JUDGMENT : Devashis Baruah, J. Heard Mr. N. C. Das, the learned senior counsel assisted by Ms. M. Devi, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant. 2. This is an Appeal filed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, ‘the Code’) challenging the judgment and decree dated 31.10.2019 passed in Title Appeal No.6/2017 (earlier numbered as Title Appeal No.10/2010) by the Court of the learned District Judge, Dibrugarh (hereinafter referred to as the ‘learned First Appellate Court’) whereby the Appeal so filed by the appellant was dismissed thereby affirming the judgment and decree dated 27.01.2010 passed by the learned Munsiff No.1, Dibrugarh (hereinafter referred to as the ‘learned Trial Court’) in Title Suit No.39/2007. 3. At the outset, it is relevant to take note of that the instant Appeal is in respect to the dismissal of the suit and not the decreeing of the counterclaim. In so far as decreeing of the counterclaim, a separate proceedings under Section 115 of the Code has been filed which is presently pending before this Court. 4. The question which arises before this Court as to whether the questions of law so proposed in the instant Appeal can be formulated in terms of Section 100(4) of the Code so that the instant Appeal can be proceeded with. 5. Mr. N. C. Das, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant proposed two questions of law which can be framed as substantial questions of law in terms with Section 100(4) of the Code. The said questions so proposed are as under:- (i) That the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court on the face of it are perverse being not based on evidence on record both oral and documentary? (ii) That the learned First Appellate Court below has totally failed to decide the issues framed in the suit by discussing the evidence on record both oral as well as documentary by formulating points for determination which violates the mandate of law as provided under Order 41 Rule 30 and 31 of the CPC? 6. The question which arises before this Court is as to whether the questions of law so proposed by the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant can at all be formulated as substantial questions of law in the present Appeal. 6. The question which arises before this Court is as to whether the questions of law so proposed by the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant can at all be formulated as substantial questions of law in the present Appeal. It is noteworthy to take note of that the instant Appeal is being taken up at the stage of Order XLI Rule 11 of the Code. 7. For the purpose of deciding the aspect as to whether the two questions of law so proposed can be formulated as substantial questions of law, this Court finds it relevant to take note of the facts which led to the filing of the instant Appeal. 8. For the sake of convenience, the parties herein are referred to in the same status as they were before the learned Trial Court. 9. The appellant herein as plaintiff had filed a suit being Title Suit No.9/2006 seeking specific performance of an oral Agreement for Sale entered into in the month of May, 1998 between the plaintiff and the defendant No.1 for sale of a plot of land admeasuring 30 ft X 52 ft = 1560 sq. ft. equivalent to 10.8 lechas under Dag No.60 covered by Periodic Patta No.10 of Chiring Gaon Ward, Dibrugarh Town Mouza which has been most specifically described in the Schedule to the plaint. It was stated in the plaint that the oral agreement agreed to was that the plaintiff would have to pay a sum of Rs.1,50,000/- to the defendant No.1 as a consideration for sale of the said land and out of that, on 01.05.1998, the plaintiff paid Rs.9,800/-; on 05.01.1999 paid a sum of Rs.25,000/-; on 09.02.1999, the plaintiff paid another sum of Rs.10,000/- and on 15.04.1999, the plaintiff paid another sum of Rs.10,000/- and it has been alleged that the defendant No.1 assured the plaintiff that he would soon take steps to execute the Sale Deed and will receive the balance consideration. It has been further alleged in the plaint that even after receipt of a total amount of Rs.54,800/-, the defendants neither took any steps for obtaining necessary sale permission and approval for the sale of the land inspite of insistence by the plaintiff. It has been further alleged in the plaint that even after receipt of a total amount of Rs.54,800/-, the defendants neither took any steps for obtaining necessary sale permission and approval for the sale of the land inspite of insistence by the plaintiff. On the other hand, on 22.12.2005 the defendant No.2 who is the wife of the defendant No.1 in collusion with some other persons surreptitiously raised a torza wall around the said shop house in occupation of the plaintiff and completely blocked the front passage for which a proceedings under Section 133/145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was initiated. It is further stated that on the basis of the said, the plaintiff filed the suit seeking specific performance of the contract for sale of the plot of land described in the Schedule to the plaint on payment of the balance amount of Rs.95,200/- and for permanent injunction restraining the defendant No.1 from transferring the suit land. 10. It is pertinent to mention that the suit was filed in the year 2006. 11. On behalf of the defendants, a written statement-cum-countercalm was filed. In the written statement, it was specifically denied that the defendant No.1 had entered into any form of agreement with the plaintiff or had received any consideration. On that basis itself, the defendants have categorically stated that the question of specific performance of a non-existent agreement does not arise for which the suit is required to be dismissed. It was further stated that since the month of June, 2005, the plaintiff stopped paying the monthly rent inspite of repeated requests. On the basis thereof, the counterclaim was filed seeking ejectment of the plaintiff from the suit premises. It is relevant to take note of that the plaintiff did not file any written statement to the counterclaim and the suit proceeded. 12. On the basis of the pleadings, the learned Trial Court framed seven issues which being relevant are reproduced herein under:- (1) Whether the suit as well as counter-claim are maintainable in law and in facts? (2) Whether there is cause of action for the suit and counter-claim? (3) Whether there was any lawful contract in between the plaintiff and the defendants to sell and purchase the suit land? (4) Whether the defendants have failed to perform the terms and conditions of the alleged agreement in respect of the suit land? (2) Whether there is cause of action for the suit and counter-claim? (3) Whether there was any lawful contract in between the plaintiff and the defendants to sell and purchase the suit land? (4) Whether the defendants have failed to perform the terms and conditions of the alleged agreement in respect of the suit land? (5) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for sale in respect of the suit land from the defendants? (6) Whether the defendant is a trespass/defaulter/undesirable tenant over the suit land and liable to be evicted? (7) Whether the parties are entitled to any other relief/s as prayed for respectively? 13. On behalf of the plaintiff, three witnesses were adduced and various documents were exhibited. On behalf of the defendants, two witnesses were adduced and various documents were also exhibited. It is relevant to take note of that the plaintiff while adducing his evidence did not adduce any receipt pertaining to payment of rent or depositing of any rent before the Court. The learned Trial Court while deciding the Issue Nos.3 & 4 came to a categorical finding on the basis of the evidence that the plaintiff had failed to prove that there was an Agreement for Sale of the suit land. It was further observed that the plaintiff had also failed to prove the existence of any contract in accordance with law, and as such, the question of fulfilling the terms and conditions by the defendant No.1 did not arise at all. Further to that, the learned Trial Court while deciding the Issue Nos.3 & 4 also observed that there was nothing on record to show that the plaintiff ever asked the defendant No.1 since 1999 to execute the alleged Sale Deed in his favour even after a period of 6 to 7 years, and accordingly, it was held that there was no lawful contract in between the plaintiff and the defendant No.1 to sell and purchase the suit land as alleged and it cannot be held that the defendant No.1 failed to perform his duty. 14. On the issue pertaining to the cause of action for a suit for counterclaim, it was held that there was a cause for the suit and the counterclaim. While deciding the Issue No.6 it was held that the plaintiff was a defaulter in paying the monthly rent since 2005. 15. 14. On the issue pertaining to the cause of action for a suit for counterclaim, it was held that there was a cause for the suit and the counterclaim. While deciding the Issue No.6 it was held that the plaintiff was a defaulter in paying the monthly rent since 2005. 15. The learned Trial Court while passing the judgment and decree declared that the defendants are entitled to recover and the plaintiff is liable to hand over the vacant possession of the suit premises to the defendants by removing his belongings therefrom within a period of 3 months from the date of the said judgment and decree and further it was held that the defendants were also entitled to receive the rents at the rate of Rs.500/- per month w.e.f. June, 2005 till the date of the judgment and decree and the plaintiff was also liable to clear the outstanding rents before the delivery of possession. Further to that, the learned Trial Court also held that the amount of Rs.54,800/- paid by the plaintiff to the defendant No.1 would be adjusted on the rents payable to the landlord. 16. Being aggrieved, an Appeal was preferred by the plaintiff before the Court of the learned District Judge, Dibrugarh which was initially registered and numbered as Title Appeal No.10/2010 and later on re-registered as Title Appeal No.6/2017. The learned First Appellate Court while deciding the said Appeal took into account the pleadings, the evidence so led by both the parties, the submission so made by the learned counsels appearing on behalf of the parties and took up the Appeal for determination on the basis of the issues so framed by the learned Trial Court and vide the impugned judgment and decree dated 31.10.2019, upheld the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court dated 27.01.2010 and it is under such circumstances, the present Appeal has been preferred. At this stage, this Court finds it relevant to reproduce the findings of fact arrived at by the learned First Appellant Court at paragraph No.21 of the impugned judgment which is reproduced herein below:- “21. At this stage, this Court finds it relevant to reproduce the findings of fact arrived at by the learned First Appellant Court at paragraph No.21 of the impugned judgment which is reproduced herein below:- “21. In view of my foregoing discussions relating to Issue No. 1, 2, 3 and 4, it is held that the plaintiff failed to prove through his evidence and pleadings that the agreement was executed between both the parties and pursuant to their oral agreement, the plaintiff paid Rs.54,800/- and the defendant issued receipts Ext. 16 to Ext. 19. On the touchstone of preponderance of probabilities, the plaintiff also failed to prove that the plaintiff has paid Rs.95,200/- to the defendant by performing his part of the agreement to sell and purchase the suit land for a total amount of Rs. 1,50,000/-. It is true that the plaintiff appears to be willing to perform his part of the contract, but this is not sufficient for a decree in favour of the plaintiff, directing the defendant to accept the remaining part of the amount and transfer the land to the plaintiff to execute the contract. It has already been held in my foregoing discussions, that on the preponderance of probabilities, the plaintiff failed to prove about a valid agreement for sale executed between both the parties. It is true that the tenancy agreement between the parties was not renewed and the plaintiff has been in possession and occupation of the tenanted premises and he has been operating his industry from the tenanted premises till date. There is no evidence on what capacity, the plaintiff is occupying the tenanted premises. Apart from the pleadings and evidence of the plaintiff regarding the oral agreement to sell, the plaintiff also failed to submit his written statement against the counterclaim of the defendant that he is a undesirable tenant and trespasser and when he failed to pay his rent continuously since June, 2005. There is not even a whisper regarding the intervening period. The plaintiff as well as the defendant failed to bring forward through their evidence and pleadings in what capacity, the defendant was occupying the suit premises continuously after the expiry of the tenancy agreement. From 1986 to 1989, the tenancy agreement was prevalent and thereafter, there was no renewal of tenancy agreement, but the plaintiff was still occupying the suit premises. From 1986 to 1989, the tenancy agreement was prevalent and thereafter, there was no renewal of tenancy agreement, but the plaintiff was still occupying the suit premises. The plaintiff's evidence and pleadings depicts that much later in the year 1986, both the parties orally agreed transfer of the suit premises in favour of the plaintiff and pursuant thereto, the plaintiff paid Rs.54,890/- to the defendant vide Ext. 16 to Ext. 19 which were also received by the defendant. Thereafter, there appears to be sudden lull from the year 1989 upto 2005 when the defendant have claimed that the plaintiff has become a trespasser. The crux of the case is that the plaintiff failed to produce any rent receipts regarding payment of rents continuously from the year 1986 till date. The plaintiff has admitted that he is a tenant. There is no evidence that the plaintiff has been paying the rent without any accounts maintained by any of the parties. This Court has to decide this case relying on documents and not on stray verbal submissions.” 17. In the backdrop of the above, let this Court consider as to whether the two questions of law so submitted by the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant can be formulated as substantial questions of law. The first question of law so proposed to be a substantial question of law is as to whether the judgment and decree passed by the learned Courts below on the face of it were perverse being not based on evidence on record, both oral and documentary. 18. Mr. N. C. Das, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submitted that the oral as well as the documentary evidence on record in so far as the case of the plaintiff is concerned in the suit was not discussed by the learned First Appellate Court, and as such, the judgment and decree so passed is perverse. 19. This Court has duly taken note of the judgments passed by the learned Trial Court as well as the learned First Appellate Court wherein both the Courts below had duly taken into account the evidence on record and on the basis of that had arrived at the conclusion that the plaintiff could not prove that there existed an oral Agreement for Sale of the suit land. Under such circumstances, the question of framing a substantial question of law on the basis of perversity does not arise. This Court would reiterate that no perversity could be shown to the finding arrived at by both the learned Courts of facts. 20. The second substantial question of law so proposed is as to whether the learned First Appellate had failed to decide the issues framed in the suit by discussing the evidence on record both oral as well as documentary by formulating the points for determination which violates the mandate of law as provided under Order XLI Rule 30 & 31 of the CPC. The said substantial question of law so proposed, in the opinion of the Court, does not arise at all taking into account that the learned First Appellate Court had duly taken into account the pleadings, the issues which were framed, the evidence so laid, the submissions so made and decided each and every issues taking into consideration the evidence on record. In this regard, this Court finds it relevant to take note of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Mrugendra Indravadan Mehta vs. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation, reported in 2024 SCC online SC 849 wherein it was categorically observed that if the First Appellate Court does not separately frame the points for determination arising in the first appeal, it would not prove fatal as long as the Court deals with all the issues that actually arises for deliberation in the Appeal. Paragraph Nos.29, 30 & 31 of the said judgment being relevant is reproduced herein under:- “29. However, in Laliteshwar Prasad Singh v. S.P. Srivastava (Dead) thru. Lrs. , this Court, while affirming the aforestated principles, observed that it is well settled that the mere omission to frame the points for determination would not vitiate the judgment of the first appellate Court, provided that the first appellate Court recorded its reasons based on the evidence adduced by both parties. 30. Thus, even if the first appellate Court does not separately frame the points for determination arising in the first appeal, it would not prove fatal as long as that Court deals with all the issues that actually arise for deliberation in the said appeal. Substantial compliance with the mandate of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC in that regard is sufficient. Thus, even if the first appellate Court does not separately frame the points for determination arising in the first appeal, it would not prove fatal as long as that Court deals with all the issues that actually arise for deliberation in the said appeal. Substantial compliance with the mandate of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC in that regard is sufficient. In this regard, useful reference may be made to G. Amalorpavam v. R.C. Diocese of Madurai, wherein this Court held as under:— ‘9. The question whether in a particular case there has been substantial compliance with the provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC has to be determined on the nature of the judgment delivered in each case. Non-compliance with the provisions may not vitiate the judgment and make it wholly void, and may be ignored if there has been substantial compliance with it and the second appellate court is in a position to ascertain the findings of the lower appellate court. It is no doubt desirable that the appellate court should comply with all the requirements of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC. But if it is possible to make out from the judgment that there is substantial compliance with the said requirements and that justice has not thereby suffered, that would be sufficient. Where the appellate court has considered the entire evidence on record and discussed the same in detail, come to any conclusion and its findings are supported by reasons even though the point has not been framed by the appellate court there is substantial compliance with the provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC and the judgment is not in any manner vitiated by the absence of a point of determination. Where there is an honest endeavour on the part of the lower appellate court to consider the controversy between the parties and there is proper appraisement of the respective cases and weighing and balancing of the evidence, facts and the other considerations appearing on both sides is clearly manifest by the perusal of the judgment of the lower appellate court, it would be a valid judgment even though it does not contain the points for determination. The object of the rule in making it incumbent upon the appellate court to frame points for determination and to cite reasons for the decision is to focus attention of the court on the rival contentions which arise for determination and also to provide litigant parties opportunity in understanding the ground upon which the decision is founded with a view to enable them to know the basis of the decision and if so considered appropriate and so advised to avail the remedy of second appeal conferred by Section 100 CPC.’ 31. As already noted hereinabove, the High Court did set out all the issues framed by the Trial Court in the body of the judgment and was, therefore, fully conscious of all the points that it had to consider in the appeal. Further, we do not find that any particular issue that was considered by the Trial Court was left out by the High Court while adjudicating the appeal. In effect, we do not find merit in the contention that the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside on this preliminary ground, warranting reconsideration of the first appeal by the High Court afresh.” 21. In view of the above, it is therefore seen that as there is no substantial question of law that can be formulated in the instant Appeal, the instant Appeal cannot be proceeded with for which the Appeal stands dismissed. 22. However, in the facts of the case, this Court is not imposing costs. 23. Before parting with the present Appeal, this Court finds it relevant to clarify that the dismissal of the present Appeal shall not prejudice the appellant who had filed a proceedings under Section 115 of the Code challenging the impugned judgment and decree in so far as the counterclaim is concerned.