JUDGMENT : Mitali Thakuria, J. Heard Mr. M. G. Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Ms. T. Jini, learned Additional Public Prosecutor representing the State respondent No. 1 and Mr. T. Tagum, learned counsel for the respondent No.2. 2. This is an application filed under Section 439 (2) read with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, praying for setting aside the bail order dated 20.06.2024 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Lower Subansiri District, Ziro in Crl. Misc. Bail Application No. 27/2024 (Z). 3. The brief facts leading to the filing of the present petition is that: On 23.03.2023 at 07:00 hours, written information was received from one Tasso Lajee, S/o Shri Tasso Bida, resident of Village Hari, PO/PS Ziro, District Lower Subansiri, alleging that his uncle, namely Shri Tasso Grayu, had been stabbed in the chest at around 8:40 PM on 22.03.2023. As a result, the victim was severely injured and admitted to Gyati Taka General Hospital, Hapoli. Accordingly, upon receipt of the written information, a case was registered as Ziro P.S Case No. 08/23 under Sections 302/341 of IPC. Later, on 24.03.2023, the victim, Tasso Grayu, succumbed to his injuries while being taken to Guwahati for treatment. 4. Thereafter, the investigating agency arrested the accused along with his son, Shri Nami Rakesh, from Banderdewa on 30.03.2023. During interrogation, the accused, Nani Chatung, confessed to having stabbed Late Tasso Grayu on the night of the incident. Following investigation, a charge sheet was filed on 02.06.2023, and charges were subsequently framed against the accused under Sections 302/201 of IPC. Three witnesses have been examined so far, out of which the statements of two witnesses, i.e. P.W. Nos. 1 & 2 have already been recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C., both of them directly implicated the accused in the incident. 5. Subsequently, the accused/respondent No. 2 approached the learned Sessions Judge, Lower Subansiri District, with an application under Section 439 of Cr.P.C. for grant of bail in connection with Ziro P.S. Case No. 08/2023. After hearing the arguments from both parties, the accused/respondent No. 2 was granted bail vide the impugned order dated 20.06.2024. 5. Subsequently, the accused/respondent No. 2 approached the learned Sessions Judge, Lower Subansiri District, with an application under Section 439 of Cr.P.C. for grant of bail in connection with Ziro P.S. Case No. 08/2023. After hearing the arguments from both parties, the accused/respondent No. 2 was granted bail vide the impugned order dated 20.06.2024. The learned Sessions Judge failed to take into consideration the role played by the accused in committing the crime and also ignored the fact that the accused shared information regarding the incident with his two sisters, i.e. P.W. 1 & 2 and with his son, Shri Nami Radhe @ Rakesh, who is also one of the listed witnesses. The learned Sessions Judge conducted a mini-trial while hearing the petition under Section 439 Cr.P.C., thereby arriving at an erroneous finding and granting bail to the accused. 6. Mr. Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that there is a high likelihood of the accused threatening the witnesses who are yet to be examined in this case. Moreover, one of the eyewitnesses to the crime has not yet been examined, and there is every probability that the accused, if allowed to remain on bail, may influence the said witness. The learned Sessions Judge also overlooked the relevant provisions of law and acted in contravention of the directions laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court regarding the grant of bail in cases involving heinous offences where the sentence may extend to 10 (ten) years, life imprisonment, or even the death penalty. The High Court has inherent powers and discretion to cancel or set aside bail granted to an accused, even in the absence of supervening circumstances, if the following principles have been overlooked while granting bail: I. Where past criminal record and conduct of the accused is completely ignored while granting bail. II. Where bail has been granted on untenable grounds. III. Where serious discrepancies are found in the order granting bail thereby causing prejudice to justice. IV. Where the grant of bail was not appropriate in the first place given the very serious nature of the charges against the accused which disentitles him for bail and thus cannot be justified. V. When the order granting bail is apparently whimsical, capricious and perverse in the facts of the given case. VI. IV. Where the grant of bail was not appropriate in the first place given the very serious nature of the charges against the accused which disentitles him for bail and thus cannot be justified. V. When the order granting bail is apparently whimsical, capricious and perverse in the facts of the given case. VI. Where the court granting bail takes into account irrelevant material of substantial nature and not trivial nature while ignoring relevant material on record. 7. Mr. Singh submitted that while granting bail, the learned Sessions Judge failed to consider the high probability of tampering with witnesses and also neglected to take into account the seriousness and gravity of the offence. Despite these omissions, the learned Judge proceeded to pass the bail order in favour of the accused/respondent No. 2. Accordingly, he submits that, in view of the facts and circumstances of the present case, the petitioner/informant has preferred this application seeking cancellation of bail by invoking the power under Section 439(2) of Cr.P.C. read with Section 482 of Cr.P.C., in order to prevent abuse of the process of law and to secure the ends of justice. 8. He further submitted that P.W. 1 and P.W. 2, who are relatives of the accused/respondent No. 2, have clearly stated that the accused committed the murder of the victim by stabbing him. However, the learned Sessions Judge failed to consider the statements of the said P.Ws, and also overlooked the fact that one of the eyewitnesses had not yet been examined at the time of granting bail. It is contended that, although there are no supervening circumstances in the present case, bail can still be cancelled if there exists any reasonable likelihood of the accused tampering with witnesses or any other circumstance that may result in injustice to the victim or informant. 9. To support his submissions, Mr. Singh relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Neeru Yadav vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. reported in (2014) 16 SCC 508 , and particularly emphasized paragraphs 9, 12, and 16 of the said judgment, which read as under: “9. 9. To support his submissions, Mr. Singh relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Neeru Yadav vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. reported in (2014) 16 SCC 508 , and particularly emphasized paragraphs 9, 12, and 16 of the said judgment, which read as under: “9. In this context, a fruitful reference be made to the pronouncement in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh[1], wherein this Court has observed that grant of bail though discretionary in nature, yet such exercise cannot be arbitrary, capricious and injudicious, for the heinous nature of the crime warrants more caution and there is greater change of rejection of bail, though, however dependant on the factual matrix of the matter. In the said decision, reference was made to Prahlad Singh Bhati v. NCT, Delhi[2] and the Court opined thus: "(a) While granting bail the court has to keep in mind not only the nature of the accusations, but the severity of the punishment, if the accusation entails a conviction and the nature of evidence in support of the accusations. (b) Reasonable apprehensions of the witnesses being tampered with or the apprehension of there being a threat for the complainant should also weigh with the court in the matter of grant of bail. (c) While it is not expected to have the entire evidence establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt but there ought always to be a prima facie satisfaction of the court in support of the charge. [pic] (d) Frivolity in prosecution should always be considered and it is only the element of genuineness that shall have to be considered in the matter of grant of bail, and in the event of there being some doubt as to the genuineness of the prosecution, in the normal course of events, the accused is entitled to an order of bail." 12. We have referred to certain principles to be kept in mind while granting bail, as has been laid down by this Court from time to time. It is well settled in law that cancellation of bail after it is granted because the accused has misconducted himself or of some supervening circumstances warranting such cancellation have occurred is in a different compartment altogether than an order granting bail which is unjustified, illegal and perverse. It is well settled in law that cancellation of bail after it is granted because the accused has misconducted himself or of some supervening circumstances warranting such cancellation have occurred is in a different compartment altogether than an order granting bail which is unjustified, illegal and perverse. If in a case, the relevant factors which should have been taken into consideration while dealing with the application for bail and have not been taken note of bail or it is founded on irrelevant considerations, indisputably the superior court can set aside the order of such a grant of bail. Such a case belongs to a different category and is in a separate realm. While dealing with a case of second nature, the Court does not dwell upon the violation of conditions by the accused or the supervening circumstances that have happened subsequently. It, on the contrary, delves into the justifiability and the soundness of the order passed by the Court. 16. The issue that is presented before us is whether this Court can annul the order passed by the High Court and curtail the liberty of the 2nd respondent. We are not oblivious of the fact that the liberty is a priceless treasure for a human being. It is founded on the bed rock of constitutional right and accentuated further on human rights principle. It is basically a natural right. In fact, some regard it as the grammar of life. No one would like to lose his liberty or barter it for all the wealth of the world. People from centuries have fought for liberty, for absence of liberty causes sense of emptiness. The sanctity of liberty is the fulcrum of any civilized society. It is a cardinal value on which the civilisation rests. It cannot be allowed to be paralysed and immobilized. Deprivation of liberty of a person has enormous impact on his mind as well as body. A democratic body polity which is wedded to rule of law, anxiously guards liberty. But, a pregnant and significant one, the liberty of an individual is not absolute. The society by its collective wisdom through process of law can withdraw the liberty that it has sanctioned to an individual when an individual becomes a danger to the collective and to the societal order. Accent on individual liberty cannot be pyramided to that extent which would bring chaos and anarchy to a society. The society by its collective wisdom through process of law can withdraw the liberty that it has sanctioned to an individual when an individual becomes a danger to the collective and to the societal order. Accent on individual liberty cannot be pyramided to that extent which would bring chaos and anarchy to a society. A society expects responsibility and accountability from the member, and it desires that the citizens should obey the law, respecting it as a cherished social norm. No individual can make an attempt to create a concavity in the stem of social stream. It is impermissible. Therefore, when an individual behaves in a disharmonious manner ushering in disorderly things which the society disapproves, the legal consequences are bound to follow. At that stage, the Court has a duty. It cannot abandon its sacrosanct obligation and pass an order at its own whim or caprice. It has to be guided by the established parameters of law.” 10. Mr. Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner, also cited the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ajwar vs. Waseem & Anr. , reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 974, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court expressed the view that “it well settled that bail once granted, ought not to be cancelled in a mechanical manner. However, an unreasoned or perverse order of bail is always open to interference by the superior Court. If there are serious allegations against the accused, even if he has not misused the bail granted to him, such an order can be cancelled by the same Court that has granted the bail. Bail can also be revoked by a superior Court if it transpires that the courts below have ignored the relevant material available on record or not looked into the gravity of the offence or the impact on the society resulting in such an order”. 11. In paragraph 33 of the aforesaid judgment [ Ajwar (supra)], the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that bail cannot be considered in cases involving offences of a serious nature, such as murder, where the accused/respondents have remained in custody for less than three years. The Court emphasized that the gravity of the offence must be given due weight, particularly in heinous crimes, and mere duration of custody is not a sufficient ground for grant of bail. 12. In that context, Mr. The Court emphasized that the gravity of the offence must be given due weight, particularly in heinous crimes, and mere duration of custody is not a sufficient ground for grant of bail. 12. In that context, Mr. Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner, also cited the decision rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Deepak Yadav vs. State of U.P. & Anr. , [Criminal Appeal No. 861 of 2022 (arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 9655 of 2021)], and placed reliance on paragraphs 21, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 30 and 31 of the said judgment. Paragraph 23 of the said judgment reads as under: “23. In a recent pronouncement of this Court in the case of 'Y' Vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr." authored by one of us (Hon'ble N.V. Ramana, CJI), it has been observed as under :- 22. The impugned order passed by the High Court is cryptic, and does not suggest any application of mind. There is a recent trend of passing such orders granting or refusing to grant bail, where the Courts make a general observation that "the facts and the circumstances" have been considered. No specific reasons are indicated which precipitated the passing of the order by the Court. 23. Such a situation continues despite various judgments of this Court wherein this Court has disapproved of such a practice. In the case of Mahipal (Supra), this Court observed as follows:- 25. Merely recording "having perused the record" and "on the facts and circumstances of the case" does not subserve the purpose of a reasoned judicial order. It is a fundamental premise of open justice, to which our judicial system is committed, that factors which have weighed in the mind of the Judge in the rejection or the grant of bail are recorded in the order passed. Open justice is premised on the notion that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done. The duty of Judges to give reasoned decisions lies at the heart of this commitment. Questions of the grant of bail concern both liberty of individuals undergoing criminal prosecution as well as the interests of the criminal justice system in ensuring that those who commit crimes are not afforded the opportunity to obstruct justice. Judges are duty-bound to explain the basis on which they have arrived at a conclusion." (emphasis supplied) 13. Questions of the grant of bail concern both liberty of individuals undergoing criminal prosecution as well as the interests of the criminal justice system in ensuring that those who commit crimes are not afforded the opportunity to obstruct justice. Judges are duty-bound to explain the basis on which they have arrived at a conclusion." (emphasis supplied) 13. On the other hand, Mr. Tagum, learned counsel for respondent No. 2, submitted that the learned Sessions Judge, Ziro, had duly considered the evidence on record at the time of passing the bail order. It was taken into account that the accused/respondent No. 2 had been languishing in judicial custody for more than one year and is a 72-year-old person. He further submitted that the learned Sessions Judge considered all the relevant facts of the case vis-à-vis the evidence on record and applied his judicial mind while granting bail to the accused/respondent No. 2. 14. He further submitted that respondent No. 2 never confessed before anyone to having committed the murder of the victim or to stabbing him on the night of the incident, and that any statement recorded under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. is not admissible in law and cannot be treated as substantive evidence. Moreover, after obtaining the order of bail, the accused/respondent No. 2 has neither misused the liberty granted to him nor violated any of the terms and conditions of the bail order. Therefore, there exists no valid reason or ground for cancellation of the bail granted by the learned Sessions Judge, Ziro, on 20.06.2024. It was also submitted that respondent No. 2 has no criminal antecedents, and thus the apprehension of hampering or tampering with witnesses is wholly unfounded. 15. Further, it is a cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that an accused is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The primary object of granting bail is to ensure the appearance of the accused during trial; it is neither punitive nor preventive in nature. It is also a settled principle of law that normally very cogent and overwhelming circumstances are required for the cancellation of bail once granted. Therefore, unless a strong case based on a supervening event is made out, demonstrating misuse or abuse of the bail order by the accused, the bail already granted cannot be cancelled or interfered with. 16. Mr. It is also a settled principle of law that normally very cogent and overwhelming circumstances are required for the cancellation of bail once granted. Therefore, unless a strong case based on a supervening event is made out, demonstrating misuse or abuse of the bail order by the accused, the bail already granted cannot be cancelled or interfered with. 16. Mr. Tagum further submitted that the case of Deepak Yadav (supra), as relied upon by the petitioner, is not relevant to the present case. He argued that in Deepak Yadav (supra), paragraph 23 of the judgment specifically held that “only general observation that "the facts and the circumstances" have been considered. No specific reasons are indicated which precipitated the passing of the order by the Court. It has been also observe that “merely recording "having perused the record" and "on the facts and circumstances of the case" does not subserve the purpose of a reasoned judicial order”. 17. In the present case, however, it is evident that the learned Sessions Judge passed a detailed order after considering all the facts and circumstances, including the evidence of the P.Ws. Moreover, in this case, 8 witnesses have already been examined, and there are no eyewitnesses to the prosecution’s case. Therefore, the probability of hampering or tampering with the witnesses does not arise at this stage. Mr. Tagum further submitted that there is very limited scope for the cancellation of bail. Based on the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge, there is no perversity in the bail order. Accordingly, he contended that there is no reason to interfere with the bail order passed by the learned Sessions Judge, as the petitioner has failed to present any circumstances justifying the cancellation of bail at this stage. 18. He further submitted that the cancellation of bail, once granted, has to be considered and dealt with on a different basis, and that an order for cancellation of bail may be passed only under cogent and overwhelming circumstances. In this context, he relied on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Dolat Ram vs. State of Haryana , reported in (1995) 1 SCC 349 , and emphasized paragraphs 4 and 5 of the said judgment, which read as follows: “4. In this context, he relied on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Dolat Ram vs. State of Haryana , reported in (1995) 1 SCC 349 , and emphasized paragraphs 4 and 5 of the said judgment, which read as follows: “4. Rejection of bail in a non-bailable case at the initial stage and the cancellation of bail so granted, have to be considered and dealt with on different basis. Very cogent and overwhelming circumstances are necessary for an order directing the cancellation of the bail, already granted. Generally speaking, the grounds for cancellation of bail, broadly (illustrative and not exhaustive) are: interference or attempt to interfere with the due course of administration of Justice or evasion or attempt to evade the due course of justice or abuse of the concession granted to the accused in any manner. The satisfaction of the court, on the basis of material placed on the record of the possibility of the accused absconding is yet another reason justifying the cancellation of bail. However, bail once granted should not be cancelled in a mechanical manner without considering whether any supervening circumstances have rendered it no longer conducive to a fair trial to allow the accused to retain his freedom by enjoying the concession of bail during the trial. These principles, it appears, were lost sight of by the High Court when it decided to cancel the bail, already granted. The High Court it appears to us overlooked the distinction of the factors relevant for rejecting bail in a nonbailable case in the first instance and the cancellation of bail already granted. 5. We are, therefore, satisfied that the cancellation of anticipatory bail granted to the appellants, for the reasons given by the High Court, was not justified. Nothing has been brought to our notice either from which any inference may possibly be drawn that the appellants have in any manner, whatsoever, abused the concession of bail during the intervening period.” 19. He further relied on the decision passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Myakala Dharmarjam & Ors. vs. State of Telangana & Ors. Nothing has been brought to our notice either from which any inference may possibly be drawn that the appellants have in any manner, whatsoever, abused the concession of bail during the intervening period.” 19. He further relied on the decision passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Myakala Dharmarjam & Ors. vs. State of Telangana & Ors. reported in (2020) 2 SCC 743 , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court expressed the view that even in the absence of a detailed discussion in the bail order, if there is any indication that bail was granted after a perusal of the entire material, it may not be termed perverse. This is particularly so where the Sessions Court was conscious of the fact that the investigation was complete and there was no likelihood of the accused tampering with evidence. 20. In a similar context, he also relied on another decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bhuri Bhai vs. State of Andhra Pradesh , reported in 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1779, particularly emphasizing paragraph 16 (last line), and paragraphs 19 and 20 of the said judgment. 21. He also cited the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Himanshu Sharma vs. State of Madhya Pradesh , reported in (2024) 4 SCC 222 , and specifically emphasized paragraphs 11, 14, and 15 of the said judgment, which read as under: “11. Law is well settled by a catena of judgments rendered by this Court that the considerations for grant of bail and cancellation thereof are entirely different. Bail granted to an accused can only be cancelled if the Court is satisfied that after being released on bail, (a) the accused has misused the liberty granted to him; (b) flouted the conditions of bail order; (c ) that the bail was granted in ignorance of statutory provisions restricting the powers of the Court to grant bail; (d) or that the bail was procured by misrepresentation or fraud. In the present case, none of these situations existed. 14. It may further be noted that the learned Single Judge while cancelling the bail granted to the appellants did not even consider the fact that charges had been framed against the appellants on 28th May, 2022 and the trial had commenced and thus there could not have been any requirement of the appellants for further investigation as observed in para 7 of the impugned order. This Court is informed that by now, seven witnesses have been examined at the trial. 15. Thus, we are of the considered opinion that the impugned orders dated 12th December, 2023 whereby the bail granted to the appellants by the learned Single Judge of High Court of Madhya Pradesh vide orders dated 8 th September, 2022 and 14th September, 2022 was cancelled, are grossly illegal and do not stand to scrutiny. Resultantly, the same are hereby quashed and set aside.” 22. He further submitted that the petitioner has placed emphasis on the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2, as well as the statements made by the prosecution witnesses under Sections 164 and 161 of the Cr. P.C. However, at the stage of consideration of bail, the Court is not expected to conduct a mini-trial. To substantiate his plea, he cited the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Kailash Kumar vs. State of Himachal Pradesh & Anr. [Criminal Appeal No. 861/2025 arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 713/2025, dated 20.02.2025], and relied on paragraph 12 of the said judgment, which reads as under: “12. Instead, what the High Court did was to embark upon conducting sort of a mini-trial at the stage of considering whether the bail should be cancelled or not. According to the High Court, presence of the appellant and the co-accused at the scene of occurrence and causing of injury to the complainant-PW1 by the appellant being undisputed and notwithstanding that the injury caused by him is simple, there was common intention for which Section 34 of the IPC is attracted. There are also other observations in the impugned judgment having the potential of affecting the trial and sounding the death knell for the appellant, which we do not consider necessary to refer at this stage.” 23. He accordingly submitted that there are no valid reasons to cancel the bail already granted by the learned Sessions Judge, which was passed after perusal of the record and by way of a detailed order. Furthermore, there is no allegation against the accused/respondent No.2 of having violated any of the terms and conditions of the bail to date. Accordingly, he prays for the dismissal of the present petition. 24. Ms. Furthermore, there is no allegation against the accused/respondent No.2 of having violated any of the terms and conditions of the bail to date. Accordingly, he prays for the dismissal of the present petition. 24. Ms. Jini, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, submitted that while passing the bail order, the learned Sessions Judge considered only two grounds: (i) that the accused/respondent No.2 is 72 years old, and (ii) that he is a permanent resident of Hong Village and currently staying at Banderdewa. According to her, the learned Sessions Judge failed to pass a reasoned order while considering the bail application of the present accused/respondent No.2. 24. She further submitted that the accused is a retired police officer and, as such, there is a high likelihood that he may influence witnesses or tamper with the remaining evidence. She also pointed out that he has allegedly shown his influence in the past. Moreover, the accused/respondent No.2 is said to have confessed his guilt, and his extra-judicial confession has been recorded. Additionally, statements of some prosecution witnesses have been recorded under Section 164 of the Cr. P.C. In view of these circumstances, she submits that the learned Sessions Judge did not pass a reasoned order while granting bail in a case involving such a heinous offence, nor did the Judge adequately consider the possibility of the accused influencing witnesses, especially given his background as a retired police officer. 25. In support of her submission, she placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Manoj Kumar Khokhar vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr. , reported in (2022) 3 SCC 501 , wherein in paragraph 17 of the said judgment it has been held that “We have extracted the relevant portions of the impugned order above. At the outset, we observe that the extracted portions are the only portions forming part of the “reasoning” of the High court while granting bail. As noted from the aforecited judgments, it is not necessary for a Court to give elaborate reasons while granting bail particularly when the case is at the initial stage and the allegations of the offences by the accused would not have been crystallized as such. As noted from the aforecited judgments, it is not necessary for a Court to give elaborate reasons while granting bail particularly when the case is at the initial stage and the allegations of the offences by the accused would not have been crystallized as such. There cannot be elaborate details recorded to give an impression that the case is one that would result in a conviction or, by contrast, in an acquittal while passing an order on an application for grant of bail. However, the Court deciding a bail application cannot completely divorce its decision from material aspects of the case such as the allegations made against the accused; severity of the punishment if the allegations are proved beyond reasonable doubt and would result in a conviction; reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced by the accused; tampering of the evidence; the frivolity in the case of the prosecution; criminal antecedents of the accused; and a prima facie satisfaction of the Court in support of the charge against the accused.” 26. She also relied on another decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ram Govind Upadhyay vs. Sudarshan Singh & Ors. , reported in (2002) 3 SCC 598 , and mainly emphasized paragraphs 3 and 4 of the said judgment, which read as under: “3. Grant of bail though being a discretionary order but, however, calls for exercise of such a discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. Order for Bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained. Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being dealt with by the Court and facts however do always vary from case to case. While placement of the accused in the society, though may be considered but that by itself cannot be a guiding factor in the matter of grant of bail and the same should and ought always be coupled with other circumstances warranting the grant of bail. The nature of the offence is one of the basic consideration for the grant of bail more heinous is a crime, the greater is the chance of rejection of the bail, though, however, dependent on the factual matrix of the matter. 4. The nature of the offence is one of the basic consideration for the grant of bail more heinous is a crime, the greater is the chance of rejection of the bail, though, however, dependent on the factual matrix of the matter. 4. Apart from the above, certain other which may be attributed to be relevant considerations may also be noticed at this juncture though however, the same are only illustrative and nor exhaustive neither there can be any. The considerations being: (a) While granting bail the Court has to keep in mind not only the nature of the accusations, but the severity of the punishment, if the accusation entails a conviction and the nature of evidence in support of the accusations. (b) Reasonable apprehensions of the witnesses being tampered with or the apprehension of there being a threat for the complainant should also weigh with the Court in the matter of grant of bail. (c) While it is not accepted to have the entire evidence establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt but there ought always to be a prima facie satisfaction of the Court in support of the charge. (d) Frivolity in prosecution should always be considered and it is only the element of genuineness that shall have to be considered in the matter of grant of bail and in the event of there being some doubt as to the genuineness of the prosecution, in the normal course of events, the accused is entitled to an order of bail.” 27. She further relied on a decision passed by this Court in the case of Shri Lige Ori vs. State of Arunachal Pradesh , reported in (2024) 0 Supreme (Gau) 11, and submitted that in that case as well, the bail order passed by the learned Sessions Judge was considered to be very casual and was issued without a reasoned order. She submits that the same principle is applicable in the present case, where the learned Sessions Judge granted bail solely on two grounds: (i) that the accused/respondent No.2 was 72 years old at the time of the bail application, and (ii) that he is a permanent resident of his addressed locality. 28. Ms. Jini also relied on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Kalyan Chandra Sarkar vs. Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav & Anr. 28. Ms. Jini also relied on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Kalyan Chandra Sarkar vs. Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav & Anr. , reported in (2004) 0 Supreme (SC) 310, and specifically emphasized paragraph 10 of the said judgment, which reads as under: “10. The law in regard to grant or refusal of bail is very well settled. The Court granting bail should exercise its discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. Though at the stage of granting bail a detailed examination of evidence and elaborate documentation of the merit of the case need not be undertaken, there is a need to indicate in such orders reasons for prima facie concluding why bail was being granted particularly where the accused is charged of having committed a serious offence. Any order devoid of such reasons would suffer from non- application of mind. It is also necessary for the court granting bail to consider among other circumstances, the following factors also before granting bail; they are, (a) The nature of accusation and the severity of punishment in case of conviction and the nature of supporting evidence; (b) Reasonable apprehension of tampering of the witness or apprehension of threat to the complainant; (c) Prima facie satisfaction of the Court in support of the charge; (See Ram Govind Upadhyay Vs. Sudarshan Singh and others ( 2002 (3) SCC 598 ) and Puran Vs. Rambilas and another ( 2001 (6) SCC 338 ). 29. She further relied on the decision passed by this Court in the case of Munni Effa vs. State of Arunachal Pradesh , reported in 2020 0 Supreme (Gau) 685, wherein the Division Bench of this Court expressed the view in paragraph 21(C) that bail can be cancelled under the following two circumstances: “(i) When the accused mis-use the liberty of bail, or there is any other supervening circumstance rendering the liberty of bail non-conducive to fair trial or when some new facts comes to light. (ii) When the order of granting bail suffers from illegality, impropriety or serious infirmity causing mis-carriage of justice for not considering the relevant factors or for taking into account irrelevant factors.” 30. She further relied on paragraph 18 of the judgment in Munni Effa (supra), where it has been held as under: “18. In Prakash Kadam and Ors. Vs. (ii) When the order of granting bail suffers from illegality, impropriety or serious infirmity causing mis-carriage of justice for not considering the relevant factors or for taking into account irrelevant factors.” 30. She further relied on paragraph 18 of the judgment in Munni Effa (supra), where it has been held as under: “18. In Prakash Kadam and Ors. Vs. Ram Prasad Gupta reported in (2011) 6 SCC 189 , the Apex Court, while making distinction between cancellation of bail and consideration for grant of bail and also the factors on which bail can be cancelled, observed as under : “18. In considering whether to cancel the bail, the court has to consider the gravity and nature of the offence, prima facie case against the accused, the position and standing of the accused, etc. It there are very serious allegations against the accused, his bail may be cancelled even if he has not misused the bail granted to him. Moreover, the above principle applies when the same court which granted bail is approached for cancelling the bail. It will not apply when the order granting bail is appealed against before an appellate/revisionsal court.” 31. Citing the above-mentioned judgment, Ms. Jini, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, submitted that the learned Sessions Judge passed the order without properly considering the gravity of the offence and other relevant circumstances of the case. The bail was granted to the accused/respondent No.2 solely on the grounds that he is 72 years old and a permanent resident of the addressed locality. Thus, the bail order passed by the learned Sessions Judge is perverse and may result in a miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, she raised an objection and submitted that this is a fit case for cancelling the bail granted to the accused by the learned Sessions Judge vide order dated 20.06.2024, as prayed by the petitioner. 32. Hearing the submissions made by the learned counsels for both sides, I have perused the case record as well as the annexures filed along with the petition. It is the case of the petitioner that respondent No. 2 committed the murder of the victim on the night of the incident by stabbing him in the chest, a fact admitted by the accused before some witnesses including his sister. Statements made by these witnesses were recorded under Section 164 of the Cr. It is the case of the petitioner that respondent No. 2 committed the murder of the victim on the night of the incident by stabbing him in the chest, a fact admitted by the accused before some witnesses including his sister. Statements made by these witnesses were recorded under Section 164 of the Cr. P.C., wherein the accused/respondent No. 2 made an extra-judicial confession regarding the death of the victim. Other materials on record confirm that the death was homicidal in nature, and the Investigating Officer collected the FSL report during the investigation. 33. At the time of granting bail, only three witnesses were examined by the prosecution, as reflected in the order of the learned Sessions Judge, who considered these during the bail hearing. The petitioner contends that the learned Sessions Judge failed to consider the nature and gravity of the offence and passed the order casually without any reasoned discussion of the materials on record. Furthermore, given the accused’s influential status, there is a high probability of tampering with or influencing witnesses, including an eyewitness yet to be examined. 34. However, during arguments, learned counsel for the respondent No.2 submitted that eight witnesses have already been examined by the prosecution, including vital witnesses. The petitioner also argued that even in the absence of supervening circumstances, bail may be cancelled if the bail order is passed without considering the gravity of the offence and if the order is apparently whimsical, capricious, or perverse in the facts of the case. Accordingly, the petitioner submits that the learned Sessions Judge passed the bail order without considering relevant factors other than the accused’s age (72 years) and residency, rendering the order perverse and likely to cause miscarriage of justice. The petitioner relied on various judgments holding that bail can be cancelled if the order is perverse or trivial and if relevant materials on record are ignored. 35. On the other hand, respondent No. 2 submitted that the learned Sessions Judge considered all relevant materials placed before him and, after hearing submissions from both sides, granted bail. There is no material to show that accused/respondent No. 2 has violated any terms or conditions of bail, nor are there any supervening circumstances justifying cancellation. 36. The State respondent submitted that the order of the Sessions Judge is perverse since the only grounds considered were the accused’s age and residency. There is no material to show that accused/respondent No. 2 has violated any terms or conditions of bail, nor are there any supervening circumstances justifying cancellation. 36. The State respondent submitted that the order of the Sessions Judge is perverse since the only grounds considered were the accused’s age and residency. Being a retired police officer, the accused has a high potential to influence or hamper witnesses. She further stated that the Sessions Judge, failed to consider the nature and gravity of the offence or relevant materials on record. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor supported the petitioner’s contention and urged cancellation of bail at this stage. 37. It is admitted that some materials were produced before the learned Sessions Judge, including evidence of two prosecution witnesses who are relatives of the accused/respondent No. 2, as well as the testimony of a Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) expert (P.W.3) who opined that the bloodstains found on the weapon were human blood. A total of 27 prosecution witnesses are cited, but at the time of the bail order, only three had been examined. Despite the production of all these materials, the Sessions Judge did not consider or discuss the gravity or nature of the offence, which is admittedly murder. The bail order was passed solely on the accused’s age and residency, without other reasoning. No allegation has been brought against accused/respondent No. 2 regarding violation of bail conditions or supervening circumstances. However, the absence of a reasoned order by the Sessions Judge is apparent. 38. The Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court, as relied upon by the Additional Public Prosecutor in Munni Effa (supra), held that bail can be cancelled if the order suffers from illegality, impropriety, or serious infirmity causing miscarriage of justice by failing to consider relevant factors or considering irrelevant factors. While it is true that the Court need not conduct a mini-trial or consider every piece of evidence when granting bail, relevant factors must be considered. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Neeru Yadav (supra) has emphasized that while granting bail, the nature of accusations, severity of punishment, reasonable apprehension of tampering with witnesses, or threats to the complainant must be taken into account. But, in this case, though some materials were presented, they were ignored in the bail order, including the nature and gravity of the offence and the prosecution’s plea of potential witness tampering. 39. But, in this case, though some materials were presented, they were ignored in the bail order, including the nature and gravity of the offence and the prosecution’s plea of potential witness tampering. 39. It is settled law that bail can be cancelled only on overwhelming and strong grounds, typically where the accused misuses bail liberty, or supervening circumstances arise that make bail untenable, or new facts come to light. Additionally, bail may be cancelled if the bail order suffers from illegality, impropriety, or serious infirmity causing miscarriage of justice by ignoring relevant factors or relying on irrelevant factors. 40. Some eyewitnesses are yet to be examined, and the probability of threatening or tampering with witnesses cannot be ignored at this stage. Being a retired police officer and an influential individual, accused/respondent No. 2 may hamper the evidence yet to be recorded. In Shri Lige Ori (supra), relying on State of Manipur & Anr. vs. Shri Thokchom Jadumani Singh [2009 4 GLR 893], it was held that if the impugned order amounts to an abuse of process and interference is necessary to secure justice, the High Court may exercise its inherent powers to cancel bail. 41. Considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that the learned Sessions Judge passed the order in a very casual manner, without taking into account the nature and gravity of the offence. The order granting bail was based solely on the age of respondent No. 2 and the fact that he is a permanent resident of the addressed locality. Thus, no reasoned order was passed by the learned Sessions Judge, even though some materials were admittedly produced before the Court at the time of the hearing. 42. In view of the above, and after considering submissions of learned counsels, as well as various Supreme Court observations, this Court is of the view that the privilege of bail granted to accused/respondent No. 2 vide order dated 20.06.2024 by the learned Sessions Judge, Lower Subansiri District, Ziro, in Crl. Misc. Bail Application No. 27/2024 (Z), stands cancelled. 43. Accordingly, respondent No. 2/accused is hereby directed to surrender before the learned Sessions Judge within fifteen (15) days from the date of this order. Misc. Bail Application No. 27/2024 (Z), stands cancelled. 43. Accordingly, respondent No. 2/accused is hereby directed to surrender before the learned Sessions Judge within fifteen (15) days from the date of this order. However, the accused/respondent No. 2 shall be at liberty to file a fresh application for bail, which may be considered and disposed of by the learned Sessions Judge after passing a reasoned order. 44. With the above observation, this criminal petition stands allowed and disposed of.