JUDGMENT : 1. These Civil Revision applications arise for setting aside the order dated 16.07.2014 passed by the learned Civil Judge, (Senior Division) I, Dhanbad in Title (Partition) Suit No. 151 of 2013 whereby the petitions filed by the petitioners under Order VII Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code (in short ‘CPC’) for rejection of the plaint has been dismissed. 2. The plaintiff has filed the suit for partition of joint family properties, trade and business of trading companies among the plaintiff, his brothers and sisters those who are alive and their successors who are not alive . The plaintiff claimed to be the co- sharer of the properties, trade, business and trading companies, mentioned in Schedule B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, K & L which were said to be either ancestral property or properties purchased from the profits of ancestral property and with the aid of joint family property, by the joint labour of the whole family, and it was asserted that there was a nucleus sufficient to acquire the property and interest thereon by profitable investment thereof for the benefit of the joint family. 3. The plaintiff prayed for the following reliefs: - “(i) for partition of 1/9 th share of the plaintiff in the properties mentioned in Schedule C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, K and L and allotment of separate and exclusive management and control to the plaintiff upto that extent. (ii) For appointment of a Court Receiver to manage the affairs of the properties mentioned in Schedule C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, K and L in view of the reported attempts by respondent Nos. 1 to 3 and also by respondent Nos. 7 to 8 to divert cash and monies and resort to asset stripping/transfer to benami entities or creating 3 rd party interest therein and to maintain accounts of profit and loss, with the assistance of such person or persons whom such court receiver thinks fit and proper to assist him and furnish such statement of account etc. to the court periodically, on such terms and conditions as the courts thinks fit and proper, till the disposal of the suit for partition. (iii) For appointment of a survey knowing Advocate Commissioner for appointment of respective shares in the immovable properties consisting of house, buildings and landed properties. to the court periodically, on such terms and conditions as the courts thinks fit and proper, till the disposal of the suit for partition. (iii) For appointment of a survey knowing Advocate Commissioner for appointment of respective shares in the immovable properties consisting of house, buildings and landed properties. (iv) For appointment of qualified Assessor or any valuer for determining the valuation of the properties so that any of the parties to the suit may in lieu of his share may compensate in terms of money proportionately. (v) For the cost of the suit. (vi) For any other or further relies to which plaintiff may be found legally entitled to.” 4. In title partition suit, the defendant Nos. 1, 2 and 3, namely, Devendra Kumar Agarwalla, Mahendra Kumar Agarwalla and Yogendra Kumar Agarwalla respectively are the sons of Late Banwari Lal Agarwalla and defendant Nos. 4, 5 and 6, namely, Annapurna Devi Ruiya, Sarala Devi Todi and Shakuntala Devi Kanoi respectively are the daughters of Late Banwari Lal Agarwalla. 5. As per the plaint, Schedule A is the genealogy; Schedule B is the name of Companies formed during the lifetime of Banwari Lal Agarwalla; Schedule C is the details of companies running in original names or by changing name of Schedule B companies; Schedule D is the company formed after the death of Banwari Lal Agarwalla; Schedule E is the name of the partnership firms; Schedule F is the family trust; Schedule G is the details of Yashobhan Sahkari Grih Nirman Samiti having office at Lal Bungalow Dhaiya, P.O.-Nag Nagar, P.S. Dhanbad, District Dhanbad; Schedule H is the details of residential bungalows, gardens, play grounds, cottage etc. of the joint family; Schedule I is the details of apartment and flats in process of construction on the lands which stand in the name of family members ; Schedule J is the landed properties standing in the name of different family members; Schedule K is the details of house flats landed property standing in the name of different family members, situated outside the district of Dhanbad and Schedule L is the details of immovable properties of the family. 6. The petitioners and the contesting opposite party (plaintiff)have also filed short written note of arguments. 7. The learned counsels appearing on behalf of the opposite parties sisters/their legal representatives submit that they have nothing to say in the matter. 8. 6. The petitioners and the contesting opposite party (plaintiff)have also filed short written note of arguments. 7. The learned counsels appearing on behalf of the opposite parties sisters/their legal representatives submit that they have nothing to say in the matter. 8. Arguments of the Petitioners: A. By this Plaint, the Plaintiff seeks to reopen/undo a Partition that had already taken place orally on 30.12.1981 (32 years prior to the institution of the suit), subsequently recorded in a written Memorandum dated 02.02.1982 signed by all concerned including the Plaintiff as well and also acted upon by all the signatories including the Plaintiff and also recognized by the statutory authorities under the Income Tax Act, 1961 (in short 'I.T. Act') and the Wealth Tax Act, 1957. B. The factum of the complete oral partition on 30.12.1981 of all the family properties has been recorded in the 1982 Memorandum. In the Plaint, the Plaintiff has neither contended that the total Oral Partition did not take place on 30.12.1981 (as recorded in 1982 Memorandum), nor pleaded that the same suffers from any illegality in any manner. C. The Plaintiff has completely suppressed the factum of the complete oral partition on 30.12.1981 in the Plaint. The said Oral Partition is extremely material and relevant aspect, in presence of which the Plaint discloses no cause of action. D. The existence of the "Memorandum of Understanding" dated02.02.1982 (1982 Memorandum) and the Plaintiff's signatures thereon is not disputed, rather the Plaintiff attached the said Memorandum with the Plaint as Document No.83 to the Plaint. The Plaint at Paragraph No. 27, 30, 32 and 39 contains the Plaintiff's averments with respect to the 1982 Memorandum. E. The relevant clauses and recitals of the 1982 Memorandum are reproduced as follows: a. "WHEREAS the parties hereto of the FIRST PART, the SECOND PART, the THIRD PART, the FOURTH PART, the FIFTH PART and the SIXTH PART constituted a Hindu Joint Family governed by the Miktakshara School of Hindu Law known as BANWARILAL AGARWALLA (HUF) at Tharla, PO.P.S. Jharia, in the District of Dhanbad;" b. “AND WHEREAS members mutually decided to effect partition of the family properties and the members of the family agreeing thereto decided on total partition of the family and accordingly effected such total partition on 30.12.1981. c. Clause 1: "That on 30.12.1981 the members of the said erstwhile Hindu Joint Family, of which Shri Parmeshwar Kumar Agarwalla was the Karta effected a complete partition of all the properties owned by the family on the said date.” d. Clause 4: "That the immovable properties belonging to the family were divided between the members in the manner shown more particularly in Schedule 'C'annexed hereto." F. The details of equal division of all the family properties (assets and liabilities) to each member, including the Plaintiff, has been tabulated in the enclosures/schedules appended to the 1982 Memorandum. All that was mutually and jointly recognized by the Plaintiff and other brothers as the family property was partitioned. Nothing more was identified to remain that was joint family property. G. Pursuant thereto, after due inquiry and giving of notice of inquiry to all the members of the family, the Assessing Officer under Section 171 of I.T. Act has also returned a finding dated 14.01.1983 that there has been a complete partition effected on30.12.1981: "As per memorandum of partition dated 2-2-82, the complete partition has been effected on 30-12-81. The claim of partition has been gone into. The claim is in order. Complete partition of the assets and liabilities as affirmed by each of the members is allowed.” The order records that "Each member has affirmed to the fact of partition" and that "The deposition made has been testified by all the members. On partition, the members have received the assets as detailed in Schedules...” H. Section 171 of the I.T. Act requires that in case any member of a Hindu Family claims that there has been a total partition, then the Assessing Officer has to conduct an inquiry into such a claim after giving notice of inquiry to all the members of the family. Only a total partition can be accepted under the I.T. Act. This order under Section 171 of the I.T. Act dated 14.01.1983 has attained finality. I. A similar order dated 14.01.1983 was passed by the Income Tax Officer under Section 20 of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957. J. In the Plaint, the Plaintiff, inter alia, seeks to take an exception to the binding 1982 Memorandum on the ground that it is unregistered and that too without laying any challenge to total/complete partition effected on 30.12.1981 as recorded in the said 1982 Memorandum. J. In the Plaint, the Plaintiff, inter alia, seeks to take an exception to the binding 1982 Memorandum on the ground that it is unregistered and that too without laying any challenge to total/complete partition effected on 30.12.1981 as recorded in the said 1982 Memorandum. K. Undisputedly, the 1982 Memorandum is a mere memorandum prepared after the total/complete oral partition which was effected on 30.12.1981 and the same by itself does not create or extinguish any right in the immovable properties and therefore, does not fall within the mischief of Section 17(2) of the Registration Act, 1908 and thus not compulsorily registrable. He has relied upon two judgments passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in Kale and others vs. Dy. Director of Consolidation and others, (1976) 3 SCC 119 (paragraphs 10, 15, 20 and 25 and Ravinder Kaur Grewal and others vs. Manjit Kaur and others, (2020) 9 SCC 706 (paragraphs 23 to 30). L. In absence of any challenge to the total/complete oral partition as arrived on 30.12.1981, the Plaintiff is not entitled to any relief whatsoever. The lack of challenge appears to be deliberate, for the reason, if the same would have been laid, the suit would have been ex-facie barred by limitation. Any challenge to the total/complete oral partition as arrived on 30.12.1981, inter-alia, on the ground of it being allegedly unconscionable or otherwise, would have been barred under Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963 as the right to sue admittedly accrued for the first time on 30.12.1981 i.e. almost more than 32 years prior to the date of filing of the Plaint i.e., on 01.06.2013. M.The Plaintiff has deliberately not laid any relief of declaration or cancellation qua the 1982 Memorandum, which ought to be the foundational claim in absence of which the relief of partition could not have been sought for by the Plaintiff. By clever drafting, the Plaintiff sought only the consequential reliefs as it was well within the knowledge of the Plaintiff that seeking any relief of declaration and cancellation would have been barred by limitation. In light of the own writing of the Plaintiff as contained in the unchallenged and admitted 1982 Memorandum that the properties referred therein were the joint family property, the Plaintiff has no cause of action to contend after 30 years that there were more properties. In light of the own writing of the Plaintiff as contained in the unchallenged and admitted 1982 Memorandum that the properties referred therein were the joint family property, the Plaintiff has no cause of action to contend after 30 years that there were more properties. N. The reference in the Plaint to the Memorandum dated 26.05.1999 is completely misconceived and unfounded. The said document does not create any right to sue or disclose any cause of action in favour of the Plaintiff and that too after 14 years of its execution and knowledge. On the contrary, a bare perusal of the said document only fortifies the stand of the petitioner(s) that a complete total partition of Shri Banwari Lal Agarwalla (HUF) had already taken place on 30.12.1981. Furthermore, the Plaintiff is deliberately and intentionally misleading the Hon'ble Courts by referring to the said document for the reason that the said document was executed by the other four brothers not as coparceners or members of Shri Banwari Lal (HUF), but as Karta of their own HUF and solely for the purpose of complete separation and efficient management of the various companies held by the signatories to the said Memorandum. The Memorandum dated 26.05.1999 also acknowledges and accepts the factum of partition effected on 30.12.1981. The portions of the said document are reproduced below for convenience:- "AND WHEREAS the parties hereto have also separated between themselves and have their own HUP and are leaving (sic. living) separately and managing independent business and Companies" "AND WHEREAS for the purpose to ensure complete separation between the Parties hereto and for efficient management of the various Companies held and controlled by the First Party, the Second Party, the Third Party and the Fourth Party and to meet Global Competition and to raise finance and resources the Parties hereto have agreed to the transfer of shares in the Companies to the Party in control of the concerned companies to ensure exclusive and complete control and management of the Company held by the respective Parties" Even from this Memorandum dated 26.05.1999, no relief has been sought and even otherwise it would be time barred. O. The 1982 Memorandum has also been acted by the Plaintiff and he has executed sale deed on 01.08.2001 of one of the properties derived from such partition. O. The 1982 Memorandum has also been acted by the Plaintiff and he has executed sale deed on 01.08.2001 of one of the properties derived from such partition. Such partition was also admitted in a Written Statement dated 09.02.2004 by the Plaintiff in Title Suit No. 40 of 2003. P. In the facts of the present case, the learned Trial Court should have examined the Plaintiff searchingly under Order X of CPC and thereafter heard the Application under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC, more so, when an application in this regard had been preferred by the Petitioners herein as has also been recorded in the first paragraph of the impugned order. In the case of T. Arivandandam Vs. T.V. Satyapal and Another, (1977) 4 SCC 467 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed at Paragraph 5 of the report that if on a meaningful- not formal-reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, the learned trial Court should exercise his power under Order VII Rule 11 C.P.C. taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. And, if clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, nip it in the bud at the first hearing by examining the party searchingly under Order X C.P.C. An activist judge is the answer to irresponsible law suits. The Trial Courts would insist imperatively on examining the party at the first hearing so that bogus litigation can be shot down at the earliest stage. This examination under Order X C.P.C. has been subsequently conducted by the learned trial Court. Q. The Petitioners/Defendants filed the Application under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC at the earliest possible opportunity to nip the frivolous case in the bud on 24.08.2013 (filed by Shri D.K. Agarwalla), which was rejected by the impugned order dated 16.07.2014. Immediately thereafter, the Petitioners/Defendants on 13.10.2014 (filed by Shri D.K. Agarwalla) filed the present Revision Petition being Civil Revision No. 32 of 2014 on which date, the suit was at a nascent stage and issues had yet not been framed. The pendency of the Revision Petitions before this Hon'ble Court is not attributable to the Petitioners/Defendants and therefore the progress made in the suit cannot be a ground to oppose the present Petition. The pendency of the Revision Petitions before this Hon'ble Court is not attributable to the Petitioners/Defendants and therefore the progress made in the suit cannot be a ground to oppose the present Petition. Pendency of a petition before the Court is the act of the Court and it is trite that an act of the Court shall prejudice no man. Reliance is placed on the maxim Actus Curiae Neminem Gravabit. R. It is settled law that the provision of Order VII Rule 11 of CPC is mandatory in nature and the powers under the said provision can be exercised by the Court at any stage of the suit. [Dahiben vs. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhansuali (Gajra) (Dead) through Legal Representatives, (2020) 7 SCC 366 (Paragraph 23.14 and 23.15) ]. S. In view of the aforesaid factual and legal matrix, it has been submitted that the plaint does not disclose any cause of action and is also liable to be rejected as being ex-facie barred by the law of limitation. The continuance of this suit shall be a gross abuse of law as the suit is vexatious and the plaint seeks to create an illusory cause of action. T. It has accordingly been prayed that the order dated 16.07.2014 passed by the Learned Trial Court be set aside and the plaint be rejected under the relevant provisions of Order VII Rule 11 of CPC. 9. Arguments of the Opposite Party no.1 - plaintiff: I. The plaintiff and defendants are family members, all being children or Class-I heirs of deceased children of Late Banwari Lal Agarwalla. All schedule properties are family properties, in which the plaintiff has 1/9 th share. The other defendants are co-owners of such properties. Since the schedule properties are jointly owned by the plaintiff and defendants, there is evidently a cause of action for partition. II. The cause of action in a suit for partition is continuous, and therefore the suit cannot be barred by limitation. III. As per the opposing defendants, there are earlier Memorandums of Understandings (MOUs) in existence which were in the nature of family settlements. However, there was no definite full proof partition of the schedule properties under any purported MOUs. Had there been a holistic final partition of all joint assets, there would not have been a requirement for executing multiple MOUs. As per the opposing defendants, there are earlier Memorandums of Understandings (MOUs) in existence which were in the nature of family settlements. However, there was no definite full proof partition of the schedule properties under any purported MOUs. Had there been a holistic final partition of all joint assets, there would not have been a requirement for executing multiple MOUs. That apart, most schedule properties mentioned in the plaint do not find any reference in the purported MOUs. This is without prejudice to the plaintiff’s stance that the earlier MOUs were created only for income tax filing convenience, which were not to be acted upon. These are all questions of trial which require evidence, and the suit ought not to be dismissed at the threshold. IV. Even if hypothetically assuming for sake of argument (without admitting) that the earlier MOUs have partitioned the properties mentioned therein, only few of the schedule properties are referred to in the earlier MOUs. It is well settled that a plaint cannot be rejected in part. Trial must happen to ascertain as to which of the scheduled properties, if any, have been partitioned earlier. V. Evidently, there is not a single document signed by all parties to the suit so as to give all co-owners a definite demarcated share in the joint estate reflected in the plaint schedule. For instance, none of the plaintiff’s four sisters have signed any MOU till date. That apart, the plaintiff himself was not a signatory to the two MOUs of 1999 whereby several properties and assets forming subject matter of the instant suit were purportedly divided amongst the plaintiff’s brothers behind the plaintiff’s back. In the absence of all co-owners being signatories, none of the MOUs could be said to have validly partitioned any property. VI. The plaint is self-explanatory. In deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC, the civil court has to confine itself to the pleadings in the plaint and the documents annexed thereto. None of the contentions of the opposing defendants can be taken into consideration for the purpose of deciding such an application. The contentions of the opposing defendants have to stand the test of trial. VII. The companies mentioned in the schedule essentially mean the complete shares of such companies. None of the contentions of the opposing defendants can be taken into consideration for the purpose of deciding such an application. The contentions of the opposing defendants have to stand the test of trial. VII. The companies mentioned in the schedule essentially mean the complete shares of such companies. All shares of each of the schedule companies are jointly owned by the parties to the suit which ought to be partitioned. If the joint ownership of such shares by the parties to the suit is being contested by the opposing defendants, the same shall be subject matter of trial in the partition suit. There is no impediment for the civil court in making a decision on title of the shares upon conclusion of trial for the purpose of deciding whether or not such shares should be partitioned. VIII. The trial court has already rejected the application under Order VII Rule 11 by the impugned order. The opposing defendants, after preferring the captioned revision applications, took no steps for a period of about 11 years to have such application heard. In the meantime, the trial has reached advanced stages of evidence wherein the plaintiff’s evidence is complete and the plaintiff’s second witness is in process of being cross examined. The opposing defendants, by conduct, have conceded to the necessity of trial in the case, and are now estopped from contending that the plaint should be rejected. IX. For the purpose of deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC, court cannot delve into the merits of the pleadings and/or the evidence produced by the parties. For deciding on whether or not to reject the plaint, the contents of the plaint are to be treated as true and correct. X. The learned trial Court, in the facts of the case, has rightly concluded that the issues of the case cannot be decided without there being a trial and the parties adducing evidence in support of their contentions. Admittedly, there are contradictory contentions and assertions being made by the plaintiff and the opposing defendants, which have to be decided by way of trial. XI. Above are the broad points of argument to contend that the impugned order dismissing the defendant’s application under Order VII Rule 11 should not be interfered with. 10. Admittedly, there are contradictory contentions and assertions being made by the plaintiff and the opposing defendants, which have to be decided by way of trial. XI. Above are the broad points of argument to contend that the impugned order dismissing the defendant’s application under Order VII Rule 11 should not be interfered with. 10. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff- opposite party has submitted that on the face of the memorandum of partition, it indicates that further partition was required to be done in future with respect to certain properties. He has also submitted that the schedule of the plaint does not tally with the schedule of the properties mentioned in the memorandum of partition. He submits that even if worst case of the plaintiff is taken into consideration and without admitting that the partition had taken place way back in the year 1982, then also there are much more properties which were required to be partitioned. The learned counsel has submitted that the petition under order VII Rule 11 of the C.P.C. has been rightly dismissed by the learned court which does not call for any interference. Findings of this Court. 11. Before proceeding to consider the facts of this case, it would be useful to refer to the provisions of law relevant for the purposes of this case. 12. Order VII Rule 11 of CPC is quoted as under: “11. Rejection of plaint. Findings of this Court. 11. Before proceeding to consider the facts of this case, it would be useful to refer to the provisions of law relevant for the purposes of this case. 12. Order VII Rule 11 of CPC is quoted as under: “11. Rejection of plaint. — The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases: (a) where it does not disclose a cause of action; (b) where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being required by the court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the court, fails to do so; (c) where the relief claimed is properly valued but the plaint is written upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the court to supply the requisite stamp paper within a time to be fixed by the court, fails to do so; (d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law; (e) where it is not filed in duplicate; (f) where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of Rule 9: Provided that the time fixed by the court for the correction of the valuation or supplying of the requisite stamp-papers shall not be extended unless the court, for reasons to be recorded, is satisfied that the plaintiff was prevented by any cause of an exceptional nature from correcting the valuation or supplying the requisite stamp- papers, as the case may be, within the time fixed by the court and that refusal to extend such time would cause grave injustice to the plaintiff.” (Emphasis supplied) 13. Order VII Rule 14 of CPC is quoted as under: “14. Production of document on which plaintiff sues or relies. — (1) Where a plaintiff sues upon a document or relies upon document in his possession or power in support of his claim, he shall enter such documents in a list, and shall produce it in court when the plaint is presented by him and shall, at the same time deliver the document and a copy thereof, to be filed with the plaint. (2) Where any such document is not in the possession or power of the plaintiff, he shall, wherever possible, state in whose possession or power it is. (2) Where any such document is not in the possession or power of the plaintiff, he shall, wherever possible, state in whose possession or power it is. (3) A document which ought to be produced in court by the plaintiff when the plaint is presented, or to be entered in the list to be added or annexed to the plaint but is not produced or entered accordingly, shall not, without the leave of the court, be received in evidence on his behalf at the hearing of the suit. (4) Nothing in this Rule shall apply to document produced for the cross-examination of the plaintiff’s witnesses, or, handed over to a witness merely to refresh his memory.” 14. The said provisions were subject matter of consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the judgment reported in (2020) 7 SCC 366 [Dahiben Vs. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (Gajra) Dead Through Legal Representatives and others] wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has summarized the scope of consideration under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC and also under Order VII Rule 14(1) of CPC as well as the concept of cause of action in paragraphs 23 to 28 of its judgment and has, inter alia, held as under: A. The remedy under Order 7 Rule 11 is an independent and special remedy, wherein the court is empowered to summarily dismiss a suit at the threshold, without proceeding to record evidence, and conducting a trial, on the basis of the evidence adduced, if it is satisfied that the action should be terminated on any of the grounds contained in this provision. B. The underlying object of Order 7 Rule 11(a) is that if in a suit, no cause of action is disclosed, or the suit is barred by limitation or barred by any law under Rule 11(d), the court would not permit the plaintiff to unnecessarily protract the proceedings in the suit. In such a case, it would be necessary to put an end to the sham litigation, so that further judicial time is not wasted. C. The whole purpose of conferment of powers under this provision is to ensure that a litigation which is meaningless, and bound to prove abortive, should not be permitted to waste judicial time of the court. In such a case, it would be necessary to put an end to the sham litigation, so that further judicial time is not wasted. C. The whole purpose of conferment of powers under this provision is to ensure that a litigation which is meaningless, and bound to prove abortive, should not be permitted to waste judicial time of the court. D. The power conferred on the court to terminate a civil action is, however, a drastic one, and the conditions enumerated in Order 7 Rule 11 are required to be strictly adhered to. E. Under Order 7 Rule 11, a duty is cast on the court to determine whether the plaint discloses a cause of action by scrutinising the averments in the plaint, read in conjunction with the documents relied upon, or whether the suit is barred by any law. F. Having regard to Order 7 Rule 14 CPC, the documents filed along with the plaint, are required to be taken into consideration for deciding the application under Order 7 Rule 11(a). When a document referred to in the plaint, forms the basis of the plaint, it should be treated as a part of the plaint. G. In exercise of power under this provision, the court would determine if the assertions made in the plaint are contrary to statutory law, or judicial dicta, for deciding whether a case for rejecting the plaint at the threshold is made out. H. At this stage, the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement and application for rejection of the plaint on the merits, would be irrelevant, and cannot be adverted to, or taken into consideration. I. The test for exercising the power under Order 7 Rule 11 is that if the averments made in the plaint are taken in entirety, in conjunction with the documents relied upon, would the same result in a decree being passed. J. It is not permissible to cull out a sentence or a passage, and to read it in isolation. It is the substance, and not merely the form, which has to be looked into. The plaint has to be construed as it stands, without addition or subtraction of words. If the allegations in the plaint prima facie show a cause of action, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry whether the allegations are true in fact. It is the substance, and not merely the form, which has to be looked into. The plaint has to be construed as it stands, without addition or subtraction of words. If the allegations in the plaint prima facie show a cause of action, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry whether the allegations are true in fact. K. If on a meaningful reading of the plaint, it is found that the suit is manifestly vexatious and without any merit, and does not disclose a right to sue, the court would be justified in exercising the power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. L. The power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC may be exercised by the court at any stage of the suit, either before registering the plaint, or after issuing summons to the defendant, or before conclusion of the trial. The provision of Order VII Rule 11 is mandatory in nature and the powers under the said provision can be exercised by the Court at any stage of the suit. M. The provision of Order 7 Rule 11 is mandatory in nature. It states that the plaint “shall” be rejected if any of the grounds specified in clauses (a) to (e) are made out. If the court finds that the plaint does not disclose a cause of action, or that the suit is barred by any law, the court has no option, but to reject the plaint. N. “Cause of action” means every fact which would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to judgment. It consists of a bundle of material facts, which are necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to entitle him to the reliefs claimed in the suit. O. Law cannot permit clever drafting which creates illusions of a cause of action. What is required is that a clear right must be made out in the plaint. P. If, however, by clever drafting of the plaint, it has created the illusion of a cause of action, it should be nipped in the bud, so that bogus litigation will end at the earliest stage. The Court must be vigilant against any camouflage or suppression, and determine whether the litigation is utterly vexatious, and an abuse of the process of the court. The Court must be vigilant against any camouflage or suppression, and determine whether the litigation is utterly vexatious, and an abuse of the process of the court. Q. The Limitation Act, 1963 prescribes a time-limit for the institution of all suits, appeals, and applications. Section 2(j) defines the expression “period of limitation” to mean the period of limitation prescribed in the Schedule for suits, appeals or applications. Section 3 lays down that every suit instituted after the prescribed period, shall be dismissed even though limitation may not have been set up as a defence. If a suit is not covered by any specific article, then it would fall within the residuary article. R. If a suit is based on multiple causes of action, the period of limitation will begin to run from the date when the right to sue first accrues. That is, if there are successive violations of the right, it would not give rise to a fresh cause of action, and the suit will be liable to be dismissed, if it is beyond the period of limitation counted from the date when the right to sue first accrued. S. The Court must examine the plaint and determine when the right to sue first accrued to the plaintiff, and whether on the assumed facts, the plaint is within time. The words “right to sue” mean the right to seek relief by means of legal proceedings. The right to sue accrues only when the cause of action arises. The suit must be instituted when the right asserted in the suit is infringed, or when there is a clear and unequivocal threat to infringe such right by the defendant against whom the suit is instituted. Order 7 Rule 11(d) provides that where a suit appears from the averments in the plaint to be barred by any law, the plaint shall be rejected. 15. In the case of T. Arivandandam (Supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed the following at Paragraph 5:- "5. We have not the slightest hesitation in condemning the Petitioner for the gross abuse of the process of the court repeatedly and unrepentantly resorted to. From the statement of the facts found in the judgment of the High Court, it is perfectly plain that the suit now pending before the First Munsif's Court, Bangalore, is a flagrant misuse of the mercies of the law in receiving plaints. From the statement of the facts found in the judgment of the High Court, it is perfectly plain that the suit now pending before the First Munsif's Court, Bangalore, is a flagrant misuse of the mercies of the law in receiving plaints. The Learned Munsif must remember that if on a meaningful- not formal- reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, he should exercise his power under Order VII Rule 11 C.P.C. taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. And, if clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, nip it in the bud at the first hearing by examining the party searchingly under Order X C.P.C. An activist judge is the answer to irresponsible law suits. The Trial Courts would insist imperatively on examining the party at the first hearing so that bogus litigation can be shot down at the earliest stage…..” 16. The present case has to be examined on the basis of the aforesaid proposition of law. 17. This Court finds that the suit arises out of a Title Partition Suit and the specific case as argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner in each case (the defendant) is that there has already been a partition in the family through family arrangement and instead of challenging the partition through family arrangement, the present suit seeking partition has been filed as the challenge to family arrangement/earlier partition has become barred by limitation. It is their further case that the plaintiff had also acted pursuant to the earlier partition and sold a portion of the property and even under Income Tax Act, 1961 and the Wealth Tax Act, 1957, the plaintiff accepted that there has been earlier partition amongst the family members of late Banwari Lal Agarwalla and therefore there was no occasion of fresh partition and there was no cause of action to file the suit. The plaintiff has resorted to clever drafting by seeking partition as the suit to challenge the earlier partition had become barred by limitation. The detailed arguments have been recorded in paragraph 8 above. 18. The plaintiff has resorted to clever drafting by seeking partition as the suit to challenge the earlier partition had become barred by limitation. The detailed arguments have been recorded in paragraph 8 above. 18. On the other hand, the specific case of the opposite party (plaintiff) in all the cases is that there has never been complete partition amongst the family members of late Banwari Lal Agarwalla and the arrangement was only for the sake of convenience , the so called family arrangement was not including the entire joint family properties as the properties mentioned in schedules to the so called earlier family arrangement is much less as compared to the properties mentioned in the schedules to the plaint and the cause of action arose when the defendants refused partition by metes and bounds with respect to the entire joint family property. The cause of action in a suit for partition is continuous, and therefore the suit cannot be barred by limitation. There are earlier Memorandums of Understand (MOUs) in existence which were in the nature of family settlements. However, there was no definite full proof partition of the schedule properties under any purported MOUs. Had there been a holistic final partition of all joint assets, there would not have been a requirement for executing multiple MOUs. That apart, the plaintiff himself was not a signatory to the two MOUs of 1999 whereby several properties and assets forming subject matter of the instant suit were purportedly divided amongst the plaintiff’s brothers behind the plaintiff’s back. The detailed arguments of the opposite party (plaintiff) have been recorded in paragraph 9 above. 19. This Court also finds that the plaintiff has been examined under Order X Rule 2 of CPC wherein he has stated that in the year 1981-82 he was about 30 years of age and was a graduate and with respect to the memorandum of partition dated 02.02.1982 he has admitted that he had signed the same but stated that the same was not a document of partition, it contained the signature of his brothers only and the sisters had not signed and the said document was only for the purposes of income tax. He has also admitted that execution of registered sale deed no. He has also admitted that execution of registered sale deed no. 4459 dated 01.08.2001 wherein it was recorded that there was partition on 31.12.1981 and he received the property as owner and was therefore selling the property, but there was partition only with respect to some of the properties. With respect to his written statement filed in Title Suit No. 40 of 2003, he has tried to explain the same by stating that he had filed the written statement and as he was removed from being a director of the company, therefore, he had denied of his liability. 20. The plaint, the documents annexed with the plaint, the documents referred to in the plaint and also the examination of the plaintiff under Order X Rule 2 of C.P.C. are the materials to be considered in order to decide as to whether the plaint was fit to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the C.P.C. It is just to place on record that the examination of the plaintiff under Order X Rule 2 of CPC was done on 10.08.2022 and the impugned order refusing to reject the plaint has been passed in the year 2014, but the parties have referred to the examination of the plaintiff under Order X Rule 2 of CPC. The following discussions would reveal that on the face of the plaint and the documents annexed with the plaint, it discloses a cause of action, the suit is not barred by any law including law of limitation, the suit does not suffer from short payment of court fees/short payment of stamp duty and the impugned order dismissing the petition seeking rejection of plaint does not call for any interference. 21. The bare perusal of the plaint, inter alia, reveals as under: - I. The suit for partition has been filed with regards to joint family properties, trade and business of trading companies among legal heirs and successors of late Banwari Lal Agarwalla who died in the year 1969. Banwari Lal Agarwalla was one amongst the four sons of Hardeo Das Agarwalla which constituted a joint family and there was partition amongst them in the year 1947. II. Banwari Lal Agarwalla was one amongst the four sons of Hardeo Das Agarwalla which constituted a joint family and there was partition amongst them in the year 1947. II. Schedules B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, K & L contain the list of properties which are said to be either ancestral property or properties purchased from the profits of ancestral property and with the aid of joint family property by the joint labour of the whole family. It is the case of the plaintiff that there is a nucleus sufficient to acquire the property and interest thereon by profitable investment thereof for the benefit of the joint family. III. It has been stated that after death of Banwari Lal Agarwalla, his eldest son Parmeshwar Kumar Agarwalla became the “Karta” and after his death in the year 2005 next elder brother Devendra Kumar Agarwalla became the “Karta”. IV. The plaint gives the description of the entire joint family (schedule-A) and joint family properties (schedules B to L). The plaint also gives the mode and manner of acquisition with respect to properties mentioned in different schedules. V. It is the case of the plaintiff that there has never been any registered partition amongst the family member of Banwari Lal Agarwalla; there has not been any equitable partition and there has never been complete partition of the entire joint family properties. It is the case of the plaintiff that there have been multiple memorandums of partition and two of them have been referred to in the plaint i.e., memorandums of the year 1982 and 1999. VI. One “Memorandum of Understanding” of the year 1982 has been referred and it has been stated that the partition was never acted upon and was just a pretension and only a portion of B. L. Agarwalla and sons (HUF) was affected for Income Tax and in view of fallen health of the aged mother Smt. Yashomati Devi Agarwalla. It has been stated that Banwari Lal Agarwalla (HUF) was only one out of 6 HUF in the family and constituted a very tiny fraction of the total joint family assets. It has been stated that the contents of the “Memorandum of Understanding” cannot partake the form of a partition deed which has some basic and essential requirements including its registration under the Mandatory provision of the Registration Act being compulsorily registerable. It has been stated that the contents of the “Memorandum of Understanding” cannot partake the form of a partition deed which has some basic and essential requirements including its registration under the Mandatory provision of the Registration Act being compulsorily registerable. Besides it covers only a tiny portion of the entire family assets. It has been stated that Parmeshwar Kumar Agarwalla as a Karta used to propose various unregistered documents by way of internal arrangement for official benefit and income tax, as a business stratagem as he made the other members of the family to understand. The said ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ dated 02.02.1982 was not signed by all the members of the joint family in which only the five brothers and their mother had signed only when it was given to understand that a deed of partition will be executed and registered when actual partition will take place. VII. It has been alleged that a clandestine memorandum of separation signed by only four brothers was prepared on 26 th day of May, 1999, stating that the plaintiff has separated himself from the joint family business and family trading companies. Such recital in the memorandum dated 26.05.1999 has been denied by the plaintiff. The plaintiff never knew as to when he was silently but surely sidelined from the family. There was no such deed or document or any notice or information by or from the other brother or brothers or sharer that the plaintiff is being separated or going to be separated. The plaintiff claims to have been victimized and it has been stated that there was no reason of separation in the year 1999 if the 1982 partition was complete. The memorandum of 1999 neither includes a list of assets allotted nor does it have the signature of the plaintiff. It has been questioned in the plaint that how the Memorandum dated 26.05.1999 regarding relinquishment or separation of the plaintiff can be proved if the plaintiff is not a signatory to such relinquishment or separation from the joint family business and family trading companies. VIII. It has been asserted that the properties are still joint and the plaintiff has neither relinquished nor separated himself from the joint family business or family trading companies or other joint family properties. IX. VIII. It has been asserted that the properties are still joint and the plaintiff has neither relinquished nor separated himself from the joint family business or family trading companies or other joint family properties. IX. Even after repeated requests made by the plaintiff for partitioning of the family companies and joint family properties amongst family members according to their shares, the same has been delayed and ultimately it has been refused on 8 th of April 2012 which is said to be the cause of action to file the suit for partition. 22. So far as payment of court fees is concerned, the plaintiff has not sought annulment of any memorandum /sale deed but is seeking partition and accordingly, it cannot be stated that the suit suffered from any undervaluation/short payment of court fees/stamp etc. In the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in (2010) 12 SCC 112 (Suhrid Singh @ Sardool Singh vs. Randhir Singh & Others) which has been relied upon by the petitioner(s), it has been held that where the executant of a deed wants it to be annulled, he has to seek the cancellation of the deed. But, if a non- executant seeks annulment of a deed, he has to seek a declaration that the deed is invalid, or non-est, or that it is not binding on him. The difference between a prayer for cancellation and declaration in regard to a deed of transfer/conveyance has been explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgment. Paragraphs 6 to 8 of the judgment reported in (2010) 12 SCC 112 (supra) are quoted as under: - “ 6. The second proviso to Section 7(iv) of the Act will apply in this case and the valuation shall not be less than the value of the property calculated in the manner provided for by clause (v) of the said section. Clause (v) provides that where the relief is in regard to agricultural lands, court fee should be reckoned with reference to the revenue payable under sub-clauses (a) to (d) thereof; and where the relief is in regard to the houses, court fee shall be on the market value of the houses, under sub-clause (e) thereof. 7. Where the executant of a deed wants it to be annulled, he has to seek cancellation of the deed. 7. Where the executant of a deed wants it to be annulled, he has to seek cancellation of the deed. But if a non- executant seeks annulment of a deed, he has to seek a declaration that the deed is invalid, or non est, or illegal or that it is not binding on him. The difference between a prayer for cancellation and declaration in regard to a deed of transfer/conveyance, can be brought out by the following illustration relating to A and B, two brothers. A executes a sale deed in favour of C. Subsequently A wants to avoid the sale. A has to sue for cancellation of the deed. On the other hand, if B, who is not the executant of the deed, wants to avoid it, he has to sue for a declaration that the deed executed by A is invalid/void and non est/illegal and he is not bound by it. In essence both may be suing to have the deed set aside or declared as non-binding. But the form is different and court fee is also different. If A, the executant of the deed, seeks cancellation of the deed, he has to pay ad valorem court fee on the consideration stated in the sale deed. If B, who is a non-executant, is in possession and sues for a declaration that the deed is null or void and does not bind him or his share, he has to merely pay a fixed court fee of Rs. 19.50 under Article 17(iii) of the Second Schedule of the Act. But if B, a non-executant, is not in possession, and he seeks not only a declaration that the sale deed is invalid, but also the consequential relief of possession, he has to pay an ad valorem court fee as provided under Section 7(iv)(c) of the Act. 8. Section 7(iv)(c) provides that in suits for a declaratory decree with consequential relief, the court fee shall be computed according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint. 8. Section 7(iv)(c) provides that in suits for a declaratory decree with consequential relief, the court fee shall be computed according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint. The proviso thereto makes it clear that where the suit for declaratory decree with consequential relief is with reference to any property, such valuation shall not be less than the value of the property calculated in the manner provided for by clause (v) of Section 7.” As discussed above, the aforesaid judgment does not apply to the facts and circumstances of this case. 23. In the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in (2000) 10 SCC 636 [A. Abdul Rashid Khan (Dead) and others Vs. P.A.K.A. Shahul Hamid and others] , it has been held in paragraph 4 that the law is well-settled in view of Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act that where any contract is required by law to be reduced in writing, then no oral evidence or understanding to the contrary or what is apart from the said contract would be admissible in law. In the said case, there was an agreement of sale which was reduced in writing which was for an immovable property and it was held in the facts of the said case that both the appellants and the opposite party No. 1 were making statements which were beyond the written statement of sale agreement and accordingly, it was held that such plea cannot be taken into consideration. In the said case, the findings and observations were made after full-fledged trial and the present case is relating to rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC and accordingly the aforesaid judgment does not apply to the facts and circumstances of this case. The present case has to be decided on the basis of the averments in the plaint and the documents annexed thereto and further ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ dated 02.02.1982 or memorandum of the year 1999 relating to family partition/ family settlement based on past transaction/settlement stand on a different footing as compared to an agreement of sale. Memorandums relating to family settlement/family arrangements are not contracts creating rights and liabilities between the parties but they are memorandum of oral partition/arrangements which had taken place at earlier point of time which have been acted upon and subsequently reduced into writing. 24. Memorandums relating to family settlement/family arrangements are not contracts creating rights and liabilities between the parties but they are memorandum of oral partition/arrangements which had taken place at earlier point of time which have been acted upon and subsequently reduced into writing. 24. This Court finds that the issue as to whether there was a family arrangement with regard to partition itself requires adjudication and is a mixed question of fact and law. Further, it has been pointed out by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff- opposite party that even if the family arrangement as recorded in the ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ dated 02.02.1982 is taken into consideration, the properties mentioned in the schedule to the memorandum do not match with the properties mentioned in the schedules of properties annexed with the plaint. It is the specific case of the plaintiff even in the plaint that ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ dated 02.02.1982 included only a miniscule amount of joint family property. This stand in the plaint and the corresponding argument of the opposite party (plaintiff) on this point has remained unanswered by the learned counsel of the petitioners (defendants). At this stage it cannot be said that there has been complete partition as recorded in ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ dated 02.02.1982 even if the best case of the petitioners (defendants) is taken into consideration that there has been earlier partition which has been recorded in ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ dated 02.02.1982. Moreover, it is the case of the plaintiff that the ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ dated 02.02.1982 was entered for the purposes of certain stand to be taken before for income tax/wealth tax and also because the mother of the plaintiff was ailing and proper partition was to be carried out later . The correctness of such a stand needs adjudication based on evidence of the parties and it cannot be tested at the stage of entertaining petition under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC seeking rejection of the plaint. The plaintiff has also tried to explain the execution of sale deed dated 01.08.2001 by stating in his statement recorded under Order X Rule 2 C.P.C that the ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ dated 02.02.1982 involved only portion of the joint family property. The plaintiff has also tried to explain the execution of sale deed dated 01.08.2001 by stating in his statement recorded under Order X Rule 2 C.P.C that the ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ dated 02.02.1982 involved only portion of the joint family property. The correctness of such a stand is also required to be examined through evidence and it cannot be tested at the stage of entertaining petition under order VII Rule 11 of CPC seeking rejection of the plaint. It is important to note that there is another memorandum of the year 1999 wherein it has been asserted that the plaintiff has already separated himself; the plaintiff is not a signatory to this document and has stated that there has been foul play with the plaintiff by completely side-lining the plaintiff from the joint family and its properties. The circumstances in which memorandum of the year 1999 was entered into is required to be proved and requirement of entering into memorandum of the year 1999 is not clear when as per the petitioners (defendants) there has been complete partition earlier as recorded in ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ dated 02.02.1982 which would also need evidence. So far as the argument of the petitioners (defendants) that the challenge to ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ dated 02.02.1982 and also to the memorandum of the year 1999 has become barred by limitation is concerned, the same would depend upon the fact as to whether there has been complete partition in accordance with law as claimed by petitioners (defendants) and denied by the opposite party (plaintiff) which would require evidence and it cannot be said at the stage of entertaining petition under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC seeking rejection of the plaint that the suit itself is barred by any law including law of limitation. This Court is also of the considered view that the point as to whether the various companies, trusts, societies etc. could be a subject matter of consideration in a partition suit is itself a mixed question of fact and law in view of the fact that the plaintiff is asking for his share in those entities. This Court is also of the considered view that the point as to whether the various companies, trusts, societies etc. could be a subject matter of consideration in a partition suit is itself a mixed question of fact and law in view of the fact that the plaintiff is asking for his share in those entities. Further, the ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ dated 02.02.1982 by which the petitioners (defendants) are claiming that there was earlier a family arrangement, is an unregistered document and the consequence of non-registration is required to be considered which would depend upon the facts as to whether there was a partition preceded by ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ dated 02.02.1982 and whether the parties had separated as a matter of fact and whether the entire property of the joint family was subject matter of ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ dated 02.02.1982 which are the points which require evidence. This Court is of the view that merely because the plaintiff has executed a sale deed dated 01.08.2001 by stating that there has been partition, that by itself is not sufficient to hold at the stage of consideration of petition under order VII Rule 11 of CPC that there has been complete partition and that the plaintiff had no cause of action to file a suit for partition of joint family properties on the face of the stand taken in the plaint itself that the ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ dated 02.02.1982 included only miniscule of the joint family properties. 25. The aforesaid intricate facts and points of law are involved in this case and mere perusal of the plaint and documents enclosed with the plaint and even the materials referred by petitioners (defendants) are not sufficient to hold that the suit was barred by law or did not disclose any cause of action or was a result of clever drafting as challenge to ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ dated 02.02.1982 and memorandum of the year 1999 had become barred by limitation so as to dismiss the suit under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC. The learned counsel for the petitioners (defendants) has failed to satisfy this Court that on bare perusal of the plaint including the documents annexed to the plaint/ referred in the plaint, the suit was barred by any law or there was no cause of action. 26. The learned counsel for the petitioners (defendants) has failed to satisfy this Court that on bare perusal of the plaint including the documents annexed to the plaint/ referred in the plaint, the suit was barred by any law or there was no cause of action. 26. This Court finds that the learned trial Court has rightly recorded that the points raised by the petitioners are mixed question of fact and law and has rightly rejected the petition seeking dismissal of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC. The perusal of the order impugned reveals that there is no illegality or perversity in the impugned order. 27. This Court is of the considered view that the plaintiff is seeking partition. Further, it appears that there has been some family arrangement, but the issues involved are as to whether the family arrangement by itself is a partition in the eyes of law; whether the family arrangement by itself was complete in all respect and as to whether it was equitable or suffered from any illegality; whether the parties had actually separated by virtue of such family arrangement and whether the family arrangement was a memorandum of family arrangement in its true import or it was itself a deed of partition requiring compulsory registration. These are the aspects which are required to be taken into consideration and findings are to be recorded on the basis of the evidences to be adduced by the parties and accordingly it cannot be said that the suit itself was barred by law and was fit to be rejected by exercise of power under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC. 28. It is just to put on record that as per status report dated 14.12.2024 received from the learned trial Court, the issues were framed on 10.08.2022, additional issues were framed on 20.05.2023 and two witnesses of the plaintiff were already examined, deceased defendant no.13 was substituted on 14.03.2024 and permission for paper publication against legal heirs of substituted defendant no.13 was granted on 21.11.2024 and the case was pending for appearance of the substituted defendants. The next date was 02.01.2025. The next date was 02.01.2025. However, this Court has examined the case of the respective parties on the point of rejection of plaint under order VII rule 11 of C.P.C. and finds no merit in the case of the petitioners (defendants) calling for any interference in the impugned order dismissing the petition seeking rejection of plaint. 29. It is made clear that any observations made in this judgement will have no bearing on the issues to be decided on merits by the learned trial court based on materials to be brought on record by the respective parties. 30. These Civil Revision Petitions are accordingly dismissed. 31. Pending interlocutory application, if any, is closed.