JUDGMENT : Sujit Narayan Prasad, J. Prayer 1. The instant review petition has been filed on behalf of petitioner, who was appellant in LPA No. 461 of 2024, seeking review of order dated 10.09.2024 whereby and whereunder Letters Patent Appeal preferred by the petitioner/appellant has been dismissed. Factual Matrix: 2. Before proceeding to examine the availability of ground seeking review, the facts of the case, as per the pleading made in the writ petition, needs to refer herein, which reads as under: 3. The father of the writ petitioner, while working on the post of clerk in the office of District Superintendent of Education, Ranchi, died in harness on 23.11.1996. Thereafter, the District Compassionate Committee in its meeting held on 08.08.1998 recommended for appointment of the writ petitioner on compassionate ground on the post of clerk. In pursuant thereto, respondent-authority vide memo no.1122(ii) dated 02.09.1998 directed to issue appointment letter to the appellant-writ petitioner but the said appointment letter was not issued, as such, the appellant-writ petitioner made representation dated 15.01.1999 before the Commissioner, South Chhotanagpur Division, Ranchi. Thereafter, vide letter no.117(ii) dated 16.01.1999, respondent-authority again directed the respondent no.5- RDDE, Ranchi to take expeditious action in the matter of appointment of the writ petitioner on compassionate ground but no action was taken and thereafter several representations were submitted but the respondent- authority sat tight over the matter and no action was taken. 4. Aggrieved thereof, the writ petitioner approached to this Court by filing writ petition being C.W.J.C. No. 2350 of 2000 (R) which was disposed of vide order dated 05.07.2001 directing the respondent-RRDE to issue letter of appointment to the appellant-writ petitioner on the basis of the decision taken by the District Establishment Committee. In pursuance thereof, appointment letter was issued to the appellant-writ petitioner vide office order contained in memo no.1753 dated 17.08.2001, accordingly, the writ petitioner joined the post on 01.10.2001 and retired from service on 31.12.2021 on attaining the age of superannuation. 5. In pursuance thereof, appointment letter was issued to the appellant-writ petitioner vide office order contained in memo no.1753 dated 17.08.2001, accordingly, the writ petitioner joined the post on 01.10.2001 and retired from service on 31.12.2021 on attaining the age of superannuation. 5. It is the grievance of the writ petitioner that the retiral dues to which he was actually entitled has not been paid as because if the appointment letter would have been issued immediately after the recommendation of the District Establishment Committee then the pensionary benefits would have been enhanced but the same has not been done and being aggrieved thereof, the writ petitioner filed representations on 25.07.2022; 08.08.2022 and 25.08.2022 but it did not evoke any response, as such the writ petitioner again approached to this Court by filing writ petition being W.P.(S) No. 5491 of 2023 in which the learned Single Judge has declined to pass any positive direction against which the intra-court appeal was preferred. 6. In the Letters Patent Appeal, for adjudication of the lis four issues were formulated. For ready reference, the same is quoted as under: I.Whether while seeking the relief of shifting the date of appointment from 17.08.2001 to 08.08.1998, can it be said to be re-occurring cause of action for the purpose of getting enhanced pensionary benefits? II.Whether the appellant-writ petitioner being conscious with the issue after acceptance of the appointment letter, is it now available for the appellant-writ petitioner to raise the grievance after lapse of 20 years? III.Whether merely by making recommendation by the District Compassionate Committee, can it be said to be creating a right for the purpose of consideration of shifting of date of appointment from 17.08.2001 to08.08.1998? IV.Whether the appointment letter which has been issued in pursuance of the direction passed by this Court in C.W.J.C. No.2350 of 2000 (R) wherein no direction has been passed for grant of appointment letter from the date of the decision so taken by the District Compassionate Committee, if it will be allowed, will it not amount to reviewing the direction passed by this Court way back in the year 2001? 7. The LPA Court, first dealt with issue related to principle of delay and laches. 7. The LPA Court, first dealt with issue related to principle of delay and laches. It has been taken note of that even though the law of limitation is not applicable in writ proceeding but the consideration is to be given by observing the principle of delay and laches so as to exercise the extraordinary jurisdiction conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India . The extraordinary jurisdiction created by way of Article 226 of the Constitution of India has not been made for such litigant who after rising from deep slumber will come to the Court after lapse of reasonable period rather the requirement is that the writ Court is to be approached within the reasonable period. Exception is there with respect to the aforesaid applicability of the principle of delay and laches wherein the delay is caused due to the conduct of the State and in such circumstances; it is not available for the State to take the ground of delay and laches. The appellate Court in this regard took aid of the judgment rendered in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. Vrs. Arvind Kumar Srivastava and Ors. , (2015) 1 SCC 347 ; State of Orissa and anr. v. Mamata Mohanty , (2011) 3 SCC 436. 8. The LPA Court also considered the judgment rendered in the case of Union of India and Ors. vs. Tarsem Singh , (2008) 8 SCC 648 , upon which learned counsel for the appellant had also relied upon, and after discussion at length affirmed the view taken by learned Single Judge that the ratio of the judgment rendered in the case of Union of India and Ors. vs. Tarsem Singh (supra) is not applicable reason being that learned writ Court did not find the present case identical to the factual aspects of the case of Tarsem Singh (supra). 9. So far as the issue no. vs. Tarsem Singh (supra) is not applicable reason being that learned writ Court did not find the present case identical to the factual aspects of the case of Tarsem Singh (supra). 9. So far as the issue no. IV is concerned, LPA Court, on consideration of the factual aspect in entirety, has come to the conclusion that if any direction will be passed in favour of the writ petitioner by commanding the State to consider the date of appointment of the writ petitioner w.e.f. 08.08.1998 i.e., the date of recommendation made by the District Compassionate appointment Committee, it will amount to review of the order passed by the writ Court in CWJC No. 2350 of 2000 (R) that too whether the said prayer was made in the writ petition or not, it is not evident from the pleading of the writ petition and even not from the impugned order. 10. Further, the question of recurring cause of action has been agitated, as would be evident from the discussion so made by the intra-court appeal court, but the same has also not been taken into consideration by answering the same against the appellant-writ petitioner reason being that the shifting of date is having no connection with the issue after lapse of 20 years for the purpose of acceleration in the pensionary benefit. The law is already settled that the pensionary benefit is recurring cause of action and the principle of delay and laches will not made to be applicable. But it is not a simplicitor case of non- disbursement of pensionary benefit but the pensionary benefit has already been released after superannuation of the petitioner and after three years from the date of superannuation, the cause of action has been raised for shifting the date of appointment from 2001 to 1998 i.e., the date of making recommendation by the District Compassionate Committee and as such the intra-court appeal while passing the order in LPA has held that the shifting of date cannot be said to be recurring cause of action for the purpose of acceleration of pensionary benefit. 11. 11. Another issue that the counting of service of the writ petitioner from the date on which the District Compassionate Appointment Committee has recommended for appointment the same has also been answered against the appellant by taking into consideration the settled position of law that that merely on the basis of recommendation having been made by the District Compassionate Appointment Committee no right will be said to be accrued in favour of one or the other rather the right will be said to be accrued the day when the recommendation of the District Compassionate Appointment Committee for the purpose of appointment of one or the other compassionate ground, the appointment letter will be issued in favour of such candidate. 12. The said view has been taken based upon the judgment rendered by Hon‘ble Apex Court by considering the issue of vested/accrued right, as has been dealt by Hon‘ble Apex Court in the case of MGB Gramin Bank v. Chakrawarti Singh [ (2014) 13 SCC 583 ] at paragraph 11, 12 and 13, which read hereunder as:— “11. The word “vested” is defined in Black's Law Dictionary (6th Edn.) at p. 1563, as : “Vested.—fixed; accrued; settled; absolute; complete. Having the character or given in the rights of absolute ownership; not contingent; not subject to be defeated by a condition precedent. Rights are „vested? when right to enjoyment, present or prospective, has become property of some particular person or persons as present interest; mere expectancy of future benefits, or contingent interest in property founded on anticipated continuance of existing laws, does not constitute „vested rights?.” 12. In Webster’s Comprehensive Dictionary (International Edition) at p. 1397, “vested” is defined as law held by a tenure subject to no contingency; complete; established by law as a permanent right; vested interest. 13. Thus, vested right is a right independent of any contingency and it cannot be taken away without consent of the person concerned. Vested right can arise from contract, statute or by operation of law. Unless an accrued or vested right has been derived by a party, the policy decision/scheme could be changed. 13. The present review thereafter has been filed on the ground that the judgment passed by Hon‘ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India and Ors. vs. Tarsem Singh , (supra) has not properly been considered. 14. Unless an accrued or vested right has been derived by a party, the policy decision/scheme could be changed. 13. The present review thereafter has been filed on the ground that the judgment passed by Hon‘ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India and Ors. vs. Tarsem Singh , (supra) has not properly been considered. 14. We have considered the law laid down by Hon‘ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India and Ors. vs. Tarsem Singh (supra) as would be evident from the reference to that effect made at paragraph 13 of the order passed by the intra-court appeal wherein this Court has dealt with the fact in entirety as was the subject matter in the case of Union of India and Ors. vs. Tarsem Singh (supra) and has come to the conclusive finding that the judgment rendered by Hon‘ble Apex Court in the said case is not applicable, as would be evident from the observation so made at paragraph no. 13 to 17 and 20 of the said judgment. 15. The intra-court appeal court after considering all these aspects of the matter, as referred above, answered the issues against the appellant and did not interfere with the order passed by learned Single Judge. 16. Being aggrieved thereof, the appellant has preferred the present review petition. Submission on behalf of review petitioner 17. Learned counsel for the review petitioner has taken the following grounds seeking review of the order passed by the intra-court appeal court. 18. Learned counsel for the review petitioner has submitted that specific ground was raised by the appellant before the LPA Court that delay in issuance of appointment letter is a single wrongful act, which caused continuing injury to the writ petitioner as a result of which he got his pension at a lesser scale than the other similarly situated employees. 19. Putting heavy reliance upon the judgment rendered in the case of Union of India and Ors. vs. Tarsem Singh (supra) submission has been made that underlying continuous wrongs and recurring/successive wrongs, both have been deal with by the Hon‘ble Apex Court in the aforesaid judgment and further it has been held that continuing wrong is one of the exceptions to the normal rule that a belated service related claim will be rejected on the ground of delay and laches. It has been submitted that in the aforesaid judgment, it has specifically been held that where a service related claim is based on a continuing wrong, relief can be granted even if there is a long delay in seeking remedy. Furthermore, it is also not the case of the respondents that if claim of the petitioner related to revision of pension and other retiral benefit is granted it would affect the settled right of third parties. 20. Learned counsel for the review petitioner has further submitted that at paragraph 29 of the impugned order, it has erroneously been observed that in issuance of appointment letter to the petitioner has been found to be not due to the mistake of respondents rather there was confusion with regards to the father‘s name of the petitioner, which was different in educational certificate of the appellant, as compared to the name of ex-employee as mentioned in the service record. But, in this regard an enquiry was already conducted way back in the year 1998 prior to recommendation of name of the petitioner for his appointment and it was found that the person named in the service and ex-employee and educational certificate of the petitioner was the same person, as would appear from perusal of the enquiry report dated 03.07.1998. 21. Further, the prayer before the writ Court was only for revision of his pension and other retiral benefits treating him to be notionally appointed in the year 1998. The word notionally itself clarifies that the grievance of the petitioner is not at all regarding consequential benefits, which might have been accrued during his service tenure. 22. Learned counsel for the review petitioner on the aforesaid ground has submitted that it is a fit case where the judgment passed by the LPA Court requires to be reviewed both on the ground of facts and the legal position. Submission on behalf of respondents-State 23. While on the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents-State has submitted that it is well settled principle of law that the scope of an application for review is much more restricted than that of an appeal and further review proceedings have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC. While on the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents-State has submitted that it is well settled principle of law that the scope of an application for review is much more restricted than that of an appeal and further review proceedings have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC. Submission has been made that the review petitioner has not been able to demonstrate that the order passed by the intra court appeal is fit to be reviewed and grounds which has been raised in reviewing the order impugned has already been raised by the appellant, which has elaborately dealt with the intra-court appeal court, as such, the instant petition is fit to dismissed. Analysis 24. This Court, before appreciation of the arguments advanced on behalf of the parties with respect to the issue as to whether the power of review can be exercised in the factual background of the present case, needs to refer herein the underlying principle to invoke the power or review. 25. The Hon‘ble Apex Court in the case Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos and Anr. vs. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius and Ors. , [ AIR 1954 SC 526 ] , particularly at paragraph-32 has observed as under: “32. Before going into the merits of the case it is as well to bear in mind the scope of the application for review which has given rise to the present appeal. It is needless to emphasis that the scope of an application for review is much more restricted than that of an appeal. Under the provisions in the Travancore Code of Civil Procedure which is similar in terms to Order XL VII, Rule I of our Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the Court of review has only a limited jurisdiction circumscribed by the definitive limits fixed by the language used therein. It may allow a review on three specified, grounds, namely (i) discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within the applicant?s knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed, (ii) mistake or error apparent on the face of the record and (iii) for any other sufficient reason.” 26. Likewise, the Hon‘ble Apex Court in the case of Col. Avatar Singh Sekhon Vrs. Union of India (1980) Supp. Likewise, the Hon‘ble Apex Court in the case of Col. Avatar Singh Sekhon Vrs. Union of India (1980) Supp. SCC 562 , has observed that review of an earlier order cannot be done unless the Court is satisfied that the material error which is manifest on the face of the order, would result in miscarriage of justice or undermine its soundness. The observations made are as under: “12. A review is not a routine procedure. Here we resolved to hear Shri Kapil at length to remove any feeling that the party has been hurt without being heard. But we cannot review our earlier order unless satisfied that material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice. In Sow Chandra Kante v. Sheikh Habib 1975 1 SCC 674 this Court observed: „A review of a judgment is a serious step and reluctant resort to it is proper only where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility. ….. The present stage is not a virgin ground but review of an earlier order which has the normal feature of finality.” 27. Further, the Hon‘ble Apex Court in the case of Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati , reported in (2013) 8 SCC 320 has observed that review proceedings have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order XLVII Rule 1, CPC. As long as the point sought to be raised in the review application has already been dealt with and answered, parties are not entitled to challenge the impugned judgment only because an alternative view is possible. The principles for exercising review jurisdiction were succinctly summarized as under: “20. Thus, in view of the above, the following grounds of review are maintainable as stipulated by the statute: 20.1. When the review will be maintainable: (i) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within knowledge of the petitioner or could not be produced by him; (ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; (iii) Any other sufficient reason. The words “any other sufficient reason” has been interpreted in Chajju Ram v. Neki, and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. The words “any other sufficient reason” has been interpreted in Chajju Ram v. Neki, and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasiusto mean “a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule”. The same principles have been reiterated in Union of India v. Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd.,. 20.2. When the review will not be maintainable:— (i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications. (ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import. (iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case. (iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice. (v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is re-heard and corrected but lies only for patent error. (vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot be a ground for review. (vii) The error apparent on the face of the record should not be an error which has to be fished out and searched. (viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court, it cannot be permitted to be advanced in the review petition. (ix) Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought at the time of arguing the main matter had been negatived.” 28. It is evident from the aforesaid judgments that the power of review is to be exercised if there is any error occurred on the face of the order or the factual aspect could not have been brought to the notice of this Court in spite of the due diligence having been taken in the matter of making available the factual aspect of the relevant documents. 29. The position of law is well settled, as would appear from the reference of the judgment made hereinabove that the review of the judgment can only be made if the new fact has come which could not have been brought to the notice of the Court in spite of due diligence, as has been held by the Hon‘ble Apex Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos and Anr. v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose (supra). 30. v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose (supra). 30. It is evident that while power of review may be inherent in the High Court to review its own order passed in a writ petition, the same has to be exercised on well-recognised and established grounds on which judicial orders are reviewed. For example, the power may be exercised on the discovery of some new and important matter or evidence which was not within the knowledge of the parties seeking review despite due exercise of diligence when the order was made. 31. Review can also be sought when the order discloses some error apparent on the face of record or on grounds analogous thereto. These are all grounds which find mention in various judicial pronouncements right from the earliest time as well as in the Rules of Order 47 of the Civil Procedure Code as permissible grounds of review. 32. The term ?mistake or error apparent? by its very connotation signifies an error which is evident per se from the record of the case and does not require detailed examination, scrutiny and elucidation either of the facts or the legal position. If an error is not self-evident and detection thereof requires long debate and process of reasoning, it cannot be treated as an error apparent on the face of the record for the purpose of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. 33. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be =reheard and corrected‘. There is a clear distinction between an erroneous decision and an error apparent on the face of the record. While the first can be corrected by the higher forum, the latter only can be corrected by exercise of the review jurisdiction. A review petition has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be =an appeal in disguise‘. 34. In the very recent judgment in the case of Sanjay Kumar Agarwal Vrs. While the first can be corrected by the higher forum, the latter only can be corrected by exercise of the review jurisdiction. A review petition has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be =an appeal in disguise‘. 34. In the very recent judgment in the case of Sanjay Kumar Agarwal Vrs. State Tax Officer (1) & Anr . , reported in (2024) 2 SCC 362 , the Hon‘ble Apex Court while interpreting the provision of Order 47 Rule 1 of the C.P.C. the proposition has been laid down to entertain the review, as has been held at paragraph16.1 to 16.7 which reads as under:- “16.1. A judgment is open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. 16.2. A judgment pronounced by the court is final, and departure from that principle is justified only when circumstances of a substantial and compelling character make it necessary to do so. 16.3. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of record e justifying the court to exercise its power of review. 16.4. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC, it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be "reheard and corrected". 16.5. A review petition has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be "an appeal in disguise". 16.6. Under the guise of review, the petitioner cannot be permitted to reagitate and reargue the questions which have already been addressed and decided. 16.7. An error on the face of record must be such an error which, mere looking at the record should strike and it should not require any long-drawn process of reasoning on the points where there may conceivably be two opinions.—" 35. This Court is now proceeding to examine the factual aspect as to whether the factual aspect as available in the present case and the ground which has been agitated is available to exercise the power of review or not. 36. This Court is now proceeding to examine the factual aspect as to whether the factual aspect as available in the present case and the ground which has been agitated is available to exercise the power of review or not. 36. The main ground taken by the review petitioner is that the intra-court appeal did not take into consideration the fact that immediately after superannuation in the year 2021, the petitioner approached this Court in the year 2023 confining his prayer for revision of pension and other retiral benefits, hence cause of action for the same arises after superannuation only. Further ground has been taken that the principles continuous wrongs and recurring/successive wrongs both have been dealt with by Hon‘ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India and Ors. vs. Tarsem Singh (supra) which the petitioner had relied upon, but that has been distinguished and erroneously observation has been made. 37. We have considered the grounds, as referred hereinabove and are of the view that such ground cannot be said to be fit to review the order since whatever ground is being referred for the purpose of seeking review of the order that has already been taken care of by the appellate court in the intra-court appeal while deciding the LPA No. 461 of2024. 38. The grounds so agitated in the review has also been raised in the intra-court and dealt with the LPA, by framing the issues, which has been quoted hereinabove and answered against the appellant. For ready reference, the relevant paragraph is quoted as under: “ 13 .The issue has also been taken into consideration by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India and Ors. vs. Tarsem Singh , (2008) 8 SCC 648 wherein the facts was that the respondent while working in the Indian Army was invalidated out of army service, in medical category, on 13.11.1983. He approached the High Court in the year 1999 seeking a direction to the appellants therein to pay him disability pension. The learned Single Judge by order dated 06.12.2000 allowed the writ petition and directed the appellants to grant him disability pension at the rates permissible. Insofar as arrears are concerned, the relief was restricted to thirty- eight months prior to the filing of the writ petition. The learned Single Judge by order dated 06.12.2000 allowed the writ petition and directed the appellants to grant him disability pension at the rates permissible. Insofar as arrears are concerned, the relief was restricted to thirty- eight months prior to the filing of the writ petition. The respondent was also directed to appear before the Re- survey Medical Board as and when called upon by the appellants. The appellants did not contest the said decision and granted disability pension to the respondent and also released the arrears of disability pension for 38 months. The respondent however was not satisfied. According to him the disability pension ought to be paid from the date it fell due on 13.11.1983. He therefore filed a letters patent appeal. The said appeal was allowed by the Division Bench of the High Court by judgment dated 06.12.2006. The Division Bench held that the respondent was entitled to disability pension from the date it fell due, and it should not be restricted to a period of three years and two months prior to the filing of the writ petition. By a subsequent modification order dated 23-2- 2007, the Division Bench also granted interest on the arrears at the rate of 6% per annum. The question which was under consideration before the Hon’ble Apex Court was that whether the High Court was justified in directing payment of arrears for a period of 16 years instead of restricting it to three years. 14 .The Hon’ble Apex Court in the circumstances that the issue originally crept up on 13.11.1983 but the litigation was started in the year 1999 therefore, applying the principle of limitation act which is available under the Limitation Act, 1963 for filing the money suit, i.e., three years, the benefits will be settled only for the period of three years. 15 .The factual aspect which has been taken by the Hon’ble Apex Court in that case that even though the appellant of the said case was conscious with his legal right of getting the disability pension but he has invoked the jurisdiction of the Court after the reasonable period but this Court by taking into consideration the mandate of the Persons With Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995, has passed the order on disability pension but the litigant has been imposed with arrears of salary only for the period of three years. 16 .Adverting to the facts of the present case wherein it is admitted that the writ petitioner after the recommendation having been made by the District Compassionate Committee on 08.08.1998 has approached to this Court by filing writ petition being C.W.J.C. No. 2350 of 2000 (R) wherein direction was passed and based upon that the letter of appointment was issued on 01.10.2001. 17 .The writ petitioner has not made objection at that moment rather he has accepted the offer of appointment and accordingly, started discharging his duty. There is no direction by this Court to issue the appointment letter from the date of recommendation so made by the District Compassionate Committee, i.e., on 08.08.1998”. 39. The LPA court, therefore, came to the conclusion that if the relief which has been sought for by the writ petitioner at this moment will be allowed, will it not amount to reviewing the direction passed by this Court in C.W.J.C. No. 2350 of 2000 (R). In such circumstance, denied to extend relief as sought for the writ petitioner-appellant. For ready reference, relevant paragraph 19 of the impugned judgment is quoted as under: “19.This Court is of the view that if any direction will be passed in favour of the appellant-writ petitioner by commanding the State to consider the date of the appointment of the appellant-writ petitioner w.e.f. 08.08.1998, i.e., the date of recommendation by the District Compassionate Committee, it will amount to reviewing the direction passed by this Court in CWJC No. 2350 of 2000 (R) that too whether the said prayer was made in the writ petition or not, the same is not evident from the pleading of the writ petition and even not from the impugned order.” 40. The review petitioner herein taking reference of the judgment in the case of Union of India and Ors. vs. Tarsem Singh (supra) has submitted the appellant-review petitioner is getting the lower pension which is recurring cause of action, which has arisen only after superannuation of his service on 31.12.2021. The LPA Court has elaborately dealt with this issue and came to the conclusion at paragraph nos. vs. Tarsem Singh (supra) has submitted the appellant-review petitioner is getting the lower pension which is recurring cause of action, which has arisen only after superannuation of his service on 31.12.2021. The LPA Court has elaborately dealt with this issue and came to the conclusion at paragraph nos. 24 to 26 as under: “ 24 .This Court, therefore, is of the view that in the present case the principle of re-occurring cause of action will not be applicable since the appellant-writ petitioner was getting pension and the said issue of shifting the date of appointment has not been raised within reasonable time even though the appellant-writ petitioner was conscious with the aforesaid fact regarding the recommendation which was made by the District Compassionate Committee on 08.08.1998. 25 . This Court has also considered that merely because the District Compassionate Committee had made recommendation that does not confer any right to claim his appointment from the date of such recommendation since the recommendation which has been made only resulted into the issuance of offer of appointment. 26 . The principle so far as service jurisprudence is concerned, that the moment the right will be said to be created the day when the offer of appointment will be issued in favour of one or the other person.” 41. Learned counsel for the review petitioner has tried to impress upon this Court by advancing her argument by raising the ground showing infirmities in the finding. Showing infirmity in the finding cannot be a ground for review rather the same may be a ground to prefer appeal before the higher forum. 42. This Court, on consideration of the aforesaid facts, discussions and judicial pronouncements, has considered the grounds seeking review of this Court at the touch stone of the proposition laid down for the purpose of exercising the power of judicial review, as per the judgment rendered by Hon‘ble Apex Court, as referred hereinabove and the paramount consideration to exercise such power as has recently been dealt with by Hon‘ble Apex Court in the case of Sanjay Kumar Agarwal Vrs. State Tax Officer (1) & Anr (supra) and found that none of the parameters is available for review of the order passed by the LPA Court. 43. This Court in view thereof is of the view that it is not a fit case where power of judicial review is required to be exercised. 44. State Tax Officer (1) & Anr (supra) and found that none of the parameters is available for review of the order passed by the LPA Court. 43. This Court in view thereof is of the view that it is not a fit case where power of judicial review is required to be exercised. 44. Accordingly, the present review application stands dismissed. 45. Pending Interlocutory Application, if any, stands disposed of.