ORDER: Criminal Revision Case has been preferred under Sections 397 and 401 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for brevity ‘the Cr.P.C.,’) feeling aggrieved by the order of declining to discharge the Petitioner/Accused No.2, vide order dated 11.03.2025 in Crl.M.P.No.31 of 2025 in S.C.No.47 of 2023 on the file of the learned III Additional District and Sessions Judge, Ongole, for the alleged offences punishable under Sections 143, 147, 120-B, 323, 341 and 302 read with 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short ‘the I.P.C.,’). 2. Sri Posani Venkateswarlu, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of Sri P.Sai Surya Teja, learned Counsel for the Petitioner while reiterating the grounds of the Revision, argued that the impugned order of discharge passed by the learned Magistrate is patently illegal, improper, and contrary to the settled principles of criminal jurisprudence. The learned Additional Sessions Judge committed a manifest error in declining to consider the discharge petition filed under Section 227 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ solely on the ground that the petitioner had previously invoked the revisional jurisdiction challenging the cognizance order passed by the learned Additional Judicial First-Class Magistrate under Section 190 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ which was dismissed. The rejection of the earlier revision does not preclude the petitioner from seeking discharge under Section 227 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ as both proceedings are governed by distinct legal parameters. It is well settled that the scope of consideration under Section 190 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ by the learned Judicial First- Class Magistrate (committal court), which acts upon the police report under Section 173 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ is materially different from the judicial scrutiny required under Section 227 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ by the learned Trial Court. While the committal court merely examines whether the allegations prima facie disclose the commission of an offence, the Sessions Court, under Section 227 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ is obligated to evaluate the entire material accompanying the charge sheet and, after affording an opportunity of hearing to the accused, determine whether sufficient grounds exist to proceed to trial. If no such grounds are found, the accused must be discharged. 3. It is further argued that the learned Sessions Judge failed to assign cogent reasons for rejecting the discharge petition, which is a mandatory requirement under Section 227 of ‘the Cr.P.C.’ The absence of such reasoning renders the order unsustainable in law. If no such grounds are found, the accused must be discharged. 3. It is further argued that the learned Sessions Judge failed to assign cogent reasons for rejecting the discharge petition, which is a mandatory requirement under Section 227 of ‘the Cr.P.C.’ The absence of such reasoning renders the order unsustainable in law. Further, the learned Sessions Judge failed to appreciate that the petitioner’s alleged involvement in the offence is not supported by any credible material. The initial witnesses expressed uncertainty regarding the petitioner’s presence at the scene, while others categorically denied his involvement. In light of these contradictions, the investigating agency rightly omitted the petitioner’s name from the final charge sheet. 4. Learned Senior Counsel furthermore argued that the petitioner, being a Mandal Revenue Officer (MRO), was stationed far from the locus delicti and falsely implicated due to intra-family disputes among the complainant’s relatives. The learned Additional Sessions Judge ought to have taken judicial notice of this context. Moreover, the statements of LW.6, LW.7, and LW.13, who were examined as eyewitnesses, do not contain any identification of the petitioner. Even the confessional statements of the co-accused are silent with respect to the petitioner’s alleged role, thereby negating any inference of complicity. 5. In view of the above, the learned Additional Sessions Judge failed to appreciate that the prosecution had not adduced any substantive evidence or material to establish a prima facie case against the petitioner. The continuation of proceedings against the petitioner amounts to abuse of process and warrants judicial interference and urged to set aside it. 6. On the other hand, Ms. P.Akhila Naidu, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor would argue that the learned Trial Court had rightly appreciated the material available. There was no flagrant miscarriage of justice. There were no perverse findings. There was no irregularity let alone material irregularity. The order impugned is not vitiated by manifest error of law or procedure which had resulted in miscarriage of justice. The impugned order doesn’t suffer from any illegality or infirmity. Hence, it is urged to dismiss the criminal revision case. 7. Thoughtful consideration is bestowed on the arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for both sides. I have perused the entire record. 8. The impugned order doesn’t suffer from any illegality or infirmity. Hence, it is urged to dismiss the criminal revision case. 7. Thoughtful consideration is bestowed on the arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for both sides. I have perused the entire record. 8. Now the point for consideration is: “Whether the order in Crl.M.P.No.31 of 2025 in S.C.No.47 of 2023 dated 11.03.2025, passed by the learned III Additional District and Sessions Judge, Ongole, is correct, legal, and proper with respect to its finding, sentence, or judgment, and there are any material irregularities?And to what relief?” 9. In Hareram Satpathy v. Tikaram Agarwala (1978) 4 SCC 58 , a judgment relied on by the learned Senior Counsel, it is held at para No.12 as follows: “12. Before parting with the case we wish to observe that the grievance of the respondents that there is no material to support the faked and cooked up story against them is taken care of [as held in Sanjay Gandhi v. Union of India [ (1978) 2 SCC 39 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 172] to which one of us (Jaswant Singh, J.) was a party] by Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 under which it is open to the Court of Session on committal of the case to it to discharge the accused if upon consideration of the record of the case and documents submitted therewith and after hearing the submissions of the parties it considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The respondents would therefore be at liberty to invoke the provisions of Section 227 of the Code on the case being committed to the Court of Session.” 10. Merely because the Petitioner on earlier occasion had invoked the revisional jurisdiction of this Court challenging the order of cognizance taken by the learned Magistrate under Section 190 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ and the Criminal Revision Case was dismissed, the said order of dismissal of earlier revision case would not preclude the Petitioner from filing a petition seeking discharge under Section 227 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ since the two provisions namely Section 190 and 227 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ are founded on distant legal parameters. The scope under Section 190 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ is based upon the police report filed under Section 173 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ or other material produced by the complainant. The scope under Section 190 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ is based upon the police report filed under Section 173 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ or other material produced by the complainant. Whereas the judicial scrutiny required under Section 227 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ by the learned Additional Sessions Judge is altogether different. 11. Indeed, the committal court merely examines whether the allegations, prima facie, discloses the commission of the offence. Further, the learned Additional Sessions Judge while invoking powers under Section 227 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ is duty bound to evaluate the entire material filed with police report and after affording an opportunity of being heard and determine whether sufficient grounds existed to proceed with trial. The accused is required to be discharged, when no such grounds are found. As seen from the impugned order, the learned Additional Sessions Judge failed to assign any reasons, let alone valid and sustainable reasons for dismissing the discharge petition. Non-mentioning of the reasons for dismissing the discharge petition simply because on earlier occasion this Court dismissed the Criminal Revision Case filed by the Petitioner, when cognizance was taken against the Petitioner by the learned Magistrate under Section 190 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ vitiates the impugned order. Since the learned Additional Sessions Judge had not assigned any reasons for dismissing the discharge petition, it would be proper to set aside the discharge order and direct the learned Additional Sessions Judge to pass an order afresh assigning cogent reasons under Section 227 of ‘the Cr.P.C.’ Hence the appreciation of the contention of the Petitioner about his alleged involvement in the offence is not proper and prudent while remanding back the case for fresh consideration. 12. In Hareram Satpathy ’s case also police took up the investigation on receipt of report from the complainant therein and on completion of investigation filed chargesheet, deleted the names of the respondents therein as no offence appeared to have been made out against them, but on a complaint filed by the Appellant therein, the learned Jurisdictional Magistrate found a prima face case under Section 302 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ against the respondents also and therefore directed the issuance of NBW. On revision, at the instance of the respondents, the High court set aside the order of the learned Magistrate. On revision, at the instance of the respondents, the High court set aside the order of the learned Magistrate. However, the Hon’ble Apex Court found fault with the order of the High Court quoting the observations made by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Nagawwa v. V.S. Konjalgi (1976) 3 SCC 736 , wherein at para No.5, it is held as under: “5. Mr Bhandare laid great stress on the words “the truth or falsehood of the complaint” and contended that in determining whether the complaint is false the court can go into the question of the broad probabilities of the case or intrinsic infirmities appearing in the evidence. It is true that in coming to a decision as to whether a process should be issued the Magistrate can take into consideration inherent improbabilities appearing on the face of the complaint or in the evidence led by the complainant in support of the allegations but there appears to be a very thin line of demarcation between a probability of conviction of the accused and establishment of a prima facie case against him. The Magistratehas been given an undoubteddiscretion in the matter and the discretion has to be judicially exercised by him. Once the Magistrate has exercised his discretion it is not for the High Court, or even this Court, to substitute its own discretion for that of the Magistrate or to examine the case on merits with a view to find out whether or not the allegations in the complaint, if proved, would ultimately end in conviction of the accused. These considerations, in our opinion, are totally foreign to the scope and ambit of an inquiry under Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which culminates into an order under Section 204 of the Code. These considerations, in our opinion, are totally foreign to the scope and ambit of an inquiry under Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which culminates into an order under Section 204 of the Code. Thus it may be safely held that in the following cases an order of the Magistrate issuing process against the accused can be quashed or setaside: (1) where the allegations made in the complaint or the statements of the witnesses recorded in support of the same taken at their face value make out absolutely no case against the accused or the complaint does not disclose the essential ingredients of an offence which is alleged againsttheaccused; (2) where the allegations made in the complaint are patently absurd and inherently improbable so that no prudent person can ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused; (3)wherethe discretion exercised bytheMagistrate in issuing processis capricious and arbitrary having been based either on no evidence or on materials which arewholly irrelevant or inadmissible; and (4) where the complaint suffers from fundamental legal defects, such as, want of sanction, or absence of a complaint by legally competent authorityand thelike.” 13. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Hareram Satpathy ’s case observed that the High Court had exceeded its jurisdiction in setting aside the order of the learned Jurisdictional Magistrate as the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court was very limited and the High Court could not launch a detailed examination of the case on merits. 14. It is pertinent to point out that the order of dismissal of Crl.R.C.No.2811/2017 filed at the behest of the Petitioner was only detailing with the validity of the order of the learned Jurisdictional Magistrate in proceeding against the Petitioner, Accused No.5 and Accused No.9 as prima facie there was a material to proceed against them. The observations of the learned Single Judge while dismissing the Criminal Revision Case was pertaining to the validity of the order of cognizance taken by the Magistrate under Section 190 of ‘the Cr.P.C.’ As mentioned supra, the parameters for evaluation of the cases under Section 190 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ and Section 227 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ are altogether different. 15. The observations of the learned Single Judge while dismissing the Criminal Revision Case was pertaining to the validity of the order of cognizance taken by the Magistrate under Section 190 of ‘the Cr.P.C.’ As mentioned supra, the parameters for evaluation of the cases under Section 190 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ and Section 227 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ are altogether different. 15. In this regard, it is apposite and profitable to refer the decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Mona Panwar v. High Court of Judicature of Allahabad (2011) 3 SCC 496 , wherein at para Nos.9 & 10 it is held as under: “19. The phrase “taking cognizance of” means cognizance of an offence and not of the offender. Taking cognizance does not involve any formal action or indeed action of any kind but occurs as soon as a Magistrate applies his mind to the suspected commission of an offence. Cognizance, therefore, takes place at a point when a Magistrate first takes judicial notice of an offence. This is the position whether the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence on a complaint or on a police report or upon information of a person other than a police officer. Before the Magistrate can be said to have taken cognizance of an offence under Section 190(1)(b) of the Code, he must have not only applied his mind to the contents of the complaint presented before him but must have done so for the purpose of proceeding under Section 200 and the provisions following that section. However, when the Magistrate had applied his mind only for ordering an investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code or issued a warrant for the purposes of investigation, he cannotbesaid tohavetakencognizance of anoffence. 20. Taking cognizance is a different thing from initiation of the proceedings. One of the objects of examination of the complainant and his witnesses as mentioned in Section 200 of the Code is to ascertain whether there is prima facie case against the person accused of the offence in the complaint and to prevent the issue of process on a complaint which is either false or vexatious or intended only to harass such person. Such examination is provided, therefore, to find out whetherthereis or not sufficient groundforproceeding further.” 16. Such examination is provided, therefore, to find out whetherthereis or not sufficient groundforproceeding further.” 16. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Chief Enforcement Officer v. Videocon International Ltd. (2008) 2 SCC 492 , at para Nos.19 & 20 it is held as under: “19. The expression “cognizance” has not been defined in the Code. But theword(cognizance) is of indefinite import. Ithas noesoteric or mystic significance in criminal law. It merely means “become aware of” and when used with reference to a court or a Judge, it connotes “to take notice of judicially”. It indicates the point when a court or a Magistrate takes judicial notice of an offence with a view to initiating proceedings in respect of such offence said to have been committed by someone. 20. “Taking cognizance” does not involve any formal action of any kind. It occurs as soon as a Magistrate applies his mind to the suspected commission of an offence. Cognizance is taken prior to commencement of criminal proceedings. Taking of cognizance is thus a sine qua non or condition precedent for holding a valid trial. Cognizance is taken of an offence and not of an offender. Whether or not a Magistrate has taken cognizance of an offence depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and no rule of universal application can be laid down as to whenaMagistrate canbe saidtohavetakencognizance.” 17. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Fakhruddin Ahmad v. State of Uttaranchal (2008) 17 SCC 157 , at para Nos.13 & 14, it is held as under: “13. The next incidental question is as to what is meant by the expression “taking cognizance of an offence” by a Magistrate within the contemplation of Section 190 of the Code? 14. The expression “cognizance” is not defined in the Code but is a word of indefinite import. As observed by this Court in Ajit Kumar Palit v. State of W.B. [ AIR 1963 SC 765 : 1963 Supp (1) SCR 953] : (AIR p. 770, para 19) “19. … The word ‘cognizance’ has no esoteric or mystic significance in criminal law or procedure. It merely means— become aware of and when used with reference to a court or Judge, to take notice of judicially.” Approving the observations of the Calcutta High Court in Emperor v. Sourindra Mohan Chuckerbutty [ILR (1910)37 Cal 412] (at ILRp. … The word ‘cognizance’ has no esoteric or mystic significance in criminal law or procedure. It merely means— become aware of and when used with reference to a court or Judge, to take notice of judicially.” Approving the observations of the Calcutta High Court in Emperor v. Sourindra Mohan Chuckerbutty [ILR (1910)37 Cal 412] (at ILRp. 416),the Court said that “taking cognizance does not involve any formal action, or indeed action of any kind, but occurs as soon as a Magistrate, as such, applies his mind to the suspected commission of anoffence.”” 18. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal, AIR 1979 SC 366 at para Nos.7 to 10 it is held as under: “7.Section 227 of the Code runs thus:-"If, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing." The words 'not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused' clearly show that the Judge is not a mere post-office to frame the charge at the behest of the prosecution, but has to exercise his judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by theprosecution. In assessing this fact, it is not necessary for the court to enter into the pro sand cons of the matter or in to a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really his function after the trial starts. At the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The sufficiency of ground would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him. The sufficiency of ground would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him. 8.The scope of Section 227 of the Code was considered by a recent decision of this Court in the case of State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh, (1978) 1 SCR 257 : ( AIR 1977 SC 2018 ) where Untwalia J. speaking for the Court observed as follows (at p. 2019):-"Strong suspicion against the accused,if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the Court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the Court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stages is not in the sense of the law governing the trial of criminal cases in France where the accused is presumed to be guilty unless the contrary is proved. But it is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the Court should proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial." This Court has thus held that whereas strong suspicion may not take the place of the proof at the trial stage, yet it may be sufficient for the satisfaction of the Sessions Judge in order to frame a charge against the accused. Even under the Code of 1898 this Court has held that a committing Magistrate had ample powers to weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a case of commitment to the Sessions Judge has been made out. Even under the Code of 1898 this Court has held that a committing Magistrate had ample powers to weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a case of commitment to the Sessions Judge has been made out. 9.In the case of K. P. Raghavan v. M. H. Abbas, AIR 1967 SC 740 this Court observed as follows (at p. 742):-"No doubt a Magistrate enquiring into a case under S. 209, Cr. P. C. is not to act as a mere Post Office, and has to come to a conclusion whether the case before him is fit for commitment of the accused to the Court of Session".To the same effect is the later decision of this Court in the case of Alamohan Das v. State of West Bengal, (1969) 2 SCR 520 : (AIR SC 863) where Shah, J. speaking for the Court observed as follows (at p. 866) :-"A Magistrate holding an enquiry is not intended to act merely as a recording machine. He is entitled to sift and weigh the materials on record, but only for seeing whether there is sufficient evidence for commitment, and not whether there is sufficient evidence for conviction. If there is no prima facie evidence or the evidence is totally unworthy of credit, it is his duty to discharge the accused : if there is some evidence on which a conviction may reasonably be based, he must commit the case."In the aforesaid case this Court was considering the scope and ambit of Section 209 of the Codeof 1898. 10.Thus, on a consideration of the authorities mentioned above, the following principles emerge:(1) That the Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 of the Code has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out;(2) Where the materials placed before the Court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained the Court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial.(3) The test of determine a prima facie case would naturally depend upon the facts of each case and it is difficult to lay down a rule of universal application. By and large however if two views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion against the accused, he will be fully within his right to discharge the accused.(4) That in exercising his jurisdiction under Section 227 of the Code the Judge which under the present Code is a senior and experienced Court cannot act merely as a Post-Office or a mouth-piece of the prosecution, but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the Court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. This however does not mean that the Judge should make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial.” 19. The Hon’ble Apex Court in P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala (2010) 2 SCC 398 , at para No.11 it is held as under: “11. At the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. In other words, the sufficiency of ground would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him.” 20. The Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao (2023) 17 SCC 688 , at para Nos.7 & 10 it is held as under: “Discussion and findings 7. It is trite law that application of judicial mind being necessary to determine whether a case has been made out by the prosecution for proceeding with trial and it would not be necessary to dwell into the pros and cons of the matter by examining the defence of the accused when an application for discharge is filed. At that stage, the trial Judge has to merely examine the evidence placed by the prosecution in order to determine whether or not the grounds are sufficient to proceed against the accused on basis of charge-sheet material. At that stage, the trial Judge has to merely examine the evidence placed by the prosecution in order to determine whether or not the grounds are sufficient to proceed against the accused on basis of charge-sheet material. The nature of the evidence recorded or collected by the investigating agency or the documents produced in which prima facie it reveals that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused, so as to frame a charge would suffice and such material would be taken into account for the purposes of framing the charge. If there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused necessarily, the accused would be discharged, but if the court is of the opinion, after such consideration of the material there are grounds for presuming that the accused has committed the offence which is triable, then necessarily charge has to be framed. 10. It is settled principle of law that at the stage of considering an application for discharge the court must proceed on an assumption that thematerial which has been brought on record by the prosecution is true and evaluate said material in order to determine whether the facts emerging from the material taken on its face value, disclose the existence of the ingredients necessary of the offence alleged.” 21. The Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Rajasthan v. Ashok Kumar Kashyap , (2021) 11 SCC 191 at para No.11.1 it is held as under: “11.1. In P. Vijayan [P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala, (2010) 2 SCC 398 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1488] , this Court had an occasion to consider Section 227 CrPC What is required to be considered at the time of framing of the charge and/or considering the discharge application has been considered elaborately in the said decision. It is observed and held that at the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. It is observed that in other words, the sufficiency of grounds would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him. It is observed that in other words, the sufficiency of grounds would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him. It is further observed that if the Judge comes to a conclusion that there is sufficient ground to proceed, he will frame a charge under Section 228 CrPC, if not, he will discharge the accused. It is further observed that while exercising its judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution, it is not necessary for the court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really the function of the court, after the trial starts.” 22. Upon careful consideration of the submissions made by both parties and perusal of the record, this Court finds that the order passed by the learned Trial Court suffers from procedural irregularity and lacks a reasoned analysis of the material placed before it. The learned Additional District Judge, while rejecting the discharge petition, has not adequately addressed the specific contentions raised by the petitioner nor has it recorded cogent reasons demonstrating application of judicial mind to the facts and circumstances of the case. The order appears to be cryptic and mechanical, failing to reflect the rationale behind the decision to frame charges. 23. It is well settled that while exercising jurisdiction under Section 227 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ the learned Trial Court is required to consider whether the material on record, if unrebutted, would reasonably lead to a conviction. Though a detailed evaluation of evidence is not warranted at this stage, the learned Court must nonetheless indicate the basis for its satisfaction that a prima facie case exists. In the present case, the absence of such reasoning renders the impugned order vulnerable to judicial scrutiny. The principles of natural justice and fair trial demand that the accused be informed of the grounds on which the learned Court proceeds to frame charges, especially when a discharge is sought. 24. In view of the above, this Court is of the considered opinion that the matter deserves to be remanded back. The principles of natural justice and fair trial demand that the accused be informed of the grounds on which the learned Court proceeds to frame charges, especially when a discharge is sought. 24. In view of the above, this Court is of the considered opinion that the matter deserves to be remanded back. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 11.03.2025 in Crl.M.P.No.31 of 2025 in S.C.No.47 of 2023 passed by the learned III Additional District and Sessions Judge, Ongole is set aside. The matter is remanded back to the learned Trial Court for fresh consideration and disposal of the discharge petition in accordance with law. The learned Trial Court shall make endeavour to pass a reasoned order after affording opportunity of hearing of both the parties and upon considering material available on record, within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of this order. 25. With the above observations and directions, this Criminal Revision Case is disposed of. No order as to costs. As a sequel, interlocutory applications, if any pending, shall stand closed.