildar of Circle Badagon was directed to open the closed path in Survey No.68 of Village Parampur Kheria till final disposal of the appeal which is per se illegal, as once the period of limitation expires, right crystalizes in favour of the other party and the issue of limitation assumes importance particularly when the persons pursuant to the order impugned alter their position and condonation of delay in filing the appeal is not a mere formality and not even one day's delay can be condoned without hearing the opposite party of the case. 8. 8. In State Bank of India & Others v. Rajesh Agarwal & Others reported in (2023) 6 SCC 1 , the Hon'ble apex Court in para 36 has held as under: “36. We need to bear in mind that the principles of natural justice are not mere legal formalities. They constitute substantive obligations that need to be followed by decision making and adjudicating authorities. The principles of natural justice act as a guarantee against arbitrary action, both in terms of procedure and substance, by judicial, quasi-judicial, and administrative authorities. Two fundamental principles of natural justice are entrenched in Indian jurisprudence: (i) nemo judex in causa sua, which means that no person should be a judge in their own cause; and (ii) audi alteram partem, which means that a person affected by administrative, judicial or quasi-judicial action must be heard before a decision is taken. The courts generally favor interpretation of a statutory provision consistent with the principles of natural justice because it is presumed that the statutory authorities do not intend to contravene fundamental rights. Application of the said principles depends on the facts and circumstances of the case, express language and basic scheme of the statute under which the administrative power is exercised, the nature and purpose for which the power is conferred, and the final effect of the exercise of that power.” 9. Following the above judgment, since the principles of natural justice had not been followed by the SDO while passing the impugned order herein, grave prejudice could be said to have been caused to the parties concerned. In absence of reasonable opportunity of hearing, the order passed becomes wholly vitiated, as it is well established principle of law that while interpreting a provision of law in passing the orders, the Court must give purposive interpretation and any interpretation which leads to absurdity should be avoided. Furthermore, since passing of the impugned order had apparently caused prejudice to the present petitioners and incumbent it was upon the appellate court to have afforded an opportunity of hearing to the contesting parties. As the present petitioners were not afforded the opportunity of hearing, this Court is not not inclined to approve the said order. Furthermore, since passing of the impugned order had apparently caused prejudice to the present petitioners and incumbent it was upon the appellate court to have afforded an opportunity of hearing to the contesting parties. As the present petitioners were not afforded the opportunity of hearing, this Court is not not inclined to approve the said order. Since trite it is that, if an order affects prejudicially the interests of other party, then it is incumbent upon the Authority concerned to have afforded opportunity of hearing, irrespective of fact that the party is a formal party and an opportunity of hearing is required to be granted. It also appears that without deciding the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act first, the Appellate Authority had proceeded further in the matter. 10. In view of the above and in my considered opinion that the impugned order dated 26.3.2021 passed in Case No.0021/Appeal/2020-21 alongwith its proceedings are hereby set aside and the matter is remanded back to the learned Sub-Divisional Officer, Morar to consider the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act filed by respondents afresh after giving proper opportunity of hearing to the petitioners and parties interested and thereafter, proceed with the matter in accordance with law. 11. With the aforesaid observation, the petition stands allowed and disposed of.