Tejaram S/o Sh. Narsing Ram v. State of Rajasthan, Through Pp
2025-03-26
MANOJ KUMAR GARG
body2025
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : Manoj Kumar Garg, J. 1.Instant criminal revision petition has been filed under Section 397 /401 Cr.P.C against the order dated 12.09.2024 passed by the learned Special Judge, ACB, Pali in Sessions Case No. 02/2024 whereby, the learned Judge ordered to frame charges against the petitioner for offences under Section 07 of Prevention of corruption Act. 2. Brief facts of the case are that a complaint was filed by the complainant Devendra Kumar stating therein that he is employed as Constable at Police Station Abu Road and the accused is seeking illegal gratification of Rs. 1,50,000/- from him, claiming to act on behalf of Superintendent of Police, in exchange for not placing him under suspension. Upon receipt of the complaint, the police registered a case under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act and initiated an investigation. 3. After due investigation, the police filed chargesheet against the petitioner for offence under Section 7 of the P.C. Act and the matter was committed to the court of Special Judge, ACB Cases, Pali. Subsequently, the learned trial court after hearing the arguments on charge, proceeded to frame charges against the petitioners vide impugned order dated 12.09.2024. Hence, this present revision petition. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the prosecution has not complied with the mandatory provisions as envisaged under Section 17A of the P.C. Act. As per Section 17A of the amended Act of 2018, no police officer shall conduct any enquiry or inquiry or investigation into any offence alleged to have been committed by a public servant under the Prevention of corruption Act, without previous approval. It is argued that the allegation against the present petitioner is that he demanded illegal gratification on behalf of Superintendent of Police, whereas, the Superintendent of Police has not been arrayed as an accused. Thus, neither any demand was raised by the petitioner nor any work was pending at the end of petitioner so as to demand any illegal gratification. Be that as it may, the petitioner allegedly committed the "offence" during the course of discharging their official duty and therefore, the sanction had to be sought before proceeding against the petitioner. Therefore, the impugned order dated 12.09.2024 is illegal and same is liable to be set aside. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Yashwant Sinha and Ors.
Therefore, the impugned order dated 12.09.2024 is illegal and same is liable to be set aside. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Yashwant Sinha and Ors. vs. Central Bureau of Investigation and Ors. Reported in (2020) 2 SCC 338 , decision of this Court in the case of Himanshu Yadav vs. State of Rajasthan in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 17545/2021 decided on 19.01.2022, decision of this Court in the case of Ranidan Singh vs. State of Rajasthan S.B. Criminal Misc. (Pet.) No. 1219/2022 decided on 08.10.2024, decision of this Court Jaipur Bench in the case of Surendra Singh Rathore vs. State of Rajasthan S.B. Criminal Misc. (Pet.) No. 4366/2022 decided on 09.09.2022, and decision of this Court in the case of Rakesh Sheshma vs. State of Rajasthan S.B. Criminal Misc. Stay Petition No. 9423/2024 decided on 19.12.2024. 5. Per contra, learned Public Prosecutor and learned counsel for the complainant argued that offence under Section 7 of the P.C. is prima facie made out against the accused petitioner and acts done by the petitioner cannot be said to be in discharge of official duty and same would not be protected by the armor of Section 17A of the Code. It is further argued that the point about sanction under Section 17A need not be considered at the stage of framing of charges. At this stage the Court should only see if a "prima facie" case is made out or not. Moreover, before framing of charges, prosecution sanction has been obtained against the petitioner, therefore, no interference is called for in the impugned order dated 12.09.2024 and the revision petition is liable to be dismissed. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Nara chandrababu Naidu Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr reported in 2024 1 SCR 549 , decision of this Court in the case of Rajesh Kumar vs. State of Rajasthan reported in 2022 0 Supreme (Raj.) 41, decision of Hon’ble Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Kavindra Kiyawat vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in 2020 0 Supreme (MP) 587 , decision of Hon’ble Kerala High Court in the case of Shankara Bhat vs. State of Kerala reported in 2021 Supreme (Online) (Ker) 17555 6.
I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned order. 7. In order to appreciate the controversy, it would be apt to refer to Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act which reads as under: " Section 17A. Enquiry or Inquiry or investigation of offences relatable to recommendations made or decision taken by public servant in discharge of official functions or duties: No police officer shall conduct any enquiry or inquiry or investigation into any offence alleged to have been committed by a public servant under this Act, where the alleged offence is relatable to any recommendation made or decision taken by such public servant in discharge of his official functions or duties, without the previous approval-- (a) in the case of a person who is or was employed, at the time when the offence was alleged to have been committed, in connection with the affairs of the Union, of that Government; (b) in the case of a person who is or was employed, at the time when the offence was alleged to have been committed, in connection with the affairs of a State, of that Government; (c) in the case of any other person, of the authority competent to remove him from his office, at the time when the offence was alleged to have been committed: Provided that no such approval shall be necessary for cases involving arrest of a person on the spot on the charge of accepting or attempting to accept any undue advantage for himself or for any other person: Provided further that the concerned authority shall convey its decision under this section within a period of three months, which may, for reasons to be recorded in writing by such authority, be extended by a further period of one month." 8. At the outset, it may be noted that very objectives of the PC Act are to prevent corruption, to promote transparency and accountability in the public administration, to deter individuals from engaging in corrupt practices by imposing strict penalties, protects whistleblowers etc. by the prevention of Corruption Amendment) Act, 2018, the PC Act 1988 was further amended, and Section 17A was inserted. The scope of Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act is limited to protecting public servants from investigations related to their official decisions and recommendations.
by the prevention of Corruption Amendment) Act, 2018, the PC Act 1988 was further amended, and Section 17A was inserted. The scope of Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act is limited to protecting public servants from investigations related to their official decisions and recommendations. It does not provide blanket immunity for all actions taken by public servants, particularly those that are criminal in nature or unrelated to their official duties. The requirement for prior approval serves to prevent frivolous investigations while ensuring that genuine cases of corruption are not obstructed. The Law Commission of India, in its 254th report, indicated that Section 17A was designed to align with Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which also requires prior sanction for prosecuting public servants. The intent was to prevent harassment of public officials while ensuring accountability. Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act deals with the offence of corruption committed by public servants. The intention of the Legislature was to protect the public servants in the bona- fide discharge of their official functions or duties. It specifically makes when act of a public servant is ex-facie criminal or constitutes an offence, prior approval of the Government would not be necessary. It extends the scope of corruption to encompass to cases where offence is relatable to any recommendation made or decision taken. It aims to strengthen anti-corruption laws by ensuring accountability for corrupt actions. From the bare reading, it is discernible that Section 17A has the following main three facets; the accused is (a) a public servant, (b) the alleged offence is relatable to any recommendation made or decision taken by such public servant, (c) while acting or purporting or in connection to act in the discharge of his official duty. In case these three conditions are fulfilled, then the police is prevented from initiated investigation of the offence unless the appropriate government grants a sanction against the alleged accused. 9. In the present case, the contention of the petitioner is that an offence committed by a public servant under the Prevention of Corruption Act necessitates prior approval before any inquiry, investigation, or proceeding against the public officer can be validly initiated. This contention arises from the provisions of Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, which stipulates that without such prior approval, any subsequent actions taken against a public officer may be rendered void.
This contention arises from the provisions of Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, which stipulates that without such prior approval, any subsequent actions taken against a public officer may be rendered void. However, the petitioner chose not to challenge the validity of FIR registered in the year 2021, raising the issue of the absence of the requisite prior approval and has filed the present revision petition at this juncture, when the case has progressed to the charge stage. 10. In the landmark case of Nara Chandrababu Naidu (Supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court in categoric terms observed that when an inquiry or investigation pertains to a public servant in connection with an allegation of an offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act—particularly after Section 17A became operational—it is imperative to secure prior approval as mandated under subsections (a), (b), or (c) of Section 17A to proceed legally. However, it was clarified that the absence of such approval, while rendering the action initiated under the 1988 Act potentially illegal, would not nullify the entirety of the proceedings, including remand orders. The relevant paragraph of the judgment is reproduced hereinbelow:- “A question has also been raised by the appellant as to whether the Special Judge could have passed the remand order in the event the remand was asked for only in respect of alleged commission of the IPC offences. We are apprised in course of hearing that the appellant has been enlarged on bail. Hence, this question need not be addressed by me in this judgment. I, accordingly, dispose of this appeal with the following directions:- (i) If an enquiry, inquiry or investigation is intended in respect of a public servant on the allegation of commission of offence under the 1988 Act after Section 17A thereof becomes operational, which is relatable to any recommendation made or decision taken, at least prima facie, in discharge of his official duty, previous approval of the authority postulated in sub-section (a) or (b) or (c) of Section 17A of the 1988 Act shall have to be obtained. In absence of such previous approval, the action initiated under the 1988 Act shall be held illegal. (ii) The appellant cannot be proceeded against for offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 as no previous approval of the appropriate authority has been obtained.
In absence of such previous approval, the action initiated under the 1988 Act shall be held illegal. (ii) The appellant cannot be proceeded against for offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 as no previous approval of the appropriate authority has been obtained. This opinion of this Court, however, shall not foreclose the option of the concerned authority in seeking approval in terms of the aforesaid provision. In this case, liberty is preserved for the State to apply for such approval as contained in the said provision. (iii) I decline to interfere with the remand order dated 10.09.2023 as I am of the view that the Special Judge had the jurisdiction to pass such order even if the offences under the 1988 Act could not be invoked at that stage. Lack of approval in terms of Section 17A would not have rendered the entire order of remand non-est. ……….. 28. Having considered the different contours of Section 17A, I am of the opinion that Section 17A would be applicable to the offences under the PC Act as amended by the Amendment Act, 2018, and not to the offences existing prior to the said amendment. Even otherwise, absence of an approval as contemplated in Section 17A for conducting enquiry, inquiry or investigation of the offences alleged to have been committed by a public servant in purported exercise of his official functions or duties, would neither vitiate the proceedings nor would be a ground to quash the proceedings or the FIR registered against such public servant.” 11. So far as the cases referred to by the counsel for the petitioner are concerned, in the case of Yashwant Sinha and Ors. (Supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court observed that the petitioners, had filed a complaint that Section 17A constituted a bar to any inquiry or enquiry or investigation unless there was previous approval, however, when it came to the relief sought in the writ petition, no relief was claimed in this regard, which is not relevant to the present case. In Himanshu Yadav (Supra), a coordinate bench of this Court, while quashing the impugned order, observed that Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, would create a significant obstacle for the investigating officer, impeding further proceedings. The case referred to by the counsel for the petitioner concerns a situation where the petitioner challenged the prosecution sanction at the investigation stage.
The case referred to by the counsel for the petitioner concerns a situation where the petitioner challenged the prosecution sanction at the investigation stage. However, in the present matter, the petitioner is challenging the order of framing charge on the basis of bar to an inquiry, enquiry or investigation unless there was previous approval under Section 17A of the Act of 1988. So far as the cases of Ranidan Singh (Supra), Surendra Singh Rathore (Supra), and Rakesh Sheshma (Supra) are concerned, the petitioners contested the FIR at the investigation stage by way of filing misc petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. In contrast, the petitioner has filed the present revision petition challenging the order of framing charge, thus distinguishing it from the aforementioned precedents. Furthermore, recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Nara Chandrababu Naidu (Supra) has categorically held that the lack of approval under Section 17A does not render the entire order of remand non-est, which further distinguishes this case from the petitioner’s argument. 12. In light of the judicial observation, this court recognizes that the oversight regarding the acquisition of approval under Section 17A of the Act does not necessarily invalidate the entire order but may allow for corrective measures. Notably, it has been articulated that sanction can be sought at the stage of charge under Section 19 of PC Act, thus providing a procedural remedy at a later stage of the judicial process. This approach not only aligns with legal precedent but also preserves the integrity of procedural safeguards intended to protect public servants while ensuring that due legal process is followed. In the present case, as observed in the chargesheet, the prosecution sanction has been duly obtained for proceeding against the petitioner and therefore, the impugned order dated 12.09.2024 cannot be said to be illegal or perverse. 13. Accordingly, the present revision petition having no force is hereby dismissed. Stay petition is also dismissed.