ORDER: Gadi Praveen Kumar, J. We have heard Mr.Maneesh, learned counsel representing Mr.R.Anurag, learned Standing Counsel for the Telangana State Road Transport Corporation (TSRTC) appearing for the petitioners/appellants and Sri Bethi Venkateswarlu, learned counsel appearing for the respondent. 2. The appellants filed the present appeal aggrieved by the Award passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal-cum-The Court of the Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad (for short ‘the Tribunal’) dated 05-05-2023 in M.V.O.P.No.1871 of 2018, in favour of the respondent (claimant) for a sum of Rs.87,22,978/- towards sufferance of 100% functional disability. 3. The present Appeal was filed on 09-06-2025 along with an application (I.A.No.2 of 2025) seeking condonation of a delay of 629 days in filing the Appeal. The parties have filed their respective affidavits in the I.A. The respondent who filed counter affidavit strongly objecting the condonation of delay. 4. In the present IA, learned counsel for the petitioners contend that the Tribunal passed an Award on 05-05-2023, whereas Copy Application for Certified Copy of the judgment and decree was made on 02-09-2023, which is after 4 months of the judgment, that certified copy of the judgment and decree was made ready on 29-09-2023, which is within one month, thereafter the learned Standing Counsel sent the file to the Personal Officer of the TSRTC on 20-10-2023, who had taken approximately one and half month to send the file to the Legal Cell for obtaining necessary opinion, and after instructions from the Head Office, the then learned Standing Counsel received the file to draft grounds of Appeal in December, 2023. 5. It is further stated that the then learned Standing Counsel tendered his resignation in the month of September, 2024, nearly after 9 months, thereafter the file was sent to the newly appointed Standing Counsel in the month of September, 2024, who drafted the grounds of Appeal. 6. It is further contended that in the said process, there is a delay of 629 days in filing the Appeal, and that the said delay is neither wilful nor wanton, but on account of administrative delay. 7. On the other hand, Sri Bethi Venkateswarlu, learned counsel appearing for the respondent filed counter affidavit to the IA. 6. It is further contended that in the said process, there is a delay of 629 days in filing the Appeal, and that the said delay is neither wilful nor wanton, but on account of administrative delay. 7. On the other hand, Sri Bethi Venkateswarlu, learned counsel appearing for the respondent filed counter affidavit to the IA. While denying the averments made in the affidavit filed in support of delay condonation petition by the petitioners/appellants, contended that after passing of the order and decree on 05-05-2023, even after lapse of more than one year, as the petitioners have neither complied with the order and decree nor filed any Appeal, but the claimant filed E.P.No.345 of 2024 on 04-07-2024 and the Tribunal issued notice to the J.DRs. on 25-09-2024 and after service of notices, the Corporation filed vakalatnama on 28-11-2024. The matter was adjourned to 10-01-2025 for filing counter by the Corporation. 8. Learned counsel for the respondent further contended that the matter underwent adjournments on 3 occasions on administrative reasons and later the matter was adjourned to 23-04-2025 for filing counter, on which date, the petitioners have neither filed counter affidavit nor there was any stay order even after lapse of 140 days. Therefore, the Tribunal adjourned the matter to 27-06-2025 and directed the J.DRs to pay costs of Rs.65,000/-. 9. Learned counsel for the respondent further contended that without complying with the docket orders passed on 23-04-2025 directing the J.DRs to pay costs of Rs.65,000/-, the petitioners/appellants have filed the present M.A.C.M.A.No.658 of 2025 on 09-06-2025 by suppressing the proceedings which are pending in E.P.No.345 of 2024 as well as filing of Vakalatnama by the Corporation on 28-11-2024 contrary to the averments made in the affidavit filed in support of I.A.No.2 of 2025 by the petitioners/appellant that the file was sent to the Standing Counsel in the month of December, 2023 for drafting grounds of appeal, and therefore prayed that the application to condone the delay is liable to be dismissed. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sheo Raj Singh (Deceased) through Legal Representatives and others Vs. Union of India and others , [ (2023) 10 SCC 531 ] . 10. Learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sheo Raj Singh (Deceased) through Legal Representatives and others Vs. Union of India and others , [ (2023) 10 SCC 531 ] . In the said case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that it would be improper to put the State on the same footing as an individual since it is an impersonal machinery operating through its officers, factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. 11. However, in the same judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court further observed that for sufficient cause to receive liberal treatment, the same must fall within reasonable time and through proper conduct of the party concerned. For such an application for condonation to be seen in a positive light, the same should be bona fide, based on true and plausible explanations, and should reflect the normal conduct of a common prudent man, and the explained delay should be clearly understood in contradiction to inordinate unexplained delay to warranting a condonation. 12. A perusal of the above judgment carefully, it further states that what counted was indeed the sufficiency of the cause of delay, and not the length, where the shortness of delay would be considered when using extraordinary discretion to condone the same, and the Court should attempt to decide a case on its merits, unless the same is hopelessly without any merit. 13. In order to receive a liberal treatment, the sufficient cause must fall within the reasonable time. In the instant case, right from passing of the Award by the Tribunal on 05-05-2023, filing of the certified copy is made after delay of 4 months. Even after the copy was made ready on 29-09-2023, it took more than 3 months’ time to send the same to Legal Cell for taking appropriate action. After the instructions from the Head Office, the file was sent to the then learned Standing Counsel in December 2023 to draft the appeal, meanwhile there was more than 9 months when it was lying with the office of the then learned Standing Counsel for drafting the Appeal. Further, even after the resignation of the then learned Standing Counsel in September, 2024, the Appeal was presented in the month of June, 2025. 14. Further, even after the resignation of the then learned Standing Counsel in September, 2024, the Appeal was presented in the month of June, 2025. 14. This Court observed that at every stage, there is negligence, inaction and lack of bona fides on the part of the petitioners/appellants, which cannot be liberally interpreted for condonation of delay and the appellants-Corporation has failed to establish sufficient cause. 15. With due respect to the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel petitioners/appellants is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. 16. Learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Majji Sannemma alias Sanyasirao Vs. Reddy Sridevi and others , [ (2021) 18 SCC 384 ] , wherein the Apex Court considering the judgments passed in Ramlal Vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. , [AIR 1962 SC 1961] P.K. Ramachandran Vs. State of Kerala , [ (1997) 7 SCC 556 ] , Pundlik Jalam Patil Vs. Jalgaon Medium Project , [(2008) 17 SC 448] and Basawaraj Vs LAO , [ (2013) 14 SCC 81 ] held that applying the law laid down in the aforesaid decisions to the facts of the case on hand and considering the averments in the application for condonation of delay, it was of the opinion that as such no explanation much less a sufficient or a satisfactory explanation had been offered for condoning the huge delay in preferring the Appeal. 17. Learned counsel for the petitioner also placed reliance upon the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court passed in I.A.No.1 of 2025 in COMCA No.1 of 2025 dated 25-07-2025, wherein it was held that Section 13 of the COMMERCIAL COURTS ACT , 2015 relates to filing of appeals from decrees of Commercial Courts and Commercial Divisions, Section 13 (1A) provides that any person aggrieved by the judgment or decree of a Commercial Court or from a Commercial Division of a High Court may file an appeal to the Commercial Appellate Division of the High Court within a period of sixty days from the date of the judgment or decree. The Division Bench while dealing with the issue elaborately for condonation of delay of 514 days, held that one of the grounds for passing the impugned order was whether the appellant’s claim was barred by limitation. The Division Bench while dealing with the issue elaborately for condonation of delay of 514 days, held that one of the grounds for passing the impugned order was whether the appellant’s claim was barred by limitation. The Commercial Court after considering the facts, answered the issue against the appellant and in favour of the respondent No.1 therein, and thus, it is all the more difficult to accept that the appellant would slip into a slumber for 514 days after having suffered an order, inter alia, on the ground of delay, thereby the Division Bench held that it does not find any reason, satisfactory or otherwise in condoning the delay of 514 days in filing of the Commercial Court Appeal. 18. It is settled proposition of law that in exercise of discretion under Section 5 of the LIMITATION ACT , 1963 empowers the Court concerned to entertain an appeal or application beyond the prescribed period of limitation subject to the Court being satisfied of the sufficiency of cause shown by the parties. The cause shown must be such that the overreaching requirement to advance the cause of substantial justice overweighs the appellant’s shortfall in filing the appeal within the prescribed period of limitation. The ‘sufficient’ cause must reflect a sense of purpose and a willingness to restore diligence. The reasons shown cannot be casual or lackadaisical so as to demand condonation as a matter of entitlement. It must be borne in mind that delay may have created equity in favour of another in the interregnum. 19. It is being contended that the Courts should be liberal in condoning the delay. However, even assuming the Corporations are Government entities, they cannot be put on a pedestal with privileged timelines which would be evident from the underlying objective of special statutes which contemplate fixed timelines, and more particularly the Acts are entity-neutral in terms of limit action period. 20. In the present case, even when we tried to understand the administrative delay, at every stage the delay is apparent on the face of record apart from negligence, lack of bona fides on the part of the Corporation. 20. In the present case, even when we tried to understand the administrative delay, at every stage the delay is apparent on the face of record apart from negligence, lack of bona fides on the part of the Corporation. We are surprised to note that despite having efficient legal Cell and Expert legal team headed by the learned Standing Counsel, the Corporation deliberately suppressed the factum of pendency of EP proceedings before the Tribunal, and it is only after issuance of notice and filing of vakalatnama by the learned Standing Counsel appearing for the Corporation on 28-11-2024 in E.P.No.345 of 2024 and after trial Court imposing costs of Rs.65,000/- on the petitioners-Corporation, then only knocked the doors of this Court in the month of June, 2025 by filing the present Appeal. 21. Therefore, we are unable to appreciate the suppression by the Corporation, who ought to have been a model employer with a larger heart. 22. Hence, we do not find any reason, satisfactory or otherwise, in condoning of the delay of 629 days in filing the present Appeal. 23. I.A.No.2 of 2025 is accordingly dismissed for the reasons stated above. Consequently, MACMA No.658 of 2025 stands rejected. There shall be no order as to costs.