Bhagwan Prasad v. Addl. Revenue Divisional Officer Land Reforms
2025-08-29
N.V.SHRAVAN KUMAR
body2025
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER : N.V.SHRAVAN KUMAR, J. This writ petition has been filed in the nature of writ of certiorari calling for the records of respondent No.2 pertaining to his order dated 10.01.2006 under File No.F2/5201/2002 and quash the same and to consequently set aside the Occupancy Certificates issued in favour of respondent Nos.3 to 12 pertaining to an extent of Ac.45-24 gts., in Sy.Nos.10, 11, 15, 16, 17, 257, 262, 263 and 264 of Keesara Daira Village, Keesara Mandal, Ranga Reddy District (for short ‘subject land’ hereinafter). Brief facts of the case: 2. Petitioner Nos.1 and 2 are brothers and claims that their father Sri Manohar Prasad was original owner of the subject property. Petitioners’ father died in the year 1947 leaving behind petitioners’ mother Smt.Tara Bai who was the eldest member of their family and she came into possession and enjoyment of the said land and the Revenue Records were also mutated in her name showing her as the pattadar. Petitioners’ mother also died on 26.11.1992. Thereafter petitioners filed an application before the Mandal Revenue Officer, Keesara Mandal for grant of an order of succession and the then M.R.O., Keesara Mandal, vide file No.B/366/96, dated 25.03.1996, issued proceedings declaring the petitioners as the successors for the estate of the Late Smt.Tara Bai and further directed the concerned Revenue Authority to incorporate their names in the revenue records to an extent of Ac.26-09 guntas only covered in Sy.Nos.39, 156, 257, 158, 160, 262 and 264 of Keesara Daira Village and did not order for the mutation of the remaining extent of land held by the petitioners without assigning any reasons. It is further submitted that one Patwari Shri.Suresh Prasad Tiwari of Keesara Daira Village made some manipulations in the revenue records of the said village and further managed issuance of Ownership Certificates, under Section 3 8-E of Andhra Pradesh [Telangana Area] Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950, in favour of the respondent Nos.3 to 12. It is further submitted that petitioners came to know about such issuance of Ownership Certificates in favour of respondent Nos.3 to 12, only during the first week of March 2002. 3. It is submitted that during the month of July, 1975 Ownership Certificates were issued to respondent Nos.3 to 12 though petitioners’ mother name is appearing in all the revenue records as pattadar and possessor.
3. It is submitted that during the month of July, 1975 Ownership Certificates were issued to respondent Nos.3 to 12 though petitioners’ mother name is appearing in all the revenue records as pattadar and possessor. It is their further case that the M.R.O., Keesara Mandal without issuing any notice to the petitioners’ mother had issued ownership certificate and such certificates were issued without any enquiry and without any proceedings. Subsequently, petitioners made application before respondent No.1 on 08.03.2002 requesting to issue certified copies of the said certificates and the proceedings that preceded such certificates. On 05.07.2002, respondent No.1 issued certified copies of the said ownership certificates which were said to have been issued in favour of respondent Nos.3 to 12. The petitioners thereafter filed an appeal F2/5201/2002 before the Joint Collector – II, Ranga Reddy District challenging issuance of the said ownership certificates in favour of respondent Nos.3 to 12. Respondent No.2 has issued impugned proceedings dated 10.01.2006 dismissing the appeal filed by the petitioners on the ground that the said appeal was barred by limitation. It is further submitted that respondent No.2 did not hear the contentions of the petitioners before issuing such ownership certificates. Questioning the same, the present writ petition is filed. COUNTER AFFIDAVITS: 4. A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of respondent No.3 stating that the petitioners have filed the above case without any right whatsoever in respect of the schedule lands and have suppressed the material facts. It is submitted that the grandfather of respondent No.3 namely pasha Saheb and his brother Chote Saheb are the protected tenants for an extent of Ac.4-33 Gts., in S.No.262 and an extent of Ac.16-17 Gts., in S.No.263 of Keesara Daira village, Keesara Mandal, Ranga Reddy District. It is submitted that grandfather of respondent No.3 and his brother were granted certificate of ownership under Section 3 8-E of A.P. (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Act, 1950 way back in the year 1975 vide proceedings No.B/305/LRE/75, dated 17.7.1975 and are in possession of the property since then. Subsequently, the property was divided between his grandfather and his brother equally with Ac.2-17 Gts in Sy.No.262 and Ac.8-08 Gts., in Sy.No.263 of Keesara Daira village, Keesara Mandal, R.R. District. It is further submitted that the land belonging to his grandfather in Sy.No.263 was sold to various persons both by his grandfather and father.
Subsequently, the property was divided between his grandfather and his brother equally with Ac.2-17 Gts in Sy.No.262 and Ac.8-08 Gts., in Sy.No.263 of Keesara Daira village, Keesara Mandal, R.R. District. It is further submitted that the land belonging to his grandfather in Sy.No.263 was sold to various persons both by his grandfather and father. However, the land in S.No.262 was in possession of respondent No.3 and his brother. It is further submitted that respondent No.3 along with his brother were also owners and possessors of well in Sy.No.11 of Keesara Daira Village which is water source for cultivation. The said well was inherited from their ancestors. It is further submitted that respondent No.3 along with his brother are having exclusive right over an extent of Ac.0-06 gts., in Sy.No.10 of Keesara Daira Village. Thereafter, their grandfather was granted with 38-E certificate in the year 1975 and that filing of appeal after 27 years is barred by limitation and the appeal was rightly dismissed by respondent No.2. 5. It is submitted that the writ petitioners are totally strangers to the subject lands and they are claiming that they are the sons of Tara Bai. But in fact, the said Tara Bai died issueless and during her life time, she sold and relinquished her right over all the lands. Hence, the petitioners have no right on the property. It is further submitted that the writ petitioners have earlier challenged issuance of ownership certificates by filing appeal before the Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy District vide F.No.F2/2009/2000 which was dismissed by an order dated 22.01.2001 and this material fact was suppressed in the appeal stating that no notice was issued by the authorities before granting 38-E certificate and the petitioners failed to explain the inordinate delay of about 25 years in preferring the appeal. The said order has attained finality, and the petitioners have now filed the appeal No.F2/5201/2002 (impugned proceedings) after 27 years contending that no notice was issued to Smt.Tara Bai while granting 38-E certificate to the respondents which is barred by limitation. By making the aforesaid submissions, respondent No.3 prayed to dismiss the writ petition. 6.
The said order has attained finality, and the petitioners have now filed the appeal No.F2/5201/2002 (impugned proceedings) after 27 years contending that no notice was issued to Smt.Tara Bai while granting 38-E certificate to the respondents which is barred by limitation. By making the aforesaid submissions, respondent No.3 prayed to dismiss the writ petition. 6. A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of respondent Nos.5, 6, 7, 8 and 10 being deposed by respondent No.10 wherein it is submitted that he is the pattedar and possessor of land admeasuring to an extent of Ac.2-05 guntas in Survey No.264 situated at Keesara Daira (Village), Keesara Mandal, Ranga Reddy District, having purchased the same from the Respondent Nos.5, 6 & 8 and others vide registered sale deed Doc.No.7340 of 2007 dated 07.06.2007. It is submitted that his vendors were issued ownership certificate under Section 3 8-E of Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy & Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 (for short ‘the Act’ hereinafter) vide proceedings No.B/305/LRE/75 dated 17.07.1975 and respondent No.10 has subsequently issued patta pass book on the strength of the proceedings of the Mandal Revenue Officer vide Ref.No.B/597/2007 dated 11.09.2007. As such, respondent No.10 is the absolute and legal owner to an extent of Ac.2-05 gts., of land situated at Keesara Daira (Village), Keesara Mandal, Ranga Reddy District and the petitioners have no right whatsoever. It is further submitted that respondent Nos.5, 6 and 7 are the owners and possessors for an extent of Ac.1-03 gts., in Sy.No.264 and were issued with ownership certificate as per Section 3 8-E of the Act and respondent No.8 is the owner and possessor of land to an extent of Ac.1-03 gts., in Sy.No.264. It is further submitted that petitioners are totally strangers to the lands and that petitioners are not the sons of Smt.Tara Bai to succeed her. It is further submitted that Smt.Tara Bai died issueless and she has appointed one Dasaratha prasad as her General Power of Attorney vide Doc.No.416 of 1975 who had executed several relinquishment deeds on behalf of Smt.Tara Bai. The certificates under Section 3 8-E of the Act were issued on the basis of revenue records for the year 1950-51 to 1954-55 as on 01.11.1973.
The certificates under Section 3 8-E of the Act were issued on the basis of revenue records for the year 1950-51 to 1954-55 as on 01.11.1973. The said certificates were issued as per Section 3 (1) of the Act by following due procedure, as such the said notices have become final and they are the rightful owners of the subject property and eventually prayed to dismiss the present writ petition. 7. Petitioner No.2 has filed a reply affidavit to the counter affidavit reiterating the averments made in the writ affidavit. 8. A memo has been filed by the petitioner on 12.06.2023 enclosing another memo dated 20.03.2003 issued by Office of Special Grade Deputy Collector and Revenue Divisional Officer, Ranga Reddy District stating that no 38-E certificate has been issued in Sy.Nos.156, 157 and 160 of Keesara Daira Village in the name of Nukala Gudam Pedda Narsaiah S/o.Mallaiah vide Office File no.B/305/LRE/75, as such request of the petitioner cannot be considered for issuance of patta certificate. The said memo was issued to one Mr.Ranjeet Prasad Hajari i.e., petitioner No.2. Learned counsel for the petitioner draws attention of this Court to another memo dated 29.05.2003, wherein it is stated that no 38-E certificates have been issued in Sy.Nos.156 to 160 and 164 of Daira Village, Keesara Mandal vide Office File No.B/305/LRE/75. A similar memo dated 11.01.2023 has also been filed whereby the applicant requested for final tenancy register for Sy.Nos.10, 11, 15, 16, 17, 39, 123, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 164, 257, 262, 263, 264 of Keesara Daira Village, but on verification of records, the protected tenancy for Sy.Nos.156, 157, 256, 264 were submitted however, the remaining Sy.Nos.were not available in the said Office. The said memo was addressed to Pandit Shiv Shankar Tiwari who is not the petitioner herein. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner has filed another memo dated 03.12.2024 stating that petitioner No.2 has filed contempt case in C.C.No.766 of 2024 against the orders passed in W.P.No.22560 of 2019 before this Court and respondent therein i.e., the Tahsildar, Keesara Mandal has filed additional counter dated 20.09.2024 wherein it is categorically held that 38-E certificates were not genuine and are created certificates. The copy of the said counter affidavit has also been filed along with the memo. 10. Heard learned counsel on either side and perused the record. 11.
The copy of the said counter affidavit has also been filed along with the memo. 10. Heard learned counsel on either side and perused the record. 11. On a perusal of the impugned order dated 10.01.2006, passed by the Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy District i.e., respondent No.2, the petitioners are the appellants who preferred the said appeal under Section 90 of the Act aggrieved by the orders passed by Revenue Divisional Officer, Ranga Reddy District, East Division in File No.B/305/LRE/75 dated 17.07.1975 granting ownership certificates under Section 38 -E of Tenancy Act in respect of land bearing Sy.Nos.10, 11, 15, 16, 17, 257, 262, 263 and 264 admeasuring Ac.45-24 gts., situated at Keesara Diara Manal, Ranga Reddy District. The case was taken up on record and notices were issued to both the parties and finally called on 10.01.2006 and the appellants (petitioners herein) were called absent and the matter was decided on the material papers available. The said ownership certificates were issued on 17.07.1975 in Case No.B/305/LRE/1975. The appeal preferred was in the year 2002 i.e., almost after a lapse of 27 years which is contrary to Section 93 of the LIMITATION ACT which reads as under: “ Section 93 of the Act reads as follows: Every appeal and every application for revision under this Act shall be filed within sixty days from the date of the order against the appeal or application is filed (“and the provisions of Section 5 and Sections 12 to 24 of the LIMITATION ACT , 1963, shall apply for the purpose of extension and computation of the said period.)” The relevant portion of the impugned order dated 10.01.2006 reads as follows: “In the instant case, proceedings have been initiated after 27 years of issuance of 38-E certificates and the appeal was barred by limitation. That apart, the appellant has not furnished any reasons for delay as such the appeal was dismissed as time barred.” 12. It is pertinent to note that the subject matter of this writ petition pertains to Sy.Nos.10, 11, 15, 16, 257, 262, 263 and 264 wherein in the memo filed by petitioner and in the reply filed by the petitioner the land pertains to Sy.Nos.160, 161 and 162 of Keesara Daira Village, as such they are not the subject matter of writ petition, and the submission to the extent of memos are not sustainable.
It is further to be noted that in the grounds urged in the writ petition with regard to the issuance of Occupancy Certificates in favour of respondent Nos.3 to 12, it is submitted that the said fact came to the knowledge of petitioners in the month of March, 2002 and that the appeal was preferred in the year 2006 and the impugned order was passed on 10.01.2006. The petitioners were found to be absent in the said appeal and did not pursue the matter and thereafter, filed the present writ petition. 13. It is to be further noted that in the counter filed by respondent No.3, the order passed by Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy District by order dated F2/2009/2000 dated 22.12.2001 has been enclosed which is an appeal filed under Section 90 of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 aggrieved by the orders of Revenue Divisional Officer, Ranga Reddy District East Division granting certificate of ownership under Section 3 8E of Tenancy Act in favour of respondent Nos.3 and 4 and in favour of respondent Nos.5 to 7 in respect of land bearing Sy.No.123 to an extent of Ac.20-37 gts., at keesara Diara Village, Keesara Mandal, Ranga Reddy District. The relevant portion of the said order is extracted herein for reference: “The main contention of the appellants is that no notice was issued to their mother, Smt.Tara Bai, who was the pattedar of the above said land. But as seen from the records, a notice in Form-III was issued in the name of their mother and she has not filed any objection in this case. Thus I am unable to agree with the contention of the Counsel for the Appellants that no notice was issued to the pattedar at the time of enquiry for granting Certificate of Ownership in respect of the said land. It is seen from the copies of pahanies for the year 1968-69, 1969-70, 1974-75, 1976-77, 1979-80, 1988-89, 1989-90, 1993-94 and 1995-96 produced by the Counsel for Respondents, the respondents are found to be in possession and enjoyment of the said land and their possession was also never questioned by the appellants herein. The Revenue Divisional Officer after following the procedure laid down under the act has granted the certificate of ownership U/s. 38-E of Tenancy Act in favour of the respondents in the year 1975 itself.
The Revenue Divisional Officer after following the procedure laid down under the act has granted the certificate of ownership U/s. 38-E of Tenancy Act in favour of the respondents in the year 1975 itself. But, neither the mother of the appellants nor the appellants herein have taken any steps to prefer appeal against the grant of certificate of ownership by the Revenue Divisional Officer, RR East Division. The appellants have failed to explain the inordinate delay of about 25 years in preferring this appeal. In view of the foregoing discussions, the appeal is dismissed and the certificate of ownership issued by the Revenue Divisional Officer, RR East Division, U/s.38-E of Tenancy Act in respect of the Sy. No. 123 of Keesara Daira Village is hereby confirmed.” It is to be noted that the present writ petition pertains to Sy.Nos.10, 11, 15, 16, 257, 262, 263 and 264 of Keesara Diara Village wherein the impugned order dated 10.01.2006 pertaining to Case No.F2/5201/2002, a similar view was taken by the Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy District and dismissed the appeal by order dated 22.12.2001 in File No.F2/2009/2000. In all these proceedings, petitioner did not furnish any reason for delay, as such the appeals are dismissed as time barred. 14. In the case of Karnataka Power Corporation Limited v. K.Thangappan , [(2006) 4 SCC 322] the Hon’ble Supreme Court, with regard to delay and laches, held at paragraph Nos.6 to 9 as follows: “6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prasad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports ( AIR 1970 SC 769 ). Of course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably. 7. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Company v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd etc.
Of course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably. 7. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Company v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd etc. (1874 (5) P.C. 221 at page 239) was approved by this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Courts ( AIR 1967 SC 1450 ) and Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Balwant Regular Motor Service ( AIR 1969 SC 329 ). Sir Barnes had stated: "Now, the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy either because the party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, if founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitation, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances always important in such cases are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy." 8. It would be appropriate to note certain decisions of this Court in which this aspect has been dealt with in relation with Article 32 of the Constitution. It is apparent that what has been stated as regards that Article would apply, a fortiori, to Article 226. It was observed in R.N. Bose v. Union of India ( AIR 1970 SC 470 ) that no relief can be given to the petitioner who without any reasonable explanation approaches this Court under Article 32 after inordinate delay.
It is apparent that what has been stated as regards that Article would apply, a fortiori, to Article 226. It was observed in R.N. Bose v. Union of India ( AIR 1970 SC 470 ) that no relief can be given to the petitioner who without any reasonable explanation approaches this Court under Article 32 after inordinate delay. It was stated that though Article 32 is itself a guaranteed right, it does not follow from this that it was the intention of the Constitution makers that this Court should disregard all principles and grant relief in petitions filed after inordinate delay. 9. It was stated in State of M.P. v. Nandlal (AIR 1987 SC 251), that the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule is premised on a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring, in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction. 15. With regard to the mixed question of fact and law, which is the preliminary issue in the present writ petition, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramesh B.Desai v. Bipin Vadilal Mehta , (2006) 5 SCC 638 in paragraph 19 held as follows: “19. A plea of limitation cannot be decided as an abstract principle of law divorced from facts as in every case the starting point of limitation has to be ascertained which is entirely a question of fact. A plea of limitation is a mixed question of law and fact.
A plea of limitation cannot be decided as an abstract principle of law divorced from facts as in every case the starting point of limitation has to be ascertained which is entirely a question of fact. A plea of limitation is a mixed question of law and fact. The question whether the words "barred by law" occurring in Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC would also include the ground that it is barred by law of limitation has been recently considered by a two Judge Bench of this Court to which one of us was a member (Ashok Bhan J.) in Civil Appeal No. 4539 of 2003 (Balasaria Construction Pvt. Ltd. vs. Hanuman Seva Trust and others) decided on 8.11.2005 and it was held: - "After hearing counsel for the parties, going through the plaint, application under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC and the judgments of the trial court and the High Court, we are of the opinion that the present suit could not be dismissed as barred by limitation without proper pleadings, framing of an issue of limitation and taking of evidence. Question of limitation is a mixed question of law and fact. Ex facie in the present case on the reading of the paint it cannot be held that the suit is barred by time." 16. In the grounds urged in the writ petition, it is submitted that respondent No.2 dismissed the appeal on the ground of limitation missing to see that no notice was served on the petitioners or their mother before issuance of ORC in favour of respondent Nos.3 to 12 till the first week of March, 2002. However, the present writ petition was filed in the year 2008. The petitioners have not duly contested the matter, and ought to have diligently pursued in appeal. It is further to be noted that petitioner in the writ averments, submitted that MRO, Keesara Mandal vide proceedings dated 25.03.1996 has issued order of succession to pattadar right in their favour as being its rightful owners. However, no copy of order of succession declaring the petitioner as successor of late Tara Bai has been filed along with the writ petition. However, in the reply, a copy of death certificate dated 27.06.2006 has been filed wherein it was certified that the said Tara Bai expired on 26.11.1992.
However, no copy of order of succession declaring the petitioner as successor of late Tara Bai has been filed along with the writ petition. However, in the reply, a copy of death certificate dated 27.06.2006 has been filed wherein it was certified that the said Tara Bai expired on 26.11.1992. However, a dependant certificate, was issued by Tahsildar certifying the petitioners as dependants and the same cannot be considered as it is not a valid succession certificate and the said dependent certificate does not sustain in the eye of law. It is also striking to note that petitioner at every stage had delayed in pursuing the matter. 17. Taking into consideration, the set of facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the above cited judicial pronouncements, this Court is of the view that there is continuous delay, latches and petitioners could not substantiate on the issue of limitation, and could not explain and make submissions on this aspect. In the impugned order dated 10.01.2006, on the issue of delay, it is observed as follows: “In the instant case, the institution of proceedings 27 years after the issuance of 38E certificate militates against all canons of justice and one who has slept over his rights for such an extraordinary length of time should not be allowed to litigate in respect of those rights. The appeal is barred by the sheer antiquity and obscurity of the transaction. Further, the appellant has not furnished any reason for delay. Hence the appeal is dismissed as being barred by time.” 18. As such, the impugned order dated 10.01.2006 passed by Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy District i.e., respondent No.2 warrants no interference. This writ petition is devoid of merits, fails and accordingly stands dismissed. 19. With all the above observations, this writ petition is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. As a sequel, miscellaneous applications, if any pending, shall stand closed.