ORDER : I.A. No.1/2023: Heard on application for condonation of delay. For the reasons mentioned in the application, the same is allowed and the delay of 96 days in filing the present appeal is condoned. 1. Heard learned counsel for the parties on merit. 2. Present appeal is directed against the order dated 10.05.2023 passed by the learned Single Judge in exercise of jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, whereby, the learned Single Judge has upset the finding recorded by the Board of Revenue (Revenue Appellate Authority), set aside the order and allowed petition. 3. Briefly stated, the relevant facts of the case giving rise to the appeal are that one Babu Lal Nagori was granted a lease of a parcel of land for setting up of an industrial unit on 13.02.1987 under the provisions of Rajasthan Land Revenue (Industrial Areas Allotment) Rules, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as “Allotment Rules of 1959”). In course of time, the said Babu Lal Nagori sold the land by a registered sale-deed in favour of the appellant- Kamla Bai on 08.11.1996. The District Collector, Udaipur, however, sent a notice on 19.07.2006 proposing to cancel the lease on the ground that the industrial unit having not been set up within a period of two years of grant of lease, resulted in violation of mandate of Rule 7 of the Allotment Rules of 1959. The proceeding so initiated upon issuance of notice eventually led to passing of an order of cancellation of lease. The order passed by the District Collector was challenged by filing appeal before the Revenue Appellate Authority. It appears that when the first order was passed by the District Collector, in the first instance, an appeal was preferred and the case was remanded. Whereafter, again an order was passed by the District Collector. That was again challenged by filing an appeal and the Revenue Appellate Authority again remanded the case. After the second remand, the District Collector passed an order on 30.10.2010 ordering cancellation of lease. The appellant preferred third appeal before the Revenue Appellate Authority, though unsuccessfully, as the appeal was dismissed vide order dated 29.11.2010. That was again challenged by filing an appeal and the Revenue Appellate Authority again remanded the case. After the second remand, the District Collector passed an order on 30.10.2010 ordering cancellation of lease. The appellant preferred third appeal before the Revenue Appellate Authority, though unsuccessfully, as the appeal was dismissed vide order dated 29.11.2010. Aggrieved by the said order, appeal was preferred before the Board of Revenue, who vide order dated 08.10.2015 upset the order passed by the lower appellate authority and that of the Collector holding that no case was made out for cancellation of lease under the provisions of Rule 7 of the Allotment Rules of 1959. Aggrieved by the order of the Board of Revenue, the State preferred a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India before this Court. The learned Single Judge vide order impugned, set aside the order passed by the Board of Revenue giving rise to the instant appeal. 4. When this case came up for hearing before this Court on 29.01.2025, while examining the material on record, it was noticed that apart from the issue as to whether the industrial unit was established within a period of two years as mandated under Rule 7 of the Allotment Rules of 1959, it appears that without permission of the allotting authority, the original allottee Babu Lal Nagori had executed transfer deed in favour of the appellant which, on prima facie consideration, appeared not only in violation of terms and conditions of the lease earlier granted in favour of Babu Lal Nagori but also in violation of statutory provisions contained in Rule 9 of the Allotment Rules of 1959. The parties were granted time to address the Court. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant raised following submissions: A) The order passed by the Board of Revenue is based on correct factual premise and legally admissible documentary evidence on record. He would submit that the finding recorded by the Board of Revenue is essentially based on spot inspection report dated 28.06.2006 on the basis of spot inspection of the industrial unit which records that the industrial unit was closed down 10 to 12 years before and upon enquiry, it is revealed that the unit has been sold. The report recorded that there was a shed constructed, though closed, and machines are also situated. The unit is surrounded by boundary wall. The report recorded that there was a shed constructed, though closed, and machines are also situated. The unit is surrounded by boundary wall. The finding of the Board of Revenue that this does not constitute material to arrive at a finding that the industrial unit was not established within a period of two years of grant of lease in favour of Babu Lal Nagori, is neither perverse nor can be said to be contrary to the material on record or suffering from any other perversity warranting interference in exercise of its certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. He would submit that the finding recorded by the Collector and the First Revenue Appellate Authority were without any evidence collected by the State and placed before the Court that after Babu Lal Nagori was granted lease on 13.02.1987, he failed to establish an industrial unit within a period of two years. The spot inspection report dated 28.06.2006 prepared by the Industries Department was completely misread and perverse finding was recorded which was corrected by the Board of Revenue. Therefore, the learned Single Judge ought not to have interfered with the finding of fact recorded by the Board of Revenue. B) Even if it is assumed that a technical breach had occurred and Babu Lal Nagori, before selling the industrial unit to the appellant vide deed dated 15.03.1997, had not obtained the permission of the competent authority as required under Rule 9(ii) of the Allotment Rules of 1959, can even now be regularized under the scheme of the Allotment Rules of 1959 as provided in Rule 13-A. In any case, it is contended, that is not the basis on which the learned Single Judge reversed the order of the Board of Revenue and none of the authorities at any stage of proceedings held the lease in favour of the appellant illegal on such ground of contravention of provisions of law. An alternative submission has been made by the learned counsel that even if, ultimately, it is found that at the time of sale of land by way of transfer in favour of the appellant, the original lessee Babu Lal Nagori had not obtained any permission, in the peculiar circumstances of the present case where the appellant had paid substantial amount as consideration for transfer of right to Babu Lal Nagori way back in the year 1997 and ever since that the appellant is in possession of the same, a direction may be issued to the respondents to grant lease in favour of the appellant. On such appropriate terms and conditions including payment of premium rent and/or penalty as may be considered appropriate and the appellant is ready and willing to make necessary payment in this regard in case the State grants lease in favour of the appellant, in the peculiar circumstances that the appellant has been in possession of the same under semblance of authority since 1997. 6. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents in support of the order passed by the learned Single Judge would submit that the Collector as well as the First Revenue Appellate Authority had correctly interpreted and construed the inspection report dated 28.06.2006 prepared by the Industrial Department but the Board of Revenue while interfering with the concurrent finding of fact, based its finding on patent misreading of documentary evidence on record as also ignored to take into consideration that there was violation of mandatory conditions of lease. Therefore, now there is no scope for interference with the finding recorded by the Writ Court. He would next submit that in any case, even at the stage of appeal, a legal issue based on admitted facts on record can always be taken into consideration by the Court. He would submit that there is no material placed on record by the appellant even though time was granted by this Court on 29.01.2025 to establish that Babu Lal Nagori had obtained permission as mandated under Rule 9(ii) of the Allotment Rules of 1959 before transfer of rights in her favour. Therefore, there is a patent violation of provision and transfer itself being in violation of provisions of law. Therefore, there is a patent violation of provision and transfer itself being in violation of provisions of law. He would next submit that regularization clause as contained in Rule 13-A of the Allotment Rules of 1959 does not apply in the case of the appellant but it seeks to regularize certain occupations in specified circumstances enumerated in the regularization clause. 7. On the aspect of alternative submission, learned State counsel would submit that it is open for the appellant to apply for grant of lease to the competent authority and in that event the same can always be examined. 8. The order passed by the Board of Revenue has been upset by the learned Single Judge on the finding as below: “20. The allotment order dated 13.2.1987 and lease- deed dated 31.3.87 had been executed in favour of Kalika Industries through Proprietor Babulal Nagori. It is apparent that the respondent could not set up an industry within a period of two years on the said land. The respondent was under an obligation to establish that he had set up an industry on the said land within a period of two years but nothing concrete was placed by the respondent no.1, rather a copy of Registry was placed on record showing that the allotted land in- dispute was transferred in favour of the respondent no.1 on 15.03.1997 and the name of Smt. Kamla Bai is entered instead of Kalika Industries. The learned Revenue Appellate Authority in its order dated 8.10.2015 has given a finding that the respondent sought some time before it to start a new industry on account of closure of the earlier one and based on this statement, the learned Revenue Appellate Authority remanded the matter back to the District Collector for passing order afresh. However, the respondent during the arguments before the District Collector instead of seeking time to establish a new industry prayed that the nature of land in-dispute be changed from commercial use to residential use and the District Collector, therefore, upheld the order of cancellation of allotment of land in- dispute. The act of the respondent shows the intention of the respondent and the purpose for which he wanted to utilize the land in-dispute. The act of the respondent shows the intention of the respondent and the purpose for which he wanted to utilize the land in-dispute. The learned Revenue Appellate Authority held that on the one hand the respondent sought time before the Revenue Appellate Authority to establish a new industry and on the other hand an application was moved before the District Collector for changing the use of land from commercial to residential.” 9. Having so noted, the learned Single Judge in the next following paragraphs of the order concludes that the learned Board of Revenue failed to appreciate the aforesaid aspects of the case and without appreciating the record of the case held that once industry was established and was running for two years, then as per Rule 7 of the Allotment Rules of 1959, the whole of such industrial unit can be sold. 10. The finding recorded by the learned Single Judge is that basic requirement of fulfilling the condition of Rule 7 of the Allotment Rules of 1959 has not been made by the appellant herein as industry had not been established within a period of two years and nothing substantial was placed on record by the appellant to demonstrate the same. On such considerate finding and conclusion, the learned Single Judge has upset the order of the Board of Revenue. 11. Before proceeding further, it is apposite to refer to recent Supreme Court decision in the case of Central Council for Research in Ayurvedic Sciences & Ors. Vs. Bikartan Das & Ors. : (2023) 16 SCC 462 . The principles governing ambit and scope of judicial review while exercising certiorari jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, succinctly stated in several decisions, outline development of jurisprudence in this regard, it was surveyed and concluded as below:- “ 48. Before we close this matter, we would like to observe something important in the aforesaid context: Two cardinal principles of law governing exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution more particularly when it comes to issue of writ of certiorari. 49. The first cardinal principle of law that governs the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, more particularly when it comes to the issue of a writ of certiorari is that in granting such a writ, the High Court does not exercise the powers of the Appellate Tribunal. 49. The first cardinal principle of law that governs the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, more particularly when it comes to the issue of a writ of certiorari is that in granting such a writ, the High Court does not exercise the powers of the Appellate Tribunal. It does not review or reweigh the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior tribunal purports to be based. It demolishes the order which it considers to be without jurisdiction or palpably erroneous but does not substitute its own views for those of the inferior tribunal. The writ of certiorari can be issued if an error of law is apparent on the face of the record. A writ of certiorari, being a high prerogative writ, should not be issued on mere asking. 50. The second cardinal principle of exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is that in a given case, even if some action or order challenged in the writ petition is found to be illegal and invalid, the High Court while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction thereunder can refuse to upset it with a view to doing substantial justice between the parties. Article 226 of the Constitution grants an extraordinary remedy, which is essentially discretionary, although founded on legal injury. It is perfectly open for the writ court, exercising this flexible power to pass such orders as public interest dictates & equity projects. The legal formulations cannot be enforced divorced from the realities of the fact situation of the case. While administering law, it is to be tempered with equity and if the equitable situation demands after setting right the legal formulations, not to take it to the logical end, the High Court would be failing in its duty if it does not notice equitable consideration and mould the final order in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction. Any other approach would render the High Court a normal court of appeal which it is not. 51. The essential features of a writ of certiorari, including a brief history, have been very exhaustively explained by B.K. Mukherjea, J. in T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa. The Court held that a writ in the nature of certiorari could be issued in “all appropriate cases and in appropriate manner” so long as the broad and fundamental principles were kept in mind. The Court held that a writ in the nature of certiorari could be issued in “all appropriate cases and in appropriate manner” so long as the broad and fundamental principles were kept in mind. Those principles were delineated as follows : (SCC p. 914 paras 8-10) “8. … In granting a writ of “certiorari”, the superior court does not exercise the powers of an Appellate Tribunal. It does not review or reweigh the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior tribunal purports to be based. It demolishes the order which it considers to be without jurisdiction or palpably erroneous but does not substitute its own views for those of the inferior tribunal. … 9. The supervision of the superior court exercised through writs of “certiorari” goes on two points, as has been expressed by Lord Summer in R. v. Nat Bell Liquors Ltd., AC at p. 156. One is the area of inferior jurisdiction and the qualifications and conditions of its exercise; the other is the observance of law in the course of its exercise. … 10. “Certiorari” may and is generally granted when a court has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction.” 52. Relying on T.C. Basappa, the Constitution Bench of this Court in Hari Vishnu Kamath, laid down the following propositions as well established : (Hari Vishnu Kamath case, SCC p. 899, para 24) “24. … 24.1. “Certiorari” will be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction, as when an inferior court or tribunal acts without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or fails to exercise it. 24.2. “Certiorari” will also be issued when the court or tribunal acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, or violates the principles of natural justice. 24.3. The court issuing a writ of “certiorari” acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that the court will not review findings of fact reached by the inferior court or tribunal, even if they be erroneous.” 53. 24.3. The court issuing a writ of “certiorari” acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that the court will not review findings of fact reached by the inferior court or tribunal, even if they be erroneous.” 53. This Court explained that a court which has jurisdiction over a subject-matter has jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right, and when the legislature does not choose to confer a right of appeal against that decision, it would be defeating its purpose and policy if a superior court were to rehear the case on the evidence and substitute its own finding in certiorari. 54. In Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan, P.B. Gajendragadkar, C.J., speaking for the Constitution Bench, placed the matter beyond any position of doubt by holding that a writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals. The observations of this Court in para 7 are worth taking note of : (SCC OnLine SC para 7) “7. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Article 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals : these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior court or Tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior court or Tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised….” 55. In Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, a Bench of two Judges held that the certiorari jurisdiction though available, should not be exercised as a matter of course. The High Court would be justified in refusing the writ of certiorari if no failure of justice had been occasioned. In exercising the certiorari jurisdiction, the procedure ordinarily followed by the High Court is to command the inferior court or tribunal to certify its record or proceedings to the High Court for its inspection so as to enable the High Court to determine, whether on the face of the record the inferior court has committed any of the errors as explained by this Court in Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque occasioning failure of justice. 56. 56. From the aforesaid, it could be said in terms of a jurisdictional error that want of jurisdiction may arise from the nature of the subject-matter so that the inferior court or tribunal might not have the authority to enter on the inquiry. It may also arise from the absence of some essential preliminary or jurisdictional fact. Where the jurisdiction of a body depends upon a preliminary finding of fact in a proceeding for a writ of certiorari, the court may determine, whether or not that finding of fact is correct. The reason is that by wrongly deciding such a fact, the court or tribunal cannot give itself jurisdiction. 57. In Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission, the House of Lords has given a very broad connotation to the concept of “jurisdictional error”. It has been laid down that a tribunal exceeds jurisdiction not only at the threshold when it enters into an inquiry which it is not entitled to undertake, but it may enter into an enquiry within its jurisdiction in the first instance and then do something which would deprive it of its jurisdiction and render its decision a nullity. In the words of Lord Reid : (AC p. 171) “… But there are many cases where, although the tribunal had jurisdiction to enter on the enquiry, it has done or failed to do something in the course of the enquiry which is of such a nature that its decision is a nullity. It may have given its decision in bad faith. It may have made a decision which it had no power to make. It may have failed in the course of the enquiry to comply with the requirements of natural justice. It may in perfect good faith have misconstrued the provisions giving it power to act so that it failed to deal with the question remitted to it and decided some question which was not remitted to it. It may have refused to take into account something which it was required to take into account. Or it may have based its decision on some matter which, under the provisions setting it up, it had no right to take into account. I do not intend this list to be exhaustive.” 58. It may have refused to take into account something which it was required to take into account. Or it may have based its decision on some matter which, under the provisions setting it up, it had no right to take into account. I do not intend this list to be exhaustive.” 58. So far as the errors of law are concerned, a writ of certiorari could be issued if an error of law is apparent on the face of the record. To attract the writ of certiorari, a mere error of law is not sufficient. It must be one which is manifest or patent on the face of the record. Mere formal or technical errors, even of law, are not sufficient, so as to attract a writ of certiorari. As reminded by this Court time and again, this concept is indefinite and cannot be defined precisely or exhaustively and so it has to be determined judiciously on the facts of each case. The concept, according to this Court in K.M. Shanmugam v. S.R.V.S. (P) Ltd., “is comprised of many imponderables … it is not capable of precise definition, as no objective criterion could be laid down, the apparent nature of the error, to a large extent, being dependent upon the subjective element.” A general test to apply, however, is that no error could be said to be apparent on the face of the record if it is not “self-evident” or “manifest”. If it requires an examination or argument to establish it, if it has to be established by a long-drawn out process of reasoning, or lengthy or complicated arguments, on points where there may considerably be two opinions, then such an error would cease to be an error of law. (See : Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde v. Millikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale.) 59. However, in our opinion, such a test should not be applied in a straitjacket formula and may fail because what might be considered by one Judge as an error self-evident, might not be considered so by another Judge. 60. (See : Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde v. Millikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale.) 59. However, in our opinion, such a test should not be applied in a straitjacket formula and may fail because what might be considered by one Judge as an error self-evident, might not be considered so by another Judge. 60. At this stage, it may not be out of place to remind ourselves of the observations of this Court in Yakoob on this point, which are as follows : (SCC OnLine SC paras 7-8) Where it is manifest or clear that the conclusion of law recorded by an inferior court or tribunal is based on an obvious misinterpretation of the relevant statutory provision, or something in ignorance of it, or may be even in disregard of it, or is expressly founded on reasons which are wrong in law, the said conclusion can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. Certiorari would also not lie to correct mere errors of fact even though such errors may be apparent on the face of the record. The writ jurisdiction is supervisory and the court exercising it is not to act as an appellate court. It is well settled that the writ court would not reappreciate the evidence and substitute its own conclusion of fact for that recorded by the adjudicating body, be it a court or a tribunal. A finding of fact, howsoever erroneous, recorded by a court or a tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the court or the tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. It is also well settled that adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribunal and these points cannot be agitated before the writ court. 61. In the aforesaid context, it will be profitable for us to refer to the decision of this Court in Indian Overseas Bank v. Staff Canteen Workers' Union. This Court observed as under : (SCC pp. 259-60, para 17) “17. 61. In the aforesaid context, it will be profitable for us to refer to the decision of this Court in Indian Overseas Bank v. Staff Canteen Workers' Union. This Court observed as under : (SCC pp. 259-60, para 17) “17. … The findings of fact recorded by a fact-finding authority duly constituted for the purpose and which ordinarily should be considered to have become final, cannot be disturbed for the mere reason of having been based on materials or evidence not sufficient or credible in the opinion of the writ court to warrant those findings, at any rate, as long as they are based upon some material which are relevant for the purpose or even on the ground that there is yet another view which can reasonably and possibly be taken.” 62. However, we may clarify that findings of fact based on “no evidence” or purely on surmises and conjectures or which are perverse points could be challenged by way of a certiorari as such findings could be regarded as an error of law. 63. Thus, from the various decisions referred to above, we have no hesitation in reaching to the conclusion that a writ of certiorari is a high prerogative writ and should not be issued on mere asking. For the issue of a writ of certiorari, the party concerned has to make out a definite case for the same and is not a matter of course. To put it pithily, certiorari shall issue to correct errors of jurisdiction, that is to say, absence, excess or failure to exercise and also when in the exercise of undoubted jurisdiction, there has been illegality. It shall also issue to correct an error in the decision or determination itself, if it is an error manifest on the face of the proceedings. By its exercise, only a patent error can be corrected but not also a wrong decision. It should be well remembered at the cost of repetition that certiorari is not appellate but only supervisory. 64. A writ of certiorari, being a high prerogative writ, is issued by a superior court in respect of the exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial functions by another authority when the contention is that the exercising authority had no jurisdiction or exceeded the jurisdiction. 64. A writ of certiorari, being a high prerogative writ, is issued by a superior court in respect of the exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial functions by another authority when the contention is that the exercising authority had no jurisdiction or exceeded the jurisdiction. It cannot be denied that the tribunals or the authorities concerned in this batch of appeals had the jurisdiction to deal with the matter. However, the argument would be that the tribunals had acted arbitrarily and illegally and that they had failed to give proper findings on the facts and circumstances of the case. We may only say that while adjudicating a writ application for a writ of certiorari, the court is not sitting as a court of appeal against the order of the tribunals to test the legality thereof with a view to reach a different conclusion. If there is any evidence, the court will not examine whether the right conclusion is drawn from it or not. It is a well-established principle of law that a writ of certiorari will not lie where the order or decision of a tribunal or authority is wrong in matter of facts or on merits. (See : R. v. Nat Bell Liquors Ltd.)” 12. Keeping in forefront the aforesaid settled principles, we shall endeavor to answer the submission of learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant that the learned Single Judge has interfered with the findings of fact by assuming to itself the role of appellate authority. 13. The facts which have been revealed from the orders and proceedings and which are beyond dispute are that an allotment order for a parcel of land for industrial purpose was issued in favour of Babu Lal Nagori on 13.02.1987 followed by execution of lease deed on 31.03.1987. Rule 7 of the Allotment Rules of 1959 reads as below: “ 7. Setting up of industry .- (1) Industry other than tourism unit shall be set up within a period of two years from the date of allotment of land: Provided that the allotting authority may, on the application of allottee, extend the period of setting up of industry upto two years. If allottee fails to use of land within such extended period, the allotting authority may on application of allottee refer the matter to the State Government for extension of above period. If allottee fails to use of land within such extended period, the allotting authority may on application of allottee refer the matter to the State Government for extension of above period. The State Government may extend the above period in appropriate cases. (2) If the land is not used within the stipulated period or time extended as per provisions of sub- rule (1), the land shall revert back to the State Government free from all encumbrances.” 14. The aforesaid rule, amongst other things, requires that industries other than tourism unit shall be setup within a period of two years from the date of allotment of land. The proviso appended thereto provides for extension of period for setting up of industry upto two years. The consequences of non-use of land within the stipulated period or time extended have also been provided in the manner that the land shall revert back to the State Government free from all encumbrances. 15. Logical and fair interpretation of the aforesaid provision leads to the conclusion that the person who has been granted lease for setting up of industry other than tourism unit has to setup the industrial unit within a period of two years from the date of allotment of land. The land was allotted on 13.02.1987. Even assuming that the date of execution of lease (31.03.1987) should be taken as the date of commencement for the purpose of application of law, the industry was required to be set up on or before 31.03.1989. 16. The consequences which follow under the law that the land shall revert back to the State Government free from all encumbrances in case of violation of provisions contained in Sub- Rule 1 of Rule 7 of the Allotment Rules of 1959, would not be attracted unless there is specific material brought on record before the competent authority on which reliance is placed and a definite conclusion is arrived at by the competent authority that the industrial unit was not setup within a period of two years. 17. The very foundation of initiation of proceedings and issuance of Show Cause Notice to the appellant was premised on the spot inspection report dated 28.06.2006. The Collector as well as the Revenue Appellate Authority have relied upon this particular documentary evidence to return a finding of fact that the respondent therein failed to establish an industrial unit within a period of two years. The Collector as well as the Revenue Appellate Authority have relied upon this particular documentary evidence to return a finding of fact that the respondent therein failed to establish an industrial unit within a period of two years. It is an admitted fact that Babu Lal Nagori had transferred the land in favour of the appellant vide deed dated 08.11.1996. The spot inspection report which has been considered by the Board of Revenue as well as the Collector and the Revenue Appellate Authority does not contain any stipulation that Babu Lal Nagori failed to establish an industrial unit within a period of two years as mandated under Rule 7 of the Allotment Rules of 1959. The report, on the contrary, states that the unit stands closed since last 10 to 12 years. Moreover, other part of the report is that the unit has been sold and that there is a shed constructed as also machines situated. 18. The contents of the report, as it is, do not lead to a conclusion that no industrial unit was established. The report on facts stated as it is, only shows that the unit was closed somewhere around 1994-1996. Moreover, existence of machines and shed as also construction of boundary wall only lead to an inference that Babu Lal Nagori had established a unit which was sold to the appellant. The Collector as well as Revenue Appellate Authority have not referred to any report that Babu Lal Nagori after grant of lease, failed to establish unit within a period of two years. 19. Application of Rule 7 of the Allotment Rules of 1959 would arise only when the original allottee after allotment of land has failed to establish industrial unit. Rule 7 is not attracted in a case where the original allottee having established an industrial unit within the time stipulated, later on, sells the unit to a third party. The object and purpose of Rule 7 was to ensure that the land which has been sought and allotted for industrial use should be used for that purpose within a reasonable time. The object seeks to ensure that one may not obtain lease of land in the name of setting up of industrial unit and thereafter fail to establish an industrial unit within reasonable time. Allotment of land for industrial purpose is based on a public policy to encourage industrial development. The object seeks to ensure that one may not obtain lease of land in the name of setting up of industrial unit and thereafter fail to establish an industrial unit within reasonable time. Allotment of land for industrial purpose is based on a public policy to encourage industrial development. That purpose would be frustrated if the industrial unit is not set up within a reasonable time. It was on this statutory policy based on public consideration that Rule 7 provided consequences that if the unit is not established within two years, the land shall automatically revert back to the State Government. This statutory consequence would follow only on a concurrent proof and definite finding that the industrial unit was not established by Babu Lal Nagori. In the absence of there being any such material on record, the Collector as well the Revenue Appellate Authority acted in excess of jurisdiction and perversely recorded finding that the land stood reverted to the State Government by operation of provisions contained in Rule 7(2) of the Allotment Rules of 1959. 20. It appears that the provision contained in Rule 7 was applied to the fact situation of the present case that after having purchased the land from Babu Lal Nagori, the appellant was found not running any industrial unit but it was found closed. Even if this factual aspect is taken as it is, in our considered view, Rule 7 would not be attracted. There may be other consequences that the State authorities may proceed to cancel the lease on the ground that the land is not being used for industrial purposes. But the legal consequence which flow per force provision contained in Rule 7(2) of the Allotment Rules of 1959 would not be attracted. 21. In the present case, the factual aspect of the case applied to the provisions of law lead to conclusion that lease would not terminate by operation of provisions contained in Rule 7 of the Allotment Rules of 1959. This legal aspect based on admitted factual backdrop was rightly appreciated by the Board of Revenue. The finding recorded by the Board of Revenue did not suffer from any perversity or apparent violation of law or principles of natural justice, much less defect of jurisdiction. The finding of the Board of Revenue was essentially based on a documentary evidence in the form of spot inspection report dated 28.06.2006. The finding recorded by the Board of Revenue did not suffer from any perversity or apparent violation of law or principles of natural justice, much less defect of jurisdiction. The finding of the Board of Revenue was essentially based on a documentary evidence in the form of spot inspection report dated 28.06.2006. Therefore, in our view, it was outside the scope of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is well settled, as has been adumbrated in the decisions which we have cited hereinabove, the Writ Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would not assume to itself the role of appellate authority. 22. We are therefore of the view that the learned Single Judge was not justified in interfering with the order of Board of Revenue in exercise of Certiorari jurisdiction. 23. But then the other issue which has incidentally cropped up before this Court is whether the transaction between the appellant and Babu Lal Nagori was with the permission of the competent authority as required under Rule 9 of the Allotment Rules of 1959. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant would vehemently submit that this issue was not one of the basis to cancel the lease, therefore, at this stage it cannot be allowed to be raised, we are of the view that this is a pure issue of law without involving enquiry into any disputed questions of fact. Since it goes to the root of the matter and an issue of legality of the transaction is involved, despite this objection, we have considered this aspect. It is not disputed that Babu Lal Nagori was the original allottee and later on, vide lease deed dated 08.11.1996, he transferred the land/unit in favour of the appellant. Admittedly, the land was allotted to Babu Lal Nagori under the provisions of Allotment Rules of 1959 for the purpose of setting up industrial unit. It appears that Babu Lal Nagori after having setup the industrial unit, later on disposed off the same in favour of the appellant. This mandatorily required permission of the authorities as mandated in Rule 9 of the Allotment Rules of 1959 which for ready reference is extracted hereinbelow: “ 9. Lessee debarred from sale of land etc. It appears that Babu Lal Nagori after having setup the industrial unit, later on disposed off the same in favour of the appellant. This mandatorily required permission of the authorities as mandated in Rule 9 of the Allotment Rules of 1959 which for ready reference is extracted hereinbelow: “ 9. Lessee debarred from sale of land etc. – The lessee shall have the limited ownership on the land leased till the lease subsists and shall have the right of assignment only for the purpose of taking a loan for the development of the industry or for pledging as collateral security for a loan taken by the lessee or some other industry owned by the same management. The lessee shall have no right to sell the land: (i) Provided that the land can be pledged as collateral security only in favour of industrial Financial Corporation of India, Rajasthan Finance Corporation, IDBI, ICICI, LIC, IRBI, HDFC, SIDBI, EXIM Bank, Co- operative Banks and any Public Fincancial Institution as defined in the Public Financial Institution Act or Scheduled Banks or private lending agencies subject to ensuring that the lessee has cleared all the outstanding dues of the lessor and the lessee creates first charge in favour of the State Government and second to the financing body or bodies. (ii) Provided further that once the land has been utilized for the purpose for which it was allotted within the period specified in rule 7, the lessee may, with the permission of the Allotting Authority transfer his right or interest in the whole land, so leased out, on the following conditions:- (a) In case of government land allotted under these rules, he shall pay 50% of prevailing market price of land after deducting allotment price charged under rule 3A and the transferee shall pay 50% of excess amount of yearly lease land mentioned in rule 5 and other conditions of lease shall be remain unchanged. (b) In case of converted Khatedari land allotted under these rules for industrial purpose, the transferee shall pay 50% excess amount of yearly lease rent mentioned in rule 5 and other conditions of lease shall be remain unchanged. (b) In case of converted Khatedari land allotted under these rules for industrial purpose, the transferee shall pay 50% excess amount of yearly lease rent mentioned in rule 5 and other conditions of lease shall be remain unchanged. (iia) Provided also that if after grant of permission the transferee has failed to execute the lease deed and further transferred the allotted land without prior permission of allotting authority, such transfer may be regularized by the allotting authority on payment of penalty of Rs. 3000/- for each transfer. The lease deed may be executed in favour of such transferee for the remaining period of lease may be executed in favour of such transferee for the remaining period of lease. The transferee shall pay 50% excess amount of the yearly lease rent mentioned in Rule 5 on such transfer. (iii) ijUrq ;g Hkh fd [kkrsnkjh Hkwfe dh n'kk esa] iV~Vsnkj vkoaVu vf/kdkjh dh vuqKk ls] bl izdkj iV~Vkd`r lEiw.kZ Hkwfe esa vius vf/kdkj ;k fgr dk vUrj.k] iV~Vs dh 'krsZa vifjofrZr jgrs gq,] dj ldsxkA vUrfjrh ,sls vUrj.k ij fu;e 5 esa mfYyf[kr okf"kZd iV~Vk fdjk;s dh 50 % vf/kd jde dk lank; djsxkA (iiia) Provide also that if any industrial plot is divided or sub-divided without obtaining prior permission of the State Government, the lessee shall apply for permission of division or sub-division to the allotting authority along with a copy of the challan depositing an amount of Rs. 3000/. The allotting authority, with prior approval of the State Government, may regularize the division or sub-division. (iv) Provided also that in case an industrial plot is proposed to be divided or sub-divided for any purpose, whatsoever, prior permission of the State Government in Revenue Department shall be obtained by the allotting authority: (v) Provided also that, in case of sick unit as per RBI guidelines, the lessee with the prior permission of the State Government, may transfer his right or interest in the leased land sub-divided under the above proviso on the following conditions:- (a) That NOC from financial Institutions/Bank shall be obtained, in case land is mortgaged. (b) that the conditions of lease shall remain unchanged. (c) that the transfree shall pay additional 100 percent excess amount of the proportionate yearly lease rent applicable from the date of transfer of right or interest in leased land. (d) that the transferee shall use the land for the Industrial purpose only. (b) that the conditions of lease shall remain unchanged. (c) that the transfree shall pay additional 100 percent excess amount of the proportionate yearly lease rent applicable from the date of transfer of right or interest in leased land. (d) that the transferee shall use the land for the Industrial purpose only. (e) that in case of government land allotted under these rules, the transferee shall pay 50% of prevailing market price of land after deducting allotment price charged under rule 3A. (vi) Provided also that no permission of transfer under the above proviso, shall be allowed in case of a Government land unless the unit is declared sick by Board of Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR). (vii) Provided also that in case of any doubt of any kind the allotting authority shall refer the matter to the State Government in the Revenue Department whose decision shall be final. (vii) Provided also that the developer of micro, small and medium enterprises clusters, as per approved plan, may transfer his right or interest in the whole land, so leased out to entrepreneurs. The conditions of lease remaining unchanged. The transferee shall pay 50% excess amount of the yearly lease rent mentioned in Rule 5 on such transfer.” 24. Clause (ii) of Rule 9 provides that once land has been utilized for the purpose for which it was allotted within the period specified in Rule 7, the lessee may, with the permission of the allotting authority, transfer his right or interest in the whole land so leased out on the conditions enumerated therein. 25. Therefore, it is a condition precedent for transfer that permission of competent authority should be obtained. It being a mandatory requirement of law, any transfer of land in violation of provisions of law would be void and incapable of transferring any legally enforceable right on the strength of the lease of transfer. 26. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant has sought to persuade this Court on the submission that even if it is admitted that Babu Lal Nagori, before effecting transfer in favour of the appellant, had not sought permission of the competent authority, there are inbuilt provisions contained in the Allotment Rules of 1959 which permit regularization on certain terms and conditions. 27. 27. Sub-Rule (ii-a) of Rule 9 of the Allotment Rules of 1959 deals with a case where after grant of permission the transferee has failed to execute the lease deed and further transferred the allotted land without prior permission of the allotting authority. This class of transfer may be regularized by the allotting authority on fulfillment of certain conditions. However, this would not be applicable to provide for regularization if there is no permission at all. Rationally construed, this provision provides for regularization because in any case, the authority has granted permission but consequent upon such permission, the transferee fails to execute lease deed and further transfers the land without prior permission. In such a case, there is in fact, a permission to transfer the land but because of certain subsequent defaults, the scheme of regularization has been incorporated in the Rules. This provision will not come to the aid of the appellant because it is not a case where Babu Lal otherwise sought permission for transfer of land but failed to execute the lease deed and then further transferred the allotted land to the appellant. 28. Other provision which has been relied upon to claim regularization is incorporated in Rule 13-A of the Allotment Rules of 1959 which was incorporated vide notification dated 06.05.2002. The aforesaid provision is reproduced hereinbelow for ready reference : “ 13-A Regularisation of Land. - Any Government agricultural land which is used for industrial purpose without proper allotment upto dated 15-07-1994 may be regularised on the payment of prevalent highest market price of land in the neighborhood and with an additional penalty equal to five times of the prevailing market price of land. Provided also that in town or village that are not municipalities and the population whereof does not exceed eight thousand, such penalty shall not exceed the prevailing market price of the land.” The aforesaid provisions is in effect, incorporation of a statutory policy with reference to a cut off date where it is found that any government agricultural land has been found used for industrial purpose without proper allotment. Fixation of cut off date of 15.07.1994 cannot be ignored and has to be given full effect to and meaning as unless it is warranted or barring exceptional cases, addition or deletion of any word or expression in a statute is not permissible, it being a cardinal principle of interpretation of statutes. Fixation of cut off date of 15.07.1994 cannot be ignored and has to be given full effect to and meaning as unless it is warranted or barring exceptional cases, addition or deletion of any word or expression in a statute is not permissible, it being a cardinal principle of interpretation of statutes. Fixation of cut off date to 15.07.1994 is indicative of the object behind such provision. It appears that certain government agricultural lands were being used for industrial purposes without proper allotment. The rule-making authority, in its wisdom, decided to regularize all such uses up to 15.071994. This clearly is a provision for regularization as a one time measure and is not a perennial source of regularization of all industrial activities on government agricultural lands after 15.07.1994. In its very essence, the regularization of those lands which have been used for industrial purposes without allotment could be regularized with cut off date of 15.07.1994. Present is not a case where Babu Lal Nagori was using a government agricultural land for industrial purpose without proper allotment. In fact, he was allotted that land on 13.02.1987 and which remained in his hand until he sold it on 08.11.1996 in favour of the petitioner. Therefore, as on 15.07.1994, the land was in the hands of Babu Lal Nagori. The cut off date means that Rule 13-A of the Allotment Rule of 1959 stood exhausted once regularization of a class of illegal occupants had been undertaken. It does not apply to those transactions which have been made after 15.07.994 much less the transaction of selling the land by Babu Lal Nagori. 29. Therefore, in view of the above consideration, the submission of learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant that it is a case of regularization under the Allotment Rules of 1959 cannot be accepted and is rejected. 30. We have given our anxious consideration to the last submission of learned Senior Counsel for the appellant which perhaps we would not have granted but for the fact that the appellant had entered into a transaction way back in the year 1997 on payment of consideration and claims to be in possession of land since 1997 till date. 30. We have given our anxious consideration to the last submission of learned Senior Counsel for the appellant which perhaps we would not have granted but for the fact that the appellant had entered into a transaction way back in the year 1997 on payment of consideration and claims to be in possession of land since 1997 till date. However, as the transaction is in violation of law and there is no specific provision contained in the Rules permitting regularization of such cases, we find ourselves unable to grant any relief in favour of the appellant. Yet, taking into consideration the long standing possession, we would leave the appellant to approach the competent authority for grant of lease of the land on such terms and conditions as may be considered appropriate by the authority. It will be open for the authority to consider such application and take decision thereon as may be considered appropriate by it, of course, keeping in view that appellant has remained in possession, without enjoying its fruit. 31. In the result, even though we find that the order passed by the learned Single Judge reversing the order of the Board of Revenue was not proper, in view of other considerations which we have bestowed hereinabove, we are unable to grant any relief to the appellant and the appeal is disposed off. The order dated 10.05.2023 passed by the learned Single Judge is, therefore, modified in the manner and to the extent stated hereinabove. 32. All pending applications also stand disposed off.