ORDER : M.A.ABDUL HAKHIM, J. 1. This Regular Second Appeal was posted before me unnumbered on the request of the learned counsel for the appellant since according to the learned counsel the court fee paid as per the newly introduced Article 1(A) of the first schedule of the Kerala Court Fees and Suit Valuation Act inserted by the Kerala Finance Act 2025 with effect from 01.04.2025 is sufficient. 2. The Registry of this Court found the Appeal defective on account of deficiency of court fee, as according to the Registry as per Section 52 of the Kerala Court Fees and Suit Valuation Act, 1959, the court fee payable in an appeal shall be same as the fee that would be payable in the Court of first instance on the subject matter of appeal. The Division Bench decision of this Court in Usha v. Food Corporation of India 1997 (1) KLT 264 supporting the stand of the Registry is also brought to the notice of this Court. 3. The Appeal arises from a suit for damages on account of defamation. The Ad Valorem court fee of Rs.8,400/- is paid on the valuation of Rs,1,00,000/- in the Trial Court as well as in the First Appellate Court under Section 22 read with Article 1 of Schedule I KCF & SV Act. 4. The Appeal is filed on 05.04.2025. The court fee paid on the Memorandum of Appeal is 1% of the valuation as per the newly introduced Article 1A of Schedule I KCF & SV Act, with effect from 01.04.2025 which is extracted below. 1A Plaint or written statement, pleading a set-off or counter claim or memorandum of appeal presented to any Court — compensation for bodily injury or death caused by any criminal act, grievous hurt, malicious prosecution, defamation – libel or slander One per centum on the amount of compensation 5. I heard the learned counsel for the appellant Sri.R.Surendran. 6. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, the appellant is liable to pay the court fee as per the newly introduced provision since the newly introduced provision reduces the court fee and is beneficial to the litigant. The learned counsel tried to distinguish the decision in Usha (supra) on the ground that the said decision is applicable only when the amendment Act is onerous to the litigant. The learned counsel tried to distinguish the decision in Usha (supra) on the ground that the said decision is applicable only when the amendment Act is onerous to the litigant. The learned counsel cited the Division Bench decision of this Court in Kochappu v. Somasundaran Chettiar [1991 (1) KLT 657] and argued that it is this decision which is applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case. 7. On perusal of both the aforesaid decisions of this Court, it is seen that in both the decisions this Court has considered the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Bombay v. M/s. S.G. Films Exchange [ AIR 1960 SC 980 ] . It is useful extract Paragraph 12 of the said decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court: “ It is thus clear that in a long line of decisions approved by this Court and at least in one given by this Court it has been held that an impairment of the right of appeal by putting a new restriction thereon or imposing more onerous condition is not a matter of procedure only, it impairs or imperils a substantive right and an enactment which does so is not retrospective unless it says so expressly or by necessary intendment." 8. After referring to the said decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, and another decision of this Court in Raman Kumaran v. Kalikutty Amma , [ 1969 KLT 229 ] the Division Bench of this Court in Kochappu (supra) held that those decisions are not applicable, as by the Amendment Acts considered in those decisions the revision Court Fee is upward, which is onerous to the litigant, whereas by the Amendment Act before this Court the revision Court Fee is downward, which is beneficial to the litigant. It is useful to extract Paragraph 10 of the decision of this Court in Kochappu (supra): “ In the present case, the right of appeal is not imperilled. Nor is it even impaired by the imposition of a more onerous condition. It is patent that what has been conferred under the new enactment is only an additional benefit or advantage to the litigant public. In such a situation, a statute which is otherwise procedural in character does not get transmuted to a substantial law.. It would then follow that the new enactment would govern all matters coming within its scope and ambit. In such a situation, a statute which is otherwise procedural in character does not get transmuted to a substantial law.. It would then follow that the new enactment would govern all matters coming within its scope and ambit. Payment of court fee on an appeal would also be taken in by the new enactment so brought into force. The situation is entirely different from and even diametrically opposite to the one visible in 1969 KLT 229 supra and AIR 1960 S.C. 980 supra. As against the upward revision of court fee in those two cases, which could rightly be termed as imperilling the right of appeal or imposing a more onerous condition on the exercise of the right of appeal, the present situation is one where the amended Act brought in some relief if not the whole of manna. Indeed, a downward revision of the court fee, a sweet slashing down giving relief to the honest litigant, is a hitherto unnoticed phenomenon in the history of court fee legislation. The Bengal Regulation brought about payment of court fee in 1795. Macaulay, a prodigious genius much misunderstood in his time and even later, declared that "the imposition of court fee neither makes the pleadings clearer nor the law plainer, nor the corrupt judge purer, nor the stupid judge wiser." His exhortation was easily overpowered by the State which wanted more money in its coffers. Initially the rate was not that unbearable. As for the first enactment in the Travancore Cochin portion of the State, there was a ceiling cap. The lid was, however, laid aside, and the fee payable shot up without ceiling on the basis of the ad valorem computation. This is the singular and solitary occasion when the trend is not only halted but even reversed. That is indeed a warm and welcome experience for the litigant citizen. The point to be stressed in the discussion in the context is that a relief granted is the very antithesis of an impairment or impediment of an existing right.” 9. This Court ultimately held that in respect of all appeals filed after 05.12.1990, the court fee payable is to be calculated only on the basis of the new schedule brought into force with effect from the said day. 10.The decision in Usha (supra) is distinguishable on the facts of the present case. This Court ultimately held that in respect of all appeals filed after 05.12.1990, the court fee payable is to be calculated only on the basis of the new schedule brought into force with effect from the said day. 10.The decision in Usha (supra) is distinguishable on the facts of the present case. The Amendment Act considered therein increases the court fee which is onerous to the litigant. In such case, the aforesaid decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court is squarely applicable, and hence, this Court followed the same in Usha (supra), holding that in such case, the right of appeal is imperiled by enhancing the rate of court fee. 11. I am of the view that the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Kochappu (supra) is applicable to the facts of the present case. The newly introduced Article 1A reduced the court fee and is beneficial to the litigant and hence I hold that the appellants in all appeals filed after 01.04.2025 arising from the proceedings mentioned in Article 1A Schedule I KCF & SV Act are liable to pay court fee at 1% as provided therein. 12. I overrule the objection raised by the Registry with respect to the deficiency of the court fee in this appeal and direct the Registry to number the appeal if it is otherwise in order.