JUDGMENT : Petitioners are all owners of buildings situated within the limits of Kochi Corporation. They have challenged the demand notices issued to them, demanding property tax in relation to the buildings owned by them for the period from 2016-17 till the date of demand notice. Reliefs are also sought for a declaration that the provisions of the Kerala Municipality Act, 1994 (for short ‘the Act’) do not permit enhancement of property tax with retrospective effect. Since the issues arising are similar, all these writ petitions are disposed of by this common judgment. W.P.(C) No.13370/2021 is treated as the leading case and the facts and exhibits wherever referred to, are stated from the said writ petition. 2. Petitioner is the owner of a room in a commercial building in Ernakulam. The property tax due for the building has already been paid till the first half of the year 2020-21. In the year 2009, provision for property tax in the Act was amended. Though rules were framed in 2011, the Municipal Council failed to fix the minimum and maximum limits of rates of the basic property tax. However, by Ext.P4, served on 24-06-2021, property tax computed as per the new rates were demanded for the period from 01-04-2016 till 31-03-2021. Petitioner has pleaded that the levy of property tax has been carried out without complying with the provisions of the Act or the Rules and further that the required deductions have not been granted while calculating the tax. Petitioner asserted that the fixation of property tax was irrational and arbitrary and hence sought to quash the demand notice issued to it and also sought for a direction to reassess the property tax after complying with the Rules. 3. Counter affidavits have been filed by the first respondent dated 13.06.2024 and 28.01.2025. According to the first respondent, pursuant to section 233 of the Kerala Municipality Act, 1994 (for short 'the Act'), the Kerala Municipality (Property Tax, Service Cess and Surcharge) Rules, 2011 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules') came into force on 14.01.2011, and the minimum and maximum limits of rates of basic property tax were also notified by an Order of the same date. It is pleaded that the Council had, by a resolution dated 01.08.2011 bearing No. 63/2011 fixed the rates of basic property tax for buildings situated within the limits of Kochi Corporation. It is pleaded that the Council had, by a resolution dated 01.08.2011 bearing No. 63/2011 fixed the rates of basic property tax for buildings situated within the limits of Kochi Corporation. Thereafter, the Council had, by Resolution No.12 dated 16.11.2011, produced as Ext.R1(c), proposed to divide 74 divisions of the Corporation into prime, secondary and tertiary zones for the purpose of fixation of the annual property tax and invited objections from the public as per Ext.R1(d) publication in the newspaper. According to the respondents, the requirements of rule 4(1), (2) and rule 7 were thus complied with. 4. Respondents further pleaded that the Municipal Council had by Ext.R1(y) resolution dated 12.04.2012 bearing No.115, decided to implement the revised rates of basic property tax as per the Rules with effect from 01.04.2013 and the notification to that effect was published as per Ext.R1(e). In the meantime, the Government had brought out certain amendments on 15.03.2013 to the Rules and the same was also decided to be implemented as per resolution dated 14.06.2013. Thereafter, Ext.R1(p) public notice in Form-1 dated 17.12.2013 was published in the Mathrubhumi daily on 24.12.2013, and the owners of buildings were called upon to submit returns in Form-2 within 30 days. According to the respondents, consequent to the aforesaid publication, the property tax of the buildings were assessed as per the details noted in the property tax assessment register. 5. In the additional affidavit filed by the first respondent, it is stated that, in respect of those who filed returns in Form 2, intimation of property tax assessment was given in Form 5, while in respect of those who had not filed their returns in Form 2, intimation is being given in Form 7. In I.A. No.1 of 2025, the first respondent has produced the newspaper publications dated 08.09.2013 in Mathrubhumi and New Indian Express, apart from the intimations issued to two persons under Form 7 and Form 5. In yet another affidavit, Ext.R1(y) has also been produced. 6. In the counter affidavit filed by the State, it is pleaded that, pursuant to the Government fixing the minimum and maximum limits of rates of basic property tax applicable to one square metre of plinth area, the Municipality took steps for collection of property tax as per the procedure prescribed under the Rules. 6. In the counter affidavit filed by the State, it is pleaded that, pursuant to the Government fixing the minimum and maximum limits of rates of basic property tax applicable to one square metre of plinth area, the Municipality took steps for collection of property tax as per the procedure prescribed under the Rules. Subsequently, by a Government Order, the implementation of the revised tax was made with effect from 01.04.2013. However, since the procedure in various Municipalities and Corporations was not completed and demands were not made immediately thereafter, the Government had, in public interest, permitted the Local Self Government Institutions to levy the revised property tax with effect from 01.04.2016 as per G.O.(Rt) No.540/2019/LSGD dated 06.03.2019. 7. It is pleaded that the said Government Order has been issued to streamline the property tax collection and also that there is no retrospective fixation or retrospective revision of tax. According to the Government, property tax was revised already, with effect from 01.04.2013 itself, and later, since the procedural formalities were not completed, the demand alone was made belatedly by some of the Municipalities. Referring to section 282 of the Act, it was pointed out that, the notice can be issued within four years from the date on which such person should have been assessed and in the absence of challenge against the notifications or the amendments, petitioners have to pursue their statutory remedies. 8. The learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that while fixing the property tax by the respondent Corporation, there had been violation of mandatory requirements and also that the demand notices are all barred by limitation. It was further argued that the notification as per section 233(5) of the Act has not been issued and that could only have been issued after the rates of basic property tax was fixed. According to the learned counsel, in the absence of compliance with every step in the imposition of tax, the levy becomes illegal as held in the decisions in Municipal Council, Khurai and Another v. Kamal Kumar and Another [ AIR 1965 SC 1321 ], Mathuram Agrawal v. State of Madhya Pradesh [ AIR 2000 SC 109 ] and Subaidabi K.M v. State of Kerala [ 2024 (2) KLT 450 ] 9. The learned counsel also submitted that the intimation required under rule 12(1) and 12(6) of the Rules has not been complied with, apart from there being a total absence of an assessment order. In the alternative, it was contended that if the assessment order is not issued, the bare minimum requirement was the intimation under rule 12(1) and 12(6) of the Rules and in the absence of such an intimation, the consequent demand notices are all bad in law. The learned counsel further submitted that the appeals can be filed against the assessments and in the absence of any such order served on the owners, the levy itself is illegal. It was also argued that the inspection contemplated under rule 12(4) and 12(6) of the Rules is mandatory and there is nothing to indicate that any site inspection being carried and hence, the basis of the levy is faulty. The learned counsel also argued that section 539 of the Act prescribes a period of limitation and as assessments have to be for each half year, the period of three years starts from the day after the half year ends and therefore recovery can only be for the tax due for a period of three years till the date of demand notice. 10. I have heard Sri. Mayankutty Mather, learned Senior Counsel, Sri. Sudeesh Kumar, Sri. Tony Kannanthanam, Sri. Vishnu and Sri. Aravind apart from various other learned counsel on behalf of the petitioners. I also heard Sri. Harishankar and Sri. Janardhana Shenoy, the learned Standing Counsel on behalf of the respondent Corporation and Smt. Deepa K.R., the learned Special Government pleader. 11. On a consideration of the rival contentions, the following issues arise for consideration:- (i). What is the mode of assessment contemplated under section 233 of the Act as well as the Rules thereon? (ii). Whether a notification as contemplated under section 233(5) of the Act has been issued? (iii). What are the requirements under the Act and the Rules that have been complied with and not complied with by Kochi Corporation? (iv).Whether the non-compliances with the requirements would affect the levy and the consequential demand? (v) Whether the power under section 282 of the Act can be exercised to levy property tax from 2016-17 onwards? (vi) Whether the demand notices issued in the instant cases are barred by limitation? 12. (iv).Whether the non-compliances with the requirements would affect the levy and the consequential demand? (v) Whether the power under section 282 of the Act can be exercised to levy property tax from 2016-17 onwards? (vi) Whether the demand notices issued in the instant cases are barred by limitation? 12. Before dealing with the aforesaid issues, it is necessary to refer to the interpretation to be adopted while considering a taxing provision. The principles for interpreting a taxing statute has been laid down in various decisions, including Commissioner of Sales Tax , U.P v. Modi Sugar Mills Ltd. [ AIR 1961 SC 1047 ]. In a recent decision in Chief Commissioner of Central Goods and Service Tax and Others v. Safari Retreats Private Limited and Others [2024 SCC Online SC 2691], the Supreme Court had reiterated those principles, which are extracted below: “RULES REGARDING THE INTERPRETATION OF TAXING STATUTES 25. The principles governing the interpretation of the taxation statutes can be summarised as follows: a. A taxing statute must be read as it is with no additions and no subtractions on the grounds of legislative intendment or otherwise; b. If the language of a taxing provision is plain, the consequence of giving effect to it may lead to some absurd result is not a factor to be considered when interpreting the provisions. It is for the legislature to step in and remove the absurdity; c. While dealing with a taxing provision, the principle of strict interpretation should be applied; d. If two interpretations of a statutory provision are possible, the Court ordinarily would interpret the provision in favour of a taxpayer and against the revenue; e. In interpreting a taxing statute, equitable considerations are entirely out of place; f. A taxing provision cannot be interpreted on any presumption or assumption; g. A taxing statute has to be interpreted in the light of what is clearly expressed. The Court cannot imply anything which is not expressed. Moreover, the Court cannot import provisions in the statute to supply any deficiency; h. There is nothing unjust in the taxpayer escaping if the letter of the law fails to catch him on account of the legislature's failure to express itself clearly; i. If literal interpretation is manifestly unjust, which produces a result not intended by the legislature, only in such a case can the Court modify the language; j. Equity and taxation are strangers. But if construction results in equity rather than injustice, such construction should be preferred; k. It is not a function of the Court in the fiscal arena to compel the Parliament to go further and do more; l. When a word used in a taxing statute is to be construed and has not been specifically defined, it should not be interpreted in accordance with its definition in another statute that does not deal with a cognate subject. It should be understood in its commercial sense. Unless defined in the statute itself, the words and expressions in a taxing statute have to be construed in the sense in which the persons dealing with them understand, that is, as per the trade understanding, commercial and technical practice and usage.” 13. With the above principles in mind, the issues mentioned earlier are considered as below:- Issue No.(i). What is the mode of assessment contemplated under section 233 of the Act as well as the Rules thereon? 14. Part IXA of the Constitution of India deals with Municipalities. Article 243X confers power upon the State Legislature to authorise a Municipality to levy and collect appropriate taxes, duties, tolls and fees in accordance with such procedure as may be specified by law. In accordance with the aforesaid power, the State has enacted section 233 of the Act, enabling every Council of a Municipality to levy property tax on every building situated within its area and not exempted under the Act. Till 2009, property tax was levied on the basis of the annual value of a building, calculated on the basis of the annual rent that can be received for the property. However by Act 30 of 2009, the provision was substituted providing for levy of property tax on the basis of plinth area of the building. 15. Section 233(2)(a) of the Act, as was enacted in 2009, contemplated the Government to fix, by notification, the minimum and maximum limits of rates of basic property tax that can be made applicable to one square metre of plinth area of the different categories of buildings and the date from which it shall come into force. Seven categories have been specified in the provision, of which the seventh is a general category and section 233(2)(b) enables the Government to fix sub categories of the above referred seven categories of buildings. 16. Seven categories have been specified in the provision, of which the seventh is a general category and section 233(2)(b) enables the Government to fix sub categories of the above referred seven categories of buildings. 16. After the Government prescribes the minimum and maximum limits of rate of basic property tax, as mentioned in the preceding paragraph, sub-section (3) of section 233 of the Act empowers the Council of the respective Municipality to fix the rates of basic property tax, subject to limits fixed by State Government, as applicable to each category of building, within its area and such rates shall be the same for all buildings of the same category or its sub category. Sub-section (5) of section 233 of the Act stipulates that the Government must by notification, fix the date from which the basic property tax fixed by the Council shall come into force. After the basic property tax is fixed, various other steps are also required to be carried out to arrive at the annual property tax of a building. 17. At this juncture, it is appropriate to note the submission of the learned Standing Counsel for the Kochi Corporation that out of more than two lakh fifty thousand buildings in Kochi Corporation, only around two hundred persons have questioned the assessment. True that the challenges are raised by only a minuscule fraction of owners which can indicate that the assessment was done to the satisfaction of the overwhelming majority. However, since challenge has been raised, this Court has to consider the same on its merits. 18. Be that as it may, for easier comprehension, the different stages and steps in fixing the annual property tax of a building in a Municipality are narrated below: Stage 1. Fixing the basic property tax 1. Government to fix the minimum and maximum limits of rates of basic property tax for one square metre of plinth area for the different categories of buildings and notify the date that it shall come into force. [See Sec.233(2)] 2. Municipality to inform the public through publication in the notice board and in a newspaper about the Council's intention to fix the basic property tax and invite objections. [See section 233(3) & Rule 4(2)]. 3. Fix the rates of basic property tax for each category or sub-category of buildings by a resolution of the Municipal Council. [See Section 233(3) & Rule 4(1)] 4. [See section 233(3) & Rule 4(2)]. 3. Fix the rates of basic property tax for each category or sub-category of buildings by a resolution of the Municipal Council. [See Section 233(3) & Rule 4(1)] 4. The final rates of basic property tax fixed by the Council, including the date of commencement and period of operation shall be published on the noticeboard of the office of Municipality and in two newspapers. [See Sec.233(3) and Rule 4(4)] 5. Government to notify the date on which rates of the basic property tax fixed by the Council shall come into force. [See Section 233(5)]. 6. Classify the Municipality into prime zones, secondary zones and tertiary zones and publish a notice inviting objections to such classification. [See Rule 7(1)]. 7. Finalise the zones after examining the objections and publish them on the notice board of the Municipality. [See Rule 7(3)] 8. Classify the roads and pathways within the Municipality as roads having a width of 5 m and more/less than 5 m, apart from pathways with a width of 1.5 m or less. [See Rule 8]. 9. Assess the basic property tax of a building by multiplying the basic rate of property tax with the plinth area of the building. [See Rule 5(2) and Sec.233(6)]. Stage 2. Assessment of Annual Property Tax. 1. A public notice in Form 1 shall be published in the notice board of the Municipality, containing the details helpful to the owners to assess the tax by themselves and a summary of the said notice shall be published in two newspapers, requesting the owners of the buildings to submit a tax return. [See Sec.233(10) and Rule 10]. 2. The return shall be filed in Form 2, and a model of the form shall be published on the Municipality's noticeboard. [See Sec.233(11) and Rule 11]. 3. The Secretary or authorised Officer shall conduct an inquiry/site inspection and assess the property tax by recording the details of the building in the property tax assessment register. [See Sec.233(13) and Rule 12]. 4. After the particulars of assessment are recorded in the property tax assessment register, a demand notice shall be issued to each owner of the building along with an intimation to the owner [See Sec.233(13) and Rule 14]. 5. While assessing the property tax, deductions/additions to the basic property tax shall be carried out on the basis of the Schedules under Rule 6. 5. While assessing the property tax, deductions/additions to the basic property tax shall be carried out on the basis of the Schedules under Rule 6. [See Sec.233(7) & Rule 9]. 19. It is relevant to mention that there are no deductions or additions provided for buildings in the prime zone, while a deduction of 10% and 20% are provided for buildings in the secondary and tertiary zones respectively. Buildings on the sides of roads having a width of less than 1½ m are to be given 10% deduction and those with no public way facility with a 20% deduction. Buildings with low type roofs like those constructed with tiles, sheets, palm leaf or grass have to be given 10% deduction, while those with concrete roofs will have no deductions. Buildings between 10 and 25 years of age ought to be given a deduction of 10% while those between 25 and 50 years are entitled to a deduction of 20% and buildings of 50 years and more with a deduction of 50%. Notwithstanding the above entitlement for deductions, the total of deductions shall not exceed 75% of the basic property tax. The above mode provided in the Schedules to rule 6 is to be adopted while fixing the annual property tax of a building in the Municipality. Issue No.(ii). Whether a notification as contemplated under section 233(5) of the Act has been issued? 20. Section 233(5) of the Act stipulates that the rates of basic property tax fixed by the Council for the first time under sub-section (3) shall come into force on such date the Government notifies. Ext.R1(a) is the notification dated 14.01.2011, issued by the Government under sections 233(2) and 233(5) of the Act. Concededly, a separate notification has not been issued under section 233(5) of the Act, but what is issued is a composite notification under the two provisions. The date of commencement of the minimum and maximum limits of property tax fixed by the Government and the basic property tax fixed by the Council are both the same, as mentioned in Ext.R1(a). 21. The contention of the petitioners, that when viewed in the light of sections 57 and 64 of the Act, a separate notification is essential as it acts as a check on the rates fixed by the Municipality, though impressive at first blush, on a deeper analysis, is found to be not legally tenable. 21. The contention of the petitioners, that when viewed in the light of sections 57 and 64 of the Act, a separate notification is essential as it acts as a check on the rates fixed by the Municipality, though impressive at first blush, on a deeper analysis, is found to be not legally tenable. The words “rates of basic property tax fixed by the Council for the first time” need not necessarily be interpreted as requiring the notification to be issued only subsequent to the Council fixing the rate of basic property tax. The Government is given the prerogative to fix the date, from which the rate fixed by the Council shall come into force. The notification can be issued either prior to the date the Council fixes the rate of basic property tax or thereafter. Merely because one of the requisites for levy of tax is an action in future, the notification making the rates applicable from a date prior to such action cannot be held to be legally flawed, especially considering the manner in which the provision is couched. 22. Validating an action to be carried out in future is not impermissible in taxing statutes. The provision cannot be interpreted to denote that the notification should be issued only after the Council fixes the basic property tax. Such a restricted interpretation is uncalled for in the circumstances of the statutory provision and the nature of language used. There is no express stipulation as well, that the notification under section 233(5) of the Act must be subsequent to the Council fixing the basic property tax. 23. The contention of the petitioners based on sections 57 and 64 of the Act is not tenable as those powers can be exercised by the Government at any time, even after the rates are fixed by the Council. There is also no impairment of any right of any of the owners merely because the Government decided to notify the rates as coming into force on a prior date, even before it was fixed. 24. Further, on a reading of the notification, it is evident that the intention was clearly to have the date of commencement of the minimum and maximum limits of basic property tax fixed by the Government and the basic property tax fixed by the Council to coincide. 24. Further, on a reading of the notification, it is evident that the intention was clearly to have the date of commencement of the minimum and maximum limits of basic property tax fixed by the Government and the basic property tax fixed by the Council to coincide. Though the language employed in the notification is not perfect, as the intention of the Government was evidently to have those two dates coincide with each other, the composite notification issued under section 233(2) and section 233(5) of the Act cannot be found fault with. 25. Apart from the above, none of the writ petitioners had challenged the notification dated 14.01.2011. Further, no specific pleading has also been raised, questioning the composite notice. In the absence of any specific challenge as well, against the notification, the contentions in that regard are rejected. Issue No.(iii). What are the requirements under the Act and the Rules that have been complied with and not complied with by Kochi Corporation? 26. Ext. R1(c) is the decision of the Kochi Corporation Council to fix the basic property tax and the decision to divide the Corporation area into different zones as required under rule 4(2) and rule 7 of the Rules, while Ext.R1(d) is a paper publication dated 19.11.2011 classifying the zones and inviting objections. Ext.R1(y) is the decision of the Council dated 12.04.2012 fixing the basic property tax and Ext.R1(s) and Ext.R1(t) are the two paper publications dated 08.09.2013, as required under rule 4(4) of the Rules. Further, Ext.R1(p) is the paper publication dated 24.12.2013 in the Mathrubhumi daily newspaper requesting the owners of buildings to submit returns, thus satisfying the requirement of rule 10 of the Rules, but only in one newspaper. Ext.R1(u) and Ext.R1(v) are the Form 7 intimations and Ext.R1(w) and Ext.R1(x) are Form 5 intimations issued to the building owners. Thus Kochi Corporation has complied with the requirements of rules 4, 7, and even the intimations required under rule 12 of the Rules. As far as rule 10 is concerned, there is only one newspaper publication produced. 27. Apart from there being no publication of the summary of Form 1 in two newspapers, there is neither any pleading nor any material to show that an inspection was carried out by the respondent Corporation. Hence, it has to be presumed that inspection of buildings had not taken place. 27. Apart from there being no publication of the summary of Form 1 in two newspapers, there is neither any pleading nor any material to show that an inspection was carried out by the respondent Corporation. Hence, it has to be presumed that inspection of buildings had not taken place. Issue No.(iv) Whether the non-compliances with the requirements would affect the levy and the consequential demand? 28. Rule 10 of the Rules require the public notice in Form-1 to be published and a summary of the public notice to be published in two newspapers having circulation in the Corporation. However, the respondent Corporation has been able to produce the notice published only in one newspaper. Ext.R1(p) is the public notice dated 17.12.2013, published in the Mathrubhumi daily on 24.12.2013. It is in fact the entire Form-1 notice itself and not just the summary that was published. Considering that 12 years have elapsed since the publication, and no specific challenge against absence of a second newspaper publication has been raised in any of the writ petitions, it has to be presumed that publication of Form-1 in the noticeboard and in the newspapers have been substantially complied with by the respondent Corporation by publishing the entire Form-1 in one newspaper. 29. Further, as per rule 12(4) and rule 12(6) of the Rules, irrespective of whether a return is filed by the owner or not, the authorised officer has to collect particulars of the buildings by a site inspection and on that basis, make the property tax assessment, after recording the particulars in the property tax assessment register. It needs no detailed discussion that the purpose of a site inspection is to collect details regarding the building. During the course of arguments, some of the property tax assessment registers were brought by the Corporation for perusal of the Court. It was noticed that the relevant details of the buildings have been recorded in those registers. Learned Standing Counsel for the Corporation submitted that the particulars of buildings were collected by the Officer from the materials already available on record in the form of building permits, completion plans and occupancy certificates. Apart from the above, the particulars were even available from the register under the prior property tax regime. 30. Learned Standing Counsel for the Corporation submitted that the particulars of buildings were collected by the Officer from the materials already available on record in the form of building permits, completion plans and occupancy certificates. Apart from the above, the particulars were even available from the register under the prior property tax regime. 30. The questions that arise in this context is whether the failure to publish the summary of public notice in two newspapers stipulated in rule 10 of the Rules and to conduct inspection as stipulated in rules 12(4) and 12(6) of the Rules will vitiate the very levy of property tax assessment in its entirety. In the decision in Municipal Council Khurai and Another v. Kamal Kumar and Another ( AIR 1965 SC 1321 ), it has been held that “Under Art.265 of the Constitution no tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of law. This clearly implies that the procedure for imposing with the liability to pay a tax has to be strictly complied with. Where it is not so complied with, the liability to pay the tax cannot be said to be according to law.” 31. In Raza Buland Sugar Co. Ltd., Rampur v. Municipal Board, Rampur [ AIR 1965 SC 895 ], the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court considered the question whether the resolution of the proposal to tax which was required to be published in a newspaper in Hindi was complied with by publishing it in a newspaper in Urdu. It was held that the provision for publication was mandatory but publication in Urdu was in substantial compliance of the requirement. 32. Similarly in the decision in Rai Vimal Krishna and Others v. State of Bihar and Others [ (2003) 6 SCC 401 ], the Supreme Court while dealing with issues that arose in relation to property tax levy under the Patna Municipal Corporations Act, 1951, held that though the statute specifies notice to be given by beat of drums and display of placards, publication in the newspapers amounts to sufficient notice to all. 33. In this context, it is appropriate to refer to the decision in Sonik Industries, Rajkot v. Municipal Corporation of the City of Rajkot [ AIR 1986 SC 1518 ] also. 33. In this context, it is appropriate to refer to the decision in Sonik Industries, Rajkot v. Municipal Corporation of the City of Rajkot [ AIR 1986 SC 1518 ] also. In the said decision, section 77 of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925, which provided that a notice informing the consent of the States to the Rules along with a copy of the Rules was required to be published in the newspaper. However, what was published in the newspaper was only the consent without the Rules. The principle of substantial compliance was adopted in the said case to hold that there was valid publication. 34. Explaining the concept of substantial compliance, it was observed in Commissioner of Central Excise, New Delhi v. Hari Chand Shri Gopal and Others [ (2011) 1 SCC 236 ], that: “32. The doctrine of substantial compliance is a judicial invention, equitable in nature, designed to avoid hardship in cases where a party does all that can reasonably expected of it, but failed or faulted in some minor or inconsequent aspects which cannot be described as the "essence" or the "substance" of the requirements. Like the concept of "reasonableness", the acceptance or otherwise of a plea of "substantial compliance" depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case and the purpose and object to be achieved and the context of the prerequisites which are essential to achieve the object and purpose of the rule or the regulation. Such a defence cannot be pleaded if a clear statutory prerequisite which effectuates the object and the purpose of the statute has not been met. Certainly, it means that the Court should determine whether the statute has been followed sufficiently so as to carry out the intent for which the statute was enacted and not a mirror image type of strict compliance. Substantial compliance means "actual compliance in respect to the substance essential to every reasonable objective of the statute" and the court should determine whether the statute has been followed sufficiently so as to carry out the intent of the statute and accomplish the reasonable objectives for which it was passed. 33. Fiscal statute generally seeks to preserve the need to comply strictly with regulatory requirements that are important, especially when a party seeks the benefits of an exemption clause that are important. 33. Fiscal statute generally seeks to preserve the need to comply strictly with regulatory requirements that are important, especially when a party seeks the benefits of an exemption clause that are important. Substantial compliance of an enactment is insisted, where mandatory and directory requirements are lumped together, for in such a case, if mandatory requirements are complied with, it will be proper to say that the enactment has been substantially complied with notwithstanding the non - compliance of directory requirements. In cases where substantial compliance has been found, there has been actual compliance with the statute, albeit procedurally faulty. The doctrine of substantial compliance seeks to preserve the need to comply strictly with the conditions or requirements that are important to invoke a tax or duty exemption and to forgive non - compliance for either unimportant and tangential requirements or requirements that are so confusingly or incorrectly written that an earnest effort at compliance should be accepted. 34. The test for determining the applicability of the substantial compliance doctrine has been the subject of a myriad of cases and quite often, the critical question to be examined is whether the requirements relate to the "substance" or "essence" of the statute, if so, strict adherence to those requirements is a precondition to give effect to that doctrine. On the other hand, if the requirements are procedural or directory in that they are not of the "essence" of the thing to be done but are given with a view to the orderly conduct of business, they may be fulfilled by substantial, if not strict compliance. In other words, a mere attempted compliance may not be sufficient, but actual compliance of those factors which are considered as essential”. 35. The above decisions indicate that substantial compliance of the procedure would be sufficient in certain circumstances to make the levy valid. Though there can be no quarrel with the proposition that procedure for imposing tax has to be strictly complied with, there can be instances of procedure whose strict compliance need not be insisted. Thus, it needs to be considered whether the public notice under rule 10 and the inspection contemplated under rules 12(4) and 12(6) of the Rules are substantially complied with. 36. The publication required under section 233(10) of the Act read with rule 10 is the public notice in Form-1 to be published by the Corporation. Thus, it needs to be considered whether the public notice under rule 10 and the inspection contemplated under rules 12(4) and 12(6) of the Rules are substantially complied with. 36. The publication required under section 233(10) of the Act read with rule 10 is the public notice in Form-1 to be published by the Corporation. Rule 10(2) stipulates only the summary of the public notice to be published in two newspapers. Instead of just the summary, the entire notice in Form-1 having been published in the newspaper, it has to be held that the said publication satisfies the requirement under rule 10(1) of the Rules read with section 233(10) of the Act. Publication of the entire notice in the newspaper in the circumstances has to be treated as sufficient compliance with the requirement of public notice in the noticeboard of the Corporation. The publication of the entire Form-1 in the newspaper can certainly target a wider community. 37. Apart from the above, collection of particulars of buildings and entering them in the property tax assessment register is an essential requirement in levying the property tax on a building. Section 233(13) of the Act does not speak about a site inspection. It refers only to an inquiry in contradistinction to an inspection. Of course, inquiry can also take in a site inspection. Further, the inspection in rules 12(4) and 12(6) of the Rules only speaks about a site inspection and not inspection of the building. Thus the Rules do not contemplate the building to be inspected. If the building is to be inspected, questions relating to right to privacy, prior notice to the owner, presence of the owner in the building can all arise. Moreover, if an owner refuses to permit the authorised officer to inspect the building, the situation can even go out of control. The Act and the Rules are also silent as to the procedure and mode to be adopted, for inspection of the site. At the same time, details about the building and the site may already be available with the Municipality. An inquiry with the records of the Municipality may reveal those particulars. The return, if any, submitted by the owner, can also be compared with the details available with the Municipality during the inquiry. At the same time, details about the building and the site may already be available with the Municipality. An inquiry with the records of the Municipality may reveal those particulars. The return, if any, submitted by the owner, can also be compared with the details available with the Municipality during the inquiry. In the above perspective, it has to be held that, while an inquiry regarding the building and collection of particulars of the building is a mandatory requirement, a site inspection, however desirable it be, cannot be regarded as a mandatory procedure for levying property tax. Thus, as long as an inquiry to collect the particulars of the building has been carried out and the details have been entered in the property tax assessment register, absence of a site inspection cannot vitiate the assessment or levy or demand. The inquiry and consequent entry of details of the building in the property tax assessment register will be in substantial compliance with the requirement under section 233(13) of the Act and rule 12 of the Rules. In this context, it needs to be mentioned that out of more than two hundred and sixty thousand buildings within the limits of Kochi Corporation, only 142 owners alone have challenged the levy. The minuscule fraction of owners who alone have questioned the levy indicates that the assessment was done to the satisfaction of the overwhelming majority. 38. It is also relevant to mention that under the Act and the Rules, an assessment order is not required to be issued as in other taxing statutes. Section 233(13) of the Act stipulates that the Secretary shall assess the annual property tax and levy it by issuing a demand notice. The assessment is carried out by entering the details of assessment in the property tax assessment register. Though none of the petitioners have questioned the vires of the statutory provision or the Rules thereon, it needs to be mentioned that the rationale behind the absence of the requirement of an assessment order is because, once the basic property tax is fixed and other details are also available, what remains is only a calculation by multiplying the plinth area with the basic property tax rate coupled with the additions or deductions, as the case may be. A reasoned order of assessment has no significance or purpose in the context of the levy. A reasoned order of assessment has no significance or purpose in the context of the levy. Further, the right to appeal commences from the receipt of the demand notice, though the assessment will be under challenge in appeal. The form prescribed for the demand notice provides all details regarding the quantum levied. 39. A person aggrieved by the details entered in the assessment register will also be at liberty to disprove those particulars at the time of appeal before the Standing Committee for Finance. The peculiar feature of the appellate remedy is evident from rule 16 of the Rules. The appellate body, has the power under rule 16(4) of the Rules to review the assessment of property tax, reassess the tax and can even suo motu or on a complaint, verify whether the assessment has been carried out contrary to the criteria. If it is satisfied, the appellate body can review the assessment after notice to the owner and reassess the tax according to the criteria. 40. Yet another contention raised on behalf of the petitioners is the absence of an intimation as required under rules 12(1) and 12(6) of the Rules. The Corporation in its counter affidavit has pleaded that Form 5 and Form 7 intimations are being sent to the respective owners. Four of the intimations sent to some of the petitioners have also been produced. Hence the contentions taken on a general basis that intimations have not been sent to individual owners cannot be considered in these writ petitions. Those issues should have been taken up in an appeal as it falls within the realm of factual dispute. 41. Notwithstanding the above, it needs to be considered as to whether the intimation itself is a mandatory procedure. The scheme of the statute does not provide for an assessment order to be issued. The Act and the Rules only provide for the assessment to be entered in the property tax assessment register. Section 233(13) of the Act stipulates that the Secretary shall assess the annual property tax of the building and levy property tax by issuing demand notice applicable for five years to the owner of the building. However, rule 12(1) of the Rules refers to information of the assessment of property tax to be intimated to the owner of the building in Form-5. Similar intimation in Form-7 is also provided under rule 12(6) of the Rules. However, rule 12(1) of the Rules refers to information of the assessment of property tax to be intimated to the owner of the building in Form-5. Similar intimation in Form-7 is also provided under rule 12(6) of the Rules. Though the words used in both the above provisions are ‘shall’, it is seen from Form-5 that the intimation is to be sent along with the demand notice. The details required to be included in Form-5 and Form-7 are not of much significance, except for intimating the assessment of the building and quantum of tax assessed. Both the aforesaid factors are part of the demand notice, that too, with more details. While a demand notice gives a cause of action for an appeal, intimations under rule 12(1) or 12(6) of the Rules do not result in any consequence of any nature whatsoever. 42. In this context, it needs to be mentioned that normally, the use of the word 'shall' raises a presumption that the particular provision is mandatory as held in State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava ( AIR 1957 SC 912 ). Nevertheless, the said presumption is not conclusive as the term 'shall' need always be reflective of the mandatory nature of the provision. While determining the question whether a provision is mandatory or directory, the language alone is not always decisive and regard ought to be given to the context, the subject matter and the object of the provision. The observations of the Supreme Court in Kailash v. Nanhku and Others (2005) 4 SCC 480 ), and Amardeep Singh v. Harveen Kaur (2017) 8 SCC 746 are relevant.Further, in the decision in Sharif-ud-Din v. Abdul Gani Lone (1980) 1 SCC 403 , it was observed as follows: “The fact that the statute uses the word "shall" while laying down a duty is not conclusive on the question whether it is a mandatory or directory provision. In order to find out the true character of the legislation, the court has to ascertain the object which the provision of law in question has to subserve and its design and the context in which it is enacted. If the object of a law is to be defeated by non - compliance with it, it has to be regarded as mandatory. If the object of a law is to be defeated by non - compliance with it, it has to be regarded as mandatory. But when a provision of law relates to the performance of any public duty and the invalidation of any act done in disregard of that provision causes serious prejudice to those for whose benefit it is enacted and at the same time who have no control over the performance of the duty, such provision should be treated as a directory one. Where, however, a provision of law prescribes that a certain act has to be done in a particular manner by a person in order to acquire a right and it is coupled with another provision which confers an immunity on another when such act is not done in that manner, the former has to be regarded as a mandatory one. A procedural rule ordinarily should not be construed as mandatory if the defect in the act done in pursuance of it can be cured by permitting appropriate rectification to be carried out at a subsequent stage unless by according such permission to rectify the error later on, another rule would be contravened. Whenever a statute prescribes that a particular act is to be done in a particular manner and also lays down that failure to comply with the said requirement leads to a specific consequence, it would be difficult to hold that the requirement is not mandatory and the specified consequence should not follow." 43. The decisions in SCG Contracts (India) Private Limited v. K. S. Chamankar Infrastructure Private Limited and Others (2019) 12 SCC 210 ) and Administrator, Municipal Committee Charkhi Dadri and Another v. Ramji Lal Bagla and Others (1995) 5 SCC 272 ) are also relevant. Thus, the interpretation to be accorded to a provision depends upon the context and the scheme of the statute and not merely due to the use of the word 'shall'. A procedural rule should not ordinarily be construed as mandatory and further the absence of any consequences provided by the statute is an indication that a provision is not intended to be mandatory in its application but can be regarded as directory. A procedural rule should not ordinarily be construed as mandatory and further the absence of any consequences provided by the statute is an indication that a provision is not intended to be mandatory in its application but can be regarded as directory. Viewed in the above perspective, since the requirement of an intimation is not provided in the Act and no consequences are also stipulated in the Rules for failure to provide the intimation, such a requirement can only be treated as directory. Apart from the above, no right flows out of the intimation and further, the intimation has to, as per Form-5, be sent along with the demand notice. Hence, this Court is of the view that the intimation under rule 12(1) and 12(6) of the Rules is only a directory procedure. Failure to send the intimations is not fatal to the assessment of property tax. 44. Though some of the learned Counsel had referred to the unreported decisions in K.H. Mohammadali v. The Thrikkakara Municipality (W.P.(C) No.9056/2018) and E.M.Nazeer v. State of Kerala (W.P.(C) No.6772/2017), those decisions had not considered the legal character of the intimation prescribed under rule 12 of the Rules or the absence of such an intimation/notice under the Act. It was also not brought to the notice of the said Court that the said requirement was not a mandatory requirement or even that Form-5 notice was not to be issued prior to the demand notice but only along with it. In view of the above, the aforenoted two decisions are per incuriam. Issue No . (v) Whether the power under section 282 of the Act can be exercised to levy property tax from 2016-17 onwards ? 45. Section 282 of the Act reads as follows; “ S.282. In view of the above, the aforenoted two decisions are per incuriam. Issue No . (v) Whether the power under section 282 of the Act can be exercised to levy property tax from 2016-17 onwards ? 45. Section 282 of the Act reads as follows; “ S.282. Power to assess in case of escape from assessment.— Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Act or the rules made thereunder, where for any reason a person liable to pay any tax or fees leviable under this Chapter has escaped assessment in any half- year, the Secretary may at any time within four years from the date on which such person should have been assessed, serve on him a notice assessing to the tax or fee due and demanding payment thereof within fifteen days from the date of such service and thereupon the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder shall, so far as may be, apply as if the assessment was made in the half-year to which the tax or fee relates.” 46. A reading of the above provision reveals that the power under section 282 of the Act is to assess a person who has escaped assessment, in contradistinction to any amount of tax that has escaped assessment. In other words, if for some reason, a person was not assessed to tax, then the Municipality can, within a period of four years from the date on which such person should have been assessed to tax, assess such person. The power under section 282 of the Act cannot be exercised to levy any additional quantum of tax that was omitted from assessment earlier. The power can be exercised to proceed against persons who were wholly omitted from assessment and not a person who was already subjected to an assessment. Hence, the Municipality cannot assess, under section 282 of the Act, persons who have already been assessed to property tax, whether it be from 2016-17 onwards or otherwise. Issue No. (vi). Whether the demand notices issued in the instant cases are barred by limitation? 47. By a notification dated 06.03.2019, Government has permitted the Municipalities to collect the property tax from 01.04.2016. The said notification is not what is contemplated under section 279 of the Act, as concededly it has not been published in the Gazette. Issue No. (vi). Whether the demand notices issued in the instant cases are barred by limitation? 47. By a notification dated 06.03.2019, Government has permitted the Municipalities to collect the property tax from 01.04.2016. The said notification is not what is contemplated under section 279 of the Act, as concededly it has not been published in the Gazette. According to the Government, the notification issued by it on 06.03.2019 is not a retrospective levy but only to protect the officers of the Municipalities from being proceeded against for non-collection of tax from 01.04.2013. With the above proposition in mind, when the statutory scheme is considered, it needs to be borne in mind that, section 237 of the Act makes the property tax and the surcharge payable thereon, including the service cess when levied, to be a first charge upon the building, land and even upon the movable property belonging to the person liable to pay the tax, subject to the prior payment of land revenue due to the Government. The said provision thus creates a charge on the land as well as the income arising from the property. Creation of a statutory charge is intended to ensure priority in the matter of recovery. In the process of recovery, in the absence of any statutory charge, the liability becomes entangled in the rights and actions created and initiated by other persons as well. It is in such circumstances that the statutory tool of creating a first charge is adopted to provide a priority for payment when recovery modes are resorted to. Such a creation of a statutory charge is not a measure of limitation period but as mentioned above, only to identify who should be given priority in payment. 48. In the year 2023, an amendment was brought in and section 538B has been incorporated, making arrears of tax to be treated as arrears of public revenue recoverable by recourse to the Revenue Recovery Act. Till the amendment, recovery of arrears of tax could have been carried out only by virtue of the provisions in the Municipality Act. It is only to overcome the limited mode of recovery available under the statute that section 538B has been incorporated enabling the Municipality to resort to the Revenue Recovery Act also for recovery of arrears of tax due to it. It is only to overcome the limited mode of recovery available under the statute that section 538B has been incorporated enabling the Municipality to resort to the Revenue Recovery Act also for recovery of arrears of tax due to it. Merely because the arrears of tax have been treated as arrears of public revenue, the same would not extend the period of limitation. However, for the purpose of recovery of any sum of money when charged on the land, Article 62 of the Limitation Act prescribes a period of limitation of 12 years. In this context, it has to be observed that section 539 of the Act stipulates that no distraint shall be made, no suit shall be instituted and no prosecution shall be commenced in respect of any sum due to a Municipality under this Act after the expiration of a period of three years from the date on which the distraint might first have been made, suit might first have been instituted or a prosecution might first have been commenced. The proviso to the said section carves out an exemption for recovery of the amount in respect of escaped assessment under section 282 of the Act. Thus, a period of limitation of three years is provided for under section 539 of the Act. The question that begs consideration of this Court is whether, despite the creation of charge on the property enabling the Municipality to recover the arrears of tax as arrears of public revenue, the limitation period would stand extended beyond three years. 49. Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 reads as follows:- “S.29(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only insofar as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.” 50. As per the above provision, when a period of limitation is provided under a special law, the said period of limitation shall be deemed to have been incorporated as a limitation period under the Limitation Act. In the decision in Corporation of Cochin v. New India Maritime Agencies (P) Ltd. ( 2003 (3) KLT 209 ), a Division Bench of this Court considered the implication of creation of a charge on a property, in relation to the erstwhile Municipal Corporations Act 1961 and held that, despite such a charge on the property, in view of the limitation prescribed under section 417 of the 1961 Act, recovery of any amount due to the Municipality will be governed by a period of three years when read along with section 29(2) of the Limitation Act 1963. For the purpose of reference, the observations in the aforesaid judgment is extracted as below: “6. ……………..S.105 of the Act merely says that the property tax is a charge on a property. It does not prescribe the period of limitation. If there was no other provision prescribing the limitation, we would have followed the limitation under the Limitation Act. But S.29(2) of the Limitation Act says that if there is separate law prescribing limitation, then that law should be followed. Question for consideration is whether S.417 of the Act applies to recover the property tax. In this context, we wish to state that Part.3, wherein S.105 appears, does not deal with recovery of tax. Enumeration of tax contains property tax, profession tax, tax on animals, vessels and vehicles, show tax, tax on timber brought into the city, tax on advertisement and duty on certain transfers of property in the shape of an additional stamp duty. S.138 says that the rules and tables embodied in Schedule.2 shall be read as part of that chapter. Part.6 deals with collection of tax. The Rules regarding collection of tax are common to all kinds of taxes. 7. Now let us turn to S.417 of the Act. S.138 says that the rules and tables embodied in Schedule.2 shall be read as part of that chapter. Part.6 deals with collection of tax. The Rules regarding collection of tax are common to all kinds of taxes. 7. Now let us turn to S.417 of the Act. It says that no distraint shall be made, no suit shall be instituted and no prosecution shall be commenced in respect of any sum due to the Corporation under this Act after the expiration of a period of three years from the date on which distraint might first have been made, a suit might first have been instituted or prosecution might first have been commenced, as the case may be, in respect of such sum. There is no quarrel that with regard to profession tax and other taxes it will definitely come under S.417 of the Act. Can we say that S.105 of the Act is out of the purview of S.417? We are of the view that that it is not out of the purview of S.417. While S.105 of the Act only says that a charge is created, S.417 of the Act prescribes the period of limitation for recovery of tax. Thus, according to us, the time for recovery of property tax is only three years………....” 51. It would be relevant to mention at this juncture the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Kerala and Others v. V.R.Kalliyanikutty and Another ( AIR 1999 SC 1305 ) as well as the Full Bench judgment in Raveendran Nair M.G. V. State of Kerala and Others ( 2014 (4) KHC 518 ). 52. A perusal of the above decisions will reveal that despite the provisions of the Limitation Act stipulating a period of limitation of 12 years for recovery of the amounts due, when it becomes a charge on the property, the period of limitation stipulated in the special statute will have to be given preference and the same will prevail over the general period prescribed under the Limitation Act. As mentioned earlier, neither section 538B nor section 237 of the Act extends the period of limitation for recovery of amounts due to the Municipality. As mentioned earlier, neither section 538B nor section 237 of the Act extends the period of limitation for recovery of amounts due to the Municipality. The creation of a charge on the property as well as the recovery of arrears of tax as an arrear of public revenue would not extend the limitation period prescribed under section 539 of the Act and the Municipalities are governed by the said provision. Viewed in the above perspective, the Municipality could have recovered only amounts as arrears for a period of three years. 53. Apart from the above, even the Government had understood section 539 of the Act as restraining recovery of arrears beyond three years, as is noted from the Government Order dated 06.03.2019. Though the interpretation of the Government cannot be regarded as the law of the land, in view of the discussion in the preceding paragraphs, the view is legally tenable. 54. Thus, the recovery under the impugned demand notices cannot be initiated for arrears beyond three years from the date of demand. As the period of limitation is only a measure of restriction on recovering amounts due, all those owners who have paid the tax voluntarily or otherwise are not entitled for refund of the same. However, in respect of those persons who have not yet paid the amount, they need to pay only the arrears from a period that accrued three years prior to the demand notices issued to them. Conclusion 55. In the result: (1) The basic property tax fixation in respect of Kochi Corporation needs no interference. (2) The owners of buildings can be made liable to pay the annual property tax demanded in the respective demand notices at the revised rates from a period three years prior to the date of demand, after deducting the property tax already paid. (3) No amount under the respective demand notices at the revised rates can be recovered for the periods till three years prior to the date of demand and the owners of buildings in Kochi Corporation cannot be put to any prejudice for non-payment of property tax for those periods. (4) The demand of property tax as per the respective demand notices in all these cases from 2016-17 till three years prior to the date of demand notices shall not be enforced, if not paid voluntarily. The writ petitions are disposed of as above.